[gnutls-devel] GnuTLS | Make XTS key check failure not fatal (!1648)

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Daiki Ueno started a new discussion on lib/nettle/cipher.c: https://gitlab.com/gnutls/gnutls/-/merge_requests/1648#note_1119312731

> -
>  	switch (ctx->cipher->algo) {
> +	case GNUTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_XTS:
> +		if (_gnutls_fips_mode_enabled() &&
> +		    gnutls_memcmp(key, (char *)key + AES128_KEY_SIZE, AES128_KEY_SIZE) == 0)
> +			return gnutls_assert_val(GNUTLS_E_INVALID_REQUEST);
> +		break;
> +	case GNUTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_XTS:
> +		if (_gnutls_fips_mode_enabled() &&
> +		    gnutls_memcmp(key, (char *)key + AES256_KEY_SIZE, AES256_KEY_SIZE) == 0)
> +			return gnutls_assert_val(GNUTLS_E_INVALID_REQUEST);
> +		break;
>  	case GNUTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_GCM:
>  	case GNUTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_GCM:
>  	case GNUTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_GCM:
>  		ctx->rekey_counter = 0;

Hmm, I would only reset this counter after key is successfully set.

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