[gnutls-devel] libtasn1 | Parsing a certificate containing numerous names or name constraints leads to a DoS attack (#52)

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Andreas Stieger commented: https://gitlab.com/gnutls/libtasn1/-/issues/52#note_2336406135


I believe you could argue for both: `AC:L` because it seems straightforward to generate such a certificate. But also `AC:H` as you would need to get the application to process it. So the adversary would need to control one party (or be MITM), or the client needs to connect to peers based on the adversary input, or the client routinely connects to new peers, some of which turn out present specially crafted certificates. What do you think?

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