Working with an Online and Offline Computer when using GnuPG - Best Practice?
Robert J. Hansen
rjh at sixdemonbag.org
Wed Oct 11 14:04:34 CEST 2017
> Our frames of reference were different: I was actually mostly
> thinking about a duplex system, which if needed could be reduced to
> simplex, in which case it would be the other way around than your
> use-case. I never considered the scenario where the trusted system
> was already compromised and you need to make sure it is completely
> deaf and blind so an attacker can't influence it in real time.
Right. Our assumption was that the web server would be compromised
within moments of bringing up the external-facing network. Permitting
trusted machines to communicate in a *provably* one-way manner with
systems outside the DMZ is an important problem -- not just being able
to do it, but coming up with a way simple enough that non-technical
users can understand.
> The disadvantage for your attacker is lack of economy of scale: an
> attack through internet can be done from your home to anywhere on the
> planet. If you need to be in the vicinity of your target, you lose
> that.
That's why the vote tabulating office is guarded by people with guns. :)
More information about the Gnupg-users
mailing list