[gnutls-devel] libtasn1 | Parsing a certificate containing numerous names or name constraints leads to a DoS attack (#52)

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Tim Kosse commented: https://gitlab.com/gnutls/libtasn1/-/issues/52#note_2354661444


I'm sorry if this may be unrelated, but looking at the patches, seeing _asn1_find_up as culprit reminded me of an obscure issue I observed a few times a couple of years ago:
 
There were a handful of Windows systems that, for reasons unknown, have an abnormal CRL in the system trust store that is megabytes in size, to the effect that calling GnuTLS's gnutls_certificate_set_x509_system_trust takes a few minutes to complete. If I remember correctly, _asn1_find_up was in the hot path in a profile I received. The workaround back then was to reset the system trust store to its default contents.

Would anyone of you happen to know if this issue could possibly affect the CRL parsing in GnuTLS as well?

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