[gnutls-devel] GnuTLS | Mark HKDF and AES-GCM as approved when used in TLS (!1568)

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Daiki Ueno started a new discussion on lib/constate.c: https://gitlab.com/gnutls/gnutls/-/merge_requests/1568#note_900803317

>  	key.data = state->key;
>  	key.size = state->key_size;
>  
> -	ret = _gnutls_aead_cipher_init(&state->ctx.aead,
> -				       algo, &key);
> -	if (ret < 0)
> +	ret = _gnutls_aead_cipher_init(&state->ctx.aead, algo, &key);
> +	if (ret < 0) {
> +		_gnutls_switch_fips_state(GNUTLS_FIPS140_OP_ERROR);
>  		return gnutls_assert_val(ret);
> +	} else {
> +		_gnutls_switch_fips_state(GNUTLS_FIPS140_OP_APPROVED);

I think we need a check on `algo` (as in `gnutls_cipher_init`); otherwise non-approved algorithms (such as `CAMELLIA-128-GCM`) could be marked as approved.

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