phasing out SHA1 for digest creation
Bernhard Reiter
bernhard at intevation.de
Thu Dec 5 11:37:44 CET 2024
Hi Werner,
last year in March 2023 you wrote in
https://dev.gnupg.org/T6433
to the question
> > Is there some plan to disable SHA-1 signatures by including this in the
weak algorithms list in close future?
> No, it would break the verification of too many signatures.
Just rereading
https://www.gnupg.org/faq/weak-digest-algos.html
> Although the SHA-1 algorithm shows signs of weaknesses as well,
> it is still very hard and time consuming to create collisions.
> Mounting a pre-image attack is still far out of reach.
Wikipedia has
> As of 2020, chosen-prefix attacks against SHA-1 are practical.[6][8]
[6]
https://www.ntu.edu.sg/news/detail/critical-flaw-demonstrated-in-common-digital-security-algorithm
| [‘chosen-prefix collision attack]
| using a cluster of 900 GPUs running for two months,
| the pair have successfully demonstrated their way to break the SHA-1
| algorithm using this attack
[8] is the same research result, adding costs
| using 900 Nvidia GTX 1060 GPUs (we paid US$ 75k
and machines got faster.
Is the statement of https://www.gnupg.org/faq/weak-digest-algos.html
for 2025 still current? It feels outdated.
This page is not linked from
https://www.gnupg.org/faq/gnupg-faq.html
so maybe it should have been deleted already. I suggest to delete it.
I also suggest to change the default to not create SHA1 message digest
by default anymore, unless and option is given. (And update
https://dev.gnupg.org/T6433)
As for verification, how many signatures would be affected,
do we have any ideas since when no new signatures with SHA1 digests
are created? Maybe adding a depreciation warning is another path?
It has been more than 18th months since March 2023. :)
NIST aims to phase out SHA1 until 2030 (if Wikipedia is right), I think this
means old signatures.
In short, there should be a plan.
Best Regards,
Bernhard
--
https://intevation.de/~bernhard +49 541 33 508 3-3
Intevation GmbH, Osnabrück, DE; Amtsgericht Osnabrück, HRB 18998
Geschäftsführer: Frank Koormann, Bernhard Reiter
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