SKS Keyserver Network Under Attack

[Jerry]

On Sun, 30 Jun 2019 08:44:43 -0400, Robert J. Hansen stated:
>> What would have prevented a state level actor from activating this
>> exploit on a wide level during a time when it would have been most
>> effective for them?  
>
>A nation-state with a professional intelligence service probably isn't
>very interested in taking down the keyserver network.  Why should they
>take down something that's not a big priority for them, especially if
>it'll cost them a lot of international goodwill if it gets attributed
>to them?

I seriously doubt that a nation, such as North Korea or China, a nation
that openly runs over its own citizens, would much care what anyone
thought. However, I do agree with your general premise.

>This has all the hallmarks of a child playing with matches and clapping
>with glee as the house catches fire.

While that is probably correct, it could also be attributed to some
intelligence agency trying to test a 'proof of concept' in the real
world in real time. Never-the-less, I think that Ockham's Razor applies
here.

-- 
Jerry
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