SKS Keyserver Network Under Attack

[Alyssa Ross]

> And yes, hkps://keys.openpgp.org would fall over and die if too many
> users started using it. So cert poisoning will be an issue until there's
> a secure alternative.

Just as a point of interest, I've talked to the people running
keys.openpgp.org about their capacity in #hagrid, when we were exploring
whether to change the default keyserver in Nixpkgs' GnuPG[1] (which we
ended up doing).

The impression I got was that they're very optimistic about their
ability to handle traffic to their server -- they were happy to have a
distro make the switch, and will be changing the defaults in Enigmail
and OpenKeychain very soon, as I understand it.

It is a real shame that a decentralized Hagrid isn't really possible,
though, at least to my understanding. It's quite the limitation for
GnuPG.

[1]: https://github.com/NixOS/nixpkgs/pull/63952
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