SKS and GnuPG related issues and possible workarounds

[Michał Górny]

On Wed, 2019-07-03 at 03:01 -0700, Mirimir via Gnupg-users wrote:
> On 07/02/2019 11:42 PM, Michał Górny wrote:
> > Then, they may decide to start mass poisoning other keys just to 
> > prove this is not the right solution.
> 
> If what I propose is workable, attackers can poison as many keys as they
> like. Until SKS keyservers go down, anyway. Until then, if the system
> catches them quickly enough, they won't do widespread damage. They'll
> inconvenience some people, of course, but that seems unavoidable. And as
> an extra benefit, this would nuke file systems that store data in
> signatures.
> 

I'm afraid you are underestimating those people.  The way I see it,
the number of poisoned OpenPGP keys will grow quick enough to remove all
valid keys from SKS keyservers, and render them practically useless.


-- 
Best regards,
Michał Górny

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