From gniibe at fsij.org Thu Oct 1 08:06:06 2015 From: gniibe at fsij.org (NIIBE Yutaka) Date: Thu, 01 Oct 2015 15:06:06 +0900 Subject: Local PAM authentication with OpenPGP Card (was Re: PAM authentication with gpg or ssh key) In-Reply-To: <560BBF65.3060000@digitalbrains.com> References: <560B2A06.3080006@fsij.org> <560BBF65.3060000@digitalbrains.com> Message-ID: <560CCD4E.10606@fsij.org> On 09/30/2015 07:54 PM, Peter Lebbing wrote: > So that's my scenario. I'm just expressing my idea of what would be > cool. If you decide to work on authentication with OpenPGP cards, this > is an idea for one way of using it. Thank you for explanation. I could imagine the use case for OpenPGPcard authentication for local sudo (or remote sudo). I guess that this can be done by pam module for SSH authentication by ssh-agent. If really needed, we could write new pam module doing similar by connecting gpg-agent (instead of socket for ssh). Although I have a bit of experience with Poldi, frankly speaking, I don't quite understand the need for local login authentication with OpenPGPcard. For me, if I do some access control for my own PC, it would be better to consider removing keyboard from a PC, or securing access to the room where I have a PC. Anyway, I do understand now, there are some needs for local login authentication with OpenPGPcard. Thank you, again. -- From peter at digitalbrains.com Thu Oct 1 11:52:19 2015 From: peter at digitalbrains.com (Peter Lebbing) Date: Thu, 01 Oct 2015 11:52:19 +0200 Subject: Local PAM authentication with OpenPGP Card (was Re: PAM authentication with gpg or ssh key) In-Reply-To: <560CCD4E.10606@fsij.org> References: <560B2A06.3080006@fsij.org> <560BBF65.3060000@digitalbrains.com> <560CCD4E.10606@fsij.org> Message-ID: <560D0253.1080400@digitalbrains.com> On 01/10/15 08:06, NIIBE Yutaka wrote: > Although I have a bit of experience with Poldi, frankly speaking, I > don't quite understand the need for local login authentication with > OpenPGPcard. For me, if I do some access control for my own PC, it > would be better to consider removing keyboard from a PC, or securing > access to the room where I have a PC. For me, it's about getting rid of the root password altogether. Authentication as root can only be done with an OpenPGP Card and its PIN. Or by booting the system into single user mode ;). Your comment regarding securing the room is very true: once someone has unfettered access to the machine, it's near impossible to secure. This is not a threat model I consider. Once they have physical access to the machine, I give up. I'm primarily (though not exclusively) talking about machines that normally run headless. But sometimes you can't use SSH with an OpenPGP card to solve a problem, for instance if it's the network that is not working. So you really need to connect a monitor to the system and do a local login. Thank you for your response and giving it thought! Peter. -- I use the GNU Privacy Guard (GnuPG) in combination with Enigmail. You can send me encrypted mail if you want some privacy. My key is available at From bob.henson at galen.org.uk Thu Oct 1 10:33:59 2015 From: bob.henson at galen.org.uk (Bob Henson) Date: Thu, 1 Oct 2015 09:33:59 +0100 Subject: How to get your first key signed In-Reply-To: <560C3EFB.4020405@sixdemonbag.org> References: <20150930131717.145e55b7@ulgy_thing> <560C3EFB.4020405@sixdemonbag.org> Message-ID: <560CEFF7.1040705@galen.org.uk> On 30/09/2015 8:58 pm, Robert J. Hansen wrote: >> I create for myself a gpg key and want to get it signed > > More important than whether your certificate gets signed is who signs > the certificate, who they are connected to, and so on. > > Some people will sign almost anything. People who get a reputation for > signing anything develop a reputation for their signatures being > meaningless. Some people have very strong requirements before they'll > sign. Their signatures are often worth quite a lot of credibility, but > good luck getting them. > > The good news is this *can be done*. I promise. > > The best thing you can do right now is to get involved in the community. > Get engaged in the mailing lists (here, PGP-Basics, Enigmail-Users are > three good ones). And when you post, sign your messages. Over time > people will come to trust that your signature connects to the real you, > even if they can't promise that your name really is David Niklas, or > can't say what you look like. > Whilst that is partially useful, surely it only vouches for the fact that the postings came from the same person and not who that person is - and as such is of very limited use. I have a "newsgroup" key for that purpose - but it is a tad pointless. I think I know the person who calls himself Robert J. Hansen and you have certainly corresponded with someone called Robert H. Henson, but we have no idea who those people are unless we meet. Keys should only ever be signed in person and if the person is not well known to you by sight, with some form of irrefutable photo evidence being presented along with the key signature - a passport, or something carrying equal weight. There might be a possible exception where there is no individual person to meet - the verification signature with software, say. When you have downloaded the software from the same, known website for some time it might be reasonable to sign the verification key - if a tad pointless if it is only really a checksum. Perhaps the same applies to a Certificate Authority key, say. But a signature of any person's key that you have not met and positively verified is worse than useless as it degrades the whole trust process. Someone who I had never previously even heard of once signed my old, now revoked key - were that person someone "known" to be nasty, it would have degraded my key's value. The best it could have been is totally meaningless. Regards, Bob -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: signature.asc Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 538 bytes Desc: OpenPGP digital signature URL: From peter at digitalbrains.com Thu Oct 1 12:35:09 2015 From: peter at digitalbrains.com (Peter Lebbing) Date: Thu, 01 Oct 2015 12:35:09 +0200 Subject: How to get your first key signed In-Reply-To: <560CEFF7.1040705@galen.org.uk> References: <20150930131717.145e55b7@ulgy_thing> <560C3EFB.4020405@sixdemonbag.org> <560CEFF7.1040705@galen.org.uk> Message-ID: <560D0C5D.8020106@digitalbrains.com> On 01/10/15 10:33, Bob Henson wrote: > There might be a possible exception where there is no individual > person to meet - the verification signature with software, say. When > you have downloaded the software from the same, known website for > some time it might be reasonable to sign the verification key - if a > tad pointless if it is only really a checksum. Well, it doesn't help me at all to know that the developer of said software indeed has "David Niklas" on his passport. That gives me no more confidence in the integrity of the software than if he had a different name. All I need to know is that that piece of software that I previously trusted has had an update written by the guy or girl I trust, regardless of his or her name.[1] I don't understand "it's only really a checksum". The key property is that it's signed by the same developer each and every time. A checksum has very different properties, but I might simply misunderstand you. > Someone who I had never previously even heard of once signed my old, > now revoked key - were that person someone "known" to be nasty, it > would have degraded my key's value. No, it should not degrade the key's value. Unfortunately the key's value is in the eye of the beholder, and that eye is often not fully aware of the lack of implications an untrusted signature has. An untrusted signature has precisely one implication: useless baggage. It neither increases nor decreases the value of the key it has signed. One of the people who's key I've signed at a keysigning party gained a signature by Adolph Hitler. Enter Godwin's Law. Anyway, he revoked the key. I can understand that. It just looks bad when someone uses the web interface of a keyserver to look up his key. But it doesn't degrade his key in any way other than what is a misperception. Only trusted keys matter. Untrusted keys can be wholly ignored. Even if they are from the F?hrer. > The best it could have been is totally meaningless. It /is/ totally meaningless. And we should educate users that it is meaningless. HTH, Peter. [1] If some really persistent threat was Man In The Middle all the time I downloaded the software and the key, they could replace the key all that time by their own. Then at some point, when I trust the wrong key, they could still do something nasty with the software. But this is a much higher bar than once MITM'ing and inserting nastiness. -- I use the GNU Privacy Guard (GnuPG) in combination with Enigmail. You can send me encrypted mail if you want some privacy. My key is available at From gniibe at fsij.org Thu Oct 1 13:07:58 2015 From: gniibe at fsij.org (NIIBE Yutaka) Date: Thu, 01 Oct 2015 20:07:58 +0900 Subject: Non-interactive PIN not accepted, gpg hangs In-Reply-To: <560BE589.8000706@elanor.org> References: <560ADFC2.4050000@elanor.org> <560B212E.8080909@fsij.org> <560BA95B.8080408@elanor.org> <560BC556.1070902@digitalbrains.com> <560BCFB3.8070104@elanor.org> <560BD94C.1030602@digitalbrains.com> <560BE589.8000706@elanor.org> Message-ID: <560D140E.8040406@fsij.org> Hello, While the discussion proceeds, I can't determine which post I should reply. Well, I think I reply to this post. On 09/30/2015 10:37 PM, Laurent Blume wrote: > The thing is, I asked around (on some other lists), and had a look at > HSM's, we even have a hundred thousands ? worth of HSM, used for > something completely different. > But that's the thing: those very expensive thingies, they come with an > API and a manual, you ?only? need to develop your application around it. > The NitroKey (and others like it) are both cheaper and easier to deploy > using off-the-shelf software (at least it looks so on paper). > That said, maybe the Pro model is not the right one, and I made a > mistake there out of ignorance. I think that Nitrokey series would be a right solution, both for hardware-wise and their perspective. As Peter suggested, I feel that your use case is not directly related to OpenPGP. It seems that you just need simple (non-interactive) public key authentication. IIUC, I believe that Nitrokey community would be best place for such a use case. I guess that they are open to diverse use cases other than OpenPGP, while I have narrow/tight perspective for my Gnuk Token, specifically limited to OpenPGP. I think that it is not that technically difficult to write an application to access Nitrokey (something) for simple non-interactive public key authentication. If you say you made a mistake, it's just that it has not been directly supported by existing tool of GnuPG and its friends. > My impression is that there are no middle-ground options between the > cheap, personal use device and the super-expensive brick. > If you do have suggestions, they're very welcome. I'm still assessing > feasibility, and able to change directions. OpenPGPcard compatible assumes it's users who control their computing. This can be done by reasonable cost, because there are less conflicts. Most smartcard/token applications assume that it's a company (or other entity) who should control "consumers"' computing. This is a different problem to solve, and some expensive solution is only to be expected, naturally, --- no wonder. -- From bob.henson at galen.org.uk Thu Oct 1 13:08:18 2015 From: bob.henson at galen.org.uk (Bob Henson) Date: Thu, 1 Oct 2015 12:08:18 +0100 Subject: How to get your first key signed In-Reply-To: <560D0C5D.8020106@digitalbrains.com> References: <20150930131717.145e55b7@ulgy_thing> <560C3EFB.4020405@sixdemonbag.org> <560CEFF7.1040705@galen.org.uk> <560D0C5D.8020106@digitalbrains.com> Message-ID: <560D1422.7040407@galen.org.uk> On 01/10/2015 11:35 am, Peter Lebbing wrote: > On 01/10/15 10:33, Bob Henson wrote: >> There might be a possible exception where there is no individual >> person to meet - the verification signature with software, say. When >> you have downloaded the software from the same, known website for >> some time it might be reasonable to sign the verification key - if a >> tad pointless if it is only really a checksum. > > Well, it doesn't help me at all to know that the developer of said > software indeed has "David Niklas" on his passport. That gives me no > more confidence in the integrity of the software than if he had a > different name. All I need to know is that that piece of software that I > previously trusted has had an update written by the guy or girl I trust, > regardless of his or her name.[1] That's what I was implying when I described it as a possible exception. > I don't understand "it's only really a checksum". The key property is > that it's signed by the same developer each and every time. A checksum > has very different properties, but I might simply misunderstand you. If the program has been altered the signature will fail, will it not? > >> Someone who I had never previously even heard of once signed my old, >> now revoked key - were that person someone "known" to be nasty, it >> would have degraded my key's value. > > No, it should not degrade the key's value. Unfortunately the key's value > is in the eye of the beholder, and that eye is often not fully aware of > the lack of implications an untrusted signature has. An untrusted > signature has precisely one implication: useless baggage. It neither > increases nor decreases the value of the key it has signed. > > One of the people who's key I've signed at a keysigning party gained a > signature by Adolph Hitler. Enter Godwin's Law. Anyway, he revoked the > key. I can understand that. It just looks bad when someone uses the web > interface of a keyserver to look up his key. But it doesn't degrade his > key in any way other than what is a misperception. Only trusted keys > matter. Untrusted keys can be wholly ignored. Even if they are from the > F?hrer. > >> The best it could have been is totally meaningless. > > It /is/ totally meaningless. And we should educate users that it is > meaningless. Agreed. But a new user who has yet to be educated would baulk at trusting a key signed by Genghis Khan or Atilla the Hun - however they perceived it, they might well refuse to acknowledge the signature as valid and would certainly not sign it or assign it user trust - that's human nature. Human beings are essentially illogical. :-) From andrewg at andrewg.com Thu Oct 1 13:35:02 2015 From: andrewg at andrewg.com (Andrew Gallagher) Date: Thu, 01 Oct 2015 12:35:02 +0100 Subject: How to get your first key signed In-Reply-To: <560D0C5D.8020106@digitalbrains.com> References: <20150930131717.145e55b7@ulgy_thing> <560C3EFB.4020405@sixdemonbag.org> <560CEFF7.1040705@galen.org.uk> <560D0C5D.8020106@digitalbrains.com> Message-ID: <560D1A66.9040306@andrewg.com> On 01/10/15 11:35, Peter Lebbing wrote: > > Well, it doesn't help me at all to know that the developer of said > software indeed has "David Niklas" on his passport. That gives me no > more confidence in the integrity of the software than if he had a > different name. All I need to know is that that piece of software that I > previously trusted has had an update written by the guy or girl I trust, > regardless of his or her name.[1] Yes, trust in the intent, or competency, of a particular person is completely different to verification of the identity of that person (which is why I think PGP's use of the word "trust" in this context is dangerously misleading). > [1] If some really persistent threat was Man In The Middle all the time > I downloaded the software and the key, they could replace the key all > that time by their own. Then at some point, when I trust the wrong key, > they could still do something nasty with the software. But this is a > much higher bar than once MITM'ing and inserting nastiness. And if you want to create a localsig on that basis, fire away. But publicly certifying someone else's key is a statement of identity verification, not trust. A -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: signature.asc Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 801 bytes Desc: OpenPGP digital signature URL: From peter at digitalbrains.com Thu Oct 1 14:32:37 2015 From: peter at digitalbrains.com (Peter Lebbing) Date: Thu, 01 Oct 2015 14:32:37 +0200 Subject: How to get your first key signed In-Reply-To: <560D1422.7040407@galen.org.uk> References: <20150930131717.145e55b7@ulgy_thing> <560C3EFB.4020405@sixdemonbag.org> <560CEFF7.1040705@galen.org.uk> <560D0C5D.8020106@digitalbrains.com> <560D1422.7040407@galen.org.uk> Message-ID: <560D27E5.2080007@digitalbrains.com> On 01/10/15 13:08, Bob Henson wrote: > If the program has been altered the signature will fail, will it not? Well, first of all, a checksum is not a cryptographic hash. It has different properties: a checksum usually has no collision resistance. Which is why the designers of WEP should have never chosen CRC-32 to protect their data, especially since said data was encrypted with a stream cipher[1]. Anyway, it was not the most important shortcoming of WEP, so it doesn't truly matter ;). And a signature by a key has a lot of extra information that simply putting a hash value on the website where you offer the download does not have. Just a hash value on the website does not tell me who calculated that hash value, and whether there is some MITM between me and the website. Peter. [1] Stream ciphers allow you to flip single bits in the plaintext. And when I flip a bit in a piece of data, I know exactly which bit I need to flip in the CRC-32 checksum to make the checksum correct again. So the CRC-32 was completely useless for protection against malicious bitflips in the plaintext it was supposed to protect. -- I use the GNU Privacy Guard (GnuPG) in combination with Enigmail. You can send me encrypted mail if you want some privacy. My key is available at From laurent at elanor.org Thu Oct 1 15:52:28 2015 From: laurent at elanor.org (Laurent Blume) Date: Thu, 1 Oct 2015 15:52:28 +0200 Subject: Non-interactive PIN not accepted, gpg hangs In-Reply-To: <560D140E.8040406@fsij.org> References: <560ADFC2.4050000@elanor.org> <560B212E.8080909@fsij.org> <560BA95B.8080408@elanor.org> <560BC556.1070902@digitalbrains.com> <560BCFB3.8070104@elanor.org> <560BD94C.1030602@digitalbrains.com> <560BE589.8000706@elanor.org> <560D140E.8040406@fsij.org> Message-ID: <560D3A9C.1080509@elanor.org> Le 2015/10/01 13:07 +0200, Niibe Yutaka a ?crit: > I think that Nitrokey series would be a right solution, both for > hardware-wise and their perspective. So far, looks good, so I'm hopeful :) > As Peter suggested, I feel that your use case is not directly related > to OpenPGP. It seems that you just need simple (non-interactive) > public key authentication. Bit more than that. Well, what's been asked for is the kitchen sink. Apparently the PCI auditor said: ?all private keys must be stored outside the server?. Our main use for keys is straight GPG, for decrypting files, both manually and automatically, but there are others involved, like LUKS, S/MIME (also for files), Apache, ssh... LUKS I've now done, using the GPG key in the Nitrokey and an agent service to decrypt its passphrase non-interactively. My next worry is checking what I can do if we need several private GPG keys. Eg, have a bunch of NitroKeys? > IIUC, I believe that Nitrokey community would be best place for such a > use case. I guess that they are open to diverse use cases other than > OpenPGP, while I have narrow/tight perspective for my Gnuk Token, > specifically limited to OpenPGP. Yes, it's definitely where I'm going tor the for the other non-GPG kinds when I get to them. In all likeliness, once I'm fully satisfied the hardware is up to the task, Nitrokey will be hired for some expertise in ironing the details. At least I'm going to push for that. > I think that it is not that technically difficult to write an > application to access Nitrokey (something) for simple non-interactive > public key authentication. If you say you made a mistake, it's just > that it has not been directly supported by existing tool of GnuPG and > its friends. Technically, not difficult, but anything needing compilation is a huge amount of maintenance and red tape overhead. > OpenPGPcard compatible assumes it's users who control their computing. > This can be done by reasonable cost, because there are less conflicts. > > Most smartcard/token applications assume that it's a company (or other > entity) who should control "consumers"' computing. This is a > different problem to solve, and some expensive solution is only to be > expected, naturally, --- no wonder. Yes, quite. I'll continue pushing for that elusive middle ground :) Laurent From cloehle at linutronix.de Thu Oct 1 16:38:13 2015 From: cloehle at linutronix.de (Christian Loehle) Date: Thu, 01 Oct 2015 16:38:13 +0200 Subject: Seperate Session Key and Encrypted Data Message-ID: <560D4555.2030203@linutronix.de> I want to use gpg to encrypt a potentially large file to some (cloud-like) storage provider, the recipients are not known at the time of uploading. What I want to do is to send the encrypted session key of the file to a recipient, when I 'add' them, without re-uploading or even touching the original (encrypted) file. This should be possible, does anyone know how to? I'm also open to other suggestions. From cloehle at linutronix.de Thu Oct 1 16:52:51 2015 From: cloehle at linutronix.de (Christian Loehle) Date: Thu, 01 Oct 2015 16:52:51 +0200 Subject: AW: Seperate Session Key and Encrypted Data In-Reply-To: <560D485D.9060809@linutronix.de> References: <560D485D.9060809@linutronix.de> Message-ID: <560D48C3.8070206@linutronix.de> That's what I would do if I had no other choice. The real downside is that it doesn't follow a standard(like openpgp) and I will have to write more code on the client side, compared to a standard openpgp solution. It just seems like there is no reason why separating the session key and the data wouldn't be supported, but I couldn't find anything about it. On 10/01/2015 04:47 PM, Heiko Folkerts wrote: > Hi Christina, > why not just use symetric encryption oft he file and encrypt a small file > containing the password you used to encrypt? > Ofcourse this kind of encryption works also with 7zip, TrueCrypt that > support encryption. 7zip hast he advantage that the user don't needs any > decrypting software at all as long as you send them the password on a secure > wa e.g. via phone. > > Heiko > > > Machen Sie mit und teilen Sie Ihr Wissen auf www.besonderetipps.de > > Bitte sch?tzen Sie meine und Ihre privatsph?re und verwenden Sie PGP. > pub 2048R/B5F8D556 2014-08-06 > Schl.-Fingerabdruck = 758D DA37 1DA1 1E2F 7CDD 60A2 F3F4 1E8D B5F8 D556 > uid [ uneing.] Heiko Folkerts > uid [ uneing.] Heiko Folkerts > uid [ uneing.] Heiko Folkerts > sub 4096g/BC0D1006 2015-08-27 [verf?llt: 2016-08-26] > > -----Urspr?ngliche Nachricht----- > Von: Gnupg-users [mailto:gnupg-users-bounces at gnupg.org] Im Auftrag von > Christian Loehle > Gesendet: Donnerstag, 1. Oktober 2015 16:38 > An: gnupg-users at gnupg.org > Betreff: Seperate Session Key and Encrypted Data > > I want to use gpg to encrypt a potentially large file to some > (cloud-like) storage provider, the recipients are not known at the time > of uploading. > What I want to do is to send the encrypted session key of the file to a > recipient, when I 'add' them, without re-uploading or even touching the > original (encrypted) file. > This should be possible, does anyone know how to? I'm also open to other > suggestions. > > > _______________________________________________ > Gnupg-users mailing list > Gnupg-users at gnupg.org > http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users > From mwood at IUPUI.Edu Thu Oct 1 16:18:41 2015 From: mwood at IUPUI.Edu (Mark H. Wood) Date: Thu, 1 Oct 2015 10:18:41 -0400 Subject: How to get your first key signed In-Reply-To: <560CEFF7.1040705@galen.org.uk> References: <20150930131717.145e55b7@ulgy_thing> <560C3EFB.4020405@sixdemonbag.org> <560CEFF7.1040705@galen.org.uk> Message-ID: <20151001141841.GA14545@IUPUI.Edu> On Thu, Oct 01, 2015 at 09:33:59AM +0100, Bob Henson wrote: > On 30/09/2015 8:58 pm, Robert J. Hansen wrote: > >> I create for myself a gpg key and want to get it signed > > > > More important than whether your certificate gets signed is who signs > > the certificate, who they are connected to, and so on. > > > > Some people will sign almost anything. People who get a reputation for > > signing anything develop a reputation for their signatures being > > meaningless. Some people have very strong requirements before they'll > > sign. Their signatures are often worth quite a lot of credibility, but > > good luck getting them. > > > > The good news is this *can be done*. I promise. > > > > The best thing you can do right now is to get involved in the community. > > Get engaged in the mailing lists (here, PGP-Basics, Enigmail-Users are > > three good ones). And when you post, sign your messages. Over time > > people will come to trust that your signature connects to the real you, > > even if they can't promise that your name really is David Niklas, or > > can't say what you look like. > > > > Whilst that is partially useful, surely it only vouches for the fact > that the postings came from the same person and not who that person is - > and as such is of very limited use. I have a "newsgroup" key for that > purpose - but it is a tad pointless. I think I know the person who calls > himself Robert J. Hansen and you have certainly corresponded with > someone called Robert H. Henson, but we have no idea who those people > are unless we meet. Keys should only ever be signed in person and if the > person is not well known to you by sight, with some form of irrefutable > photo evidence being presented along with the key signature - a > passport, or something carrying equal weight. There are two issues here. One is what the O.P. asked: how to get useful signatures which bind a key to a specific physical-world person. Face-to-face meetings, photo ID, etc. are all part of that. But the other is binding a key to a reputation. And that can be done at arms' length, simply by doing stuff in public and signing the stuff with your perhaps-unsigned key. If I've examined, tested, and used stuff bound to key X, and learned to trust it, then when I meet some other stuff bound to key X it is not unreasonable to trust it more readily since, by means of key X, it is bound to stuff that I already trust. > There might be a possible exception where there is no individual person > to meet - the verification signature with software, say. When you have > downloaded the software from the same, known website for some time it > might be reasonable to sign the verification key - if a tad pointless if > it is only really a checksum. Perhaps the same applies to a Certificate > Authority key, say. But a signature of any person's key that you have > not met and positively verified is worse than useless as it degrades the > whole trust process. Someone who I had never previously even heard of > once signed my old, now revoked key - were that person someone "known" > to be nasty, it would have degraded my key's value. The best it could > have been is totally meaningless. To put my point more plainly: signatures on products and signatures on keys mean different things, and to gain trust for them works in different ways. -- Mark H. Wood Lead Technology Analyst University Library Indiana University - Purdue University Indianapolis 755 W. Michigan Street Indianapolis, IN 46202 317-274-0749 www.ulib.iupui.edu -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: signature.asc Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 181 bytes Desc: Digital signature URL: From andrewg at andrewg.com Thu Oct 1 17:44:00 2015 From: andrewg at andrewg.com (Andrew Gallagher) Date: Thu, 01 Oct 2015 16:44:00 +0100 Subject: How to get your first key signed In-Reply-To: <20151001141841.GA14545@IUPUI.Edu> References: <20150930131717.145e55b7@ulgy_thing> <560C3EFB.4020405@sixdemonbag.org> <560CEFF7.1040705@galen.org.uk> <20151001141841.GA14545@IUPUI.Edu> Message-ID: <560D54C0.20905@andrewg.com> On 01/10/15 15:18, Mark H. Wood wrote: > > To put my point more plainly: signatures on products and signatures > on keys mean different things, and to gain trust for them works in > different ways. Another case where common PGP terminology is confusing. You don't really "sign a key", you certify that a particular identity should be bound to a key. This process uses the same algorithm as a signature, but the semantics are different - as evidenced by the fact that [C]ertify and [S]ign are distinct usages. A -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: signature.asc Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 801 bytes Desc: OpenPGP digital signature URL: From wk at gnupg.org Thu Oct 1 17:57:47 2015 From: wk at gnupg.org (Werner Koch) Date: Thu, 01 Oct 2015 17:57:47 +0200 Subject: GnuPG User ID expiry In-Reply-To: <87wpv84lya.fsf@alice.fifthhorseman.net> (Daniel Kahn Gillmor's message of "Tue, 29 Sep 2015 20:37:01 -0700") References: <87wpvfx7j7.fsf@wi.uni-muenster.de> <87wpv84lya.fsf@alice.fifthhorseman.net> Message-ID: <871tdebmys.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> On Wed, 30 Sep 2015 05:37, dkg at fifthhorseman.net said: > In the subprompt GnuPG provides, use "1" (or "2", etc) to select which > user ID you want. then use "expire" to change the expiration for that Well, you can do that but gpg ignores it. The expiration date is taken from the primary user id and the "expire" command only works on that user id. For easier debugging I just checked in a feature to show only self signatures: $ ../g10/gpg2 --edit-key 5DE249965B0358A2 [...] gpg> check selfsig uid Werner Koch sig-3 5DE249965B0358A2 1999-03-15 never [self-signature] [expires: 2005-12-31 17:52:41] sig!3 5DE249965B0358A2 1999-04-19 never [self-signature] [expires: 2005-12-31 17:52:41] sig!3 5DE249965B0358A2 2004-03-21 never [self-signature] [primary] [expires: 2009-07-11 18:07:36] sig!3 5DE249965B0358A2 1999-04-19 never [self-signature] [expires: 2005-12-31 17:52:41] sig!3 5DE249965B0358A2 2005-04-10 never [self-signature] [primary] [expires: 2009-07-11 18:07:36] sig!3 5DE249965B0358A2 2004-03-21 never [self-signature] [primary] [expires: 2009-07-11 18:07:36] sig!3 5DE249965B0358A2 2004-03-21 never [self-signature] [primary] [expires: 2009-07-11 18:07:36] sig!3 5DE249965B0358A2 2005-04-10 never [self-signature] [primary] [expires: 2009-07-11 18:07:36] sig!3 5DE249965B0358A2 2007-08-05 never [self-signature]* [primary] [expires: 2011-07-11 22:00:08] 1 bad signature Which shows that the 2007 selfsig is the used one. The listing also shows the primary flag and the exiration time from each signature and thus shows the history of my key (preference and expiration changes). Salam-Shalom, Werner -- Die Gedanken sind frei. Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz. From daniel.koszta at gmail.com Thu Oct 1 17:08:13 2015 From: daniel.koszta at gmail.com (=?windows-1252?Q?Koszta_D=E1niel?=) Date: Thu, 01 Oct 2015 17:08:13 +0200 Subject: Seperate Session Key and Encrypted Data In-Reply-To: <560D4555.2030203@linutronix.de> References: <560D4555.2030203@linutronix.de> Message-ID: <560D4C5D.5000701@gmail.com> You can use the --show-session-key and --override-session-key option for gpg. $ gpg --encrypt <<< "Test Message" > msg $ gpg --decrypt --show-session-key msg $ gpg --decrypt --override-session-key 'the_session_key_gpg_gave_you' Note that you do not need your private key for the last operation. However, I'm not sure of the security implications of this. From the gpg manual: > We think that Key Escrow is a Bad Thing From anthony at cajuntechie.org Thu Oct 1 17:09:32 2015 From: anthony at cajuntechie.org (Anthony Papillion) Date: Thu, 01 Oct 2015 10:09:32 -0500 Subject: Seperate Session Key and Encrypted Data In-Reply-To: <560D4555.2030203@linutronix.de> References: <560D4555.2030203@linutronix.de> Message-ID: <8c283d60-8492-4fbd-9354-fa74573a2397@email.android.com> I On October 1, 2015 9:38:13 AM CDT, Christian Loehle wrote: >I want to use gpg to encrypt a potentially large file to some >(cloud-like) storage provider, the recipients are not known at the time >of uploading. >What I want to do is to send the encrypted session key of the file to a >recipient, when I 'add' them, without re-uploading or even touching the >original (encrypted) file. >This should be possible, does anyone know how to? I'm also open to >other >suggestions. Is there any reason why you can't just symmetrically encrypt it then send an encrypted message to them with the passphrase using their PGP key? -- Phone: +1.845.666.3312 Skype: CajunTechie SIP/VoIP: 17772471988 at in.callcentric.com PGP Key: 0x53B04B15 Fingerprint: C5CE E687 DDC2 D12B 9063 56EA 028A DF74 53B0 4B15 From jmillican at fb.com Thu Oct 1 17:56:24 2015 From: jmillican at fb.com (Jon Millican) Date: Thu, 1 Oct 2015 15:56:24 +0000 Subject: Facebook and OpenPGP Message-ID: <5250901F-A9E5-406E-B7C3-43A363E0C919@fb.com> On 26 September 2015 at 03:24, Christian Heinrich > wrote: > > So as far as I am aware there is no integration with the Facebook > GraphAPI yet :( Hi, I'm Jon - I work on OpenPGP support at Facebook. I thought you might be interested to hear that we now support fetching public keys via the Graph API. Keys can be fetched from someone's profile "public_key" field, e.g. you could fetch my public key with the query: /1617090031?fields=public_key If you would like to experiment with this, you can try it out with the Graph API Explorer at https://developers.facebook.com/tools/explorer/145634995501895/ (you'll need to be logged in to use the tool). Reference: https://developers.facebook.com/docs/graph-api/reference/user -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: signature.asc Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 842 bytes Desc: Message signed with OpenPGP using GPGMail URL: From rjh at sixdemonbag.org Thu Oct 1 19:05:28 2015 From: rjh at sixdemonbag.org (Robert J. Hansen) Date: Thu, 1 Oct 2015 13:05:28 -0400 Subject: How to get your first key signed In-Reply-To: <560CEFF7.1040705@galen.org.uk> References: <20150930131717.145e55b7@ulgy_thing> <560C3EFB.4020405@sixdemonbag.org> <560CEFF7.1040705@galen.org.uk> Message-ID: <560D67D8.8070203@sixdemonbag.org> > Whilst that is partially useful, surely it only vouches for the fact > that the postings came from the same person and not who that person is - > and as such is of very limited use. Yes. No. Somewhere in between. Some years ago a user on PGP-Basics was irate over how I refused to sign my messages. My argument was basically the one you were using: that nobody on the list had verified my identity and that made my signatures of marginal use. This fellow insisted, and insisted rudely, so John Clizbe, John W. Moore, and I all conspired together to make a point: we created a keypair, shared it amongst us, and all three of us used the exact same certificate to sign our emails. It took a few months for anyone to notice. So sure, yes, without identity verification it's hard to have confidence in someone's legal identity, absolutely. But even with identity verification, most people don't even bother to check to see that the signing certificate's email address matches the one on the email. Identity verification is a useful step: it's not a sufficient one by itself. > purpose - but it is a tad pointless. Pointless in the sense of *legal* identity. But there are many identities other than the legal. One of my favorite books, _Shibumi_, was written by an author named Trevanian. Trevanian was infamously private and withdrawn: there are only a few interviews with him and they were all conducted via letter or email. Trevanian wrote books, had some amazing ideas and insights, and was even responsible for a great Clint Eastwood movie (_The Eiger Sanction_). Trevanian was a real identity, as real as you could hope for. And then there was Rodney William Whitaker, a professor at a small American university who never amounted to very much. Except that, unbeknownst to the world at large, he was Trevanian. So let's imagine, for sake of argument, that Trevanian had an OpenPGP certificate which he used to sign all of his books, plays, and screenplays, so that people could be confident they were reading an authentic Trevanian work. If I just read _The Eiger Sanction_, okay, fine, that signature has little merit for me. But then would come _Shibumi_ and _The Summer of Katya_ and by the time _The Crazyladies of Pearl Street_ came out I could be confident that if I saw Trevanian's signature on an ebook, that ebook would be worth my hard-earned money. Trevanian is an identity every bit as real as Rodney William Whitaker. Trevanian can amass reputation, engage in interviews and communication, opine on things, have fans and foes, the whole nine yards. The only thing Trevanian can't do is get a driver's license, because Trevanian isn't a *legal* identity. > are unless we meet. Keys should only ever be signed in person and if the > person is not well known to you by sight, with some form of irrefutable > photo evidence being presented along with the key signature - a > passport, or something carrying equal weight. No. Absolutely not. This is flat wrong. You don't get to control what somebody else's signing policy is. They get to decide that on their own. Neither you nor I nor anyone else gets a vote in it. We don't get to say what they should or should not do. I have determined what *my own* signing policy is, and yes, it depends on face to face meetings and identity documents. That's because it makes sense for my needs to do this. But other people will have different needs, and I've got no business telling them what their signing policy should be. Neither do you. -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: signature.asc Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 1016 bytes Desc: OpenPGP digital signature URL: From daniel.koszta at gmail.com Thu Oct 1 17:57:36 2015 From: daniel.koszta at gmail.com (Daniel Koszta) Date: Thu, 1 Oct 2015 17:57:36 +0200 Subject: Seperate Session Key and Encrypted Data In-Reply-To: <560D4555.2030203@linutronix.de> References: <560D4555.2030203@linutronix.de> Message-ID: You can use the --show-session-key and --override-session-key option for gpg. $ gpg --encrypt <<< "Test Message" > msg $ gpg --decrypt --show-session-key msg $ gpg --decrypt --override-session-key 'the_session_key_gpg_gave_you' Note that you do not need your private key for the last operation. However, I'm not sure of the security implications of this. From the gpg manual: > We think that Key Escrow is a Bad Thing (Sorry if this message appear twice on the list; I couldn't see the first one either in my inbox or the archives of the mailing list.) 2015-10-01 16:38 GMT+02:00 Christian Loehle : > I want to use gpg to encrypt a potentially large file to some > (cloud-like) storage provider, the recipients are not known at the time > of uploading. > What I want to do is to send the encrypted session key of the file to a > recipient, when I 'add' them, without re-uploading or even touching the > original (encrypted) file. > This should be possible, does anyone know how to? I'm also open to other > suggestions. > > > _______________________________________________ > Gnupg-users mailing list > Gnupg-users at gnupg.org > http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users > -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From melvincarvalho at gmail.com Thu Oct 1 19:14:49 2015 From: melvincarvalho at gmail.com (Melvin Carvalho) Date: Thu, 1 Oct 2015 19:14:49 +0200 Subject: Facebook and OpenPGP In-Reply-To: <5250901F-A9E5-406E-B7C3-43A363E0C919@fb.com> References: <5250901F-A9E5-406E-B7C3-43A363E0C919@fb.com> Message-ID: On 1 October 2015 at 17:56, Jon Millican wrote: > On 26 September 2015 at 03:24, Christian Heinrich < > christian.heinrich at cmlh.id.au> wrote: > > > > So as far as I am aware there is no integration with the Facebook > > GraphAPI yet :( > > Hi, I'm Jon - I work on OpenPGP support at Facebook. I thought you might > be interested to hear that we now support fetching public keys via the > Graph API. > > Keys can be fetched from someone's profile "public_key" field, e.g. you > could fetch my public key with the query: > > /1617090031?fields=public_key > > If you would like to experiment with this, you can try it out with the > Graph API Explorer at > https://developers.facebook.com/tools/explorer/145634995501895/ (you'll > need to be logged in to use the tool). > This is really fantastic! Just out of curiosity would you consider using public / private key to log in to facebook too without a password a good thing. I know facebook would unlikely have a business case to prioritize this as few would use it. But Id be curious to know whether developers would consider it a cool feature ... > > Reference: https://developers.facebook.com/docs/graph-api/reference/user > > _______________________________________________ > Gnupg-users mailing list > Gnupg-users at gnupg.org > http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users > > -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From cloehle at linutronix.de Thu Oct 1 12:26:37 2015 From: cloehle at linutronix.de (Christian Loehle) Date: Thu, 01 Oct 2015 12:26:37 +0200 Subject: Seperate Session Key and Encrypted Data Message-ID: <560D0A5D.90706@linutronix.de> I want to use gpg to encrypt a potentially large file to some (cloud-like) storage provider, the recipients are not known at the time of uploading. What I want to do is to send the encrypted session key of the file to a recipient, when I 'add' them, without reuploading or even touching the original file. This should be possible, does anyone know how to? I'm also open to other suggestions From jonas.hedman at fripost.org Thu Oct 1 20:48:25 2015 From: jonas.hedman at fripost.org (jonas hedman) Date: Thu, 1 Oct 2015 20:48:25 +0200 Subject: How to get your first key signed In-Reply-To: <560D67D8.8070203@sixdemonbag.org> References: <20150930131717.145e55b7@ulgy_thing> <560C3EFB.4020405@sixdemonbag.org> <560CEFF7.1040705@galen.org.uk> <560D67D8.8070203@sixdemonbag.org> Message-ID: <20151001184824.GB7649@bruce> On 15-10-01 13:05:28, Robert J. Hansen wrote: > > Whilst that is partially useful, surely it only vouches for the fact > > that the postings came from the same person and not who that person is - > > and as such is of very limited use. > > Yes. No. Somewhere in between. > > Some years ago a user on PGP-Basics was irate over how I refused to sign > my messages. My argument was basically the one you were using: that > nobody on the list had verified my identity and that made my signatures > of marginal use. This fellow insisted, and insisted rudely, so John > Clizbe, John W. Moore, and I all conspired together to make a point: we > created a keypair, shared it amongst us, and all three of us used the > exact same certificate to sign our emails. > > It took a few months for anyone to notice. > > So sure, yes, without identity verification it's hard to have confidence > in someone's legal identity, absolutely. But even with identity > verification, most people don't even bother to check to see that the > signing certificate's email address matches the one on the email. > Identity verification is a useful step: it's not a sufficient one by itself. Doesn't all decent e-mail clients automagically check if a signature is legit and matches the known public key? /Jonas -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: signature.asc Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 819 bytes Desc: Digital signature URL: From rjh at sixdemonbag.org Thu Oct 1 21:57:36 2015 From: rjh at sixdemonbag.org (Robert J. Hansen) Date: Thu, 1 Oct 2015 15:57:36 -0400 Subject: How to get your first key signed In-Reply-To: <560D7A63.7080105@galen.org.uk> References: <20150930131717.145e55b7@ulgy_thing> <560C3EFB.4020405@sixdemonbag.org> <560CEFF7.1040705@galen.org.uk> <560D67D8.8070203@sixdemonbag.org> <560D7A63.7080105@galen.org.uk> Message-ID: <560D9030.8030903@sixdemonbag.org> (This came just to me, not to the mailing list. I'm assuming Bob intended to reply-all and just hit the wrong button. If I'm in error, Bob, please forgive me.) > What would be no use, and possibly harmful, would be to sign that > certificate just because you had seen it a couple of times - unless > you've met him and certified in person by some means that he is > indeed the owner of that pseudonym you cannot ask other people to > accept your opinion as to who he is or might be by signing his key. This depends on what a certification means. You have a belief that a certification must, _a priori_, be connected to a legal identity. This isn't necessarily true. Imagine there are thousands, millions, of self-styled prophets who announce tomorrow's lottery numbers. They sign each pronouncement. One particular lottery prophet has always been right. Someone then asks you, "So this lottery prophet, 0xBADD00D5F00DBAD, is he for-real?" And you could say, "All I know is, the person who uses that certificate has always been right so far." And that would be a certification, and that would be a perfectly appropriate usage of certification. If other people want to project onto your certification that the prophet's name is Maurice Micklewhite, or whatever -- that's their projection and their folly, not yours. Your certification was accurate and appropriate. > Sorry, I don't believe in gods, ghosts or pseudonyms - none of them > exist. Neither does "Bob Henson". The collection of bits that represent the glyphs that make up "Bob Henson" has no more connection to you than the word "gift" does to a ... well, to something. In German it's poison, in English it's a present. Neither one is right or wrong. What matters is whether we can use a pseudonym to identify a figure, not whether that actually happens to be the person's given name. Look at how many people have read the teachings of Jesus Christ. Are his teachings any different just because his name was actually Isho? Err -- well -- maybe it was Isho. Probably. But it was also probably Yeshua ben Yosef. Christ grew up speaking Aramaic in conversation and Hebrew in the temple. He had two names: in Aramaic he was Isho, in Hebrew he was Yeshua, and after his death accidents of transliteration into Greek turned Yeshua into Iesous, which then turned into Latin as Iesus, and then when Latin invented the J- letter he became Jesus. Look at how many names that guy's had over the years, and during his life *no two groups could agree on his legal name*. Look at William Shakespeare. We've got six of his signatures, and they all have different spellings of his name: * Willm Shakp * William Shaksper * Wm Shakspe * William Shakspere * Willm Shakspere * William Shakespeare ... and these were all recognized as his legal name. (All six signatures are on legal documents.) Names are tremendously fluid instruments. Charles Martel, the hero of France, didn't actually have a last name. "Martel" is an appellation he picked up on the battlefield: it means "hammer". Chuck the Hammer was so named because of how he beat the Moors at the Battle of Poitiers in 732. Within a few years, the "pseudonym" of Martel became his very real last name just by dint of how many Frenchmen would look at you funny if you suggested his name was something *other* than Martel. If you think pseudonyms don't exist, well--there are two possibilities I can see. If you're saying that "all names are really pseudonymous to one degree or another, so it doesn't make sense to call some names true names and some other ones fake", then I agree with you. If you're saying that "only true names exist and I insist on calling Jesus 'Isho', Charles Martel 'Charles', William Shakespeare 'Wm Shakspe', and so on," then I think you're quite wrong. :) I dunno. If any observant Jews want to argue with me that the Tetragrammaton is the original true name and that everything else is pseudonymous, I think that would be a fascinating theological argument we should have off-list. :) > If there is no fairly fixed procedure and standard for signing There have been a large number of well-meaning, well-intentioned people who have wanted there to be one--but there isn't one and never has been. > Why in all the years of use of PGP/GnuPG have the pundits always > advocated and laid down rules for key signing parties and face to > face meetings? Nobody has. They've laid down *guidelines*. "We think this is a pretty good procedure to follow, and here's why. Ultimately, though, it's up to you." Last year I was sitting in the audience at a keysigning event emceed by Samir Nassar. Samir was absolutely fastidious about how he did things, but at the same time, he wasn't walking through the aisles of chairs making sure that everybody was double-checking two forms of government ID. How could he? Crazy to even suggest it. He did what he could, accepted there was a lot he couldn't do, and did his best to keep people informed of the process and why it was the way it was. Couldn't ask for better than that. > If I am obliged (and there you are totally and utterly wrong - I have > no such obligation) to accord everyone the privilege of being totally > careless and random about signing keys It isn't that you're obliged. It's that *you can't stop them*. If you want to be King Canute, well--the ocean's that way. Enjoy the tides. As for me, I have learned the wisdom in accepting that some people will just be foolish and there's nothing I can do to stop them. The best I can do is to keep my wits about me and learn who acts foolishly and who acts wisely. :) From jonas.hedman at fripost.org Thu Oct 1 20:42:55 2015 From: jonas.hedman at fripost.org (jonas hedman) Date: Thu, 1 Oct 2015 20:42:55 +0200 Subject: Facebook and OpenPGP In-Reply-To: References: <5250901F-A9E5-406E-B7C3-43A363E0C919@fb.com> Message-ID: <20151001184255.GA7649@bruce> On 15-10-01 19:14:49, Melvin Carvalho wrote: > On 1 October 2015 at 17:56, Jon Millican wrote: > > > On 26 September 2015 at 03:24, Christian Heinrich < > > christian.heinrich at cmlh.id.au> wrote: > > > > > > So as far as I am aware there is no integration with the Facebook > > > GraphAPI yet :( > > > > Hi, I'm Jon - I work on OpenPGP support at Facebook. I thought you might > > be interested to hear that we now support fetching public keys via the > > Graph API. > > > > Keys can be fetched from someone's profile "public_key" field, e.g. you > > could fetch my public key with the query: > > > > /1617090031?fields=public_key > > > > If you would like to experiment with this, you can try it out with the > > Graph API Explorer at > > https://developers.facebook.com/tools/explorer/145634995501895/ (you'll > > need to be logged in to use the tool). > > > > This is really fantastic! > > Just out of curiosity would you consider using public / private key to log > in to facebook too without a password a good thing. > > I know facebook would unlikely have a business case to prioritize this as > few would use it. But Id be curious to know whether developers would > consider it a cool feature ... I'm not a big user of facebook myself but this would indeed be a pretty cool and great feature! /j -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: signature.asc Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 819 bytes Desc: Digital signature URL: From rjh at sixdemonbag.org Thu Oct 1 22:01:19 2015 From: rjh at sixdemonbag.org (Robert J. Hansen) Date: Thu, 1 Oct 2015 16:01:19 -0400 Subject: How to get your first key signed In-Reply-To: <20151001184824.GB7649@bruce> References: <20150930131717.145e55b7@ulgy_thing> <560C3EFB.4020405@sixdemonbag.org> <560CEFF7.1040705@galen.org.uk> <560D67D8.8070203@sixdemonbag.org> <20151001184824.GB7649@bruce> Message-ID: <560D910F.8070301@sixdemonbag.org> > Doesn't all decent e-mail clients automagically check if a signature is > legit and matches the known public key? Probably not "all", but a lot, yes. The problem comes from you can't force a user to pay attention to a warning. Some years ago a friend of mine, Peter Likarish, invented a browser plugin that would detect phishing sites. When you hit a suspected phishing site it would display a big red banner across the top of the screen. In controlled usability trials (he was a university researcher), not a single person noticed the big red banner across the top of the screen. In exit interviews those who did notice it said they assumed it was a banner ad and they just ignored it. Users have become so accustomed to advertisements trying to attract their attention that it's actually become difficult for apps to warn people of real dangers. This is a real concern in the usability field. It's a hard problem. -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: signature.asc Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 1016 bytes Desc: OpenPGP digital signature URL: From rjh at sixdemonbag.org Thu Oct 1 22:17:06 2015 From: rjh at sixdemonbag.org (Robert J. Hansen) Date: Thu, 1 Oct 2015 16:17:06 -0400 Subject: How to get your first key signed In-Reply-To: <560D9030.8030903@sixdemonbag.org> References: <20150930131717.145e55b7@ulgy_thing> <560C3EFB.4020405@sixdemonbag.org> <560CEFF7.1040705@galen.org.uk> <560D67D8.8070203@sixdemonbag.org> <560D7A63.7080105@galen.org.uk> <560D9030.8030903@sixdemonbag.org> Message-ID: <560D94C2.8010108@sixdemonbag.org> > Names are tremendously fluid instruments. Charles Martel, the hero of > France, didn't actually have a last name... Oh, man -- I completely forgot the great one from modernity. You can be elected President under a pseudonym. Not only that: *it's already happened*. President Ulysses Simpson Grant. His real name was Hiram Ulysses Grant. That's what's on his birth certificate. When he was seventeen he asked Congressman Thomas Hamer to nominate him for West Point (the American Army's military college). Hamer got the name wrong and wrote it down as "Ulysses Simpson Grant". Grant refused to correct Hamer's error, though, as he thought that "U.S. Grant" was a much better set of initials for a military officer than "HUG". So if a pseudonym's good enough to get elected President of the United States... is it a pseudonym at all? Would you refuse to sign Ulysses S. Grant's certificate on the grounds that "well, that isn't your *real* name"? From melvincarvalho at gmail.com Thu Oct 1 22:28:26 2015 From: melvincarvalho at gmail.com (Melvin Carvalho) Date: Thu, 1 Oct 2015 22:28:26 +0200 Subject: Facebook and OpenPGP In-Reply-To: <5250901F-A9E5-406E-B7C3-43A363E0C919@fb.com> References: <5250901F-A9E5-406E-B7C3-43A363E0C919@fb.com> Message-ID: On 1 October 2015 at 17:56, Jon Millican wrote: > On 26 September 2015 at 03:24, Christian Heinrich < > christian.heinrich at cmlh.id.au> wrote: > > > > So as far as I am aware there is no integration with the Facebook > > GraphAPI yet :( > > Hi, I'm Jon - I work on OpenPGP support at Facebook. I thought you might > be interested to hear that we now support fetching public keys via the > Graph API. > > Keys can be fetched from someone's profile "public_key" field, e.g. you > could fetch my public key with the query: > > /1617090031?fields=public_key > > If you would like to experiment with this, you can try it out with the > Graph API Explorer at > https://developers.facebook.com/tools/explorer/145634995501895/ (you'll > need to be logged in to use the tool). > > Reference: https://developers.facebook.com/docs/graph-api/reference/user > Quick question: I just uploaded my key and the dropdown said "public" ... does this mean I can get at it without an access token? That would be super cool! > > _______________________________________________ > Gnupg-users mailing list > Gnupg-users at gnupg.org > http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users > > -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From kristian.fiskerstrand at sumptuouscapital.com Thu Oct 1 22:33:46 2015 From: kristian.fiskerstrand at sumptuouscapital.com (Kristian Fiskerstrand) Date: Thu, 1 Oct 2015 22:33:46 +0200 Subject: Facebook and OpenPGP In-Reply-To: References: <5250901F-A9E5-406E-B7C3-43A363E0C919@fb.com> <560D9801.3080704@sumptuouscapital.com> Message-ID: <560D98AA.8020302@sumptuouscapital.com> On 10/01/2015 10:35 PM, Melvin Carvalho wrote: > >> Quick question: I just uploaded my key and the dropdown said >> "public" ... does this mean I can get at it without an access >> token? That would be super cool! > > > > I was actually looking into the same thing myself by trying > something as simplistic as curl queries for the API :) Another > thing that strikes me, but granted I haven't done much research, is > that the key can't be requested by username, only by user id. So if > anyone were to want to using it as a keyserver / CA of sorts to > establish identity for a user profile they believe to be genuine, > they couldn't do so from outside of FB. > > >> It works! I found how: > >> curl https://www.facebook.com/melvo/publickey/download/ > Thats great, thanks! :) -- ---------------------------- Kristian Fiskerstrand Blog: http://blog.sumptuouscapital.com Twitter: @krifisk ---------------------------- Public OpenPGP key 0xE3EDFAE3 at hkp://pool.sks-keyservers.net fpr:94CB AFDD 3034 5109 5618 35AA 0B7F 8B60 E3ED FAE3 ---------------------------- "Knowing is not enough; we must apply. Willing is not enough; we must do." (Johann Wolfgang von Goethe) -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: signature.asc Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 455 bytes Desc: OpenPGP digital signature URL: From melvincarvalho at gmail.com Thu Oct 1 22:35:02 2015 From: melvincarvalho at gmail.com (Melvin Carvalho) Date: Thu, 1 Oct 2015 22:35:02 +0200 Subject: Facebook and OpenPGP In-Reply-To: <560D9801.3080704@sumptuouscapital.com> References: <5250901F-A9E5-406E-B7C3-43A363E0C919@fb.com> <560D9801.3080704@sumptuouscapital.com> Message-ID: On 1 October 2015 at 22:30, Kristian Fiskerstrand < kristian.fiskerstrand at sumptuouscapital.com> wrote: > -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- > Hash: SHA512 > > On 10/01/2015 10:28 PM, Melvin Carvalho wrote: > > > > > > ... > > > > > Reference: > > https://developers.facebook.com/docs/graph-api/reference/user > > > > > > Quick question: I just uploaded my key and the dropdown said > > "public" ... does this mean I can get at it without an access > > token? That would be super cool! > > > > > > I was actually looking into the same thing myself by trying something > as simplistic as curl queries for the API :) Another thing that > strikes me, but granted I haven't done much research, is that the key > can't be requested by username, only by user id. So if anyone were to > want to using it as a keyserver / CA of sorts to establish identity > for a user profile they believe to be genuine, they couldn't do so > from outside of FB. > It works! I found how: curl https://www.facebook.com/melvo/publickey/download/ -----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- Version: GnuPG v1.4.11 (GNU/Linux) mQENBE3ZoEcBCADXmHWK/QhE82aPiOco5zWzTpRwbbzcerhYMUArsEOohQin18Tr Ri2v2Rfm0wWPWVl8VHOfgwu/+f9ddAyQasSA7+PhydCo5X3oGph6f9DBtotLTKHk NK7AfE9DzQSKhuCF0o9ps+l8hE067bdJwnNjnwq/7z1YKf6FZ3s0NkcBEy5EWbla zDNHBPgMTePg558hrPKCxAHnPn5Xf7vBlakRMuIVxBEZG648Z+0cPRKTSpqFE7vo qvxuAkcBoVlbhIwf5bX2rJOJHjOePRgdSLOleuhitQCWpAVw3eez+p8UmnL1vH1d wgCZzSYBXiD389xhG2byx4SZfZk7mJnHr9JfABEBAAG0Kk1lbHZpbiBDYXJ2YWxo byA8bWVsdmluY2FydmFsaG9AZ21haWwuY29tPokBOAQTAQIAIgUCTdmgRwIbAwYL CQgHAwIGFQgCCQoLBBYCAwECHgECF4AACgkQEU73vJRgRYPfBwf+O2uf1fKenDQh qnrlMGC2n2XU/JRX5dhiRtKYkoYi8dFELMFJg/ng2FOc7DalQw/PGIaXIiuxg23r K3Eq6hCzx+cYiSTKjnqD/QkhYAfjdD8PsIatGwu+/OF53NXA6hjveOHyo5c/Lq51 Jh7cZRd5AJko8Kk3toCqZKJhfbZ9+e49HsIj0i0qrtyD/7hR9UYl2wEJQ91H6fZg 7DvfrlA9aywAx6cvo0p9BBvX4hLMd9dPfL35UjVq4xJUBsgpf9By70Yw6SRgPGyz 9vyM6Ka0lXm65BvIsalgvhkR72E5Zi7M+lfO0HgZa2DgeObEi7yx2NfwGrJkIYyD 33Xw5xh017kBDQRN2aBHAQgArxEdGGZCNPAPjLf0bdi6rILv2seRiggU6f7SC8+G hAFjPnBAUV+ccC/1NIUr10HHOWDKWLqdBqLk7rJoDdjFGeoS18auISgk+h3kTsSY dMi/o3TmHFmVPX6dMjSL2rac7GrNKL70Dg8gZ3ku7VmaueoG+H592sYxc32cr+MM MFRFP5sai2hClug4qCgnt2pFtcvmlT2yk5YXNpgnjXHjUcEzn6FwonKcjISezTE8 I1RYltFef/7R40rF/h+6JQSO2eOdMtlKv3cfdxd08CpynMjtN3YTGW709hwW3/J/ lGenSTDF8OLEIhvm4sELUCpCaL6WTf7xdQNWkShPgX2HOwARAQABiQEfBBgBAgAJ BQJN2aBHAhsMAAoJEBFO97yUYEWD2E0H/idszAlTu5WhjSjYZL79qNwWuA0qjJtf 4Bm5BOYEItGAhNt8vpweGw+KRvn3+KdfvYXe49fShY3TFvgTjloR6yKY1SKvYbUu TojGAI798vh68dLoBJGWHfh0fmcSYE0O6SaBiBWRHnszBfsOTSiF3FKE3NxKsC6u zXYBuT8sgFn8RLILRiWeBZZXkzq4CYjNNnuxWqv9tW0NkRvjwQUR32L3o7sEYHiE UDi6nCOUeG3rXfpzITHB+TvIGCG7ZPjkyfqRGxb9c6Je3pm76UtGOkLCYJwoeD38 aWWdvQyNlhT4sq5U9KDZifaQ0gVsW+PKuU8TCXECJ0SJVPaKAwauhfw= =QoVU -----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- curl -I https://www.facebook.com/melvo/publickey/download/ HTTP/1.1 200 OK Content-Disposition: attachment; filename="melvo.asc" X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff Content-Type: application/pgp-keys First class work! > > - -- > - ---------------------------- > Kristian Fiskerstrand > Blog: http://blog.sumptuouscapital.com > Twitter: @krifisk > - ---------------------------- > Public OpenPGP key 0xE3EDFAE3 at hkp://pool.sks-keyservers.net > fpr:94CB AFDD 3034 5109 5618 35AA 0B7F 8B60 E3ED FAE3 > - ---------------------------- > Aut disce aut discede > Either learn or leave > -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- > > iQEcBAEBCgAGBQJWDZf9AAoJECULev7WN52FFpsH/jbC5TZCvJxQSZVmNt6ENQal > k0GWRjzQ5wuwju3QxKr8fCSSK6HV6jzn9Jd3WGY6BmxaIlQPJPz1YmP/IbDp+lsk > WR6LQUDp5boje6vFprK6nM87wQU6qEPpw56rDJN6IBhYRHCQYbM7IPOYYXltLTa5 > OuuP4KxBhWVJz3Yytq8u1ZHY+RTuO0S3Oy/jz6lFQ9/OFOUvovub9FkFqTwHtOyy > ndkEb26g8e2A1yt13c0Eu8gufWeG3H+AkZiN6+yb34XOFcemrP3SpWkNWLUKeiqj > OoKRfJMR4XKEdUaJmdP0ZjuN2HBc9xsnYoln561wM+qwJsmPZFvUZH4G5H+vbUc= > =yw8Q > -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- > -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From kristian.fiskerstrand at sumptuouscapital.com Thu Oct 1 22:30:57 2015 From: kristian.fiskerstrand at sumptuouscapital.com (Kristian Fiskerstrand) Date: Thu, 1 Oct 2015 22:30:57 +0200 Subject: Facebook and OpenPGP In-Reply-To: References: <5250901F-A9E5-406E-B7C3-43A363E0C919@fb.com> Message-ID: <560D9801.3080704@sumptuouscapital.com> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA512 On 10/01/2015 10:28 PM, Melvin Carvalho wrote: > > ... > > Reference: > https://developers.facebook.com/docs/graph-api/reference/user > > > Quick question: I just uploaded my key and the dropdown said > "public" ... does this mean I can get at it without an access > token? That would be super cool! > > I was actually looking into the same thing myself by trying something as simplistic as curl queries for the API :) Another thing that strikes me, but granted I haven't done much research, is that the key can't be requested by username, only by user id. So if anyone were to want to using it as a keyserver / CA of sorts to establish identity for a user profile they believe to be genuine, they couldn't do so from outside of FB. - -- - ---------------------------- Kristian Fiskerstrand Blog: http://blog.sumptuouscapital.com Twitter: @krifisk - ---------------------------- Public OpenPGP key 0xE3EDFAE3 at hkp://pool.sks-keyservers.net fpr:94CB AFDD 3034 5109 5618 35AA 0B7F 8B60 E3ED FAE3 - ---------------------------- Aut disce aut discede Either learn or leave -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- iQEcBAEBCgAGBQJWDZf9AAoJECULev7WN52FFpsH/jbC5TZCvJxQSZVmNt6ENQal k0GWRjzQ5wuwju3QxKr8fCSSK6HV6jzn9Jd3WGY6BmxaIlQPJPz1YmP/IbDp+lsk WR6LQUDp5boje6vFprK6nM87wQU6qEPpw56rDJN6IBhYRHCQYbM7IPOYYXltLTa5 OuuP4KxBhWVJz3Yytq8u1ZHY+RTuO0S3Oy/jz6lFQ9/OFOUvovub9FkFqTwHtOyy ndkEb26g8e2A1yt13c0Eu8gufWeG3H+AkZiN6+yb34XOFcemrP3SpWkNWLUKeiqj OoKRfJMR4XKEdUaJmdP0ZjuN2HBc9xsnYoln561wM+qwJsmPZFvUZH4G5H+vbUc= =yw8Q -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From beckus at beckus.eu Thu Oct 1 23:16:53 2015 From: beckus at beckus.eu (Christopher Beck) Date: Thu, 1 Oct 2015 23:16:53 +0200 Subject: How to get your first key signed In-Reply-To: <20150930131717.145e55b7@ulgy_thing> References: <20150930131717.145e55b7@ulgy_thing> Message-ID: <560DA2C5.5020202@beckus.eu> On 09/30/15 19:17, David Niklas wrote: > Hello, > I create for myself a gpg key and want to get it signed, however I've > sent out half a dozen requests and so far I've gotten only negative > responses to the effect that I must know so-and-so and we must met in > person (considering that the person responds at all). > Now, I'm a student (think penny less), and live in a rural area 100mi > from the nearest LUG and people out here are _very_ computer illiterate > to the point where educated people think that turning a computer off > will damage it, or that the computer loses power (1GHz becomes .2GHZ), > as it grows older. So no one has a key, at all. And they would not want > to help create a web of trust even if I asked and explained it to them. > They just don't believe in security around here (Oh, that would never > happen to me! There are laws against that! You are a security freak.) > > I want to develop FOSS and feel obligated to get a key to protect uses > of the software I'm modifying from MITM attacks. > > Thanks, David > > > _______________________________________________ > Gnupg-users mailing list > Gnupg-users at gnupg.org > http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users Hi David, I know that problem. But I did the following: I used "The Harvester" [1] and did a search on the domain of my university on public key servers and found out many people here, who use GPG. I just started e-mailing some of them and met them to cross sign the keys. So my suggestion is, look up the mail-addresses of a university when you are (for some reasons) in that city. Okay, this requires you to travel, but you can try that if you are in some other city for some reason. I am active member of a local association and there are some people using GPG, too. So to make it more comfortable to others, we created an extra key, stored it on a smart-card and use this key to sing our keys. This is uploaded on out website and people who trust out SSL-CA (cacert.org) could think of trusting this key in addition to it's own WoT. We also put up our finger-prints to the contact fields of our members (from those, who have GPG). Additionally, you could add your GPG-finger-print to every presentation you'll hold at university. This might also help. [1]: https://code.google.com/p/theharvester/ [2]: -- I use GnuPG (GPG) for E-Mail encryption and signing. If you want some privacy, my public key ID is 2F9D4F14. The file "singature.asc" this message includes contains a cryptographic signature which enables you to verify this E-Mail really was written by me. Christopher Beck, DL1CHB Gerhart-Hauptmann-Str. 1 91058 Erlangen Tel.: 09131 / 9245437 Fax.: 09131 / 8148708 Jabber: beckus at jabber.org -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: signature.asc Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 473 bytes Desc: OpenPGP digital signature URL: From christian.heinrich at cmlh.id.au Fri Oct 2 01:58:40 2015 From: christian.heinrich at cmlh.id.au (Christian Heinrich) Date: Fri, 2 Oct 2015 09:58:40 +1000 Subject: Facebook and OpenPGP In-Reply-To: <5250901F-A9E5-406E-B7C3-43A363E0C919@fb.com> References: <5250901F-A9E5-406E-B7C3-43A363E0C919@fb.com> Message-ID: Jon, On Fri, Oct 2, 2015 at 1:56 AM, Jon Millican wrote: > On 26 September 2015 at 03:24, Christian Heinrich > wrote: > Keys can be fetched from someone's profile "public_key" field, e.g. you > could fetch my public key with the query: > > /1617090031?fields=public_key How will this be integrated with https://developers.facebook.com/docs/apps/upgrading#upgrading_v2_0_user_ids or should the username be subsitituted instead e.g. https://www.facebook.com/cmlh.id.au/publickey/download ? Is lookup by e-mail address, similar to https://sks-keyservers.net/pks/lookup?op=vindex&search=christian.heinrich%40cmlh.id.au, on your roadmap too? -- Regards, Christian Heinrich http://cmlh.id.au/contact From dkg at fifthhorseman.net Thu Oct 1 19:29:14 2015 From: dkg at fifthhorseman.net (Daniel Kahn Gillmor) Date: Thu, 01 Oct 2015 10:29:14 -0700 Subject: AW: Seperate Session Key and Encrypted Data In-Reply-To: <560D48C3.8070206@linutronix.de> References: <560D485D.9060809@linutronix.de> <560D48C3.8070206@linutronix.de> Message-ID: <87lhbm33bp.fsf@alice.fifthhorseman.net> On Thu 2015-10-01 07:52:51 -0700, Christian Loehle wrote: > That's what I would do if I had no other choice. The real downside is > that it doesn't follow a standard(like openpgp) and I will have to write > more code on the client side, compared to a standard openpgp solution. > It just seems like there is no reason why separating the session key and > the data wouldn't be supported, but I couldn't find anything about it. The OpenPGP standard leaves this sort of approach open. GnuPG facilitates some part of it, but not everything. First, take a look at --show-session-key and --override-session-key -- this makes it possible to extract a session key from an existing PKESK or SKESK packet, and to use a known session key to decrypt a packet. You should be able to use the gpgsplit tool to take a stream of packets and split it into individual files. You can use /bin/cat to collect a set of individual files and reassemble them into an OpenPGP packet stream. So the only functionality GnuPG is missing to assemble the workflow you're describing would be a new GnuPG command named something like --generate-pkesk-with-session-key. If that command was available, the full workflow described by the original poster would be something you could probably cobble together with a couple shell scripts. Note: this is *not* something i'd want people to do as part of the normal user interface of GnuPG. This is a feature that would be useful for GnuPG as an OpenPGP programming toolkit. The fact that GnuPG is widely used as both a user-facing tool and as a programming toolkit is one of the things that makes it less convenient for both use cases :( --dkg From guanx.bac at gmail.com Fri Oct 2 06:51:52 2015 From: guanx.bac at gmail.com (Guan Xin) Date: Fri, 2 Oct 2015 06:51:52 +0200 Subject: How to get your first key signed In-Reply-To: <560D67D8.8070203@sixdemonbag.org> References: <20150930131717.145e55b7@ulgy_thing> <560C3EFB.4020405@sixdemonbag.org> <560CEFF7.1040705@galen.org.uk> <560D67D8.8070203@sixdemonbag.org> Message-ID: On Thu, Oct 1, 2015 at 7:05 PM, Robert J. Hansen wrote: > > Some years ago a user on PGP-Basics was irate over how I refused to sign > my messages. My argument was basically the one you were using: that > nobody on the list had verified my identity and that made my signatures > of marginal use. This fellow insisted, and insisted rudely, so John > Clizbe, John W. Moore, and I all conspired together to make a point: we > created a keypair, shared it amongst us, and all three of us used the > exact same certificate to sign our emails. > > It took a few months for anyone to notice. So you three will share the same reputation on the mailing list. If at least one of you commit crimes with your signed messages, you will share the same legal liability unless proved not guilty by other means, e.g. your private key was stolen or was derived from your public key by the others, and etc.. I don't think that's a problem because it doesn't cause any confusion neither online nor offline. > So sure, yes, without identity verification it's hard to have confidence > in someone's legal identity, absolutely. But even with identity > verification, most people don't even bother to check to see that the > signing certificate's email address matches the one on the email. It's sad to hear that anyone takes it seriously to check that a certificate's email address matches the originating mail address. This really messes things up in the sense that it causes additional inconvenience with little benefit. I sign my files with exactly the same key no matter if they were sent from my private email, business email, with IM tools, via http or fax. In the last three cases there is no originating email address to check. Of course I can use different keys, but what's the point? More keys, more smart cards, more easily lost or forgotten, more difficult to recognize by eye from their fingerprints ... Guan From anthony at cajuntechie.org Fri Oct 2 07:01:25 2015 From: anthony at cajuntechie.org (Anthony Papillion) Date: Fri, 2 Oct 2015 00:01:25 -0500 Subject: How to get your first key signed In-Reply-To: References: <20150930131717.145e55b7@ulgy_thing> <560C3EFB.4020405@sixdemonbag.org> <560CEFF7.1040705@galen.org.uk> <560D67D8.8070203@sixdemonbag.org> Message-ID: <560E0FA5.4080200@cajuntechie.org> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA256 On 10/1/2015 11:51 PM, Guan Xin wrote: > On Thu, Oct 1, 2015 at 7:05 PM, Robert J. Hansen wrote: >> So sure, yes, without identity verification it's hard to have confidence >> in someone's legal identity, absolutely. But even with identity >> verification, most people don't even bother to check to see that >> the signing certificate's email address matches the one on the >> email. > > It's sad to hear that anyone takes it seriously to check that a > certificate's email address matches the originating mail address. > This really messes things up in the sense that it causes additional > inconvenience with little benefit. Sorry to just jump in here but I've been following the conversation and this caught my eye. While checking the email address associated with a key might not /always/ be useful (like in the case of IM, fax, etc), it /can/ help provide 'evidence' that a key might have been compromised. If I receive an email from an email address that is different from that on the key, the very first thing I would do is email the key holder at their known address and ask what's up. It could very well be a case where the key has been compromised but the email address hasn't and the key holder doesn't know. Anthony - -- Phone: +1.845.666.1114 Skype: CajunTechie SIP/VoIP: 17772471988 at in.callcentric.com PGP Key: 0x53B04B15 Fingerprint: C5CE E687 DDC2 D12B 9063 56EA 028A DF74 53B0 4B15 -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- iQIcBAEBCAAGBQJWDg+lAAoJEAKK33RTsEsVyd8QALMR+iKmKl9bKK1oib+pi9qa s5H+q9wohsj51bPU89VakTvc7vQQFssO1HdnATk3vSDpfUX0NQCyDhZd8Qw6Wijd LCjRoyuY3SKvoWUww4iklHofVzGrATUU4EHyz9u6m6X1V9bsNPLiwbnZPr+vp/08 Xte8YmZs0z9yRJl2aclySutQa7oLbiHD8iuU++4Kj2q5g8fy/Hi6Kz1A3/j1zXLd S5TxIWzYqlbt/4IpIdJmcgP0WwKkINwzBW0yAx9+JWflJ57B81oWdXYXN2QRMraZ JKQgD0KVjHt1HuD2k3gTZKAdqPU22LI3rAk9yQu1AgAYmAFdGx1MpjLxvhkBnQBk +uEhmCNh0x/g7RM9GKjPYTKkEI2VLlsw3MfTE44RJJyH5NexJZkqV0/7JAF5EWI+ QX7PsPOKQZb0CpK2zWvvFFKmLS46Val54O+2iBw5pmh64733/htEhXoHILHhE18+ CSfa+mWMZkxcZvehZkZAf1jKveKPy1sl2nfu9C804tufCN8QRt2/YgxTJJhVUwSk rsIXPy80PS/DilPt4exp9cZ6loytzPd43BVPalSmP8UvyP5CFH8zgw/wKoqwiVyu 4oeZwH1lFdsM/b2R0TBZ2a/jkVDpgEFBthCCA2s6EniCmcjr2og1tdT8E91uU84d 2cSDFlQ3W2Y6KtnOVNEm =oVTg -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From wk at gnupg.org Fri Oct 2 08:39:07 2015 From: wk at gnupg.org (Werner Koch) Date: Fri, 02 Oct 2015 08:39:07 +0200 Subject: AW: Seperate Session Key and Encrypted Data In-Reply-To: <87lhbm33bp.fsf@alice.fifthhorseman.net> (Daniel Kahn Gillmor's message of "Thu, 01 Oct 2015 10:29:14 -0700") References: <560D485D.9060809@linutronix.de> <560D48C3.8070206@linutronix.de> <87lhbm33bp.fsf@alice.fifthhorseman.net> Message-ID: <87r3ldai5w.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> On Thu, 1 Oct 2015 19:29, dkg at fifthhorseman.net said: > So the only functionality GnuPG is missing to assemble the workflow > you're describing would be a new GnuPG command named something like > --generate-pkesk-with-session-key. If that command was available, the A more generalized version would indeed be useful. For example to add a symmetrical key for archiving mails or to allow decryption with a new subkey. Salam-Shalom, Werner -- Die Gedanken sind frei. Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz. From cloehle at linutronix.de Fri Oct 2 10:10:16 2015 From: cloehle at linutronix.de (Christian Loehle) Date: Fri, 02 Oct 2015 10:10:16 +0200 Subject: AW: Seperate Session Key and Encrypted Data In-Reply-To: <87lhbm33bp.fsf@alice.fifthhorseman.net> References: <560D485D.9060809@linutronix.de> <560D48C3.8070206@linutronix.de> <87lhbm33bp.fsf@alice.fifthhorseman.net> Message-ID: <560E3BE8.3000302@linutronix.de> Thanks for your reply(and all the others of course). Personally I'm going to use non-pgp AES probably, although I'm not quite content with that. As I said, this seems like a feature that would make sense, I might work on it myself if I find the time. -- Christian Loehle On 10/01/2015 07:29 PM, Daniel Kahn Gillmor wrote: > On Thu 2015-10-01 07:52:51 -0700, Christian Loehle wrote: >> That's what I would do if I had no other choice. The real downside is >> that it doesn't follow a standard(like openpgp) and I will have to write >> more code on the client side, compared to a standard openpgp solution. >> It just seems like there is no reason why separating the session key and >> the data wouldn't be supported, but I couldn't find anything about it. > The OpenPGP standard leaves this sort of approach open. GnuPG > facilitates some part of it, but not everything. > > First, take a look at --show-session-key and --override-session-key -- > this makes it possible to extract a session key from an existing PKESK > or SKESK packet, and to use a known session key to decrypt a packet. > > You should be able to use the gpgsplit tool to take a stream of packets > and split it into individual files. You can use /bin/cat to collect a > set of individual files and reassemble them into an OpenPGP packet > stream. > > So the only functionality GnuPG is missing to assemble the workflow > you're describing would be a new GnuPG command named something like > --generate-pkesk-with-session-key. If that command was available, the > full workflow described by the original poster would be something you > could probably cobble together with a couple shell scripts. > > Note: this is *not* something i'd want people to do as part of the > normal user interface of GnuPG. This is a feature that would be useful > for GnuPG as an OpenPGP programming toolkit. The fact that GnuPG is > widely used as both a user-facing tool and as a programming toolkit is > one of the things that makes it less convenient for both use cases :( > > --dkg From guanx.bac at gmail.com Fri Oct 2 11:50:22 2015 From: guanx.bac at gmail.com (Guan Xin) Date: Fri, 2 Oct 2015 11:50:22 +0200 Subject: How to get your first key signed In-Reply-To: <560E0FA5.4080200@cajuntechie.org> References: <20150930131717.145e55b7@ulgy_thing> <560C3EFB.4020405@sixdemonbag.org> <560CEFF7.1040705@galen.org.uk> <560D67D8.8070203@sixdemonbag.org> <560E0FA5.4080200@cajuntechie.org> Message-ID: On Fri, Oct 2, 2015 at 7:01 AM, Anthony Papillion wrote: > > Sorry to just jump in here but I've been following the conversation > and this caught my eye. While checking the email address associated > with a key might not /always/ be useful (like in the case of IM, fax, > etc), it /can/ help provide 'evidence' that a key might have been > compromised. If I receive an email from an email address that is > different from that on the key, the very first thing I would do is > email the key holder at their known address and ask what's up. It > could very well be a case where the key has been compromised but the > email address hasn't and the key holder doesn't know. While the key is used to certify the email / IM name / website, etc. and not the other way round, it is certainly helpful to check both. So you are right. However, note that an email inbox can be hijacked as well as a regular mailbox. ... After some thoughts, I found that for all the contact methods (various email addresses, IMs, websites) where I use my key, I had identified myself by person to my frequent contacts before. So the signatures really mean that "this email / IM account has not been compromised", and not that "this key is probably compromised". Guan From lechten at wi.uni-muenster.de Fri Oct 2 11:06:20 2015 From: lechten at wi.uni-muenster.de (Jens Lechtenboerger) Date: Fri, 02 Oct 2015 11:06:20 +0200 Subject: GnuPG User ID expiry In-Reply-To: <87wpv84lya.fsf@alice.fifthhorseman.net> (Daniel Kahn Gillmor's message of "Tue, 29 Sep 2015 20:37:01 -0700") References: <87wpvfx7j7.fsf@wi.uni-muenster.de> <87wpv84lya.fsf@alice.fifthhorseman.net> Message-ID: <87wpv5tzar.fsf@wi.uni-muenster.de> Hi Daniel! On 2015-09-29, Daniel Kahn Gillmor wrote: > On Fri 2015-09-25 00:49:48 -0700, Jens Lechtenboerger wrote: > >> I tried to generate test keys with expired user IDs (under faked >> system time), but I failed, with gpg 1.4 as well as 2.1.8. > > with 2.1.8, i get an expiration prompt for the user ID if i use: > > gpg2 --full-gen-key I get an expiration prompt for the key but not the user ID. I tried different key sizes and keys with as well as without expiration date. > However, i agree with you that it seems like the following command ought > to generate an expired key: > > gpg2 --faked-system-time 20100101T000000 --default-cert-expire 1y --quick-gen-key 'Test Key ' > > But in my tests, it does not. This seems like a bug in the > implementation of --default-cert-expire. Maybe someone? should file it > at https://bugs.gnupg.org/ :) Someone just did that. Thanks Jens From faramir.cl at gmail.com Sat Oct 3 00:10:57 2015 From: faramir.cl at gmail.com (Faramir) Date: Fri, 2 Oct 2015 19:10:57 -0300 Subject: Seperate Session Key and Encrypted Data In-Reply-To: <560D0A5D.90706@linutronix.de> References: <560D0A5D.90706@linutronix.de> Message-ID: <560F00F1.1030902@gmail.com> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA256 El 01-10-2015 a las 7:26, Christian Loehle escribi?: > I want to use gpg to encrypt a potentially large file to some > (cloud-like) storage provider, the recipients are not known at the > time of uploading. What I want to do is to send the encrypted > session key of the file to a recipient, when I 'add' them, without > reuploading or even touching the original file. This should be > possible, does anyone know how to? I'm also open to other > suggestions It seems to me it would be easier to use symmetrical encryption. I always do it using a GUI, but I found these instructions to do it. I guess gpg will ask for the password: gpg --symmetric filename yields filename.gpg gpg --symmetric -a filename yields filename.asc Decryption is performed using the usual "-d" switch: gpg -d filename - --- Otherwise, you would have to encrypt the file to your own key, and then extract the session key. I've never done that, but I found these directions: gpg --show-session-key [file_name] To decrypt: gpg --override-session-key [session key] [file_name] - --- I hope it works, I wrote those directions "just in case", but never tried them, so I may have made mistakes. Best Regards -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v2 Comment: Using GnuPG with Thunderbird - http://www.enigmail.net/ iQEcBAEBCAAGBQJWDwDxAAoJEMV4f6PvczxA98gH/ja+hCm3OVqrgOPvUfklOLV3 X0jfOPm86CPRvnzzwyCC+Sd2IXdER5arZmtWHInqTJwYwh1qSP5vY12yldfPfutr O+VIgvOcqwQmbKSLSCZt0IYCp8p/4Wf390paQa79BhW00gIuhl+xpR6qmlGWhqLd +ckf+tMZdpaLxmS0CjaDCghHXX2PTGMty0M9iu443s4JOThCHnOox7xmeau/X+wE 0BFwKJNChxeYEEMy9VMwO4JR2GG5M+I0vwurJza0J2i+61n+ubwJL9hw9VuCoXTJ SQDrhoHJ7iCb4X5gBkqDhFZKC9t0dLdijzPjaOWyynp30ZN4l8mLo35QzJ2WqCQ= =Vm/n -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From faramir.cl at gmail.com Sat Oct 3 01:10:38 2015 From: faramir.cl at gmail.com (Faramir) Date: Fri, 2 Oct 2015 20:10:38 -0300 Subject: How to get your first key signed In-Reply-To: <560CEFF7.1040705@galen.org.uk> References: <20150930131717.145e55b7@ulgy_thing> <560C3EFB.4020405@sixdemonbag.org> <560CEFF7.1040705@galen.org.uk> Message-ID: <560F0EEE.8040001@gmail.com> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA256 El 01-10-2015 a las 5:33, Bob Henson escribi?: ... > Authority key, say. But a signature of any person's key that you > have not met and positively verified is worse than useless as it > degrades the whole trust process. Someone who I had never > previously even heard of once signed my old, now revoked key - were > that person someone "known" to be nasty, it would have degraded my > key's value. The best it could have been is totally meaningless. I think it is a mistake to consider a signature can degrade a key's value. After all, we CAN'T prevent people from signing our keys, unless we try to keep them off the keyservers. But keys tend to end in keyservers (probably they feel lonely and want to gather with their peers). And bogus signatures from bogus keys don't weaken the WoT, since a bogus key is not signed, so the signatures are meaningless. Of course these signatures increase the public key size, but you can distribute a clean copy of your key to your peers. Best Regards -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v2 Comment: Using GnuPG with Thunderbird - http://www.enigmail.net/ iQEcBAEBCAAGBQJWDw7uAAoJEMV4f6PvczxA39cIAKXhYP5iN+LFP3Fhj+n+b55S 4KXY6D0P0JV4DZYa6kN4duAn9jigM87xOrL4NiCbK+42wg4FkgZioIDxLJzV2C1L 8LQGxNWPfSgO0kbGQKyzsMkcsnc3HMLyiE5MnRH3jiq5arb+gQfO57YaMNRl6JdS ENpVM7GtxMoloFHZ9dJdhhv8IEqxHnoW3WkvbRZMfgiedj7YKcLDqADgqJ94fzMc HF280jXWKLbZHZhbp2XdopknzEGZqc02EZ4RBeAHse/jYPShyUfX3mJ/37jriVon sbZpzLHzxbMlzGVT8+zBzB34ei8ftb0dYaxk5FM7P4MNwycf5y5qaLDiGpT3PFI= =nKXX -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From faramir.cl at gmail.com Sat Oct 3 01:14:29 2015 From: faramir.cl at gmail.com (Faramir) Date: Fri, 2 Oct 2015 20:14:29 -0300 Subject: How to get your first key signed In-Reply-To: <560D1422.7040407@galen.org.uk> References: <20150930131717.145e55b7@ulgy_thing> <560C3EFB.4020405@sixdemonbag.org> <560CEFF7.1040705@galen.org.uk> <560D0C5D.8020106@digitalbrains.com> <560D1422.7040407@galen.org.uk> Message-ID: <560F0FD5.8040800@gmail.com> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA256 El 01-10-2015 a las 8:08, Bob Henson escribi?: ... >> It /is/ totally meaningless. And we should educate users that it >> is meaningless. > > Agreed. But a new user who has yet to be educated would baulk at > trusting a key signed by Genghis Khan or Atilla the Hun - however > they perceived it, they might well refuse to acknowledge the > signature as valid and would certainly not sign it or assign it > user trust - that's human nature. Human beings are essentially > illogical. :-) Indeed. But at first sight, the signature would come from "unknown key", not from Atilla the Hun ;) Best Regards -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v2 Comment: Using GnuPG with Thunderbird - http://www.enigmail.net/ iQEcBAEBCAAGBQJWDw/VAAoJEMV4f6PvczxA4gIH/0qXi/VlMYUZ4EynPKpqRN6M mOJchGkbd6hgrCrWhoFXHJpfoosmrWfn6s6Jpazv1B0h/uXV3w8wTzv5o+Rnrvez h/jP3tJHN4hI0AdeD/ghumZP2/TM5M3D39Juxg++btFOMZGowXXISaJK0o76yoXw MtXTywhyVpXma/3tyt2KGaFUf73Q2M8VzUPQpZkDOvN36tJl8bK3Jdid3D1gktwm nshRe2RUgtuGxECoEegTJraCdbOqi4QyoL0Pqxl4tvUUuB++mR0p9uxMrbQ1wPEU aAAMjfEBr7UQ0sRhjNcERNG7uNK1XJHeX9AXio+AADz71ikytu1P5018M680cII= =KEvr -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From faramir.cl at gmail.com Sat Oct 3 00:55:28 2015 From: faramir.cl at gmail.com (Faramir) Date: Fri, 2 Oct 2015 19:55:28 -0300 Subject: How to get your first key signed In-Reply-To: <20150930131717.145e55b7@ulgy_thing> References: <20150930131717.145e55b7@ulgy_thing> Message-ID: <560F0B60.7060603@gmail.com> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA256 El 30-09-2015 a las 14:17, David Niklas escribi?: > Hello, Hello, > Now, I'm a student (think penny less), and live in a rural area > 100mi from the nearest LUG and people out here are _very_ computer > illiterate Well, I live in the capital city of my country, I studied IT related stuff, and yet... most signatures on my key are not from people I've met in person. You'll see, most people I've met in person don't know what an OpenPGP key is, and the few that know, can't care less about them. ... > They just don't believe in security around here (Oh, that would > never happen to me! There are laws against that! You are a > security freak.) I know that feeling. > I want to develop FOSS and feel obligated to get a key to protect > uses of the software I'm modifying from MITM attacks. Well, you don't really need your key signed for that... at least, not the key with your name on it. You can make a key using the name "mysoftwarename distribution key", and use it to sign the files. Once people start using the software, they may sign the key. They don't know who is behind the key, but they will know it is the same key that has been using since day 1. Best Regards -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v2 Comment: Using GnuPG with Thunderbird - http://www.enigmail.net/ iQEcBAEBCAAGBQJWDwtfAAoJEMV4f6PvczxAQNwH/3KJh71XeuE9up7WJ8xldYAR 7lwR7PcpGxDfUTavDc+BFaAnAYEt2l2Iqt7zgMsSApzKBKCBimOKvgpEIzn13FS5 FABoGrnTmoUZEptX1bB5yqzZloB6p625HntCzJXQhDC7wm67m9H/RvAtNtcaT5xk WxQRyY/rKLLTFppTNbJ8V4lO2M1W7tsHLpFyuQL48Jy/1enMCRne1IWfrUEOdJIx AzAnMPcIENmIec2fq9uK33H+YvJLxKU1WHcxkKDK825aTT69ZAtCrBjPpv+rFLob TzI7D+mfGq7rTba68wZkshFgQdAzbFK2FJJhI4riHLe0txifno3fvEKjDrlyvL4= =88BB -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From joshterrill.dev at gmail.com Sat Oct 3 10:48:47 2015 From: joshterrill.dev at gmail.com (Joshua Terrill) Date: Sat, 3 Oct 2015 01:48:47 -0700 Subject: Having some issues installing from source Message-ID: I'm having a hell of a time trying to compile and install gnupg from the source code on an ubuntu machine. I've posted a thread on AskUbuntu here http://askubuntu.com/questions/681041/trying-to-compile-gnupg-from-source if someone would be willing to lend a hand. Thanks, Josh -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From 2014-667rhzu3dc-lists-groups at riseup.net Sat Oct 3 13:11:16 2015 From: 2014-667rhzu3dc-lists-groups at riseup.net (MFPA) Date: Sat, 3 Oct 2015 12:11:16 +0100 Subject: Seperate Session Key and Encrypted Data In-Reply-To: <560D4C5D.5000701@gmail.com> References: <560D4555.2030203@linutronix.de> <560D4C5D.5000701@gmail.com> Message-ID: <1247318939.20151003121116@my_localhost> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA512 On Thursday 1 October 2015 at 4:08:13 PM, in , Koszta D?niel wrote: > However, I'm not sure of the security implications of > this. From the gpg manual: >> We think that Key Escrow is a Bad Thing The security implication of sharing the session key is a positive one: it can only compromise the one message. By contrast, divulging a private key would compromise all messages encrypted to that key, as well as allowing the party to whom the private key was divulged to make signatures with it. - -- Best regards MFPA My mind works like lightning... one brilliant flash and it's gone -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- iQF8BAEBCgBmBQJWD7foXxSAAAAAAC4AKGlzc3Vlci1mcHJAbm90YXRpb25zLm9w ZW5wZ3AuZmlmdGhob3JzZW1hbi5uZXRCM0FFN0VDQTlBOEM4QjMwMjZBNUEwRjU2 QjdDNzRDRUIzMUYyNUYwAAoJEGt8dM6zHyXw57oH/2ZojVdVudqJoVDeXgBx6qUd hehJRPK9MG8/0HowMT3YrlWowmVQmTpZy5GHmIRGDPhFTJCoc1qNPr/CDPLu+NNi +LNBrhaw2T9MCYlFyDpVjuX4kovYgoIAoZUhC1/B6jeno+6+fXP+hY5DjqCn1Tph oisSF5qnzgbWMpHaa1PPstqXPi3riFJt0TPV/4tp7bCDRpZrKhUc7QTW5twD8Lnz AaXJ/axQcsIkVI/QKdP9Uo7fHImE798m7BRUS7RIxrndMWWqIYDnAp8MPqbRZ2Zk koZXKa0Ul6C8DHbMacUATSH7qiJ0u5DB1XRAGUT1NLVi3O0DivXuXRjpKbCbSNeI vgQBFgoAZgUCVg+3+18UgAAAAAAuAChpc3N1ZXItZnByQG5vdGF0aW9ucy5vcGVu cGdwLmZpZnRoaG9yc2VtYW4ubmV0MzNBQ0VENEVFOTEzNEVFQkRFNkE4NTA2MTcx MkJDNDYxQUY3NzhFNAAKCRAXErxGGvd45AO/AP9YUE+RBOv1fkU8NTWxyGlLOF6U P8EM8RMmOeCngEc2ZQEAjOVuTJpHBaysHzGIbiox5UaFQcMQJQILl3lR0TOqgw8= =qhK/ -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From 2014-667rhzu3dc-lists-groups at riseup.net Sat Oct 3 13:33:54 2015 From: 2014-667rhzu3dc-lists-groups at riseup.net (MFPA) Date: Sat, 3 Oct 2015 12:33:54 +0100 Subject: How to get your first key signed In-Reply-To: References: <20150930131717.145e55b7@ulgy_thing> <560C3EFB.4020405@sixdemonbag.org> <560CEFF7.1040705@galen.org.uk> <560D67D8.8070203@sixdemonbag.org> Message-ID: <32883019.20151003123354@my_localhost> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA512 On Friday 2 October 2015 at 5:51:52 AM, in , Guan Xin wrote: > So you three will share the same reputation on the > mailing list. No, their reputations and posting histories did not become merged. > If at least one of you commit crimes with > your signed messages, you will share the same legal > liability unless proved not guilty by other means, What happened to being innocent until proven guilty? - -- Best regards MFPA Did you hear? They took the word gullible out of the dictionary -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- iQF8BAEBCgBmBQJWD70rXxSAAAAAAC4AKGlzc3Vlci1mcHJAbm90YXRpb25zLm9w ZW5wZ3AuZmlmdGhob3JzZW1hbi5uZXRCM0FFN0VDQTlBOEM4QjMwMjZBNUEwRjU2 QjdDNzRDRUIzMUYyNUYwAAoJEGt8dM6zHyXwey4H/3nCzzj/c6vI8zVUGhnI9wKf DnW6IaEglDvHQbqXFW/swQKqhL6FqfnQ+/ulC/qQLG5LRiIU6XYgJsYe1IUr1seY Aq8O9Wfj5uI5ijlReZ4uQyLAmGrsMr2cshpnbeR8K8Nf1pcVrAvJLNDcbCmx5mYY 5XLXrU2rV/YpSP5d1oFVPvH9Q/UupVKZGjSduOfnixS+TvKSCefGLvAToAhFfGkp YrgBKaEO6Jo7npouNicPEY7WQbsP6EAa328timRJVJtmQN0eI31W3r0LL7UljgUA z1mJF7VH17xj4QV2VO8chcmsl0W1pRfj6Kh5goWNyNYWinjVJ1lnFXqi57yyY7GI vgQBFgoAZgUCVg+9M18UgAAAAAAuAChpc3N1ZXItZnByQG5vdGF0aW9ucy5vcGVu cGdwLmZpZnRoaG9yc2VtYW4ubmV0MzNBQ0VENEVFOTEzNEVFQkRFNkE4NTA2MTcx MkJDNDYxQUY3NzhFNAAKCRAXErxGGvd45O/6AP9BbhVFPcI7VdsEvM/Gej7fs6lw AqDOqqlm84OzEinB+AEAj0Rm1XJGoIjfgyeIwZ/Jj8fwAnZ7WLomZsEnVFvBmw8= =YrR0 -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From guanx.bac at gmail.com Sat Oct 3 14:04:55 2015 From: guanx.bac at gmail.com (Guan Xin) Date: Sat, 3 Oct 2015 14:04:55 +0200 Subject: How to get your first key signed In-Reply-To: <32883019.20151003123354@my_localhost> References: <20150930131717.145e55b7@ulgy_thing> <560C3EFB.4020405@sixdemonbag.org> <560CEFF7.1040705@galen.org.uk> <560D67D8.8070203@sixdemonbag.org> <32883019.20151003123354@my_localhost> Message-ID: On Sat, Oct 3, 2015 at 1:33 PM, MFPA <2014-667rhzu3dc-lists-groups at riseup.net> wrote: > >> So you three will share the same reputation on the >> mailing list. > > No, their reputations and posting histories did not become merged. The word "will" does not infer history. You know by reputation I meant personal reputation, not the arabic numbers or green boxes shown on the webpage, don't you? >> If at least one of you commit crimes with >> your signed messages, you will share the same legal >> liability unless proved not guilty by other means, > > What happened to being innocent until proven guilty? What happened to being guilty once proven guilty until proven innocent? Your key is the proof. If you all believe digital signature can't prove anything, why do you use it at all? Guan From mac3iii at gmail.com Sat Oct 3 17:10:40 2015 From: mac3iii at gmail.com (Murphy) Date: Sat, 3 Oct 2015 11:10:40 -0400 Subject: Having some issues installing from source In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <560FEFF0.8020101@gmail.com> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA256 > I'm having a hell of a time trying to compile and install gnupg > from the source code on an ubuntu machine. I've posted a thread on > AskUbuntu here > http://askubuntu.com/questions/681041/trying-to-compile-gnupg-from-sou rce >if > someone would be willing to lend a hand. Joshua - If you are willing to give GnuPG modern (2.1.X) a go the included Speedo method makes the compile process easy. Here is the entry I also posted on AskUbuntu: 1. sudo apt-get update 2. sudo apt-get install libldap2-dev gtk+-2 libbz2-dev 3. after unpacking the latest gnupg-2.1.X tarball and cd to the new folder, run the command: 4. sudo make -f build-aux/speedo.mk native INSTALL_PREFIX=/usr/local sudo ldconfig 5. download the latest pinentry-0.9.5, run ./configure && make && sudo make install. 6. test it out: gpg2 --version I noticed your build attempt was on gnupg-2.0.X which unfortunately does not have the speedo method included (that I could find) but if you want to have the newest features including elliptic curve crypto then 2.1 is the best! Good Luck. -Murphy -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v2 iJwEAQEIAAYFAlYP7+gACgkQUVKxkWZz2Q190QP/Xxz0BOwT1pHZ2W8V0dlAuppK n5sthl5efk3NzMgpzTKyAYsiWNV0TPfsM8vmbdt2L6hXsJ0i4Ctu0pKVbSrsLfk1 tAfN5W/IZHlq1CuiXpeT3iNEq/ZQ68MNnXiP7FK1GntjUKOep6nJkiMBaU2BrQX+ 61xhK23ze7VklEZzEm4= =oztG -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From dkg at fifthhorseman.net Sat Oct 3 18:30:18 2015 From: dkg at fifthhorseman.net (Daniel Kahn Gillmor) Date: Sat, 03 Oct 2015 12:30:18 -0400 Subject: AW: Seperate Session Key and Encrypted Data In-Reply-To: <560E3BE8.3000302@linutronix.de> References: <560D485D.9060809@linutronix.de> <560D48C3.8070206@linutronix.de> <87lhbm33bp.fsf@alice.fifthhorseman.net> <560E3BE8.3000302@linutronix.de> Message-ID: <871tdb6hk5.fsf@alice.fifthhorseman.net> On Fri 2015-10-02 04:10:16 -0400, Christian Loehle wrote: > Thanks for your reply(and all the others of course). Personally I'm > going to use non-pgp AES probably, although I'm not quite content with > that. AES is a cipher for a single block. For files larger than the block size, you'll need to use it in some sensible mode like AES-GCM. All modes of course require a high-entropy key and some of them require a well-chosen nonce or IV (initialization vector). Please use caution in making these decisions! --dkg From dkg at fifthhorseman.net Sat Oct 3 18:16:23 2015 From: dkg at fifthhorseman.net (Daniel Kahn Gillmor) Date: Sat, 03 Oct 2015 12:16:23 -0400 Subject: AW: Seperate Session Key and Encrypted Data In-Reply-To: <87r3ldai5w.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> References: <560D485D.9060809@linutronix.de> <560D48C3.8070206@linutronix.de> <87lhbm33bp.fsf@alice.fifthhorseman.net> <87r3ldai5w.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> Message-ID: <874mi853mw.fsf@alice.fifthhorseman.net> On Fri 2015-10-02 02:39:07 -0400, Werner Koch wrote: > On Thu, 1 Oct 2015 19:29, dkg at fifthhorseman.net said: > >> So the only functionality GnuPG is missing to assemble the workflow >> you're describing would be a new GnuPG command named something like >> --generate-pkesk-with-session-key. If that command was available, the > > A more generalized version would indeed be useful. For example to add a > symmetrical key for archiving mails or to allow decryption with a new > subkey. Do you mean "more generalized" than generate-pkesk-with-session-key? Do you have a spec for what you want this command to be? Can we open a ticket about the feature to keep track of the objective? --dkg From wk at gnupg.org Sat Oct 3 18:52:26 2015 From: wk at gnupg.org (Werner Koch) Date: Sat, 03 Oct 2015 18:52:26 +0200 Subject: AW: Seperate Session Key and Encrypted Data In-Reply-To: <874mi853mw.fsf@alice.fifthhorseman.net> (Daniel Kahn Gillmor's message of "Sat, 03 Oct 2015 12:16:23 -0400") References: <560D485D.9060809@linutronix.de> <560D48C3.8070206@linutronix.de> <87lhbm33bp.fsf@alice.fifthhorseman.net> <87r3ldai5w.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> <874mi853mw.fsf@alice.fifthhorseman.net> Message-ID: <878u7j7v3p.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> On Sat, 3 Oct 2015 18:16, dkg at fifthhorseman.net said: > Do you mean "more generalized" than generate-pkesk-with-session-key? Do > you have a spec for what you want this command to be? Can we open a - Add new PKESK packets to an encrypted message - Add new SKESK packets to an encrypted message - Delete selected PKESK and SKESK packets (to allow forwarding a long message without revealing the original recipients). - Add a new signature to a signed or signed+encrypted message. - Delete a signature for a signed or signed+encrypted message. Salam-Shalom, Werner -- Die Gedanken sind frei. Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz. From peter at digitalbrains.com Sat Oct 3 19:40:22 2015 From: peter at digitalbrains.com (Peter Lebbing) Date: Sat, 03 Oct 2015 19:40:22 +0200 Subject: How to get your first key signed In-Reply-To: References: <20150930131717.145e55b7@ulgy_thing> <560C3EFB.4020405@sixdemonbag.org> <560CEFF7.1040705@galen.org.uk> <560D67D8.8070203@sixdemonbag.org> <32883019.20151003123354@my_localhost> Message-ID: <56101306.1070204@digitalbrains.com> On 03/10/15 14:04, Guan Xin wrote: > What happened to being guilty once proven guilty until > proven innocent? > Your key is the proof. Please stop trolling. Peter. -- I use the GNU Privacy Guard (GnuPG) in combination with Enigmail. You can send me encrypted mail if you want some privacy. My key is available at From guanx.bac at gmail.com Sat Oct 3 19:44:00 2015 From: guanx.bac at gmail.com (Guan Xin) Date: Sat, 3 Oct 2015 19:44:00 +0200 Subject: How to get your first key signed In-Reply-To: <56101306.1070204@digitalbrains.com> References: <20150930131717.145e55b7@ulgy_thing> <560C3EFB.4020405@sixdemonbag.org> <560CEFF7.1040705@galen.org.uk> <560D67D8.8070203@sixdemonbag.org> <32883019.20151003123354@my_localhost> <56101306.1070204@digitalbrains.com> Message-ID: On Sat, Oct 3, 2015 at 7:40 PM, Peter Lebbing wrote: > On 03/10/15 14:04, Guan Xin wrote: >> What happened to being guilty once proven guilty until >> proven innocent? >> Your key is the proof. > > Please stop trolling. > > Peter. YOU who insist that digital signatures are no proof and worth nothing please STOP TROLLING. IF YOU THINK DIGITAL SIGNATURES ARE NOTHING THEN PLEASE KEEP AWAY FROM THIS MAILING LIST. Guan From guanx.bac at gmail.com Sat Oct 3 19:46:49 2015 From: guanx.bac at gmail.com (Guan Xin) Date: Sat, 3 Oct 2015 19:46:49 +0200 Subject: How to get your first key signed In-Reply-To: <56101306.1070204@digitalbrains.com> References: <20150930131717.145e55b7@ulgy_thing> <560C3EFB.4020405@sixdemonbag.org> <560CEFF7.1040705@galen.org.uk> <560D67D8.8070203@sixdemonbag.org> <32883019.20151003123354@my_localhost> <56101306.1070204@digitalbrains.com> Message-ID: On Sat, Oct 3, 2015 at 7:40 PM, Peter Lebbing wrote: > On 03/10/15 14:04, Guan Xin wrote: >> What happened to being guilty once proven guilty until >> proven innocent? >> Your key is the proof. > > Please stop trolling. > > Peter. "Please don't feed the troll" is an acceptable wording when said to me. "Please stop trolling" is the the word for you. Guan From rjh at sixdemonbag.org Sat Oct 3 20:19:30 2015 From: rjh at sixdemonbag.org (Robert J. Hansen) Date: Sat, 3 Oct 2015 14:19:30 -0400 Subject: How to get your first key signed In-Reply-To: References: <20150930131717.145e55b7@ulgy_thing> <560C3EFB.4020405@sixdemonbag.org> <560CEFF7.1040705@galen.org.uk> <560D67D8.8070203@sixdemonbag.org> <32883019.20151003123354@my_localhost> <56101306.1070204@digitalbrains.com> Message-ID: <56101C32.2050207@sixdemonbag.org> > IF YOU THINK DIGITAL SIGNATURES ARE NOTHING > THEN PLEASE KEEP AWAY FROM THIS MAILING LIST. A digital signature means surprisingly little. These are the conditions that must be met for a signature to be meaningful: it must be correct, issued from a validated[*] certificate, and belong to a trusted person. If you've got all those, then yes, a digital signature can be very meaningful. If you don't, they mean very little. Maybe I should add this to the FAQ, along with an explanation of why. [*] Insert word-of-choice here. Trusted, validated, whatever. From misscrissylynn at gmail.com Sat Oct 3 20:23:28 2015 From: misscrissylynn at gmail.com (Crissy Lynn) Date: Sat, 3 Oct 2015 14:23:28 -0400 Subject: How to get your first key signed In-Reply-To: References: <20150930131717.145e55b7@ulgy_thing> <560C3EFB.4020405@sixdemonbag.org> <560CEFF7.1040705@galen.org.uk> <560D67D8.8070203@sixdemonbag.org> <32883019.20151003123354@my_localhost> <56101306.1070204@digitalbrains.com> Message-ID: <3BD9FC76-55B6-4096-B47C-C8BD14090582@gmail.com> Please! For the 600th time! REMOVE ME FROM THIS MAILING LIST! > On Oct 3, 2015, at 1:44 PM, Guan Xin wrote: > >> On Sat, Oct 3, 2015 at 7:40 PM, Peter Lebbing wrote: >>> On 03/10/15 14:04, Guan Xin wrote: >>> What happened to being guilty once proven guilty until >>> proven innocent? >>> Your key is the proof. >> >> Please stop trolling. >> >> Peter. > > YOU who insist that digital signatures are no proof > and worth nothing please STOP TROLLING. > > IF YOU THINK DIGITAL SIGNATURES ARE NOTHING > THEN PLEASE KEEP AWAY FROM THIS MAILING LIST. > > Guan > > _______________________________________________ > Gnupg-users mailing list > Gnupg-users at gnupg.org > http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users From guanx.bac at gmail.com Sat Oct 3 21:52:59 2015 From: guanx.bac at gmail.com (Guan Xin) Date: Sat, 3 Oct 2015 21:52:59 +0200 Subject: How to get your first key signed In-Reply-To: <56101C32.2050207@sixdemonbag.org> References: <20150930131717.145e55b7@ulgy_thing> <560C3EFB.4020405@sixdemonbag.org> <560CEFF7.1040705@galen.org.uk> <560D67D8.8070203@sixdemonbag.org> <32883019.20151003123354@my_localhost> <56101306.1070204@digitalbrains.com> <56101C32.2050207@sixdemonbag.org> Message-ID: On Sat, Oct 3, 2015 at 8:19 PM, Robert J. Hansen wrote: >> IF YOU THINK DIGITAL SIGNATURES ARE NOTHING >> THEN PLEASE KEEP AWAY FROM THIS MAILING LIST. > > A digital signature means surprisingly little. It's a kind of weak proof in China, and is much more than nothing. I have absolutely no idea of the situation in the Netherlands. Peter knows. In the U.S., obviously, no proof is needed to convict someone. I've been *assumed* spying already after another Chinese citizen whom I never heard of was *only* suspected, only because we worked for the same department. Neither digital nor non-digital signatures change racism. So this is irrelevant. Guan From rjh at sixdemonbag.org Sat Oct 3 22:15:04 2015 From: rjh at sixdemonbag.org (Robert J. Hansen) Date: Sat, 3 Oct 2015 16:15:04 -0400 Subject: How to get your first key signed In-Reply-To: <3BD9FC76-55B6-4096-B47C-C8BD14090582@gmail.com> References: <20150930131717.145e55b7@ulgy_thing> <560C3EFB.4020405@sixdemonbag.org> <560CEFF7.1040705@galen.org.uk> <560D67D8.8070203@sixdemonbag.org> <32883019.20151003123354@my_localhost> <56101306.1070204@digitalbrains.com> <3BD9FC76-55B6-4096-B47C-C8BD14090582@gmail.com> Message-ID: <56103748.7060002@sixdemonbag.org> > Please! For the 600th time! REMOVE ME FROM THIS MAILING LIST! You have been told how to unsubscribe. Perhaps try following those instructions? To recap: visit this URL. http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users At the bottom you'll see text of, "To unsubscribe from Gnupg-users, get a password reminder, or change your subscription options enter your subscription email address:". Enter your email address there and click "Unsubscribe or edit options". From jerry at seibercom.net Sat Oct 3 22:20:50 2015 From: jerry at seibercom.net (Jerry) Date: Sat, 3 Oct 2015 16:20:50 -0400 Subject: How to get your first key signed In-Reply-To: <3BD9FC76-55B6-4096-B47C-C8BD14090582@gmail.com> References: <20150930131717.145e55b7@ulgy_thing> <560C3EFB.4020405@sixdemonbag.org> <560CEFF7.1040705@galen.org.uk> <560D67D8.8070203@sixdemonbag.org> <32883019.20151003123354@my_localhost> <56101306.1070204@digitalbrains.com> <3BD9FC76-55B6-4096-B47C-C8BD14090582@gmail.com> Message-ID: > Please! For the 600th time! REMOVE ME FROM THIS MAILING LIST! Please for the 601st time, follow the directions you have been give before: List-Unsubscribe: , And while you are at it, STOP hijacking threads. -- Jerry From juanmi.3000 at gmail.com Sat Oct 3 22:21:50 2015 From: juanmi.3000 at gmail.com (=?UTF-8?Q?Juan_Miguel_Navarro_Mart=c3=adnez?=) Date: Sat, 3 Oct 2015 22:21:50 +0200 Subject: How to get your first key signed In-Reply-To: <3BD9FC76-55B6-4096-B47C-C8BD14090582@gmail.com> References: <20150930131717.145e55b7@ulgy_thing> <560C3EFB.4020405@sixdemonbag.org> <560CEFF7.1040705@galen.org.uk> <560D67D8.8070203@sixdemonbag.org> <32883019.20151003123354@my_localhost> <56101306.1070204@digitalbrains.com> <3BD9FC76-55B6-4096-B47C-C8BD14090582@gmail.com> Message-ID: <561038DE.3060509@gmail.com> On 2015-10-03 at 20:23, Crissy Lynn wrote: > Please! For the 600th time! REMOVE ME FROM THIS MAILING LIST! > If you knew how to subscribe, you should know how to unsubscribe, because: 1) If you told on this mailing list to be unsubscribed for the 600th time, then someone told you how to unsubscribe for at least a 300th time. 2) If you are subscribed here, then you used a method to subscribe yourself be it a) via website or b) via e-mail. And to unsusbcribe, obviously, you use either of those methods as well. For method a): Just go to the website[1] again (the URL is on everyone's email tail). Then on the bottom, fill the form (one text box with the sentence "Unsubscribe or Edit"), and click the "Unsusbcribe" button. For method b): Just send an email to with "unsubscribe" as the subject or body[2]. No matter which method you used, just follow the instructions after that. If you are not getting unsubscribed then either a) you didn't do all steps, b) you did something wrong in any of the steps or c) you are subscribed with another email. [1]: [2]: -- Juan Miguel Navarro Mart?nez GPG Keyfingerprint: 5A91 90D4 CF27 9D52 D62A BC58 88E2 947F 9BC6 B3CF From rjh at sixdemonbag.org Sun Oct 4 00:53:26 2015 From: rjh at sixdemonbag.org (Robert J. Hansen) Date: Sat, 3 Oct 2015 18:53:26 -0400 Subject: How to get your first key signed In-Reply-To: References: <20150930131717.145e55b7@ulgy_thing> <560C3EFB.4020405@sixdemonbag.org> <560CEFF7.1040705@galen.org.uk> <560D67D8.8070203@sixdemonbag.org> Message-ID: <56105C66.4060503@sixdemonbag.org> > So you three will share the same reputation on the mailing list. Probably not. But if so, I'm fine with that: John and John are good people. And the point we were making -- which was that people invest way too much trust into unvalidated keys and/or possibly untrustworthy people -- was important and worth making. > If at least one of you commit crimes with your signed messages, > you will share the same legal liability... If I commit a crime and it gets traced back to the certificate we shared, then the authorities would have to figure out which of us was using the certificate. The idea that OpenPGP signatures are non-repudiable is a fashionable bit of nonsense: I am aware of no court, anywhere in the world, which has recognized OpenPGP signatures as being non-repudiable. From 2014-667rhzu3dc-lists-groups at riseup.net Sun Oct 4 13:06:04 2015 From: 2014-667rhzu3dc-lists-groups at riseup.net (MFPA) Date: Sun, 4 Oct 2015 12:06:04 +0100 Subject: How to get your first key signed In-Reply-To: References: <20150930131717.145e55b7@ulgy_thing> <560C3EFB.4020405@sixdemonbag.org> <560CEFF7.1040705@galen.org.uk> <560D67D8.8070203@sixdemonbag.org> <32883019.20151003123354@my_localhost> Message-ID: <1221129704.20151004120604@my_localhost> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA512 On Saturday 3 October 2015 at 1:04:55 PM, in , Guan Xin wrote: > The word "will" does not infer history. No, but talking about something that happened in the past does. (-; > You know by > reputation I meant personal reputation, It was clear to me that you meant their respective personal reputations on the mailing list. And their little experiment did not in any way lead to merging these into a single posting reputation. > not the arabic > numbers or green boxes shown on the webpage, don't you? What web page? I thought we were talking about a mailing list. > What happened to being guilty once proven guilty until > proven innocent? You mean an appeal to an unsound conviction? > Your key is the proof. If you all Not sure who you mean by "you all". > believe digital signature can't prove anything, why do > you use it at all? My understanding of what a digital signature proves is:- 1. The text or file has not been altered since it was signed. 2. Which key was used to create the signature. - -- Best regards MFPA Penguins are not to be trusted, especially those who listen to organ music. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- iQF8BAEBCgBmBQJWEQgjXxSAAAAAAC4AKGlzc3Vlci1mcHJAbm90YXRpb25zLm9w ZW5wZ3AuZmlmdGhob3JzZW1hbi5uZXRCM0FFN0VDQTlBOEM4QjMwMjZBNUEwRjU2 QjdDNzRDRUIzMUYyNUYwAAoJEGt8dM6zHyXwe+QH/0IHpiOi15+EyQ1A8YFYpNXX 0ILub7LRi/XLkT/0NWjd5fJt0YtOPfjqVH1DSqr3WVByP0Phwjj+mJ6yKvSCimrG ZZoCkZQ+85V4HLbM/u/8dssicc1JN7ik8o6TFb8F/ARD+hzh/iDFB9GXnVVWmm7y 6QeT+uir97ufXMmFkIVs/g4cSiJbnvZr5ULSLDxaCheT+iTtBeribihTKLKTXUZF OYTNVcjs1Ei9yb3PQqBrw/XVDC6/dGFe78cY76H1+VpP8ir3BkeqCWIW3vjUVigw Az8scSoxYXxf0tg7ZGWgJ64KnOmj0ZwrOpSk5JnTDPVi6s0x8eVD3bDnWZaAMxmI vgQBFgoAZgUCVhEIgV8UgAAAAAAuAChpc3N1ZXItZnByQG5vdGF0aW9ucy5vcGVu cGdwLmZpZnRoaG9yc2VtYW4ubmV0MzNBQ0VENEVFOTEzNEVFQkRFNkE4NTA2MTcx MkJDNDYxQUY3NzhFNAAKCRAXErxGGvd45GUsAQDCWv/TGv13yuDvmzPD17vHBnzW /GG9EyCma/5oAr2rMQEAxof7/Zk68CFApTVI6lI5kcg2X3k+bWm+KKU/YN+vUg0= =YI9K -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From 2014-667rhzu3dc-lists-groups at riseup.net Sun Oct 4 13:22:04 2015 From: 2014-667rhzu3dc-lists-groups at riseup.net (MFPA) Date: Sun, 4 Oct 2015 12:22:04 +0100 Subject: How to get your first key signed In-Reply-To: <56105C66.4060503@sixdemonbag.org> References: <20150930131717.145e55b7@ulgy_thing> <560C3EFB.4020405@sixdemonbag.org> <560CEFF7.1040705@galen.org.uk> <560D67D8.8070203@sixdemonbag.org> <56105C66.4060503@sixdemonbag.org> Message-ID: <1652315369.20151004122204@my_localhost> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA512 On Saturday 3 October 2015 at 11:53:26 PM, in , Robert J. Hansen wrote: > If I commit a crime and it gets traced back to the > certificate we shared, then the authorities would have > to figure out which of us was using the certificate. This may not be the case if the crime took place in a jurisdiction that applies the doctrine of joint enterprise [0]. [0] - -- Best regards MFPA When it comes to humility, I'm the greatest. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- iQF8BAEBCgBmBQJWEQvdXxSAAAAAAC4AKGlzc3Vlci1mcHJAbm90YXRpb25zLm9w ZW5wZ3AuZmlmdGhob3JzZW1hbi5uZXRCM0FFN0VDQTlBOEM4QjMwMjZBNUEwRjU2 QjdDNzRDRUIzMUYyNUYwAAoJEGt8dM6zHyXwUmEIAJ7b+NQING9gMXCn8+5uQ3Pj h2AkRmuq1I3nLsNV3UQLR3GqWHlHbSLa/KInql+YIEE0wvDvVDweVDqnU0q2d1du l8+w3ZlMQH7M4bwD0Bk69fbN1WnKxjk/gmcjoItPncWm0vcyu57Q33v9Kv3YmSU8 K6beCjMqb9WfPFsicfBHWqAAHj6awDosnkN89+gZ49rBayhCIyUZ4eTohd+Tn+44 d96oWjLR3sqzWG7rqpsWbgj+V/TIsamTlgt9/ofdlyM2mx2TEvOGwYTN9aVbvRbx XxVG38UMCy1x8tmL9iAfmdLcD1nwISGbkKwaWHy7cgnf+ThxSKP4q3Gwyi8rgaaI vgQBFgoAZgUCVhEL3l8UgAAAAAAuAChpc3N1ZXItZnByQG5vdGF0aW9ucy5vcGVu cGdwLmZpZnRoaG9yc2VtYW4ubmV0MzNBQ0VENEVFOTEzNEVFQkRFNkE4NTA2MTcx MkJDNDYxQUY3NzhFNAAKCRAXErxGGvd45D6pAP9vwqisKLKTQMpR67jh0yWMGo+2 ihmuUsoDqoYAqtb75wD8CEaD9Y79YW5BRODr7pjIRxLV4xsUI/S/eRJC0tWs0wo= =4FKZ -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From joe.asmodeus at sigaint.org Sun Oct 4 13:41:56 2015 From: joe.asmodeus at sigaint.org (joe.asmodeus at sigaint.org) Date: Sun, 4 Oct 2015 11:41:56 -0000 Subject: How to get your first key signed In-Reply-To: <56105C66.4060503@sixdemonbag.org> References: <20150930131717.145e55b7@ulgy_thing> <560C3EFB.4020405@sixdemonbag.org> <560CEFF7.1040705@galen.org.uk> <560D67D8.8070203@sixdemonbag.org> <56105C66.4060503@sixdemonbag.org> Message-ID: <4d7f3a5d763c82de185e9b819dd868d3.webmail@localhost> "Robert J. Hansen" wrote: > The idea that OpenPGP signatures are non-repudiable is a fashionable bit > of nonsense: I am aware of no court, anywhere in the world, which has > recognized OpenPGP signatures as being non-repudiable. > Are you aware of a court, anywhere in the world, which has considered the issue? From rjh at sixdemonbag.org Sun Oct 4 15:48:55 2015 From: rjh at sixdemonbag.org (Robert J. Hansen) Date: Sun, 4 Oct 2015 09:48:55 -0400 Subject: How to get your first key signed In-Reply-To: <4d7f3a5d763c82de185e9b819dd868d3.webmail@localhost> References: <20150930131717.145e55b7@ulgy_thing> <560C3EFB.4020405@sixdemonbag.org> <560CEFF7.1040705@galen.org.uk> <560D67D8.8070203@sixdemonbag.org> <56105C66.4060503@sixdemonbag.org> <4d7f3a5d763c82de185e9b819dd868d3.webmail@localhost> Message-ID: <56112E47.8040905@sixdemonbag.org> > Are you aware of a court, anywhere in the world, which has considered the > issue? Yes, many! Digital signatures are enforceable in U.S. courts. Non-repudiability, though, as far as I know has never been successfully argued. More to the point, I don't think it could be. From antony at blazrsoft.com Sun Oct 4 16:21:18 2015 From: antony at blazrsoft.com (Antony Prince) Date: Sun, 4 Oct 2015 10:21:18 -0400 Subject: How to get your first key signed In-Reply-To: <560F0B60.7060603@gmail.com> References: <20150930131717.145e55b7@ulgy_thing> <560F0B60.7060603@gmail.com> Message-ID: <561135DE.4020906@blazrsoft.com> On 10/02/2015 06:55 PM, Faramir wrote: > ... > Well, you don't really need your key signed for that... at least, > not the key with your name on it. You can make a key using the name > "mysoftwarename distribution key", and use it to sign the files. Once > people start using the software, they may sign the key. They don't > know who is behind the key, but they will know it is the same key that > has been using since day 1. > I agree with this sentiment. I have locally signed Niibe's and Werner's distribution keys, meaning the signatures are not exportable. I have not verified their identities, but the fingerprints match those on their website and listed in the announcement e-mails about the software. I would not be able to definitively say that those keys belong to a person named Werner Koch or Niibe Yutaka, but they do belong to the people claiming to have those names and consistently releasing software under those names. Since the keys do not change with every release, it is reasonable to assert that it is the same people/person every time. Point is, you don't need to have your identity verified for people to trust your key. All my keys are self-signed. I revoked the original key I created and created this one. I signed this key with the old one before revoking it. Therefore, you could roughly assume that I am the person who controlled the secret material to the previous key with this UID, since this key is signed by that one as well. My name may or may not really be "Antony Prince", but the keys created with that UID are chained together by their signatures. I could go even further and make a short web page listing the previous and current fingerprints and why I revoked the previous key (called a "transition statement", IIRC) and even sign that message. I have not done this because my identity as far as my gpg key goes is not under that much scrutiny or of that much importance to anyone that I'd need to go to those lengths. -- Antony Prince Key ID: 0xAF3D4087301B1B19 Fingerprint: 591F F17F 7A4A A8D0 F659 C482 AF3D 4087 301B 1B19 URL: http://keyserver.blazrsoft.com/pks/lookup?op=get&search=0xAF3D4087301B1B19 -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: signature.asc Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 819 bytes Desc: OpenPGP digital signature URL: From joe.asmodeus at sigaint.org Sun Oct 4 17:04:42 2015 From: joe.asmodeus at sigaint.org (joe.asmodeus at sigaint.org) Date: Sun, 4 Oct 2015 15:04:42 -0000 Subject: How to get your first key signed In-Reply-To: <56112E47.8040905@sixdemonbag.org> References: <20150930131717.145e55b7@ulgy_thing> <560C3EFB.4020405@sixdemonbag.org> <560CEFF7.1040705@galen.org.uk> <560D67D8.8070203@sixdemonbag.org> <56105C66.4060503@sixdemonbag.org> <4d7f3a5d763c82de185e9b819dd868d3.webmail@localhost> <56112E47.8040905@sixdemonbag.org> Message-ID: <7d5acf1b54ad013cf7da8cf308fc2ca4.webmail@localhost> "Robert J. Hansen" wrote: > Yes, many! Digital signatures are enforceable in U.S. courts. > > Non-repudiability, though, as far as I know has never been successfully > argued. More to the point, I don't think it could be. I assume that enforcebility is determined using the standards applied to pen-and-ink signatures. Lack of legal capacity, forgery or duress, to name a few, would permit repudiation. The party seeking to enforce a contract signed digitally should bear the burden of establishing a signature's validity. Therefore, I agree that a blanket holding that all digital signatures are non-repudiable is unlikely. From dsaklad at gnu.org Sun Oct 4 16:30:50 2015 From: dsaklad at gnu.org (Don Saklad) Date: Sun, 04 Oct 2015 10:30:50 -0400 Subject: How can it be made even easier!? Message-ID: <5id1wu66zp.fsf@fencepost.gnu.org> How can it be made even easier!? Trying to encourage M.D.'s to use it is met with complaints about not having time to learn about it. Set up is a too complicated sequence of steps that aren't entirely clear. The steps can get hampered where there aren't instructions that cover what to do when one of the steps goes awry! From malte at wk3.org Sun Oct 4 18:06:07 2015 From: malte at wk3.org (malte at wk3.org) Date: Sun, 04 Oct 2015 18:06:07 +0200 Subject: How can it be made even easier!? In-Reply-To: <5id1wu66zp.fsf@fencepost.gnu.org> References: <5id1wu66zp.fsf@fencepost.gnu.org> Message-ID: <20151004160607.17904.88208@solidarity.enteig.net> Quoting Don Saklad (2015-10-04 16:30:50) > How can it be made even easier!? CryptoParties are a good start from an educational standpoint. Whiteout.io and Pixelated are a good start from a technological standpoint. https://www.cryptoparty.in/location https://www.cryptoparty.in/parties/upcoming https://whiteout.io/ https://pixelated-project.org/ I think running Pixelated in a GAMP-certified environment would be a giant leap (very intentional) towards more confidential doctor-patient communication ? and also a quite solid business model. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Good_Automated_Manufacturing_Practice Sincerely, Malte From richard.hoechenberger at gmail.com Sun Oct 4 20:05:23 2015 From: richard.hoechenberger at gmail.com (=?UTF-8?Q?Richard_H=C3=B6chenberger?=) Date: Sun, 4 Oct 2015 20:05:23 +0200 Subject: Unsubscription Request (was: Re: How to get your first key signed) Message-ID: Hello everyone, On Sat, Oct 3, 2015 at 8:23 PM, Crissy Lynn wrote: > Please! For the 600th time! REMOVE ME FROM THIS MAILING LIST! so for whatever reason, this user is obviously unable to successfully unsubscribe from this mailing list. Will not any of the list admins/moderators have mercy and remove her email address from the list? I find the repeated explanations of how to unsubscribe extremely unhelpful, bordering to disrespect, since it does not provide the kind of help this users needs. You told her "601 times", she somehow failed equally often, is unable to comply, so please HELP her already and remove that email address! Richard -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From peter at digitalbrains.com Sun Oct 4 21:50:04 2015 From: peter at digitalbrains.com (Peter Lebbing) Date: Sun, 04 Oct 2015 21:50:04 +0200 Subject: How to get your first key signed In-Reply-To: <7d5acf1b54ad013cf7da8cf308fc2ca4.webmail@localhost> References: <20150930131717.145e55b7@ulgy_thing> <560C3EFB.4020405@sixdemonbag.org> <560CEFF7.1040705@galen.org.uk> <560D67D8.8070203@sixdemonbag.org> <56105C66.4060503@sixdemonbag.org> <4d7f3a5d763c82de185e9b819dd868d3.webmail@localhost> <56112E47.8040905@sixdemonbag.org> <7d5acf1b54ad013cf7da8cf308fc2ca4.webmail@localhost> Message-ID: <561182EC.20205@digitalbrains.com> On 04/10/15 17:04, joe.asmodeus at sigaint.org wrote: > Therefore, I agree that a blanket holding that all digital > signatures are non-repudiable is unlikely. I think you're moving the goal posts. I think Rob says that he's unaware of any case where a specific digital signature was argued to be non-repudiable. Peter. -- I use the GNU Privacy Guard (GnuPG) in combination with Enigmail. You can send me encrypted mail if you want some privacy. My key is available at From peter at digitalbrains.com Sun Oct 4 21:55:49 2015 From: peter at digitalbrains.com (Peter Lebbing) Date: Sun, 04 Oct 2015 21:55:49 +0200 Subject: Unsubscription Request (was: Re: How to get your first key signed) In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <56118445.4070202@digitalbrains.com> On 04/10/15 20:05, Richard H?chenberger wrote: > I find the repeated explanations of how to unsubscribe extremely unhelpful, > bordering to disrespect, since it does not provide the kind of help this > users needs. Even though I might share your sentiment on the rest of your mail, I personally find this statement disrespectful to the people who tried to help miss Lynn, when she is not very approachable and offers no more explanation as to why she can't just unsubscribe than the following: On 31/08/15 21:08, Crissy Lynn wrote: > I have tried any and everything the be taken OFF of this random mailing > list!!! I've 'Unsubscribed' 10 times. And yes, I was one of those people trying to help, but I would have found it equally disrespectful if I hadn't been one of the people at least trying. Peter. -- I use the GNU Privacy Guard (GnuPG) in combination with Enigmail. You can send me encrypted mail if you want some privacy. My key is available at From richard.hoechenberger at gmail.com Sun Oct 4 22:14:58 2015 From: richard.hoechenberger at gmail.com (=?UTF-8?Q?Richard_H=C3=B6chenberger?=) Date: Sun, 4 Oct 2015 22:14:58 +0200 Subject: Unsubscription Request (was: Re: How to get your first key signed) In-Reply-To: <56118445.4070202@digitalbrains.com> References: <56118445.4070202@digitalbrains.com> Message-ID: Hello Peter, On Sun, Oct 4, 2015 at 9:55 PM, Peter Lebbing wrote: > I personally > find this statement disrespectful to the people who tried to help miss > Lynn, > when she is not very approachable and offers no more explanation as to > why she can't just unsubscribe than the following > you certainly got a point there. My apologies to anyone who may have felt insulted. Nevertheless, it can be extremely hard for a not-so-tech-savvy person to provide a good description of the exact problems they are encountering. A possible explanation for her weak responsiveness could be that she was simply overwhelmed by the amount of (undesired) email flooding her inbox. Who knows. And while I usually always prefer helping people to help themselves (as you and others did), this approach was undoubtedly unfruitful here over the course of several weeks. Remote support can be a very tricky and time-consuming endeavor :) At any rate, thanks to all who were trying to help. Still, I'm hoping some moderator or admin could simply remove her address from the list. Richard -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From brad at fineby.me.uk Sun Oct 4 22:18:53 2015 From: brad at fineby.me.uk (Brad Rogers) Date: Sun, 4 Oct 2015 21:18:53 +0100 Subject: Unsubscription Request (was: Re: How to get your first key signed) In-Reply-To: <56118445.4070202@digitalbrains.com> References: <56118445.4070202@digitalbrains.com> Message-ID: <20151004211853.30da3d03@abydos.stargate.org.uk> On Sun, 04 Oct 2015 21:55:49 +0200 Peter Lebbing wrote: Hello Peter, >equally disrespectful if I hadn't been one of the people at least >trying. Whilst it's laudable that people try and help her, I doubt she's even _reading_ stuff from the list any more. *Seeing* it, yes (obviously). As such, I suspect any offers of help, or requests for information that would lead to her being unsubscribed successfully are going unnoticed. -- Regards _ / ) "The blindingly obvious is / _)rad never immediately apparent" You said you ain't had none for weeks, but baby I seen your arms Deny - The Clash -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: not available Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 473 bytes Desc: OpenPGP digital signature URL: From idmsdba at nycap.rr.com Mon Oct 5 00:20:47 2015 From: idmsdba at nycap.rr.com (Michael A. Yetto) Date: Sun, 4 Oct 2015 18:20:47 -0400 Subject: How Crissy Lynn can unsubscribe Message-ID: <20151004182047.64d5d195@Braetac.lighthouse.yetnet> On Sat, 3 Oct 2015 14:23:28 -0400 Crissy Lynn wrote: >Please! For the 600th time! REMOVE ME FROM THIS MAILING LIST! You have been asking how to unsubscribe and many participants on this mailing list have answered you. However, the theory has been proposed that you are not reading the list and have missed the many responses containing instructions. So I will tell you to look at the headers for any e-mail sent by the list. You will find the following header List-Unsubscribe: , I am sending this to the list as well Crissy Lynn in the hopes that this tempest can break free of its teapot. Mike Yetto -- "Question with boldness even the existence of God; because, if there be one, he must more approve of the homage of reason than that of blindfolded fear." - Thomas Jefferson -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: not available Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 490 bytes Desc: OpenPGP digital signature URL: From joe.asmodeus at sigaint.org Mon Oct 5 00:24:38 2015 From: joe.asmodeus at sigaint.org (joe.asmodeus at sigaint.org) Date: Sun, 4 Oct 2015 22:24:38 -0000 Subject: OpenPGP Signatures (was Re: How to get your first key signed) In-Reply-To: <561182EC.20205@digitalbrains.com> References: <20150930131717.145e55b7@ulgy_thing> <560C3EFB.4020405@sixdemonbag.org> <560CEFF7.1040705@galen.org.uk> <560D67D8.8070203@sixdemonbag.org> <56105C66.4060503@sixdemonbag.org> <4d7f3a5d763c82de185e9b819dd868d3.webmail@localhost> <56112E47.8040905@sixdemonbag.org> <7d5acf1b54ad013cf7da8cf308fc2ca4.webmail@localhost> <561182EC.20205@digitalbrains.com> Message-ID: <7f657f75f25d2c9c45453c7cfaba2cdb.webmail@localhost> "Peter Lebbing" wrote: > On 04/10/15 17:04, joe.asmodeus at sigaint.org wrote: >> Therefore, I agree that a blanket holding that all digital >> signatures are non-repudiable is unlikely. > > I think you're moving the goal posts. I think Rob says that he's unaware > of any > case where a specific digital signature was argued to be non-repudiable. > If that was what he meant to say, he didn't say it. "Robert J. Hansen" wrote: > The idea that OpenPGP signatures are non-repudiable is a fashionable bit > of nonsense: I am aware of no court, anywhere in the world, which has > recognized OpenPGP signatures as being non-repudiable. > Which prompted me to ask "Are you aware of a court, anywhere in the world, which has considered the issue?" I wanted to find out if Rob knew of any cases in which repudiability of OpenPGP signatures had been litigated. Rob apparently thought I was questioning the legality of digital signatures generally. He replied "Yes, many! Digital signatures are enforceable in U.S. courts. Non-repudiability, though, as far as I know has never been successfully argued. More to the point, I don't think it could be." That leaves unanswered the question of whether non-repudiability has ever beem unsuccessfully argued, in other words, whether any court has considered the issue. If the goal posts moved, it was not intentional on my part. Discussions have a way of doing that. The focus changes. I offered my thoughts as to standards which might be useful in dealing with the question when it comes up. If a digital signature is a signature, its enforceability should be determined in the same way a handwritten signature's enforceability is. So, I'll make my question more general. Is anyone aware of a case in which the validity or enforceability of an OpenPGP signature has been argued? It would likely have come up when a party to contract attempted to repudiate his OpenPGP signature. From anthony at cajuntechie.org Mon Oct 5 00:40:29 2015 From: anthony at cajuntechie.org (Anthony Papillion) Date: Sun, 4 Oct 2015 17:40:29 -0500 Subject: Is there a better way to change out of sync expiration dates? Message-ID: <5611AADD.4000702@cajuntechie.org> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA512 Hello Everyone, I'm not sure how but I somehow set the expiration date of my encryption key and my signing key to different dates (different by a few months time). While I know this isn't "really" a problem, I just like to have both keys expire on the same date. To fix this problem, I edited my key, set the expiration date to 'never' then edited it again and set the date a number of years in the future from today (which gave my two keys the same expiration date). But I'm wondering if there's a more 'standard' way to do this. Anybody know? Thanks! Anthony - -- Anthony Papillion Phone: +1.845.666.3312 Skype: CajunTechie SIP/VoIP: 17772471988 at in.callcentric.com PGP Key: 0x028ADF7453B04B15 Fingerprint: C5CE E687 DDC2 D12B 9063 56EA 028A DF74 53B0 4B15 -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- iQIcBAEBCgAGBQJWEardAAoJEAKK33RTsEsVeR8P/AnCPtttxapcHZX50LSupcKk TXdRqG4I1QEqth1OrP+Za7qVfLR0dvD/poU0OlxJxVfso3qY3zkPsZf5UWzZDXRG 5tFBSBXsR8R7olsbH+QEYQJCGVKAr7MMUf4D1VyBT9h9LwAIMPGnk/GBqvTM6WDx HKxXOpbKjSoH+sda1oFngGD1JBiqjGizYcO2QYCeGeIx8DqE0INC+3ELDaYWGdFi pYcCj5pfwY83n0Xfmx/GFBE3zgVSvtFP+TmMNBXmI+DMzVHyzBaNfnSDUE4nrV9N q8B95y76TujwbckLwAwo+phDJkq1zxcmceuRI0hyyFC1BlGpqRjP6yqbv5FzSCeZ rr7zJxufmasUXu0lTWiyZLqmnT8CDTzmAfIsUsxlnIjL6cQaIBWqUQq8rbGXU4Wo jINK9duKPvdqeC055DIUWjVi5UMWcu5jNOIixHEPS6OOhinGNnylbqeGbSZJksHu WRuBSAY87RZMbJwBU1mW4+6kyvpCflEYxm6F0YlxrKx1ZDzxXc61uuYANCKj3dhS GoYJTYJUP/No8sWYyNCvvLIpWcRSn2xpt5VKe6e8NzALAj+2kEvigsERx3qQGxPQ VQdUukWe1wdqRjBqtGrowECsaJnohfrQN/PXrpv0wUGUzPWIjaknGEyh4qg/Nnbx nicprT8wuzHF5hQlGXNI =oTE1 -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From the2nd at otpme.org Mon Oct 5 01:43:20 2015 From: the2nd at otpme.org (the2nd at otpme.org) Date: Mon, 05 Oct 2015 01:43:20 +0200 Subject: Sign/verify openssl RSA signatures Message-ID: <587f9f088c9cd8059b147cf70da7a578@otpme.org> Hi, i've googled a lot and i guess it is just not possible but i want to ask this list before giving up. Is it possible to create (and verify) PKCS1_PSS signatures with gpg that are compatible with openssl? The signatures are created with this commands: # Generate keys openssl genrsa -out priv.pem # Export public key openssl rsa -pubout -in priv.pem -out pub.pem # Create test file echo test123 > test.txt # Create signature openssl dgst -sha1 -sigopt rsa_padding_mode:pss -sigopt rsa_pss_saltlen:-1 -sign priv.pem -out test.txt.sig test.txt # Verify signature openssl dgst -sha1 -sigopt rsa_padding_mode:pss -sigopt rsa_pss_saltlen:-1 -verify pub.pem -signature test.txt.sig test.txt The reason for choosing openssl over gpg is the smooth support for RSA signatures in python (pycrypto). Verifying a RSA (PKCS1 PSS) signature requires just the public key which makes it easy to use especially when verification of the signature must be done in a daemon. But there are also good reasons for using gpg on the client side because its easy to use with smartcards (e.g. a yubikey). So my perfect setup would be to be able to create signatures with gpg that can be verified with openssl/pycrypto in my daemon. regards the2nd From rjh at sixdemonbag.org Mon Oct 5 01:43:48 2015 From: rjh at sixdemonbag.org (Robert J. Hansen) Date: Sun, 4 Oct 2015 19:43:48 -0400 Subject: OpenPGP Signatures (was Re: How to get your first key signed) In-Reply-To: <7f657f75f25d2c9c45453c7cfaba2cdb.webmail@localhost> References: <20150930131717.145e55b7@ulgy_thing> <560C3EFB.4020405@sixdemonbag.org> <560CEFF7.1040705@galen.org.uk> <560D67D8.8070203@sixdemonbag.org> <56105C66.4060503@sixdemonbag.org> <4d7f3a5d763c82de185e9b819dd868d3.webmail@localhost> <56112E47.8040905@sixdemonbag.org> <7d5acf1b54ad013cf7da8cf308fc2ca4.webmail@localhost> <561182EC.20205@digitalbrains.com> <7f657f75f25d2c9c45453c7cfaba2cdb.webmail@localhost> Message-ID: <5611B9B4.60806@sixdemonbag.org> > If that was what he meant to say, he didn't say it. Peter's right, and you're moving the goalposts. Please stop. > So, I'll make my question more general. Is anyone aware of a case in > which the validity or enforceability of an OpenPGP signature has been > argued? To repeat my answer: yes. Because it's a digital signature and courts have repeatedly found them enforceable. Courts have *not* found them non-repudiable, though: you repudiate a digital signature in more or less the exact same way you repudiate a real one. You say "that wasn't me, Your Honor" and you show the judge why he or she should believe it wasn't you. Werner and I (and maybe others) have seen PGP-signed spam. Someone was using Symantec's signing proxy, had it configured to sign all outgoing mail, had no passphrase on the certificate, and then got hit by a botnet that used their PC to send out Viagra spam. Did it have a valid signature? Yes. Was the signature repudiable? Yes. "Your Honor, forensic analysis shows my PC was compromised by malware. I didn't authorize those spams to be sent out and I didn't authorize their signature." Non-repudiability is a big myth when it comes to OpenPGP. In this era where, per Vint Cerf, one in five desktop PCs is pwn3ed, repudiability is cheap and easy. "Malware, Your Honor..." From wk at gnupg.org Mon Oct 5 09:29:45 2015 From: wk at gnupg.org (Werner Koch) Date: Mon, 05 Oct 2015 09:29:45 +0200 Subject: Is there a better way to change out of sync expiration dates? In-Reply-To: <5611AADD.4000702@cajuntechie.org> (Anthony Papillion's message of "Sun, 4 Oct 2015 17:40:29 -0500") References: <5611AADD.4000702@cajuntechie.org> Message-ID: <87oagd6ady.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> On Mon, 5 Oct 2015 00:40, anthony at cajuntechie.org said: > But I'm wondering if there's a more 'standard' way to do this. You may enter the expiration date directly: 20151231T120000 to expire it on New Year's Eve at noon. The 'T' is required. You may also use this seconds=1451563200 if you prefer seconds since Epoch. Salam-Shalom, Werner -- Die Gedanken sind frei. Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz. From wk at gnupg.org Mon Oct 5 09:33:25 2015 From: wk at gnupg.org (Werner Koch) Date: Mon, 05 Oct 2015 09:33:25 +0200 Subject: Sign/verify openssl RSA signatures In-Reply-To: <587f9f088c9cd8059b147cf70da7a578@otpme.org> (the2nd@otpme.org's message of "Mon, 05 Oct 2015 01:43:20 +0200") References: <587f9f088c9cd8059b147cf70da7a578@otpme.org> Message-ID: <87k2r16a7u.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> On Mon, 5 Oct 2015 01:43, the2nd at otpme.org said: > Is it possible to create (and verify) PKCS1_PSS signatures with gpg > that are compatible with openssl? No. Using gpgsm would be closer but I am not sure whether PSS is supported. Libgcrypt however supports this and you could write your own tool. Take care using raw signatures - it is not easy to get this right. Shalom-Salam, Werner -- Die Gedanken sind frei. Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz. From dsaklad at gnu.org Mon Oct 5 10:19:09 2015 From: dsaklad at gnu.org (Don Saklad) Date: Mon, 05 Oct 2015 04:19:09 -0400 Subject: How can it be made even easier!? In-Reply-To: <20151004160607.17904.88208@solidarity.enteig.net> (malte@wk3.org) Message-ID: <5izizxu3r6.fsf@fencepost.gnu.org> >> How can it be made even easier!? malte at wk3.org writes: > CryptoParties are a good start from an educational standpoint. > > Whiteout.io and Pixelated are a good start from a technological standpoint. > https://www.cryptoparty.in/location https://www.cryptoparty.in/parties/upcoming https://whiteout.io/ https://pixelated-project.org/ > > > I think running Pixelated in a GAMP-certified environment would be a giant leap (very intentional) towards more confidential doctor-patient communication ? and also a quite solid business model. > https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Good_Automated_Manufacturing_Practice > > > Sincerely, > Malte How could it be done so that presumptive background of folks with an interest isn't presumed? A presumption of no background ! From rjh at sixdemonbag.org Mon Oct 5 16:20:12 2015 From: rjh at sixdemonbag.org (Robert J. Hansen) Date: Mon, 5 Oct 2015 10:20:12 -0400 Subject: How can it be made even easier!? In-Reply-To: <5izizxu3r6.fsf@fencepost.gnu.org> References: <5izizxu3r6.fsf@fencepost.gnu.org> Message-ID: <5612871C.5000105@sixdemonbag.org> > How could it be done so that presumptive background of folks with an > interest isn't presumed? A presumption of no background ! If you're serious about "no background," I'd suggest by enrolling them in a good preschool. Everyone else will have a background: they might be lawyers, doctors, teachers, carpenters, or what-have-you. You can assume basic fluency in English and a certain amount of formal education. They might be at a sixth-grade level in math or they might all have graduate degrees, but there will be *some* background. Find out what the common background is. Then try asking your question again. Because, honestly, believing that people have *no* background is a gross disrespect to them. Learn their capabilities, and structure your materials appropriately. From diafygi at gmail.com Mon Oct 5 16:22:54 2015 From: diafygi at gmail.com (Daniel Roesler) Date: Mon, 5 Oct 2015 07:22:54 -0700 Subject: Sign/verify openssl RSA signatures In-Reply-To: <587f9f088c9cd8059b147cf70da7a578@otpme.org> References: <587f9f088c9cd8059b147cf70da7a578@otpme.org> Message-ID: Not exactly what you're asking, but I was able to verify signature packets on an OpenPGP public key using openssl. https://github.com/diafygi/openpgp-python/blob/master/README.md#openssl-signature-verification In order to learn the format better, I've been hacking together a very rough OpenPGP parser in Python without using gpg. To verify signatures with only openssl, you need to extract and convert the raw public RSA key to pem format, then dump the raw signature and data payload concatenation. My code is really terrible, but feel free to read through it to see how I calculate the public key pem (without an ASN.1 parser) and raw data payload. Maybe that can give you some ideas on how to make gpg signatures compatible with openssl. Daniel On Oct 4, 2015 4:44 PM, wrote: > > Hi, > > i've googled a lot and i guess it is just not possible but i want to ask this list before giving up. > > Is it possible to create (and verify) PKCS1_PSS signatures with gpg that are compatible with openssl? > > The signatures are created with this commands: > # Generate keys > openssl genrsa -out priv.pem > # Export public key > openssl rsa -pubout -in priv.pem -out pub.pem > # Create test file > echo test123 > test.txt > # Create signature > openssl dgst -sha1 -sigopt rsa_padding_mode:pss -sigopt rsa_pss_saltlen:-1 -sign priv.pem -out test.txt.sig test.txt > # Verify signature > openssl dgst -sha1 -sigopt rsa_padding_mode:pss -sigopt rsa_pss_saltlen:-1 -verify pub.pem -signature test.txt.sig test.txt > > The reason for choosing openssl over gpg is the smooth support for RSA signatures in python (pycrypto). Verifying a RSA (PKCS1 PSS) signature requires just the public key which makes it easy to use especially when verification of the signature must be done in a daemon. > > But there are also good reasons for using gpg on the client side because its easy to use with smartcards (e.g. a yubikey). So my perfect setup would be to be able to create signatures with gpg that can be verified with openssl/pycrypto in my daemon. > > regards > the2nd > > _______________________________________________ > Gnupg-users mailing list > Gnupg-users at gnupg.org > http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From rsv869 at gmail.com Mon Oct 5 16:36:42 2015 From: rsv869 at gmail.com (Reid Vail) Date: Mon, 5 Oct 2015 10:36:42 -0400 Subject: asking for advice please - how to isolate gnupg trouble Message-ID: <20151005103642.437ffa29@runbox.com> Hello group - I have two laptops running Linux Mint 17.2 and GPG 1.4.16 and Claws-Mail. Both machines have the same Claws-mail plug-ins installed. However, on my primary machine I can't get PKI encryption to work and on my secondary it worked the first time. below is the message Claws kicks out, and the log messages are attached because the formatting made them impossible to follow. --- sorry if there's a lot.... I haven't messed with any of the GPG config files or intentionally made any changes. Is it possible to re-install a component, or some how isolate the broken part :-> ? thanks Reid "Couldn't encrypt the email: Encryption failed, General error Use "Send queued messages" from the main window to retry." -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: log notes Type: application/octet-stream Size: 20307 bytes Desc: not available URL: From anthony at cajuntechie.org Mon Oct 5 21:22:30 2015 From: anthony at cajuntechie.org (Anthony Papillion) Date: Mon, 5 Oct 2015 14:22:30 -0500 Subject: Portable version of modern GnuOG Message-ID: <5612CDF6.2060008@cajuntechie.org> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA512 I'm working on a project that requires a portable version of GnuPG and I'd like to use a modern version of it. As far as I can tell from searching, GnuPG stopped being portable somewhere in the 1.4.x branch. I'm wondering a few things: 1. If all I'll be using are the RSA and AES246 algorithms, is using a 1.4.x implementation that dangerous? 2. Does anyone know of a modern variant of GnuPG that is or could be made portable? Thanks, Anthony - -- Anthony Papillion Phone: +1.845.666.3312 Skype: CajunTechie SIP/VoIP: 17772471988 at in.callcentric.com PGP Key: 0x028ADF7453B04B15 Fingerprint: C5CE E687 DDC2 D12B 9063 56EA 028A DF74 53B0 4B15 -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- iQIcBAEBCgAGBQJWEs31AAoJEAKK33RTsEsVQQYP/jJnH/5C1wagZeo6Wm/fueUp 4/zKkhg3aTKzy0y97xdH4QPU6rSE9VTn7irNDOVrqT0XSCaHwOEqMfKaCIvAOtP0 DozFIcsXdd6MqBXqogFQL+INTxvb6gzdk/I4wAigEIKbvlljNcpQYGcLhl5W9Ism xaS8St6R/7t2FcW+F+7YgrNxGF1Q8lRwCcXOPCvW5RA0CavX8nXhxZWC9qgbhbWD +IzsnADC1PW3bFcZIu9LOWaPy2WzP083sJrzHF+Eq4CRFwKKgDEK+M5rWy0UQFzy hyi4E8q3Daq8vROumQYfJpr/5rWMW0Od3d1hHS6XXcIO674sYpTDhn47YszXd4TI ABobIdoJbfjuofeng4pRMw9dPFHFZwN8peZyy1O78BXQSpNzvoj2Y8TXhoeoHxgO 9jfpwTwC8AyFfM1u6Ls6dXxak9AakTAvWuNcaldAW8qiY0quHkjX4bBD0YqUrt5r XU3qfNPl7tpORQ0K/hOffdz7WwpzH6V7Fmu1mZaHBUS29pvXhJtWVtZW1ImtMao4 0dUg0iC4LIdUcH8jYjwaysZJzY/+zcKxQVSHrrdxg0GvnW6WeTeFDE3erqfxD0Mp pbOJAkxblA/igj0GNf/FSs0273NqbMxfMB18PjdMd1qM14U51bc2ZC5FWrpZNrCm KU3HF1stLYyESdW5i2TO =dhiA -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From rsv869 at runbox.com Mon Oct 5 15:33:25 2015 From: rsv869 at runbox.com (Reid Vail) Date: Mon, 5 Oct 2015 09:33:25 -0400 Subject: need advice - how to isolate gnupg trouble Message-ID: <20151005093325.1ea9614e@rsv2-Serval-Professional> Hello group - I have two laptops running Linux Mint 17.2 and GPG 1.4.16 and Claws-Mail. Both machines have the same Claws-mail plug-ins installed. However, on my primary machine I can't get PKI encryption to work and on my secondary it worked the first time. below is the message Claws kicks out, and the log messages --- sorry if there's a lot.... I haven't messed with any of the GPG config files or intentionally made any changes. Is it possible to re-install a component, or some how isolate the broken part :-> ? thanks Reid "Couldn't encrypt the email: Encryption failed, General error Use "Send queued messages" from the main window to retry." .... [09:20:59] IMAP4< [FETCH data - 1261 bytes] [09:20:59] IMAP4< [FETCH data - 1393 bytes] [09:20:59] IMAP4< [FETCH data - 1393 bytes] [09:20:59] IMAP4< [FETCH data - 646 bytes] [09:20:59] IMAP4< 492 OK Success [09:20:59] IMAP4> 493 STATUS "[Gmail]/Drafts" (MESSAGES UIDNEXT UIDVALIDITY UNSEEN) [09:20:59] IMAP4< * STATUS "[Gmail]/Drafts" (MESSAGES 8 UIDNEXT 3117 UIDVALIDITY 596427651 UNSEEN 0) [09:20:59] IMAP4< 493 OK Success [09:20:59] IMAP4> 494 STATUS "[Gmail]/Important" (MESSAGES UIDNEXT UIDVALIDITY UNSEEN) [09:20:59] IMAP4< * STATUS "[Gmail]/Important" (MESSAGES 1878 UIDNEXT 7316 UIDVALIDITY 596427679 UNSEEN 5) [09:20:59] IMAP4< 494 OK Success [09:20:59] IMAP4> 495 SELECT "[Gmail]/Important" [09:20:59] IMAP4< * FLAGS (\Answered \Flagged \Draft \Deleted \Seen $ATTACHMENT $Forwarded $IGNORED $Label1 $NotPhishing $Phishing $SIGNED $TODO $WATCHED $has_cal $label2 $label5 Junk NonJunk NotJunk receipt-handled) [09:20:59] IMAP4< * OK [PERMANENTFLAGS (\Answered \Flagged \Draft \Deleted \Seen $ATTACHMENT $Forwarded $IGNORED $Label1 $NotPhishing $Phishing $SIGNED $TODO $WATCHED $has_cal $label2 $label5 Junk NonJunk NotJunk receipt-handled \*)] Flags permitted. [09:20:59] IMAP4< * OK [UIDVALIDITY 596427679] UIDs valid. [09:20:59] IMAP4< * 1878 EXISTS [09:20:59] IMAP4< * 0 RECENT [09:20:59] IMAP4< * OK [UIDNEXT 7316] Predicted next UID. [09:20:59] IMAP4< * OK [HIGHESTMODSEQ 1793019] [09:20:59] IMAP4< 495 OK [READ-WRITE] [Gmail]/Important selected. (Success) [09:20:59] IMAP4- [fetching UIDs...] [09:20:59] IMAP4> 496 UID FETCH 1:* (UID) [09:20:59] IMAP4< [FETCH data - 1393 bytes] .... ;;;; [09:21:00] IMAP4< [FETCH data - 1393 bytes] [09:21:00] IMAP4< [FETCH data - 1393 bytes] [09:21:00] IMAP4< [FETCH data - 1153 bytes] [09:21:00] IMAP4< [FETCH data - 1393 bytes] [09:21:00] IMAP4< [FETCH data - 1393 bytes] [09:21:00] IMAP4< [FETCH data - 1162 bytes] [09:21:00] IMAP4< [FETCH data - 1393 bytes] [09:21:00] IMAP4< [FETCH data - 1393 bytes] [09:21:00] IMAP4< [FETCH data - 317 bytes] [09:21:00] IMAP4< 497 OK Success [09:21:00] IMAP4> 498 STATUS "[Gmail]/Job Search" (MESSAGES UIDNEXT UIDVALIDITY UNSEEN) [09:21:00] IMAP4< * STATUS "[Gmail]/Job Search" (MESSAGES 0 UIDNEXT 9 UIDVALIDITY 596427684 UNSEEN 0) [09:21:00] IMAP4< 498 OK Success [09:21:00] IMAP4> 499 STATUS "[Gmail]/Saved" (MESSAGES UIDNEXT UIDVALIDITY UNSEEN) [09:21:00] IMAP4< * STATUS "[Gmail]/Saved" (MESSAGES 4 UIDNEXT 46 UIDVALIDITY 596427677 UNSEEN 0) [09:21:00] IMAP4< 499 OK Success [09:21:00] IMAP4> 500 STATUS "[Gmail]/Saved/Amazon orders" (MESSAGES UIDNEXT UIDVALIDITY UNSEEN) [09:21:01] IMAP4< * STATUS "[Gmail]/Saved/Amazon orders" (MESSAGES 1 UIDNEXT 2 UIDVALIDITY 596430315 UNSEEN 0) [09:21:01] IMAP4< 500 OK Success [09:21:01] IMAP4> 501 STATUS "[Gmail]/Saved/NYT subscription info" (MESSAGES UIDNEXT UIDVALIDITY UNSEEN) [09:21:01] IMAP4< * STATUS "[Gmail]/Saved/NYT subscription info" (MESSAGES 6 UIDNEXT 7 UIDVALIDITY 596430314 UNSEEN 3) [09:21:01] IMAP4< 501 OK Success [09:21:01] IMAP4> 502 STATUS "[Gmail]/Saved/Projects" (MESSAGES UIDNEXT UIDVALIDITY UNSEEN) [09:21:01] IMAP4< * STATUS "[Gmail]/Saved/Projects" (MESSAGES 0 UIDNEXT 4 UIDVALIDITY 596427703 UNSEEN 0) [09:21:01] IMAP4< 502 OK Success [09:21:01] IMAP4> 503 STATUS "[Gmail]/Sent Mail" (MESSAGES UIDNEXT UIDVALIDITY UNSEEN) [09:21:01] IMAP4< * STATUS "[Gmail]/Sent Mail" (MESSAGES 154 UIDNEXT 5684 UIDVALIDITY 596427647 UNSEEN 0) [09:21:01] IMAP4< 503 OK Success [09:21:01] IMAP4> 504 STATUS "[Gmail]/Spam" (MESSAGES UIDNEXT UIDVALIDITY UNSEEN) [09:21:01] IMAP4< * STATUS "[Gmail]/Spam" (MESSAGES 54 UIDNEXT 26509 UIDVALIDITY 596427652 UNSEEN 54) [09:21:01] IMAP4< 504 OK Success [09:21:01] IMAP4> 505 STATUS "[Gmail]/Starred" (MESSAGES UIDNEXT UIDVALIDITY UNSEEN) [09:21:01] IMAP4< * STATUS "[Gmail]/Starred" (MESSAGES 21 UIDNEXT 254 UIDVALIDITY 596427653 UNSEEN 0) [09:21:01] IMAP4< 505 OK Success [09:21:01] IMAP4> 506 STATUS "[Gmail]/Trash" (MESSAGES UIDNEXT UIDVALIDITY UNSEEN) [09:21:02] IMAP4< * STATUS "[Gmail]/Trash" (MESSAGES 29 UIDNEXT 21442 UIDVALIDITY 596427649 UNSEEN 8) [09:21:02] IMAP4< 506 OK Success [09:21:02] IMAP4> 1006 STATUS INBOX (MESSAGES UIDNEXT UIDVALIDITY UNSEEN) [09:21:02] IMAP4< * STATUS "INBOX" (MESSAGES 639 UIDNEXT 2731 UIDVALIDITY 1419255644 UNSEEN 0) [09:21:02] IMAP4< 1006 OK STATUS Completed. [09:21:02] IMAP4> 1007 SELECT INBOX [09:21:02] IMAP4< * FLAGS (\Draft \Answered \Flagged \Deleted \Seen \Recent) [09:21:02] IMAP4< * OK [PERMANENTFLAGS (\Draft \Answered \Flagged \Deleted \Seen)] Limited [09:21:02] IMAP4< * 639 EXISTS [09:21:02] IMAP4< * 0 RECENT [09:21:02] IMAP4< * OK [UIDVALIDITY 1419255644] Ok [09:21:02] IMAP4< * OK [MYRIGHTS "acdilrsw"] ACL [09:21:02] IMAP4< 1007 OK [READ-WRITE] Ok [09:21:02] IMAP4- [fetching flags...] [09:21:02] IMAP4> 1008 UID FETCH 1:* (FLAGS UID) [09:21:03] IMAP4< [FETCH data - 4096 bytes] [09:21:03] IMAP4< [FETCH data - 4096 bytes] [09:21:03] IMAP4< [FETCH data - 4096 bytes] [09:21:03] IMAP4< [FETCH data - 4096 bytes] [09:21:04] IMAP4< [FETCH data - 4096 bytes] [09:21:04] IMAP4< [FETCH data - 4096 bytes] [09:21:04] IMAP4< [FETCH data - 816 bytes] [09:21:04] IMAP4> 1009 STATUS "INBOX.Sent" (MESSAGES UIDNEXT UIDVALIDITY UNSEEN) [09:21:04] IMAP4< * STATUS "INBOX.Sent" (MESSAGES 152 UIDNEXT 301 UIDVALIDITY 1419255195 UNSEEN 0) [09:21:04] IMAP4< 1009 OK STATUS Completed. [09:21:04] IMAP4> 1010 STATUS "INBOX.Queue" (MESSAGES UIDNEXT UIDVALIDITY UNSEEN) [09:21:04] IMAP4< * STATUS "INBOX.Queue" (MESSAGES 0 UIDNEXT 901 UIDVALIDITY 1424525859 UNSEEN 0) [09:21:04] IMAP4< 1010 OK STATUS Completed. [09:21:04] IMAP4> 1011 STATUS "INBOX.Trash" (MESSAGES UIDNEXT UIDVALIDITY UNSEEN) [09:21:04] IMAP4< * STATUS "INBOX.Trash" (MESSAGES 137 UIDNEXT 1919 UIDVALIDITY 1419257969 UNSEEN 0) [09:21:04] IMAP4< 1011 OK STATUS Completed. [09:21:04] IMAP4> 1012 STATUS "INBOX.AFN" (MESSAGES UIDNEXT UIDVALIDITY UNSEEN) [09:21:05] IMAP4< * STATUS "INBOX.AFN" (MESSAGES 3 UIDNEXT 4 UIDVALIDITY 1430997668 UNSEEN 0) [09:21:05] IMAP4< 1012 OK STATUS Completed. [09:21:05] IMAP4> 1013 STATUS "INBOX.Canon G15" (MESSAGES UIDNEXT UIDVALIDITY UNSEEN) [09:21:05] IMAP4< * STATUS "INBOX.Canon G15" (MESSAGES 4 UIDNEXT 5 UIDVALIDITY 1420592436 UNSEEN 0) [09:21:05] IMAP4< 1013 OK STATUS Completed. [09:21:05] IMAP4> 1014 STATUS "INBOX.Claws Mail" (MESSAGES UIDNEXT UIDVALIDITY UNSEEN) [09:21:05] IMAP4< * STATUS "INBOX.Claws Mail" (MESSAGES 65 UIDNEXT 499 UIDVALIDITY 1431521124 UNSEEN 17) [09:21:05] IMAP4< 1014 OK STATUS Completed. [09:21:05] IMAP4> 1015 STATUS "INBOX.Highlander Fleet #14" (MESSAGES UIDNEXT UIDVALIDITY UNSEEN) [09:21:05] IMAP4< * STATUS "INBOX.Highlander Fleet #14" (MESSAGES 32 UIDNEXT 52 UIDVALIDITY 1419619767 UNSEEN 0) [09:21:05] IMAP4< 1015 OK STATUS Completed. [09:21:05] IMAP4> 1016 STATUS "INBOX.Job Search" (MESSAGES UIDNEXT UIDVALIDITY UNSEEN) [09:21:05] IMAP4< * STATUS "INBOX.Job Search" (MESSAGES 18 UIDNEXT 48 UIDVALIDITY 1429129649 UNSEEN 0) [09:21:05] IMAP4< 1016 OK STATUS Completed. [09:21:05] IMAP4> 1017 STATUS "INBOX.Job Search.BT" (MESSAGES UIDNEXT UIDVALIDITY UNSEEN) [09:21:06] IMAP4< * STATUS "INBOX.Job Search.BT" (MESSAGES 1 UIDNEXT 3 UIDVALIDITY 1442343634 UNSEEN 0) [09:21:06] IMAP4< 1017 OK STATUS Completed. [09:21:06] IMAP4> 1018 STATUS "INBOX.Job Search.CTG" (MESSAGES UIDNEXT UIDVALIDITY UNSEEN) [09:21:06] IMAP4< * STATUS "INBOX.Job Search.CTG" (MESSAGES 2 UIDNEXT 5 UIDVALIDITY 1442415022 UNSEEN 0) [09:21:06] IMAP4< 1018 OK STATUS Completed. [09:21:06] IMAP4> 1019 STATUS "INBOX.Job Search.Everstream" (MESSAGES UIDNEXT UIDVALIDITY UNSEEN) [09:21:06] IMAP4< * STATUS "INBOX.Job Search.Everstream" (MESSAGES 12 UIDNEXT 19 UIDVALIDITY 1440783489 UNSEEN 0) [09:21:06] IMAP4< 1019 OK STATUS Completed. [09:21:06] IMAP4> 1020 STATUS "INBOX.Job Search.Evolve IP" (MESSAGES UIDNEXT UIDVALIDITY UNSEEN) [09:21:06] IMAP4< * STATUS "INBOX.Job Search.Evolve IP" (MESSAGES 17 UIDNEXT 26 UIDVALIDITY 1442415044 UNSEEN 0) [09:21:06] IMAP4< 1020 OK STATUS Completed. [09:21:06] IMAP4> 1021 STATUS "INBOX.Job Search.F5" (MESSAGES UIDNEXT UIDVALIDITY UNSEEN) [09:21:06] IMAP4< * STATUS "INBOX.Job Search.F5" (MESSAGES 5 UIDNEXT 7 UIDVALIDITY 1442493110 UNSEEN 0) [09:21:06] IMAP4< 1021 OK STATUS Completed. [09:21:06] IMAP4> 1022 STATUS "INBOX.Job Search.LHH" (MESSAGES UIDNEXT UIDVALIDITY UNSEEN) [09:21:06] IMAP4< * STATUS "INBOX.Job Search.LHH" (MESSAGES 16 UIDNEXT 18 UIDVALIDITY 1441215830 UNSEEN 0) [09:21:06] IMAP4< 1022 OK STATUS Completed. [09:21:06] IMAP4> 1023 STATUS "INBOX.Job Search.Lumos" (MESSAGES UIDNEXT UIDVALIDITY UNSEEN) [09:21:07] IMAP4< * STATUS "INBOX.Job Search.Lumos" (MESSAGES 7 UIDNEXT 10 UIDVALIDITY 1440813459 UNSEEN 0) [09:21:07] IMAP4< 1023 OK STATUS Completed. [09:21:07] IMAP4> 1024 STATUS "INBOX.Job Search.Microcorp" (MESSAGES UIDNEXT UIDVALIDITY UNSEEN) [09:21:07] IMAP4< * STATUS "INBOX.Job Search.Microcorp" (MESSAGES 9 UIDNEXT 13 UIDVALIDITY 1441843601 UNSEEN 0) [09:21:07] IMAP4< 1024 OK STATUS Completed. [09:21:07] IMAP4> 1025 STATUS "INBOX.Job Search.ODJFS" (MESSAGES UIDNEXT UIDVALIDITY UNSEEN) [09:21:07] IMAP4< * STATUS "INBOX.Job Search.ODJFS" (MESSAGES 29 UIDNEXT 58 UIDVALIDITY 1441370176 UNSEEN 0) [09:21:07] IMAP4< 1025 OK STATUS Completed. [09:21:07] IMAP4> 1026 STATUS "INBOX.Job Search.Recruiter info" (MESSAGES UIDNEXT UIDVALIDITY UNSEEN) [09:21:07] IMAP4< * STATUS "INBOX.Job Search.Recruiter info" (MESSAGES 16 UIDNEXT 22 UIDVALIDITY 1440783617 UNSEEN 0) [09:21:07] IMAP4< 1026 OK STATUS Completed. [09:21:07] IMAP4> 1027 STATUS "INBOX.Job Search.RSA - SE Cleveland" (MESSAGES UIDNEXT UIDVALIDITY UNSEEN) [09:21:07] IMAP4< * STATUS "INBOX.Job Search.RSA - SE Cleveland" (MESSAGES 6 UIDNEXT 10 UIDVALIDITY 1440783724 UNSEEN 0) [09:21:07] IMAP4< 1027 OK STATUS Completed. [09:21:07] IMAP4> 1028 STATUS "INBOX.Job Search.Temp work" (MESSAGES UIDNEXT UIDVALIDITY UNSEEN) [09:21:08] IMAP4< * STATUS "INBOX.Job Search.Temp work" (MESSAGES 1 UIDNEXT 3 UIDVALIDITY 1442584296 UNSEEN 0) [09:21:08] IMAP4< 1028 OK STATUS Completed. [09:21:08] IMAP4> 1029 STATUS "INBOX.Job Search.TWC" (MESSAGES UIDNEXT UIDVALIDITY UNSEEN) [09:21:08] IMAP4< * STATUS "INBOX.Job Search.TWC" (MESSAGES 20 UIDNEXT 31 UIDVALIDITY 1440783501 UNSEEN 0) [09:21:08] IMAP4< 1029 OK STATUS Completed. [09:21:08] IMAP4> 1030 STATUS "INBOX.Job Search.USAJOBS" (MESSAGES UIDNEXT UIDVALIDITY UNSEEN) [09:21:08] IMAP4< * STATUS "INBOX.Job Search.USAJOBS" (MESSAGES 6 UIDNEXT 11 UIDVALIDITY 1443535890 UNSEEN 0) [09:21:08] IMAP4< 1030 OK STATUS Completed. [09:21:08] IMAP4> 1031 STATUS "INBOX.Job Search.VMWare training" (MESSAGES UIDNEXT UIDVALIDITY UNSEEN) [09:21:08] IMAP4< * STATUS "INBOX.Job Search.VMWare training" (MESSAGES 7 UIDNEXT 8 UIDVALIDITY 1440767430 UNSEEN 0) [09:21:08] IMAP4< 1031 OK STATUS Completed. [09:21:08] IMAP4> 1032 STATUS "INBOX.list-serve info" (MESSAGES UIDNEXT UIDVALIDITY UNSEEN) [09:21:08] IMAP4< * STATUS "INBOX.list-serve info" (MESSAGES 0 UIDNEXT 1 UIDVALIDITY 1443993555 UNSEEN 0) [09:21:08] IMAP4< 1032 OK STATUS Completed. [09:21:08] IMAP4> 1033 STATUS "INBOX.list-serve info.gpg forum" (MESSAGES UIDNEXT UIDVALIDITY UNSEEN) [09:21:09] IMAP4< * STATUS "INBOX.list-serve info.gpg forum" (MESSAGES 2 UIDNEXT 5 UIDVALIDITY 1443993578 UNSEEN 0) [09:21:09] IMAP4< 1033 OK STATUS Completed. [09:21:09] IMAP4> 1034 STATUS "INBOX.Reno Projects" (MESSAGES UIDNEXT UIDVALIDITY UNSEEN) [09:21:09] IMAP4< * STATUS "INBOX.Reno Projects" (MESSAGES 6 UIDNEXT 13 UIDVALIDITY 1422999859 UNSEEN 0) [09:21:09] IMAP4< 1034 OK STATUS Completed. [09:21:09] IMAP4> 1035 STATUS "INBOX.Reno Projects.AC" (MESSAGES UIDNEXT UIDVALIDITY UNSEEN) [09:21:09] IMAP4< * STATUS "INBOX.Reno Projects.AC" (MESSAGES 1 UIDNEXT 2 UIDVALIDITY 1441730238 UNSEEN 0) [09:21:09] IMAP4< 1035 OK STATUS Completed. [09:21:09] IMAP4> 1036 STATUS "INBOX.Reno Projects.Fence" (MESSAGES UIDNEXT UIDVALIDITY UNSEEN) [09:21:09] IMAP4< * STATUS "INBOX.Reno Projects.Fence" (MESSAGES 1 UIDNEXT 3 UIDVALIDITY 1440526972 UNSEEN 0) [09:21:09] IMAP4< 1036 OK STATUS Completed. [09:21:09] IMAP4> 1037 STATUS "INBOX.Reno Projects.Porch" (MESSAGES UIDNEXT UIDVALIDITY UNSEEN) [09:21:10] IMAP4< * STATUS "INBOX.Reno Projects.Porch" (MESSAGES 15 UIDNEXT 16 UIDVALIDITY 1422999869 UNSEEN 0) [09:21:10] IMAP4< 1037 OK STATUS Completed. [09:21:10] IMAP4> 1038 STATUS "INBOX.Reno Projects.Roof" (MESSAGES UIDNEXT UIDVALIDITY UNSEEN) [09:21:10] IMAP4< * STATUS "INBOX.Reno Projects.Roof" (MESSAGES 2 UIDNEXT 3 UIDVALIDITY 1433423600 UNSEEN 0) [09:21:10] IMAP4< 1038 OK STATUS Completed. [09:21:10] IMAP4> 1039 STATUS "INBOX.Retirement - Investment" (MESSAGES UIDNEXT UIDVALIDITY UNSEEN) [09:21:10] IMAP4< * STATUS "INBOX.Retirement - Investment" (MESSAGES 10 UIDNEXT 15 UIDVALIDITY 1425318138 UNSEEN 0) [09:21:10] IMAP4< 1039 OK STATUS Completed. [09:21:10] IMAP4> 1040 STATUS "INBOX.Runbox Q&-A" (MESSAGES UIDNEXT UIDVALIDITY UNSEEN) [09:21:10] IMAP4< * STATUS "INBOX.Runbox Q&-A" (MESSAGES 7 UIDNEXT 8 UIDVALIDITY 1424812651 UNSEEN 0) [09:21:10] IMAP4< 1040 OK STATUS Completed. [09:21:10] IMAP4> 1041 STATUS "INBOX.Saved" (MESSAGES UIDNEXT UIDVALIDITY UNSEEN) [09:21:10] IMAP4< * STATUS "INBOX.Saved" (MESSAGES 46 UIDNEXT 87 UIDVALIDITY 1419427935 UNSEEN 0) [09:21:10] IMAP4< 1041 OK STATUS Completed. [09:21:10] IMAP4> 1042 STATUS "INBOX.Saved.UH" (MESSAGES UIDNEXT UIDVALIDITY UNSEEN) [09:21:11] IMAP4< * STATUS "INBOX.Saved.UH" (MESSAGES 5 UIDNEXT 8 UIDVALIDITY 1441380209 UNSEEN 0) [09:21:11] IMAP4< 1042 OK STATUS Completed. [09:21:11] IMAP4> 1043 STATUS "INBOX.sent2" (MESSAGES UIDNEXT UIDVALIDITY UNSEEN) [09:21:11] IMAP4< 1043 NO Mailbox does not exist, or must be subscribed to. ** IMAP error on imap99.runbox.com: STATUS error [09:21:11] IMAP4> 1044 STATUS "INBOX.Soccer" (MESSAGES UIDNEXT UIDVALIDITY UNSEEN) [09:21:11] IMAP4< * STATUS "INBOX.Soccer" (MESSAGES 2 UIDNEXT 3 UIDVALIDITY 1430745242 UNSEEN 0) [09:21:11] IMAP4< 1044 OK STATUS Completed. [09:21:11] IMAP4> 1045 STATUS "INBOX.Spam" (MESSAGES UIDNEXT UIDVALIDITY UNSEEN) [09:21:11] IMAP4< * STATUS "INBOX.Spam" (MESSAGES 2 UIDNEXT 6 UIDVALIDITY 1424719236 UNSEEN 2) [09:21:11] IMAP4< 1045 OK STATUS Completed. [09:21:11] IMAP4> 1046 STATUS "INBOX.Sylpheed" (MESSAGES UIDNEXT UIDVALIDITY UNSEEN) [09:21:11] IMAP4< * STATUS "INBOX.Sylpheed" (MESSAGES 1 UIDNEXT 2 UIDVALIDITY 1419883374 UNSEEN 0) [09:21:11] IMAP4< 1046 OK STATUS Completed. [09:21:11] IMAP4> 1047 STATUS "INBOX.System76" (MESSAGES UIDNEXT UIDVALIDITY UNSEEN) [09:21:11] IMAP4< * STATUS "INBOX.System76" (MESSAGES 8 UIDNEXT 17 UIDVALIDITY 1442514798 UNSEEN 0) [09:21:11] IMAP4< 1047 OK STATUS Completed. [09:21:11] IMAP4> 1048 STATUS "INBOX.Tails" (MESSAGES UIDNEXT UIDVALIDITY UNSEEN) [09:21:12] IMAP4< * STATUS "INBOX.Tails" (MESSAGES 1 UIDNEXT 2 UIDVALIDITY 1434456033 UNSEEN 0) [09:21:12] IMAP4< 1048 OK STATUS Completed. [09:21:12] IMAP4> 1049 STATUS "INBOX.Taxes" (MESSAGES UIDNEXT UIDVALIDITY UNSEEN) [09:21:12] IMAP4< * STATUS "INBOX.Taxes" (MESSAGES 12 UIDNEXT 21 UIDVALIDITY 1419429760 UNSEEN 0) [09:21:12] IMAP4< 1049 OK STATUS Completed. [09:21:12] IMAP4> 1050 STATUS "INBOX.TO" (MESSAGES UIDNEXT UIDVALIDITY UNSEEN) [09:21:12] IMAP4< * STATUS "INBOX.TO" (MESSAGES 0 UIDNEXT 1 UIDVALIDITY 1430477588 UNSEEN 0) [09:21:12] IMAP4< 1050 OK STATUS Completed. [09:21:12] IMAP4> 1051 STATUS "INBOX.Vacation info" (MESSAGES UIDNEXT UIDVALIDITY UNSEEN) [09:21:12] IMAP4< * STATUS "INBOX.Vacation info" (MESSAGES 12 UIDNEXT 25 UIDVALIDITY 1419619149 UNSEEN 0) [09:21:12] IMAP4< 1051 OK STATUS Completed. [09:21:12] IMAP4> 1052 STATUS "INBOX.Vacation info.China 2014" (MESSAGES UIDNEXT UIDVALIDITY UNSEEN) [09:21:13] IMAP4< * STATUS "INBOX.Vacation info.China 2014" (MESSAGES 7 UIDNEXT 15 UIDVALIDITY 1419619168 UNSEEN 0) [09:21:13] IMAP4< 1052 OK STATUS Completed. [09:21:13] IMAP4> 1053 STATUS "INBOX.Vacation info.New York City" (MESSAGES UIDNEXT UIDVALIDITY UNSEEN) [09:21:13] IMAP4< * STATUS "INBOX.Vacation info.New York City" (MESSAGES 10 UIDNEXT 12 UIDVALIDITY 1430157969 UNSEEN 0) [09:21:13] IMAP4< 1053 OK STATUS Completed. [09:21:13] IMAP4> 1054 STATUS "INBOX.Vacation info.SW Harbor 2014" (MESSAGES UIDNEXT UIDVALIDITY UNSEEN) [09:21:13] IMAP4< * STATUS "INBOX.Vacation info.SW Harbor 2014" (MESSAGES 10 UIDNEXT 21 UIDVALIDITY 1419619237 UNSEEN 0) [09:21:13] IMAP4< 1054 OK STATUS Completed. [09:21:13] IMAP4> 1055 STATUS "INBOX.Vacation info.SW Harbor 2015" (MESSAGES UIDNEXT UIDVALIDITY UNSEEN) [09:21:13] IMAP4< * STATUS "INBOX.Vacation info.SW Harbor 2015" (MESSAGES 8 UIDNEXT 9 UIDVALIDITY 1422204573 UNSEEN 0) [09:21:13] IMAP4< 1055 OK STATUS Completed. [09:21:13] IMAP4> 1056 SELECT "INBOX.Drafts" [09:21:13] IMAP4< * FLAGS (\Draft \Answered \Flagged \Deleted \Seen \Recent) [09:21:13] IMAP4< * OK [PERMANENTFLAGS (\Draft \Answered \Flagged \Deleted \Seen)] Limited [09:21:13] IMAP4< * 1962 EXISTS [09:21:13] IMAP4< * 0 RECENT [09:21:13] IMAP4< * OK [UIDVALIDITY 1419265833] Ok [09:21:13] IMAP4< * OK [MYRIGHTS "acdilrsw"] ACL [09:21:13] IMAP4< 1056 OK [READ-WRITE] Ok [09:21:13] IMAP4> 1057 STATUS INBOX (MESSAGES UIDNEXT UIDVALIDITY UNSEEN) [09:21:14] IMAP4< * STATUS "INBOX" (MESSAGES 639 UIDNEXT 2731 UIDVALIDITY 1419255644 UNSEEN 0) [09:21:14] IMAP4< 1057 OK STATUS Completed. [09:21:14] IMAP4> 1058 SELECT INBOX [09:21:14] IMAP4< * FLAGS (\Draft \Answered \Flagged \Deleted \Seen \Recent) [09:21:14] IMAP4< * OK [PERMANENTFLAGS (\Draft \Answered \Flagged \Deleted \Seen)] Limited [09:21:14] IMAP4< * 639 EXISTS [09:21:14] IMAP4< * 0 RECENT [09:21:14] IMAP4< * OK [UIDVALIDITY 1419255644] Ok [09:21:14] IMAP4< * OK [MYRIGHTS "acdilrsw"] ACL [09:21:14] IMAP4< 1058 OK [READ-WRITE] Ok [09:21:14] IMAP4- [fetching flags...] [09:21:14] IMAP4> 1059 UID FETCH 1:* (FLAGS UID) [09:21:14] IMAP4< [FETCH data - 4096 bytes] [09:21:14] IMAP4< [FETCH data - 4096 bytes] [09:21:15] IMAP4< [FETCH data - 4096 bytes] [09:21:15] IMAP4< [FETCH data - 4096 bytes] [09:21:15] IMAP4< [FETCH data - 4096 bytes] [09:21:15] IMAP4< [FETCH data - 4096 bytes] [09:21:15] IMAP4< [FETCH data - 816 bytes] [09:21:35] IMAP4> 507 NOOP [09:21:35] IMAP4< 507 OK Success [09:21:53] IMAP4> 1060 NOOP [09:21:53] IMAP4< 1060 OK NOOP completed [09:21:54] IMAP4> 1061 SELECT "INBOX.Queue" [09:21:54] IMAP4< * FLAGS (\Draft \Answered \Flagged \Deleted \Seen \Recent) [09:21:54] IMAP4< * OK [PERMANENTFLAGS (\Draft \Answered \Flagged \Deleted \Seen)] Limited [09:21:54] IMAP4< * 0 EXISTS [09:21:54] IMAP4< * 0 RECENT [09:21:54] IMAP4< * OK [UIDVALIDITY 1424525859] Ok [09:21:54] IMAP4< * OK [MYRIGHTS "acdilrsw"] ACL [09:21:54] IMAP4< 1061 OK [READ-WRITE] Ok [09:21:54] IMAP4- [fetching UIDs...] [09:21:54] IMAP4> 1062 UID FETCH 1:* (UID) [09:21:54] IMAP4< 1062 OK FETCH completed. [09:21:54] IMAP4> 1063 APPEND "INBOX.Queue" (\Seen) {766} [09:21:54] IMAP4< + OK [09:21:54] IMAP4> [data - 768 bytes] [09:21:54] IMAP4< 1063 OK [APPENDUID 1424525859 901] APPEND Ok. [09:21:54] IMAP4> 1064 NOOP [09:21:55] IMAP4< * 1 EXISTS [09:21:55] IMAP4< * 1 RECENT [09:21:55] IMAP4< 1064 OK NOOP completed [09:21:55] IMAP4> 1065 UID STORE 901 +FLAGS.SILENT (\Seen) [09:21:55] IMAP4< 1065 OK STORE completed. [09:21:55] IMAP4> 1066 UID STORE 901 +FLAGS.SILENT (\Deleted) [09:21:55] IMAP4< 1066 OK STORE completed. [09:21:55] IMAP4> 1067 EXPUNGE [09:21:55] IMAP4< 1067 OK EXPUNGE completed [09:21:55] IMAP4- [fetching UIDs...] [09:21:55] IMAP4> 1068 UID FETCH 1:* (UID) [09:21:55] IMAP4< * 1 FETCH (UID 902) [09:21:55] IMAP4< 1068 OK FETCH completed. [09:21:55] IMAP4> 1069 UID FETCH 902 BODY.PEEK[] [09:21:55] IMAP4< [FETCH data - 801 bytes] [09:21:56] IMAP4< ) [09:21:56] IMAP4< 1069 OK FETCH completed. [09:21:56] IMAP4- [fetching flags...] [09:21:56] IMAP4> 1070 UID FETCH 1:* (FLAGS UID) [09:21:56] IMAP4< * 1 FETCH (FLAGS (\Seen \Recent) UID 902) [09:21:56] IMAP4< 1070 OK FETCH completed. [09:21:56] IMAP4> 1071 UID STORE 902 +FLAGS.SILENT (\Deleted) [09:21:56] IMAP4< 1071 OK STORE completed. [09:21:56] IMAP4> 1072 EXPUNGE [09:21:56] IMAP4< * 1 EXPUNGE [09:21:56] IMAP4< * 0 EXISTS [09:21:56] IMAP4< * 0 RECENT [09:21:56] IMAP4< 1072 OK EXPUNGE completed [09:22:35] IMAP4> 508 NOOP [09:22:35] IMAP4< 508 OK Success [09:22:53] IMAP4> 1073 NOOP [09:22:53] IMAP4< 1073 OK NOOP completed From neal at walfield.org Mon Oct 5 23:46:57 2015 From: neal at walfield.org (Neal H. Walfield) Date: Mon, 05 Oct 2015 23:46:57 +0200 Subject: Portable version of modern GnuOG In-Reply-To: <5612CDF6.2060008@cajuntechie.org> References: <5612CDF6.2060008@cajuntechie.org> Message-ID: <87d1wt9eem.wl-neal@walfield.org> At Mon, 5 Oct 2015 14:22:30 -0500, Anthony Papillion wrote: > I'm working on a project that requires a portable version of GnuPG and > I'd like to use a modern version of it. As far as I can tell from > searching, GnuPG stopped being portable somewhere in the 1.4.x branch. GnuPG 2.x is still portable. What platform are you targetting? What issues are you running into? :) Neal From yuri.kanivetsky at gmail.com Tue Oct 6 10:23:03 2015 From: yuri.kanivetsky at gmail.com (Yuri Kanivetsky) Date: Tue, 6 Oct 2015 11:23:03 +0300 Subject: ?: keys.gnupg.net: Host not found Message-ID: Hi, I can easily reproduce the issue on vagrant VMs (virtualbox, https://www.vagrantup.com/). At least on ubuntu/trusty64 vagrant box. And I was probably able to reproduce it on VM created manually, not sure about it. Didn't try much on host machines. $ gpg --keyserver hkp://keys.gnupg.net --recv-keys 409B6B1796C275462A1703113804BB82D39DC0E3 gpg: requesting key D39DC0E3 from hkp server keys.gnupg.net ?: keys.gnupg.net: Host not found gpgkeys: HTTP fetch error 7: couldn't connect: Success gpg: no valid OpenPGP data found. gpg: Total number processed: 0 Here are some related links: https://bugs.launchpad.net/ubuntu/+source/gnupg/+bug/1044156 https://github.com/protobox/protobox/issues/159 https://github.com/rvm/rvm/issues/3110#issuecomment-95161168 I used this command to investigate the issue: $ i=0; while true; do echo "--- $i"; gpg --delete-key --batch --yes D39DC0E3; gpg --keyserver hkp://keys.gnupg.net --recv-keys 409B6B1796C275462A1703113804BB82D39DC0E3 || { echo -e $? '\a'; break; }; sleep 5; : $(( i++ )); done Relogging in the VM seems to help. Using canonical name (CNAME, pool.sks-keyservers.net) or IP address seems to help as well. I can ping keys.gnupg.net, when this happens: vagrant at vagrant-ubuntu-trusty-64:~$ ping keys.gnupg.net PING pool.sks-keyservers.net (223.252.21.101) 56(84) bytes of data. 64 bytes from svcs4.riverwillow.net.au (223.252.21.101): icmp_seq=1 ttl=63 time=358 ms 64 bytes from svcs4.riverwillow.net.au (223.252.21.101): icmp_seq=2 ttl=63 time=359 ms 64 bytes from svcs4.riverwillow.net.au (223.252.21.101): icmp_seq=3 ttl=63 time=360 ms 64 bytes from svcs4.riverwillow.net.au (223.252.21.101): icmp_seq=4 ttl=63 time=359 ms ^C --- pool.sks-keyservers.net ping statistics --- 4 packets transmitted, 4 received, 0% packet loss, time 3004ms rtt min/avg/max/mdev = 358.999/359.600/360.172/0.857 ms vagrant at vagrant-ubuntu-trusty-64:~$ gpg --keyserver hkp://keys.gnupg.net --recv-keys 409B6B1796C275462A1703113804BB82D39DC0E3 gpg: requesting key D39DC0E3 from hkp server keys.gnupg.net ?: keys.gnupg.net: Host not found gpgkeys: HTTP fetch error 7: couldn't connect: Success gpg: no valid OpenPGP data found. gpg: Total number processed: 0 vagrant at vagrant-ubuntu-trusty-64:~$ ping keys.gnupg.net PING pool.sks-keyservers.net (80.108.223.189) 56(84) bytes of data. 64 bytes from chello080108223189.4.13.vie.surfer.at (80.108.223.189): icmp_seq=1 ttl=63 time=60.4 ms 64 bytes from chello080108223189.4.13.vie.surfer.at (80.108.223.189): icmp_seq=2 ttl=63 time=60.5 ms ^C --- pool.sks-keyservers.net ping statistics --- 2 packets transmitted, 2 received, 0% packet loss, time 1001ms rtt min/avg/max/mdev = 60.434/60.473/60.512/0.039 ms Do you have any clues? Is there anything I can check? I'm not using proxy, if anything. Regards, Yuri -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From kristian.fiskerstrand at sumptuouscapital.com Tue Oct 6 12:39:08 2015 From: kristian.fiskerstrand at sumptuouscapital.com (Kristian Fiskerstrand) Date: Tue, 6 Oct 2015 12:39:08 +0200 Subject: ?: keys.gnupg.net: Host not found In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <5613A4CC.60204@sumptuouscapital.com> On 10/06/2015 10:23 AM, Yuri Kanivetsky wrote: > Hi, > .. > > Do you have any clues? Is there anything I can check? I'm not using > proxy, if anything. > > Regards, Yuri It would be helpful to have information regarding which version of gnupg this is using, and if <2.1 how the keyserver helpers were built, primarily whether using full curl implementation or curl-shim. This can be checked using $ gpg --keyserver-options verbose,debug --keyserver hkp://keys.gnupg.net --recv-key 0x409B6B1796C275462A1703113804BB82D39DC0E3 and one one of my VMs still running 2.0 reports gpg: requesting key D39DC0E3 from hkp server keys.gnupg.net gpgkeys: curl version = libcurl/7.43.0 OpenSSL/1.0.2d zlib/1.2.8 Output from "dig" or similar tools as to the state of the DNS resolver likely used is also helpful. Another potential issue that comes up from time to time is IPv4 vs IPv6, so pay attention to the address it is trying to connect to in the output. -- ---------------------------- Kristian Fiskerstrand Blog: http://blog.sumptuouscapital.com Twitter: @krifisk ---------------------------- Public OpenPGP key 0xE3EDFAE3 at hkp://pool.sks-keyservers.net fpr:94CB AFDD 3034 5109 5618 35AA 0B7F 8B60 E3ED FAE3 ---------------------------- "The power of accurate observation is commonly called cynicism by those who have not got it." George Bernard Shaw -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: signature.asc Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 455 bytes Desc: OpenPGP digital signature URL: From rjh at sixdemonbag.org Tue Oct 6 16:07:07 2015 From: rjh at sixdemonbag.org (Robert J. Hansen) Date: Tue, 6 Oct 2015 10:07:07 -0400 Subject: First quantum gates in silicon Message-ID: <5613D58B.7010409@sixdemonbag.org> Australian researchers have figured out how to make a quantum gate on a silicon chip. This is interesting work, because we've spent a *lot* of money learning how to etch silicon. Being able to build quantum gates on the same material that our current systems use is really important from an engineering perspective. So far they've only been able to build a two-qubit chip. This means there's absolutely nothing to panic over. Still, it's fascinating news. We live in interesting times. :) http://www.engineering.unsw.edu.au/news/quantum-computing-first-two-qubit-logic-gate-in-silicon From joshterrill.dev at gmail.com Wed Oct 7 21:38:52 2015 From: joshterrill.dev at gmail.com (Joshua Terrill) Date: Wed, 7 Oct 2015 12:38:52 -0700 Subject: Just published a browser-based PGP tool Message-ID: -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA512 Hey everyone, I just wanted to show you guys a site that I published, it's a browser-based PGP tool that allows you to generate, encrypt, and decrypt PGP messages. There's no server interaction, all of the functionality of the site happens on the client. Right now it's pretty minimal and simple, but I have plans to eventually turn it into a secure mobile messaging app as well as adding more functionality such as signing, verifying, etc. I am looking for some help as I move forward with this and would greatly appreciate it if some of you would be willing to work on this with me; whether it be with coding or brainstorming/offering advice and feedback. I'm still somewhat new to encryption methods and could really use the help! If you are interested, you know my email, and my public key can be found on the contact page of the site if you want to use it. https://www.pgp4web.com/ Thanks, Josh -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1 iQIcBAEBCgAGBQJWFXSfAAoJEHZXnHymfkbcD2wQAIVXU/spn3E+zNwJ+tT00UDx B0bSTFJ+22mxxnw+w+9eX8ctrl4fVCa7QWzpe6cu8q8beNGkrmD7gQtq1HgI70H7 PeoKsTz1awDgPlG9u0q8SvFjjdbqvi1woyxoEIeWh9pGbN2yCl+jlxtoLfEAAERN Mtx+ad8OQsEfRHPgK3WngnJQfulGVrZfswjLrtOzWb+iOf8iQ9HZRTF8Y2kJ9mi4 NVaeibyRhM7uZfWhvAen03ixuWzZG9GHMwuL6Y3eIRn5QlIYWIDaCjkX03CKOx1B vkbkVonmr+P7MrN0MoS2m74GurAxqTYSLrtW/ZxshSkYqHIvp46rCFugD4Ajs3Uv H1jAjrP09sJUjDUMaiNYC9kEBqtrL/lhxuUTjAdh3eRMu2GyQMAeTNsb/D2p0ZCI xG56p3LsgAhXPp2DGJCXGBSyI3wO9Uzt5Q3pdMk16PWwPIVLIJ8NXBstME7QjbcW tU/Q6KV4+KMTa0u55X+fJ20LGwuStBdFId4ZoTl6Va/fjAKYwXzm3A1Y8z+EL7Ok vinhbtf2SohUKndAQueSvbCYYamm5oCKtmCox34NaVTfw1LuwfeaAL0ok53loCwn vBlBdJ1WY9gHhfogRnpwgt4SOkMdGY8s/GfKqgY2kcV903faUVKmkyzwFhdqOhQ3 3l771M348CWuPWjgPT74 =k4ia -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From malte at wk3.org Thu Oct 8 09:41:51 2015 From: malte at wk3.org (malte at wk3.org) Date: Thu, 08 Oct 2015 09:41:51 +0200 Subject: Just published a browser-based PGP tool In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20151008074151.3360.39060@solidarity.enteig.net> Quoting Joshua Terrill (2015-10-07 21:38:52) > https://www.pgp4web.com/ Hi, why don't you contribute to projects that already do that? https://whiteout.io https://www.mailvelope.com/ https://encrypt.to/ http://www.openkeychain.org/ https://github.com/siacs/Conversations https://modernpgp.org/ just to name a few. Sincerely, Malte From m.mansfeld at mansfeld-elektronik.de Thu Oct 8 10:06:19 2015 From: m.mansfeld at mansfeld-elektronik.de (Matthias Mansfeld) Date: Thu, 08 Oct 2015 10:06:19 +0200 Subject: Heise: Security problem in PGP-Standard Message-ID: <561623FB.12898.6EE699F@m.mansfeld.mansfeld-elektronik.de> Hello, I think they open up a quite old "can of worms", but maybe again with a bit devastating effect, as, ya know, it's heise, not an unknown geek list....... Original article is only in German language, sorry... http://heise.de/-2840052 Forscher demonstriert L?cke im PGP-Standard heise Security 08.10.2015 09:39 Uhr J?rgen Schmidt "Durch die R?ckw?rtskompatibilit?t k?nnten Angreifer verschl?sselte und signierte Nachrichten nachtr?glich manipulieren. Immerhin geben aktuelle GnuPG-Versionen dann einen Hinweis auf m?gliche Probleme." Background in English: http://www.metzdowd.com/pipermail/cryptography/2015-October/026685.html -- Unsere Korrespondenz kann mitgelesen werden. Wollen Sie das erschweren, mailen wir uns gerne mit (Open)PGP verschl?sselt. -- Matthias Mansfeld Elektronik * Leiterplattenlayout Neithardtstr. 3, 85540 Haar; Tel.: 089/4620 093-7, Fax: -8 Internet: http://www.mansfeld-elektronik.de OpenPGP: http://www.mansfeld-elektronik.de/gnupgkey/mansfeld.asc Fingerprint: 6563 057D E6B8 9105 1CE4 18D0 4056 1F54 8B59 40EF From jhs at berklix.com Thu Oct 8 11:56:23 2015 From: jhs at berklix.com (Julian H. Stacey) Date: Thu, 08 Oct 2015 11:56:23 +0200 Subject: Heise: Security problem in PGP-Standard In-Reply-To: Your message "Thu, 08 Oct 2015 10:06:19 +0200." <561623FB.12898.6EE699F@m.mansfeld.mansfeld-elektronik.de> Message-ID: <201510080956.t989uNQN016508@fire.js.berklix.net> "Matthias Mansfeld" wrote: > Hello, > > I think they open up a quite old "can of worms", but maybe again with > a bit devastating effect, as, ya know, it's heise, not an unknown > geek list....... > > Original article is only in German language, sorry... > > http://heise.de/-2840052 > Forscher demonstriert L?cke im PGP-Standard > heise Security > 08.10.2015 09:39 Uhr J?rgen Schmidt > > "Durch die R?ckw?rtskompatibilit?t k?nnten Angreifer verschl?sselte > und signierte Nachrichten nachtr?glich manipulieren. Immerhin geben > aktuelle GnuPG-Versionen dann einen Hinweis auf m?gliche Probleme." > > Background in English: > > http://www.metzdowd.com/pipermail/cryptography/2015-October/026685.html List of translator server sites http://berklix.com/~jhs/trans/ Cheers, Julian -- Julian Stacey, BSD Linux Unix Sys. Eng. Consultant Munich http://berklix.com Reply After previous text to preserve context, as in a play script. Indent previous text with > Insert new lines before 80 chars. Use plain text, Not quoted-printable, Not HTML, Not base64, Not MS.doc. From diafygi at gmail.com Thu Oct 8 17:48:59 2015 From: diafygi at gmail.com (Daniel Roesler) Date: Thu, 8 Oct 2015 08:48:59 -0700 Subject: Just published a browser-based PGP tool In-Reply-To: <20151008074151.3360.39060@solidarity.enteig.net> References: <20151008074151.3360.39060@solidarity.enteig.net> Message-ID: It looks like this is just a barebones unhosted OpenPGP interface. All the others you listed try to do more (email, mobile apps, etc.). If I just want to quickly encrypt/decrypt/sign/verify a file, this let's me do it in seconds without any sort of signup or trouble. Ideally, you could just download the source and open it locally for a quick, cross-compatible OpenPGP user interface without having to install anything or get admin privileges. I should work anywhere you can open it in a browser (which is what I love about unhosted apps). Really sad to see it isn't open source yet... Daniel On Thu, Oct 8, 2015 at 12:41 AM, wrote: > Quoting Joshua Terrill (2015-10-07 21:38:52) >> https://www.pgp4web.com/ > > Hi, > > why don't you contribute to projects that already do that? > > https://whiteout.io An email app, not a straight > https://www.mailvelope.com/ > https://encrypt.to/ > http://www.openkeychain.org/ > https://github.com/siacs/Conversations > https://modernpgp.org/ > > just to name a few. > > > Sincerely, > > Malte > > _______________________________________________ > Gnupg-users mailing list > Gnupg-users at gnupg.org > http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users From yuri.kanivetsky at gmail.com Thu Oct 8 20:39:24 2015 From: yuri.kanivetsky at gmail.com (Yuri Kanivetsky) Date: Thu, 8 Oct 2015 21:39:24 +0300 Subject: ?: keys.gnupg.net: Host not found In-Reply-To: <5613A4CC.60204@sumptuouscapital.com> References: <5613A4CC.60204@sumptuouscapital.com> Message-ID: Hi, First, the domain name resolves to a bunch of IPs: $ dig +noall +answer keys.gnupg.net keys.gnupg.net. 62665 IN CNAME pool.sks-keyservers.net. pool.sks-keyservers.net. 60 IN A 209.135.211.141 pool.sks-keyservers.net. 60 IN A 223.252.21.101 pool.sks-keyservers.net. 60 IN A 5.45.99.106 pool.sks-keyservers.net. 60 IN A 5.135.158.148 pool.sks-keyservers.net. 60 IN A 78.46.223.54 pool.sks-keyservers.net. 60 IN A 94.142.242.225 pool.sks-keyservers.net. 60 IN A 137.158.82.7 pool.sks-keyservers.net. 60 IN A 161.53.2.219 pool.sks-keyservers.net. 60 IN A 176.9.51.79 pool.sks-keyservers.net. 60 IN A 198.84.249.106 And the list of IPs is not fixed (changes over time), so it must be some kind of pool (as the name suggests). Then, not all of them ping: $ dig +noall +answer keys.gnupg.net | awk '$4 == "A" { print $5 }' | while IFS= read -r; do echo '#################'; ping -c 1 "$REPLY"; done ################# PING 137.158.82.7 (137.158.82.7) 56(84) bytes of data. --- 137.158.82.7 ping statistics --- -> 1 packets transmitted, 0 received, 100% packet loss, time 0ms ################# PING 94.142.242.225 (94.142.242.225) 56(84) bytes of data. 64 bytes from 94.142.242.225: icmp_seq=1 ttl=52 time=39.1 ms --- 94.142.242.225 ping statistics --- 1 packets transmitted, 1 received, 0% packet loss, time 0ms rtt min/avg/max/mdev = 39.127/39.127/39.127/0.000 ms ################# PING 78.46.223.54 (78.46.223.54) 56(84) bytes of data. --- 78.46.223.54 ping statistics --- -> 1 packets transmitted, 0 received, 100% packet loss, time 0ms ################# PING 5.135.158.148 (5.135.158.148) 56(84) bytes of data. 64 bytes from 5.135.158.148: icmp_seq=1 ttl=54 time=44.9 ms --- 5.135.158.148 ping statistics --- 1 packets transmitted, 1 received, 0% packet loss, time 0ms rtt min/avg/max/mdev = 44.999/44.999/44.999/0.000 ms ################# PING 5.45.99.106 (5.45.99.106) 56(84) bytes of data. 64 bytes from 5.45.99.106: icmp_seq=1 ttl=56 time=37.3 ms --- 5.45.99.106 ping statistics --- 1 packets transmitted, 1 received, 0% packet loss, time 0ms rtt min/avg/max/mdev = 37.300/37.300/37.300/0.000 ms ################# PING 223.252.21.101 (223.252.21.101) 56(84) bytes of data. 64 bytes from 223.252.21.101: icmp_seq=1 ttl=46 time=367 ms --- 223.252.21.101 ping statistics --- 1 packets transmitted, 1 received, 0% packet loss, time 0ms rtt min/avg/max/mdev = 367.836/367.836/367.836/0.000 ms ################# PING 209.135.211.141 (209.135.211.141) 56(84) bytes of data. 64 bytes from 209.135.211.141: icmp_seq=1 ttl=46 time=136 ms --- 209.135.211.141 ping statistics --- 1 packets transmitted, 1 received, 0% packet loss, time 0ms rtt min/avg/max/mdev = 136.886/136.886/136.886/0.000 ms ################# PING 198.84.249.106 (198.84.249.106) 56(84) bytes of data. 64 bytes from 198.84.249.106: icmp_seq=1 ttl=50 time=141 ms --- 198.84.249.106 ping statistics --- 1 packets transmitted, 1 received, 0% packet loss, time 0ms rtt min/avg/max/mdev = 141.682/141.682/141.682/0.000 ms ################# PING 176.9.51.79 (176.9.51.79) 56(84) bytes of data. 64 bytes from 176.9.51.79: icmp_seq=1 ttl=52 time=38.8 ms --- 176.9.51.79 ping statistics --- 1 packets transmitted, 1 received, 0% packet loss, time 0ms rtt min/avg/max/mdev = 38.858/38.858/38.858/0.000 ms ################# PING 161.53.2.219 (161.53.2.219) 56(84) bytes of data. 64 bytes from 161.53.2.219: icmp_seq=1 ttl=48 time=50.7 ms --- 161.53.2.219 ping statistics --- 1 packets transmitted, 1 received, 0% packet loss, time 0ms rtt min/avg/max/mdev = 50.793/50.793/50.793/0.000 ms Also, I experimented with different versions of gnupg: 1.4.18: $ gpg --version gpg (GnuPG) 1.4.18 Copyright (C) 2014 Free Software Foundation, Inc. License GPLv3+: GNU GPL version 3 or later < http://gnu.org/licenses/gpl.html> This is free software: you are free to change and redistribute it. There is NO WARRANTY, to the extent permitted by law. Home: ~/.gnupg Supported algorithms: Pubkey: RSA, RSA-E, RSA-S, ELG-E, DSA Cipher: IDEA, 3DES, CAST5, BLOWFISH, AES, AES192, AES256, TWOFISH, CAMELLIA128, CAMELLIA192, CAMELLIA256 Hash: MD5, SHA1, RIPEMD160, SHA256, SHA384, SHA512, SHA224 Compression: Uncompressed, ZIP, ZLIB, BZIP2 vagrant at vagrant-ubuntu-vivid-64:~/build/gnupg-2.0.29$ gpg --keyserver-options verbose,debug --keyserver gpg: Missing argument for option "--keyserver" $ gpg --keyserver-options verbose,debug --keyserver hkp://keys.gnupg.net --recv-key 0x409B6B1796C275462A1703113804BB82D39DC0E3 gpg: requesting key D39DC0E3 from hkp server keys.gnupg.net gpgkeys: curl version = GnuPG curl-shim * HTTP proxy is "null" * HTTP URL is " http://keys.gnupg.net:11371/pks/lookup?op=get&options=mr&search=0x409B6B1796C275462A1703113804BB82D39DC0E3 " * SRV tag is "pgpkey-http": host and port may be overridden * HTTP auth is "null" * HTTP method is GET ?: keys.gnupg.net: Host not found gpgkeys: HTTP fetch error 7: couldn't connect: Success gpg: no valid OpenPGP data found. gpg: Total number processed: 0 2.0.29: $ gpg2 --version gpg (GnuPG) 2.0.29 libgcrypt 1.6.4 Copyright (C) 2015 Free Software Foundation, Inc. License GPLv3+: GNU GPL version 3 or later < http://gnu.org/licenses/gpl.html> This is free software: you are free to change and redistribute it. There is NO WARRANTY, to the extent permitted by law. Home: ~/.gnupg Supported algorithms: Pubkey: RSA, RSA, RSA, ELG, DSA Cipher: IDEA, 3DES, CAST5, BLOWFISH, AES, AES192, AES256, TWOFISH, CAMELLIA128, CAMELLIA192, CAMELLIA256 Hash: MD5, SHA1, RIPEMD160, SHA256, SHA384, SHA512, SHA224 Compression: Uncompressed, ZIP, ZLIB $ gpg2 --keyserver-options verbose,debug --keyserver hkp:// keys.gnupg.net --recv-key 0x409B6B1796C275462A1703113804BB82D39DC0E3 gpg: requesting key D39DC0E3 from hkp server keys.gnupg.net gpgkeys: curl version = GnuPG curl-shim * HTTP proxy is "null" * HTTP URL is " http://keys.gnupg.net:11371/pks/lookup?op=get&options=mr&search=0x409B6B1796C275462A1703113804BB82D39DC0E3 " * SRV tag is "pgpkey-http": host and port may be overridden * HTTP auth is "null" * HTTP method is GET gpgkeys: can't connect to `keys.gnupg.net': host not found gpgkeys: HTTP fetch error 7: couldn't connect: Not found gpg: no valid OpenPGP data found. gpg: Total number processed: 0 gpg: keyserver communications error: Unknown host gpg: keyserver communications error: No public key gpg: keyserver receive failed: No public key 2.1.8: $ gpg2 --version gpg (GnuPG) 2.1.8 libgcrypt 1.6.4 Copyright (C) 2015 Free Software Foundation, Inc. License GPLv3+: GNU GPL version 3 or later < http://gnu.org/licenses/gpl.html> This is free software: you are free to change and redistribute it. There is NO WARRANTY, to the extent permitted by law. Home: ~/.gnupg Supported algorithms: Pubkey: RSA, ELG, DSA, ECDH, ECDSA, EDDSA Cipher: IDEA, 3DES, CAST5, BLOWFISH, AES, AES192, AES256, TWOFISH, CAMELLIA128, CAMELLIA192, CAMELLIA256 Hash: SHA1, RIPEMD160, SHA256, SHA384, SHA512, SHA224 Compression: Uncompressed, ZIP, ZLIB $ gpg2 --keyserver hkp://keys.gnupg.net --recv-key 0x409B6B1796C275462A1703113804BB82D39DC0E3 gpg: keyserver receive failed: No keyserver available And we can see that error messages change over time, but doesn't get much better. Or so I think. Moreover, I've found the last message here: http://git.gnupg.org/cgi-bin/gitweb.cgi?p=libgpg-error.git;a=blob;f=src/err-codes.h.in;h=e05d41fe4193090aff91c220ce621435688dd80c;hb=HEAD#l218 So, the culprit must be gnupg. As such, the first question is, "Do you think the message clearly describes what happened?" Then, can't it pick the first IP that works? And what's wrong with this keyserver? Is it an official one? If such a thing exists, that is. Can you recommend any other, that have better uptime. AFAICS, there is at least one IP that doesn't work. And finally, why can't I reproduce it on the host machine, running Arch Linux with gnupg-2.1.8? The tests in the email I did on Ubuntu Vivid. Regards, Yuri -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From yuri.kanivetsky at gmail.com Thu Oct 8 20:44:50 2015 From: yuri.kanivetsky at gmail.com (Yuri Kanivetsky) Date: Thu, 8 Oct 2015 21:44:50 +0300 Subject: ?: keys.gnupg.net: Host not found In-Reply-To: References: <5613A4CC.60204@sumptuouscapital.com> Message-ID: > So, the culprit must be gnupg. I meant "partly gnupg." Sorry for separate email. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From antony at blazrsoft.com Thu Oct 8 21:26:39 2015 From: antony at blazrsoft.com (Antony Prince) Date: Thu, 8 Oct 2015 15:26:39 -0400 Subject: ?: keys.gnupg.net: Host not found In-Reply-To: References: <5613A4CC.60204@sumptuouscapital.com> Message-ID: <5616C36F.2000602@blazrsoft.com> On 10/08/2015 02:39 PM, Yuri Kanivetsky wrote: > Hi, > > First, the domain name resolves to a bunch of IPs: > ... > > And the list of IPs is not fixed (changes over time), so it must be some > kind of pool (as the name suggests). Then, not all of them ping: It is a pool. keys.gnupg.net is just an alias for the SKS server pool[1], IIRC. I host a server in this pool and it is set to drop all IPv4 ICMP packets, so will not respond to a ping even though the server is online. It will respond to ICMPv6 pings however. ... > > Then, can't it pick the first IP that works? And what's wrong with this > keyserver? Is it an official one? If such a thing exists, that is. Can > you recommend any other, that have better uptime. AFAICS, there is at > least one IP that doesn't work. And finally, why can't I reproduce it on > the host machine, running Arch Linux with gnupg-2.1.8? The tests in the > email I did on Ubuntu Vivid. > Only servers running SKS 1.1.5 or higher are allowed in the pool. Inclusion in the pool is voluntary, so there aren't any "official" servers, so to speak, but there are criteria for being included in the main pool. These include having a reverse proxy in front of the sks server, the hostname of the server must resolve properly, and the server cannot be missing more than a certain percentage of keys compared to other servers in the pool. The pool is checked every hour and only servers meeting the criteria are included. Using a specific keyserver is generally frowned upon since the pool was created to help distribute the load evenly over the servers. As far as uptime, if the server did not respond during the last check of the pool, it will not be included. So, in rare cases, there may be one or two servers in the pool that are not currently responding, but did so during the last check of the pool. If they do not respond at the next check, they are removed from the main pool. I am also NOT able to reproduce this error on XUbuntu 14.04 x64: gpg (GnuPG) 2.1.8 libgcrypt 1.7.0-beta261 Copyright (C) 2015 Free Software Foundation, Inc. License GPLv3+: GNU GPL version 3 or later This is free software: you are free to change and redistribute it. There is NO WARRANTY, to the extent permitted by law. Home: ~/.gnupg Supported algorithms: Pubkey: RSA, ELG, DSA, ECDH, ECDSA, EDDSA Cipher: IDEA, 3DES, CAST5, BLOWFISH, AES, AES192, AES256, TWOFISH, CAMELLIA128, CAMELLIA192, CAMELLIA256 Hash: SHA1, RIPEMD160, SHA256, SHA384, SHA512, SHA224 Compression: Uncompressed, ZIP, ZLIB, BZIP2 antony at 050415:~/Desktop$ gpg2 --keyserver hkp://keys.gnupg.net --recv-key 0x409B6B1796C275462A1703113804BB82D39DC0E3 gpg: key D39DC0E3: public key "Michal Papis (RVM signing) " imported gpg: 3 marginal(s) needed, 1 complete(s) needed, PGP trust model gpg: depth: 0 valid: 2 signed: 2 trust: 0-, 0q, 0n, 0m, 0f, 2u gpg: depth: 1 valid: 2 signed: 0 trust: 1-, 0q, 0n, 0m, 1f, 0u gpg: next trustdb check due at 2016-10-28 gpg: Total number processed: 1 gpg: imported: 1 [1]https://sks-keyservers.net/overview-of-pools.php -- Antony Prince Key ID: 0xAF3D4087301B1B19 Fingerprint: 591FF17F7A4AA8D0F659C482AF3D4087301B1B19 URL: https://keyserver.blazrsoft.com -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: signature.asc Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 819 bytes Desc: OpenPGP digital signature URL: From peter at digitalbrains.com Thu Oct 8 21:45:23 2015 From: peter at digitalbrains.com (Peter Lebbing) Date: Thu, 08 Oct 2015 21:45:23 +0200 Subject: (OT) Blocking ICMP (was: Re: ?: keys.gnupg.net: Host not found) In-Reply-To: <5616C36F.2000602@blazrsoft.com> References: <5613A4CC.60204@sumptuouscapital.com> <5616C36F.2000602@blazrsoft.com> Message-ID: <5616C7D3.70204@digitalbrains.com> On 08/10/15 21:26, Antony Prince wrote: > I host a server in this pool and it is set to drop all IPv4 ICMP packets I hope you mean specifically dropping all ICMP echo-request packets, not all ICMP packets. Because some ICMP packets are *essential* for proper functioning of your internet connection, like path MTU discovery. Systems behind firewalls that drop all ICMP packets can never properly do path MTU discovery, and this is nicely reflected in the man page for the iptables cludge that prevents most PMTU blackhole issues: > TCPMSS [...] > > This target is used to overcome criminally braindead ISPs or servers > which block "ICMP Fragmentation Needed" or "ICMPv6 Packet Too Big" > packets. The symptoms of this problem are that everything works fine from > your Linux fire? wall/router, but machines behind it can never exchange > large packets: [...] And PMTU discovery is not the only thing affected by blocking all ICMP, but it's a biggy. HTH, Peter. PS: It is referring to "working fine from your router" because this target is for the router where the "pipe" so to say becomes "smaller": a small MTU in between larger MTU's. The router is aware of the small MTU, but other systems are not, which is why only the router works properly, provided the small MTU is the smallest on the path. -- I use the GNU Privacy Guard (GnuPG) in combination with Enigmail. You can send me encrypted mail if you want some privacy. My key is available at From antony at blazrsoft.com Thu Oct 8 21:51:17 2015 From: antony at blazrsoft.com (Antony Prince) Date: Thu, 8 Oct 2015 15:51:17 -0400 Subject: (OT) Blocking ICMP In-Reply-To: <5616C7D3.70204@digitalbrains.com> References: <5613A4CC.60204@sumptuouscapital.com> <5616C36F.2000602@blazrsoft.com> <5616C7D3.70204@digitalbrains.com> Message-ID: <5616C935.9030502@blazrsoft.com> On 10/08/2015 03:45 PM, Peter Lebbing wrote: > I hope you mean specifically dropping all ICMP echo-request packets, not all > I could've been more specific, but yes. ICMPv4 echo requests. AFAIK anyway. I haven't had a single issue with any of the traffic I route through it, so I'm assuming it is fine. Haven't looked at the iptables in a while, so I don't remember specifically. Thanks for the heads-up though. -- Antony Prince Key ID: 0xAF3D4087301B1B19 Fingerprint: 591F F17F 7A4A A8D0 F659 C482 AF3D 4087 301B 1B19 URL: http://keyserver.blazrsoft.com/pks/lookup?op=get&search=0xAF3D4087301B1B19 -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: signature.asc Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 819 bytes Desc: OpenPGP digital signature URL: From malte at wk3.org Thu Oct 8 21:56:09 2015 From: malte at wk3.org (malte at wk3.org) Date: Thu, 08 Oct 2015 21:56:09 +0200 Subject: Just published a browser-based PGP tool In-Reply-To: References: <20151008074151.3360.39060@solidarity.enteig.net> Message-ID: <20151008195609.5373.69970@solidarity.enteig.net> Quoting Daniel Roesler (2015-10-08 17:48:59) > It looks like this is just a barebones unhosted OpenPGP interface. All > the others you listed try to do more (email, mobile apps, etc.). If I > just want to quickly encrypt/decrypt/sign/verify a file, this let's me > do it in seconds without any sort of signup or trouble. Yeah, no. Nothing related to OpenPGP can be done within seconds. Because key managment. Because of key generation. Because the key material for this app is stored exactly where? How is this a "cross-compatible OpenPGP user interface" in a way that Enigmail is not, except that Enigmail uses the native key managment facilities and is thus at least more cross-compatible than the suggested solution? Also OpenPGP en- and decryption does not happen in a vacuum. You don't go like "Oh, lets just quickly encrypt that GIF to a random public key.". There is a reason why most of the projects I suggested do email. But I also suggested OpenKeyChain and I forgot http://gpg4usb.org/. > Ideally, you could just download the source and open it locally for a > quick, cross-compatible OpenPGP user interface without having to > install anything or get admin privileges. I should work anywhere you > can open it in a browser (which is what I love about unhosted apps). > > Really sad to see it isn't open source yet... I mean https://www.pgp4web.com/js/bundle.js is not obfuscated (except the first line, I don't know what that is about). It's just 45000 lines of code. Sincerely, Malte From peter at digitalbrains.com Thu Oct 8 22:05:39 2015 From: peter at digitalbrains.com (Peter Lebbing) Date: Thu, 08 Oct 2015 22:05:39 +0200 Subject: (OT) Blocking ICMP In-Reply-To: <5616C935.9030502@blazrsoft.com> References: <5613A4CC.60204@sumptuouscapital.com> <5616C36F.2000602@blazrsoft.com> <5616C7D3.70204@digitalbrains.com> <5616C935.9030502@blazrsoft.com> Message-ID: <5616CC93.5070300@digitalbrains.com> On 08/10/15 21:51, Antony Prince wrote: > I haven't had a single issue with any of the traffic I route through it, so > I'm assuming it is fine. The issue with PMTU discovery only happens when there is a smaller MTU in the middle of the path from you to another system. This can be a very rare occurrence depending on your setup. On the basis of no evidence whatsoever, I suspect that it mostly affects home users with a PPPoE connection shared between multiple PC's[1]. Not the typical system you (Antony) would *connect* to yourself and notice the connection stops working as soon as a system tries to send a big packet. That's a major part of the problem: the people who block all ICMP packets are usually not the ones affected by the issue. They never notice, and it's other people who get the issues when connecting to them. Just blocking echo-request (or reply) is just a hindrance when debugging connections, but not a connectivity issue, so you can safely do it if you want to. HTH, Peter. [1] Note: you can actually use Jumbo frames[2] to have a shared PPPoE with a regularly sized MTU. If this is the case, you have no problems. [2] I'm not entirely sure if an Ethernet frame that is only slightly too large is properly a Jumbo frame, but it is only a matter of terminology. I like terminology to be exact, so I still put this in a footnote ;). -- I use the GNU Privacy Guard (GnuPG) in combination with Enigmail. You can send me encrypted mail if you want some privacy. My key is available at From antony at blazrsoft.com Thu Oct 8 22:33:40 2015 From: antony at blazrsoft.com (Antony Prince) Date: Thu, 8 Oct 2015 16:33:40 -0400 Subject: (OT) Blocking ICMP In-Reply-To: <5616CC93.5070300@digitalbrains.com> References: <5613A4CC.60204@sumptuouscapital.com> <5616C36F.2000602@blazrsoft.com> <5616C7D3.70204@digitalbrains.com> <5616C935.9030502@blazrsoft.com> <5616CC93.5070300@digitalbrains.com> Message-ID: <5616D324.4040704@blazrsoft.com> On 10/08/2015 04:05 PM, Peter Lebbing wrote: ... > > That's a major part of the problem: the people who block all ICMP packets are > usually not the ones affected by the issue. They never notice, and it's other > people who get the issues when connecting to them. > > Just blocking echo-request (or reply) is just a hindrance when debugging > connections, but not a connectivity issue, so you can safely do it if you want to. > ... I decided to take a look at it since we were on the subject and I didn't specify anything for ICMPv4. The default chain policy is DROP and I didn't add any rules to allow ICMPv4, which explains why it does not respond to ICMPv4 echo requests. Whereas in the ip6tables chains, I specifically allowed ipv6-icmp, since (from what I understand) disallowing ipv6-icmp causes a lot of issues as well. Since I only want to disallow ICMPv4 echo requests (or replies), I'll adjust the configuration accordingly. Thanks for bringing it up. :) Mainly, I'm trying to avoid port scanners who ping first before proceeding with the scan, since the IP is part of a known range of a VPS service provider (I get a lot of port scans and service breach attempts). The loss of the ability to use the PING command is trivial since there are multiple other ways for me to determine its network status. Even when they do proceed with the scan, psad[1] is pretty good at picking it up and automatically adding a drop rule to the chain for the offending IP, as long as you have a LOG rule before the packet is dropped of course. [1]http://cipherdyne.org/psad/ -- Antony Prince Key ID: 0xAF3D4087301B1B19 Fingerprint: 591F F17F 7A4A A8D0 F659 C482 AF3D 4087 301B 1B19 URL: http://keyserver.blazrsoft.com/pks/lookup?op=get&search=0xAF3D4087301B1B19 -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: signature.asc Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 819 bytes Desc: OpenPGP digital signature URL: From kristian.fiskerstrand at sumptuouscapital.com Fri Oct 9 10:37:40 2015 From: kristian.fiskerstrand at sumptuouscapital.com (Kristian Fiskerstrand) Date: Fri, 9 Oct 2015 10:37:40 +0200 Subject: ?: keys.gnupg.net: Host not found In-Reply-To: References: <5613A4CC.60204@sumptuouscapital.com> Message-ID: <56177CD4.1090104@sumptuouscapital.com> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA512 On 10/08/2015 08:39 PM, Yuri Kanivetsky wrote: > Hi, > .. > > Also, I experimented with different versions of gnupg: > > 1.4.18: > > $ gpg --version gpg (GnuPG) 1.4.18 ... > $ gpg --keyserver-options verbose,debug --keyserver > hkp://keys.gnupg.net --recv-key > 0x409B6B1796C275462A1703113804BB82D39DC0E3 gpg: requesting key > D39DC0E3 from hkp server keys.gnupg.net > gpgkeys: curl version = GnuPG curl-shim > 2.0.29: > > $ gpg2 --version gpg (GnuPG) 2.0.29 libgcrypt 1.6.4 ... > gpgkeys: curl version = GnuPG curl-shim both of these are using curl-shim, what happens if you try the full curl version (how to do that is distro-specific, iirc debian et al have a separate gnupg-curl package)? > > 2.1.8: > > $ gpg2 --version gpg (GnuPG) 2.1.8 libgcrypt 1.6.4 Copyright (C) > 2015 Free Software Foundation, Inc. License GPLv3+: GNU GPL version > 3 or later This is free > software: you are free to change and redistribute it. There is NO > WARRANTY, to the extent permitted by law. > > Home: ~/.gnupg Supported algorithms: Pubkey: RSA, ELG, DSA, ECDH, > ECDSA, EDDSA Cipher: IDEA, 3DES, CAST5, BLOWFISH, AES, AES192, > AES256, TWOFISH, CAMELLIA128, CAMELLIA192, CAMELLIA256 Hash: SHA1, > RIPEMD160, SHA256, SHA384, SHA512, SHA224 Compression: > Uncompressed, ZIP, ZLIB > > $ gpg2 --keyserver hkp://keys.gnupg.net > --recv-key 0x409B6B1796C275462A1703113804BB82D39DC0E3 gpg: > keyserver receive failed: No keyserver available What are the known schematas listed for: $ echo "KEYSERVER --help" | gpg-connect-agent --dirmngr How was this 2.1 version built? - -- - ---------------------------- Kristian Fiskerstrand Blog: http://blog.sumptuouscapital.com Twitter: @krifisk - ---------------------------- Public OpenPGP key 0xE3EDFAE3 at hkp://pool.sks-keyservers.net fpr:94CB AFDD 3034 5109 5618 35AA 0B7F 8B60 E3ED FAE3 - ---------------------------- Manus manum lavat One hand washes the other -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- iQEcBAEBCgAGBQJWF3zPAAoJECULev7WN52F5bwH/3eTl3gAmRm+UqmGb+tcBGvx vm4GQSK2QHFcEWLBSmxJAcSr+w+L/MCjhEqEhwooSNKG/GLGKXmSrZDWj4sKsBWi EMKdxu/mAva83F/ChF5xguD0d2NmuqBIs+aiL0GM0iPR/XGiAJmMX9A+b0cpNX+r 1vnT8qnFitRuPl466zBVHo2gEg9QucHyvjL7U0mIzfjdFf6YR6fdCnB8ByO/dl2d TK6e1pXKswB1KRGE2pRApOzgEmP1Wn6e897Ui0g/yhU5qQ1QYSWmCN26aoUtKX81 wZT5MakFIgt0wXJHBabqgsFvwLql79JhbkYxHpvLYiPiyN6CZo8Oy+7GsEvp6hw= =k1ZB -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From scott at smemsh.net Sat Oct 10 01:50:00 2015 From: scott at smemsh.net (Scott M) Date: Fri, 9 Oct 2015 16:50:00 -0700 Subject: cv25519 subkeys not sent in recv-keys or shown in search-keys Message-ID: Using gpg2-2.1.8 with libgcrypt-1.7.0-beta262, I did the following: (1) made a master sign/certify ed25519 key. (2) made 3 subkeys (ed25519 sign, ed25519 authorize, cv25519 encrypt) (3) send-keys to keys2.kfwebs.net (rumored to support ecc): success Here are the keys: pub ed25519/3AED5886 2015-10-04 [SC] [expires: 2016-10-03] uid [ultimate] Scott Mcdermott sub cv25519/9300DF68 2015-10-04 [E] [expires: 2016-10-03] sub ed25519/C0223044 2015-10-04 [A] [expires: 2016-10-03] sub ed25519/EB2BDC84 2015-10-04 [S] [expires: 2016-10-03] Ok, now I want to see if others can see them: (1) make a brand new user account (2) empty homedir except gpg.conf with keys2.kfwebs.net. (3) recv-keys with the master ID (0x3AED5886) ok, so the subkeys should now be in my new user's keyring, yes? But NO. Using list-keys, I see the sign and authorize (the ed25519s), but *not* the encrypt subkey: pub ed25519/3AED5886 2015-10-04 [SC] [expires: 2016-10-03] uid [ unknown] Scott Mcdermott sub ed25519/C0223044 2015-10-04 [A] [expires: 2016-10-03] sub ed25519/EB2BDC84 2015-10-04 [S] [expires: 2016-10-03] However, when I search-keys for the hexid of the encrypt subkey, it returns the master public key, so the server knows about the subkey. Then why doesn't it send to me when I --recv-keys ? For that matter, http://keys2.kfwebs.net/pks/lookup?op=vindex&search=0x9300DF68 does output my keys, but does not show the very key that was searched for! Is it possible the server supports ed25519, but not cv25519? Are there any keyservers known to support both these key types? It seems that almost all do not, even keys2.kfwebs.net (got this one from #gnupg). -- Scott From kristian.fiskerstrand at sumptuouscapital.com Sat Oct 10 10:29:23 2015 From: kristian.fiskerstrand at sumptuouscapital.com (Kristian Fiskerstrand) Date: Sat, 10 Oct 2015 10:29:23 +0200 Subject: cv25519 subkeys not sent in recv-keys or shown in search-keys In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <5618CC63.5070704@sumptuouscapital.com> On 10/10/2015 01:50 AM, Scott M wrote: > Using gpg2-2.1.8 with libgcrypt-1.7.0-beta262, I did the > following: > ... > > However, when I search-keys for the hexid of the encrypt subkey, it > returns the master public key, so the server knows about the > subkey. Then why doesn't it send to me when I --recv-keys ? For > that matter, > http://keys2.kfwebs.net/pks/lookup?op=vindex&search=0x9300DF68 You should get it if you append &clean=off to the get query, i.e. https://sks-keyservers.net/pks/lookup?op=get&search=0x9300DF68&clean=off (that is using the same server cluster) > does output my keys, but does not show the very key that was > searched for! > > Is it possible the server supports ed25519, but not cv25519? Are > there any keyservers known to support both these key types? It > seems that almost all do not, even keys2.kfwebs.net (got this one > from #gnupg). > That is very possible, as there is not yet an ID except for http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-koch-eddsa-for-openpgp-01.txt for curve25519 related keys -- ---------------------------- Kristian Fiskerstrand Blog: http://blog.sumptuouscapital.com Twitter: @krifisk ---------------------------- Public OpenPGP key 0xE3EDFAE3 at hkp://pool.sks-keyservers.net fpr:94CB AFDD 3034 5109 5618 35AA 0B7F 8B60 E3ED FAE3 ---------------------------- Veni vidi visa I came, I saw, I bought -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: signature.asc Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 455 bytes Desc: OpenPGP digital signature URL: From yuri.kanivetsky at gmail.com Sat Oct 10 12:09:55 2015 From: yuri.kanivetsky at gmail.com (Yuri Kanivetsky) Date: Sat, 10 Oct 2015 13:09:55 +0300 Subject: ?: keys.gnupg.net: Host not found In-Reply-To: <56177CD4.1090104@sumptuouscapital.com> References: <5613A4CC.60204@sumptuouscapital.com> <56177CD4.1090104@sumptuouscapital.com> Message-ID: > > It is a pool. keys.gnupg.net is just an alias for the SKS server > pool[1], IIRC. I host a server in this pool and it is set to drop all > IPv4 ICMP packets, so will not respond to a ping even though the server > is online. It will respond to ICMPv6 pings however. > I am also NOT able to reproduce this error on XUbuntu 14.04 x64: Okay, let us do this the other way around. That's what I'm getting on host machine: $ dig +noall +answer keys.gnupg.net | awk '$4 == "A" { print $5 }' | while IFS= read -r; do echo "### $REPLY"; gpg --keyserver "hkp://$REPLY" --recv-key 409B6B1796C275462A1703113804BB82D39DC0E3; done ### 62.210.74.32 gpg: keyserver receive failed: No keyserver available ### 78.157.209.9 gpg: key D39DC0E3: "Michal Papis (RVM signing) " not changed gpg: Total number processed: 1 gpg: unchanged: 1 ### 132.248.241.99 gpg: key D39DC0E3: "Michal Papis (RVM signing) " not changed gpg: Total number processed: 1 gpg: unchanged: 1 ### 154.127.60.51 gpg: keyserver receive failed: No keyserver available ### 176.9.100.87 gpg: keyserver receive failed: No data ### 178.33.187.175 gpg: keyserver receive failed: No keyserver available ### 206.176.170.195 gpg: key D39DC0E3: "Michal Papis (RVM signing) " not changed gpg: Total number processed: 1 gpg: unchanged: 1 ### 209.135.211.141 gpg: key D39DC0E3: "Michal Papis (RVM signing) " not changed gpg: Total number processed: 1 gpg: unchanged: 1 ### 212.71.252.8 gpg: keyserver receive failed: No keyserver available ### 5.9.143.170 gpg: key D39DC0E3: "Michal Papis (RVM signing) " not changed gpg: Total number processed: 1 gpg: unchanged: 1 > Inclusion in the pool is voluntary, so there aren't any "official" > servers, so to speak, but there are criteria for being included in the > main pool. [...] As far as uptime, if the server did not > respond during the last check of the pool, it will not be included. So, > in rare cases, there may be one or two servers in the pool that are not > currently responding, but did so during the last check of the pool. If > they do not respond at the next check, they are removed from the main pool. Correct me if I'm wrong. Anybody can add a machine to a pool on condition that it meets some specific criteria. Speaking of official servers, I meant this. There's also keyserver.ubuntu.com, keyring.debian.org. Surely there's no official servers among those in the keys.gnupg.net pool. I meant, is keys.gnupg.net pool an official source of keys? Can you recommend where to submit a key? > both of these are using curl-shim, what happens if you try the full > curl version (how to do that is distro-specific, iirc debian et al > have a separate gnupg-curl package)? > After installing gnupg-curl: $ gpg --version gpg (GnuPG) 1.4.18 Copyright (C) 2014 Free Software Foundation, Inc. License GPLv3+: GNU GPL version 3 or later < http://gnu.org/licenses/gpl.html> This is free software: you are free to change and redistribute it. There is NO WARRANTY, to the extent permitted by law. Home: ~/.gnupg Supported algorithms: Pubkey: RSA, RSA-E, RSA-S, ELG-E, DSA Cipher: IDEA, 3DES, CAST5, BLOWFISH, AES, AES192, AES256, TWOFISH, CAMELLIA128, CAMELLIA192, CAMELLIA256 Hash: MD5, SHA1, RIPEMD160, SHA256, SHA384, SHA512, SHA224 Compression: Uncompressed, ZIP, ZLIB, BZIP2 $ gpg --keyserver-options verbose,debug --keyserver hkp://keys.gnupg.net --recv-key 409B6B1796C275462A1703113804BB82D39DC0E3 gpg: requesting key D39DC0E3 from hkp server keys.gnupg.net gpgkeys: curl version = libcurl/7.38.0 GnuTLS/3.3.8 zlib/1.2.8 libidn/1.28 librtmp/2.3 * Hostname was NOT found in DNS cache * Could not resolve host: keys.gnupg.net * Closing connection 0 gpgkeys: HTTP fetch error 6: Could not resolve host: keys.gnupg.net gpg: no valid OpenPGP data found. gpg: Total number processed: 0 Tell me, if you need output of `gnupg-2.0.29` as well. What are the known schematas listed for: > $ echo "KEYSERVER --help" | gpg-connect-agent --dirmngr > $ echo "KEYSERVER --help" | gpg-connect-agent --dirmngr gpg-connect-agent: no running Dirmngr - starting '/usr/local/bin/dirmngr' gpg-connect-agent: waiting for the dirmngr to come up ... (5s) gpg-connect-agent: connection to the dirmngr established S # Known schemata: S # hkp S # http S # finger S # kdns S # (Use an URL for engine specific help.) OK How was this 2.1 version built? > `./configure && make && sudo make install` in the previous email, and `./configure CFLAGS='-g -O0' CXXFLAGS='-g -O0' && make && sudo make install` in this one. AFAICS, it's the dirmngr who does the request. Can I reproduce it with dirmngr alone, not involving gpg binary? Regards, Yuri -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From wk at gnupg.org Sat Oct 10 12:14:11 2015 From: wk at gnupg.org (Werner Koch) Date: Sat, 10 Oct 2015 12:14:11 +0200 Subject: [Announce] GnuPG 2.1.9 released Message-ID: <878u7byqrw.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> Hello! The GnuPG Project is pleased to announce the availability of a new release of GnuPG modern: Version 2.1.9. The GNU Privacy Guard (GnuPG) is a complete and free implementation of the OpenPGP standard which is commonly abbreviated as PGP. GnuPG allows to encrypt and sign data and communication, features a versatile key management system as well as access modules for public key directories. GnuPG itself is a command line tool with features for easy integration with other applications. A wealth of frontend applications and libraries making use of GnuPG are available. Since version 2 GnuPG provides support for S/MIME and Secure Shell in addition to OpenPGP. GnuPG is Free Software (meaning that it respects your freedom). It can be freely used, modified and distributed under the terms of the GNU General Public License. Three different branches of GnuPG are actively maintained: - GnuPG "modern" (2.1) is the latest development with a lot of new features. This announcement is about this branch. - GnuPG "stable" (2.0) is the current stable version for general use. This is what most users are currently using. - GnuPG "classic" (1.4) is the old standalone version which is most suitable for older or embedded platforms. You may not install "modern" (2.1) and "stable" (2.0) at the same time. However, it is possible to install "classic" (1.4) along with any of the other versions. Noteworthy changes in version 2.1.9 =================================== * gpg: Allow fetching keys via OpenPGP DANE (--auto-key-locate). New option --print-dane-records. * gpg: Fix for a problem with PGP-2 keys in a keyring. * gpg: Fail with an error instead of a warning if a modern cipher algorithm is used without a MDC. * agent: New option --pinentry-invisible-char. * agent: Always do a RSA signature verification after creation. * agent: Fix a regression in ssh-add-ing Ed25519 keys. * agent: Fix ssh fingerprint computation for nistp384 and EdDSA. * agent: Fix crash during passprase entry on some platforms. * scd: Change timeout to fix problems with some 2.1 cards. * dirmngr: Displayed name is now Key Acquirer. * dirmngr: Add option --keyserver. Deprecate that option for gpg. Install a dirmngr.conf file from a skeleton for new installations. A detailed description of the changes found in the 2.1 branch can be found at . Please be aware that there are still known bugs which we are working on. Check https://bugs.gnupg.org, https://wiki.gnupg.org, and the mailing list archives for known problems and workarounds. Getting the Software ==================== Please follow the instructions found at or read on: GnuPG 2.1.9 may be downloaded from one of the GnuPG mirror sites or direct from its primary FTP server. The list of mirrors can be found at . Note that GnuPG is not available at ftp.gnu.org. The GnuPG source code compressed using BZIP2 and its OpenPGP signature are available here: ftp://ftp.gnupg.org/gcrypt/gnupg/gnupg-2.1.9.tar.bz2 (4810k) ftp://ftp.gnupg.org/gcrypt/gnupg/gnupg-2.1.9.tar.bz2.sig or here: https://gnupg.org/ftp/gcrypt/gnupg/gnupg-2.1.9.tar.bz2 (4810k) https://gnupg.org/ftp/gcrypt/gnupg/gnupg-2.1.9.tar.bz2.sig An installer for Windows without any graphical frontend except for a basic Pinentry tool is available here: ftp://ftp.gnupg.org/gcrypt/binary/gnupg-w32-2.1.9_20151009.exe (2580k) ftp://ftp.gnupg.org/gcrypt/binary/gnupg-w32-2.1.9_20151009.exe.sig or here https://gnupg.org/ftp/gcrypt/binary/gnupg-w32-2.1.9_20151009.exe (2580k) https://gnupg.org/ftp/gcrypt/binary/gnupg-w32-2.1.9_20151009.exe.sig Note that some feature are not yet working in the Windows version. The source used to build the Windows installer can be found in the same directory with a ".tar.xz" suffix. Checking the Integrity ====================== In order to check that the version of GnuPG which you are going to install is an original and unmodified one, you can do it in one of the following ways: * If you already have a version of GnuPG installed, you can simply verify the supplied signature. For example to verify the signature of the file gnupg-2.1.9.tar.bz2 you would use this command: gpg --verify gnupg-2.1.9.tar.bz2.sig gnupg-2.1.9.tar.bz2 This checks whether the signature file matches the source file. You should see a message indicating that the signature is good and made by one or more of the release signing keys. Make sure that this is a valid key, either by matching the shown fingerprint against a trustworthy list of valid release signing keys or by checking that the key has been signed by trustworthy other keys. See below for information on the signing keys. * If you are not able to use an existing version of GnuPG, you have to verify the SHA-1 checksum. On Unix systems the command to do this is either "sha1sum" or "shasum". Assuming you downloaded the file gnupg-2.1.9.tar.bz2, you run the command like this: sha1sum gnupg-2.1.9.tar.bz2 and check that the output matches the next line: 119bab38d2ff3a849be62914be9bf7333da68883 gnupg-2.1.9.tar.bz2 f6568d0c407090d1528cda87ca0af85eec2b7b22 gnupg-w32-2.1.9_20151009.exe c0a514c2c1c0087aca05a425635e13eb7017bf1e gnupg-w32-2.1.9_20151009.tar.xz Release Signing Keys ==================== To guarantee that a downloaded GnuPG version has not been tampered by malicious entities we provide signature files for all tarballs and binary versions. The keys are also signed by the long term keys of their respective owners. Current releases are signed by one or more of these four keys: 2048R/4F25E3B6 2011-01-12 [expires: 2019-12-31] Key fingerprint = D869 2123 C406 5DEA 5E0F 3AB5 249B 39D2 4F25 E3B6 Werner Koch (dist sig) rsa2048/E0856959 2014-10-29 [expires: 2019-12-31] Key fingerprint = 46CC 7308 65BB 5C78 EBAB ADCF 0437 6F3E E085 6959 David Shaw (GnuPG Release Signing Key) rsa2048/33BD3F06 2014-10-29 [expires: 2016-10-28] Key fingerprint = 031E C253 6E58 0D8E A286 A9F2 2071 B08A 33BD 3F06 NIIBE Yutaka (GnuPG Release Key) rsa2048/7EFD60D9 2014-10-19 [expires: 2020-12-31] Key fingerprint = D238 EA65 D64C 67ED 4C30 73F2 8A86 1B1C 7EFD 60D9 Werner Koch (Release Signing Key) You may retrieve these keys from a keyserver using this command gpg --keyserver hkp://keys.gnupg.net --recv-keys \ 249B39D24F25E3B6 04376F3EE0856959 \ 2071B08A33BD3F06 8A861B1C7EFD60D9 The keys are also available at https://gnupg.org/signature_key.html and in any recently released GnuPG tarball in the file g10/distsigkey.gpg . Note that this mail has been signed using by a different key. Internationalization ==================== This version of GnuPG has support for 26 languages with Chinese, Czech, French, German, Japanese, Russian, and Ukrainian being almost completely translated (2091 different strings). Documentation ============= If you used GnuPG in the past you should read the description of changes and new features at doc/whats-new-in-2.1.txt or online at https://gnupg.org/faq/whats-new-in-2.1.html The file gnupg.info has the complete user manual of the system. Separate man pages are included as well but they have not all the details available as are the manual. It is also possible to read the complete manual online in HTML format at https://gnupg.org/documentation/manuals/gnupg/ or in Portable Document Format at https://gnupg.org/documentation/manuals/gnupg.pdf . The chapters on gpg-agent, gpg and gpgsm include information on how to set up the whole thing. You may also want search the GnuPG mailing list archives or ask on the gnupg-users mailing lists for advise on how to solve problems. Many of the new features are around for several years and thus enough public knowledge is already available. You may also want to follow postings at https://gnupg.org/blob/. Support ======== Please consult the archive of the gnupg-users mailing list before reporting a bug . We suggest to send bug reports for a new release to this list in favor of filing a bug at . For commercial support requests we keep a list of known service companies at: https://gnupg.org/service.html If you are a developer and you may need a certain feature for your project, please do not hesitate to bring it to the gnupg-devel mailing list for discussion. Thanks ====== We have to thank all the people who helped with this release, be it testing, coding, translating, suggesting, auditing, administering the servers, spreading the word, and answering questions on the mailing lists. Maintenance and development of GnuPG is mostly financed by individual and corporate donations; see . For the GnuPG hackers, Werner p.s. This is an announcement only mailing list. Please send replies only to the gnupg-users'at'gnupg.org mailing list. -- Die Gedanken sind frei. Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz. -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: not available Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 180 bytes Desc: not available URL: -------------- next part -------------- _______________________________________________ Gnupg-announce mailing list Gnupg-announce at gnupg.org http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-announce From ml at kairaven.de Sat Oct 10 14:29:10 2015 From: ml at kairaven.de (K. Raven) Date: Sat, 10 Oct 2015 14:29:10 +0200 Subject: [Announce] GnuPG 2.1.9 released In-Reply-To: <878u7byqrw.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> References: <878u7byqrw.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> Message-ID: <56190496.3090003@kairaven.de> Hi, > Noteworthy changes in version 2.1.9 > =================================== > * dirmngr: Add option --keyserver. Deprecate that option for gpg. > Install a dirmngr.conf file from a skeleton for new installations. man dirmngr --keyserver name The scheme is the type of keyserver: "hkp" for the HTTP (or compatible) keyservers, "ldap" for the LDAP keyservers, or "mailto" for the Graff email keyserver. "hkps" (as in dirmngr-conf.skel)? After the keyserver name, optional keyserver configuration options may be provided. These are the same as the global --keyserver-options from below (where? in man gpg2?), but apply only to this particular keyserver. keyserver hkps://hkps.pool.sks-keyservers.net option1 option2 or keyserver hkps://hkps.pool.sks-keyservers.net option1,option2 in dirmngr.conf: 2015-10-10 14:04:46 dirmngr[18334.1] command 'KS_SEARCH' failed: Syntaxfehler im URI 2015-10-10 14:04:46 dirmngr[18334.1] DBG: chan_1 -> ERR 167772206 Syntaxfehler im URI What is the right syntax? No example found in dirmngr-conf.skel. Only with "keyserver hkps://hkps.pool.sks-keyservers.net" and "keyserver-options" in gpg.conf, it works. -- Ciao Kai http://kairaven.de/ From kristian.fiskerstrand at sumptuouscapital.com Sat Oct 10 15:35:29 2015 From: kristian.fiskerstrand at sumptuouscapital.com (Kristian Fiskerstrand) Date: Sat, 10 Oct 2015 15:35:29 +0200 Subject: ?: keys.gnupg.net: Host not found In-Reply-To: References: <5613A4CC.60204@sumptuouscapital.com> <56177CD4.1090104@sumptuouscapital.com> Message-ID: <56191421.5020107@sumptuouscapital.com> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA512 On 10/10/2015 12:09 PM, Yuri Kanivetsky wrote: > It is a pool. keys.gnupg.net is just an > alias for the SKS server pool[1], IIRC. I host a server in this > pool and it is set to drop all IPv4 ICMP packets, so will not > respond to a ping even though the server is online. It will respond > to ICMPv6 pings however. > > > > I am also NOT able to reproduce this error on XUbuntu 14.04 x64: > > > Okay, let us do this the other way around. That's what I'm getting > on host machine: Just a thought, but have you tried one of the geographical pools ({eu,na,oc}.pool.sks-keyservers.net) instead of the general one? that should result in better network response time and routing. > ### 154.127.60.51 gpg: keyserver receive failed: No keyserver > available This works for me at least > ### 176.9.100.87 gpg: keyserver receive failed: No data This keyserver is wrongly configured, as it doesn't respond on all traffic on port 11371 but filters it based on Host header (the server operator is BCCed to this email), so it currently does work using the pool.sks-keyserver.net but not keys.gnupg.net > ### 178.33.187.175 gpg: keyserver receive failed: No keyserver > available ### 206.176.170.195 This works for me as well > is keys.gnupg.net pool an official source > of keys? Can you recommend where to submit a key? > There is no "official source", nor any requirement to publish keys on a keyserver, either private nor public. It is often convenient to do so, though (but the existence of a key on a keyserver is no indication of validity of the key, so this will always have to be verified out of band). > > How was this 2.1 version built? > > > `./configure && make && sudo make install` in the previous email, > and `./configure CFLAGS='-g -O0' CXXFLAGS='-g -O0' && make && sudo > make install` in this one. > > AFAICS, it's the dirmngr who does the request. Can I reproduce it > with dirmngr alone, not involving gpg binary? $ dirmngr ... OK Dirmngr 2.1.9 at your service KEYSERVER --clear hkp://pool.sks-keyservers.net OK KS_GET 409B6B1796C275462A1703113804BB82D39DC0E3 ... BYE - -- - ---------------------------- Kristian Fiskerstrand Blog: http://blog.sumptuouscapital.com Twitter: @krifisk - ---------------------------- Public OpenPGP key 0xE3EDFAE3 at hkp://pool.sks-keyservers.net fpr:94CB AFDD 3034 5109 5618 35AA 0B7F 8B60 E3ED FAE3 - ---------------------------- Vincit qui se vincit He who conquers conquers self -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- iQEcBAEBCgAGBQJWGRQdAAoJECULev7WN52FV9MH/1cGzU30oPeQ2hJpNsG7on3v yv+wsxVNnvvkhU+QAs6v2FBPZgnVkJvsykffLT7iET7xx2kOo4bxsl8zEjDF/n62 3gusVmPP2x1qCt44eXGVoB0un06QBPhCgJGu8jcN8Emtjdn93MftXkgA5fhmtiGF waTt3PdYmdyFMaMzikSU/sfMpU29j51FbcPyzi4LQK/mjRLb9Ft09QC/DiJfe+gg +k8aZgUDcYtU49eifxOJHfpPCRUfDMY5bvK+ZvgbmS3Pra3Yej9vByR1NRLsqJwk +jdPbIug/enHo7pKy2T6VhnKduO/jPo0eMVouMZ2yV7s23rWVKt8jT+sxxvC5qw= =cxUx -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From yuri.kanivetsky at gmail.com Sat Oct 10 16:30:17 2015 From: yuri.kanivetsky at gmail.com (Yuri Kanivetsky) Date: Sat, 10 Oct 2015 17:30:17 +0300 Subject: ?: keys.gnupg.net: Host not found In-Reply-To: <56191421.5020107@sumptuouscapital.com> References: <5613A4CC.60204@sumptuouscapital.com> <56177CD4.1090104@sumptuouscapital.com> <56191421.5020107@sumptuouscapital.com> Message-ID: > > Just a thought, but have you tried one of the geographical pools > ({eu,na,oc}.pool.sks-keyservers.net) instead of the general one? that > should result in better network response time and routing. > I just tried pool.sks-keyservers.net, and with this domain it works (in VM): $ gpg2 --keyserver hkp://keys.gnupg.net --recv-key 409B6B1796C275462A1703113804BB82D39DC0E3 gpg: keyserver receive failed: No keyserver available $ gpg2 --keyserver hkp://pool.sks-keyservers.net --recv-key 409B6B1796C275462A1703113804BB82D39DC0E3 gpg: key D39DC0E3: "Michal Papis (RVM signing) " not changed gpg: Total number processed: 1 gpg: unchanged: 1 $ gpg2 --keyserver hkp://keys.gnupg.net --recv-key 409B6B1796C275462A1703113804BB82D39DC0E3 gpg: keyserver receive failed: No keyserver available What could this possibly mean... > > ### 154.127.60.51 gpg: keyserver receive failed: No keyserver > > available > > This works for me at least > > > ### 178.33.187.175 gpg: keyserver receive failed: No keyserver > > available ### 206.176.170.195 > > This works for me as well > I can again confirm that those IPs doesn't work for me, but ping (on host machine): $ ping -c 1 154.127.60.51 PING 154.127.60.51 (154.127.60.51) 56(84) bytes of data. 64 bytes from 154.127.60.51: icmp_seq=1 ttl=44 time=213 ms --- 154.127.60.51 ping statistics --- 1 packets transmitted, 1 received, 0% packet loss, time 0ms rtt min/avg/max/mdev = 213.158/213.158/213.158/0.000 ms $ gpg --keyserver hkp://154.127.60.51 --recv-key 409B6B1796C275462A1703113804BB82D39DC0E3 gpg: keyserver receive failed: No keyserver available $ ping -c 1 154.127.60.51 PING 154.127.60.51 (154.127.60.51) 56(84) bytes of data. 64 bytes from 154.127.60.51: icmp_seq=1 ttl=44 time=213 ms --- 154.127.60.51 ping statistics --- 1 packets transmitted, 1 received, 0% packet loss, time 0ms rtt min/avg/max/mdev = 213.103/213.103/213.103/0.000 ms Regards, Yuri -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From jeandavid8 at verizon.net Sun Oct 11 23:34:41 2015 From: jeandavid8 at verizon.net (Jean-David Beyer) Date: Sun, 11 Oct 2015 17:34:41 -0400 Subject: How can it be made even easier!? In-Reply-To: <5id1wu66zp.fsf@fencepost.gnu.org> References: <5id1wu66zp.fsf@fencepost.gnu.org> Message-ID: <561AD5F1.9050108@verizon.net> On 10/04/2015 10:30 AM, Don Saklad wrote: > How can it be made even easier!? > > Trying to encourage M.D.'s to use it is met with complaints about not > having time to learn about it. Set up is a too complicated sequence of > steps that aren't entirely clear. The steps can get hampered where there > aren't instructions that cover what to do when one of the steps goes > awry! > Not just doctors. My lawyer has the same problem. She really needs signed e-mails and encrypted e-mails, but has not the time to learn all about how to install and use it. -- .~. Jean-David Beyer Registered Linux User 85642. /V\ PGP-Key:166D840A 0C610C8B Registered Machine 1935521. /( )\ Shrewsbury, New Jersey http://linuxcounter.net ^^-^^ 17:30:01 up 18 days, 4:32, 3 users, load average: 5.27, 5.59, 5.68 From yuri.kanivetsky at gmail.com Mon Oct 12 00:47:01 2015 From: yuri.kanivetsky at gmail.com (Yuri Kanivetsky) Date: Mon, 12 Oct 2015 01:47:01 +0300 Subject: ?: keys.gnupg.net: Host not found In-Reply-To: References: <5613A4CC.60204@sumptuouscapital.com> <56177CD4.1090104@sumptuouscapital.com> <56191421.5020107@sumptuouscapital.com> Message-ID: Hi, I was able to track it down to this line of code: http://git.gnupg.org/cgi-bin/gitweb.cgi?p=gnupg.git;a=blob;f=common/http.c;h=c2cac169d222ad5f41d1a8e224dd4bbaa2d7912b;hb=311816f6cf9d411dba060603e3c5d01c72824645#l2264 Here getaddrinfo() returns -3 (EAI_AGAIN) in the VM, but not on the host machine. One can get there like so: $ cat ~/dirmngr-input-alias KEYSERVER --clear hkp://keys.gnupg.net KS_GET 409B6B1796C275462A1703113804BB82D39DC0E3 BYE $ gdb dirmngr/dirmngr (gdb) break connect_server (gdb) r < ~/dirmngr-input-alias (gdb) u 2264 (gdb) n (gdb) print $eax $1 = -3 Here's a test program that doesn't work in VM, but works on the host machine: #include #include #include #include #include int main(void) { int r; struct addrinfo hints, *res; memset(&hints, 0, sizeof (hints)); hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM; r = getaddrinfo("keys.gnupg.net", "11371", &hints, &res); // r = getaddrinfo("pool.sks-keyservers.net", "11371", &hints, &res); if (r) { printf("r: %hhi\n", r); // EAI_AGAIN printf("r: %s\n", gai_strerror(r)); } return 0; } $ gcc 1.c $ ./a.out r: -3 r: Temporary failure in name resolution VM: $ `ldd a.out | grep libc | awk '{ print $3 }'` GNU C Library (Ubuntu GLIBC 2.21-0ubuntu4) stable release version 2.21, by Roland McGrath et al. Copyright (C) 2015 Free Software Foundation, Inc. This is free software; see the source for copying conditions. There is NO warranty; not even for MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. Compiled by GNU CC version 4.9.2. Available extensions: crypt add-on version 2.1 by Michael Glad and others GNU Libidn by Simon Josefsson Native POSIX Threads Library by Ulrich Drepper et al BIND-8.2.3-T5B libc ABIs: UNIQUE IFUNC For bug reporting instructions, please see: . host machine: $ `ldd a.out | grep libc | awk '{ print $3 }'` GNU C Library (GNU libc) stable release version 2.22, by Roland McGrath et al. Copyright (C) 2015 Free Software Foundation, Inc. This is free software; see the source for copying conditions. There is NO warranty; not even for MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. Compiled by GNU CC version 5.2.0. Available extensions: crypt add-on version 2.1 by Michael Glad and others GNU Libidn by Simon Josefsson Native POSIX Threads Library by Ulrich Drepper et al BIND-8.2.3-T5B libc ABIs: UNIQUE IFUNC For bug reporting instructions, please see: . Can you confirm if it works with libc-2.22/libc-2.21 for you? Regards, Yuri -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From mwood at IUPUI.Edu Mon Oct 12 17:32:13 2015 From: mwood at IUPUI.Edu (Mark H. Wood) Date: Mon, 12 Oct 2015 11:32:13 -0400 Subject: How can it be made even easier!? In-Reply-To: <561AD5F1.9050108@verizon.net> References: <5id1wu66zp.fsf@fencepost.gnu.org> <561AD5F1.9050108@verizon.net> Message-ID: <20151012153213.GB21049@IUPUI.Edu> On Sun, Oct 11, 2015 at 05:34:41PM -0400, Jean-David Beyer wrote: > On 10/04/2015 10:30 AM, Don Saklad wrote: > > How can it be made even easier!? > > > > Trying to encourage M.D.'s to use it is met with complaints about not > > having time to learn about it. Set up is a too complicated sequence of > > steps that aren't entirely clear. The steps can get hampered where there > > aren't instructions that cover what to do when one of the steps goes > > awry! > > > > Not just doctors. My lawyer has the same problem. She really needs > signed e-mails and encrypted e-mails, but has not the time to learn all > about how to install and use it. Dare I suggest that people who need private and/or integrity-protected email for professional use should hire a professional to interview them, set up the software according to the client's standards for professional practice, and explain its use? (That would suppose that one *can* find such people for hire.) Doctors and lawyers shouldn't be doing such things for themselves -- they aren't trained for it, they don't have time for it, and much rides on getting it right. (I had added "and bankers", but banks have whole departments devoted to securing records and communication, or should.) Doctors and lawyers hire accountants to set up their financial subsystems, so why not hire experts to set up their communication subsystems? It probably comes down to getting the professions to squarely address the problem of just what *are* their standards of professional practice for secure electronic communication with their business associates. I get the sense that this is a problem which is being studiously ignored because it is (a) hard and (b) deep in somebody else's problem domain. We should always be looking for ways to make things easier to use. But there are limits to just how simple some processes can be made before violence is done to the nature of the process and the utility of its outcomes. There *are* doctors and lawyers because medicine and law are inherently hard problems requiring considerable expertise to do well. What is the limit of simplification of secure electronic messaging imposed by its intrinsic difficulties? We should be wary of transgressing that limit in the name of further ease of use. There are already enough examples of systems which have been made so easy to use that they should not be used at all. -- Mark H. Wood Lead Technology Analyst University Library Indiana University - Purdue University Indianapolis 755 W. Michigan Street Indianapolis, IN 46202 317-274-0749 www.ulib.iupui.edu -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: signature.asc Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 181 bytes Desc: Digital signature URL: From peter at digitalbrains.com Mon Oct 12 18:47:51 2015 From: peter at digitalbrains.com (Peter Lebbing) Date: Mon, 12 Oct 2015 18:47:51 +0200 Subject: How can it be made even easier!? In-Reply-To: <20151012153213.GB21049@IUPUI.Edu> References: <5id1wu66zp.fsf@fencepost.gnu.org> <561AD5F1.9050108@verizon.net> <20151012153213.GB21049@IUPUI.Edu> Message-ID: <561BE437.4090305@digitalbrains.com> On 12/10/15 17:32, Mark H. Wood wrote: > Dare I suggest that people who need private and/or integrity-protected > email for professional use should hire a professional to interview > them, set up the software according to the client's standards for > professional practice, and explain its use? Excellent post, I agree! Ideally, some industry or sector organisation would hire professionals to solve a large part of the problem for the common use case for doctors, or lawyers, or what have you. That way the sector can save money by combining it into a larger project, setting up the system for more doctors, etc in one go. HTH, Peter. -- I use the GNU Privacy Guard (GnuPG) in combination with Enigmail. You can send me encrypted mail if you want some privacy. My key is available at From listofactor at mail.ru Mon Oct 12 22:32:52 2015 From: listofactor at mail.ru (listo factor) Date: Mon, 12 Oct 2015 20:32:52 +0000 Subject: How can it be made even easier!? In-Reply-To: <20151012153213.GB21049@IUPUI.Edu> References: <5id1wu66zp.fsf@fencepost.gnu.org> <561AD5F1.9050108@verizon.net> <20151012153213.GB21049@IUPUI.Edu> Message-ID: <561C18F4.3010701@mail.ru> On 10/12/2015 03:32 PM, Mark H. Wood - mwood at IUPUI.Edu wrote: > Dare I suggest that people who need private and/or integrity-protected > email for professional use should hire a professional to interview > them, set up the software according to the client's standards for > professional practice, and explain its use? (That would suppose that > one *can* find such people for hire.) > > Doctors and lawyers shouldn't be doing such things for themselves -- > they aren't trained for it, they don't have time for it, and much > rides on getting it right. (I had added "and bankers", but banks have > whole departments devoted to securing records and communication, or > should.) Doctors and lawyers hire accountants to set up their > financial subsystems, so why not hire experts to set up their > communication subsystems? Unfortunately, this approach has been subverted by several decades of "computer security" doctrine, which held that encryption must "just work", without any need on the part of the user to understand the fundamentals. Which is why doctors and lawyers expect the communications security to be available as a product, just as the car they drive, and not as a professional service, such as their bookkeeping. From dsaklad at gnu.org Mon Oct 12 23:29:33 2015 From: dsaklad at gnu.org (Don Saklad) Date: Mon, 12 Oct 2015 17:29:33 -0400 Subject: How can it be made even easier!? In-Reply-To: <561AD5F1.9050108@verizon.net> (message from Jean-David Beyer on Sun, 11 Oct 2015 17:34:41 -0400) Message-ID: <5ibnc36aiq.fsf@fencepost.gnu.org> For cognoscenti ?... not for greater users that the too steep learning curve holds back distributing more widely? http://english.stackexchange.com/questions/6209/what-is-meant-by-steep-learning-curve Would it need an even easier version?... than at https://emailselfdefense.fsf.org/en/ From doark at mail.com Mon Oct 12 23:32:26 2015 From: doark at mail.com (David Niklas) Date: Mon, 12 Oct 2015 17:32:26 -0400 Subject: How to get your first key signed Message-ID: <20151012173226.7eb1a81e@ulgy_thing> Sorry to disappear and thanks for your answers! As for why you can't find my key. I thought that if you upload to one server it will spread it to them all. My key is at biglumber.com , I'll copy it, but I'm out of time now. Thanks again, David From antony at blazrsoft.com Mon Oct 12 23:55:10 2015 From: antony at blazrsoft.com (Antony Prince) Date: Mon, 12 Oct 2015 17:55:10 -0400 Subject: How to get your first key signed In-Reply-To: <20151012173226.7eb1a81e@ulgy_thing> References: <20151012173226.7eb1a81e@ulgy_thing> Message-ID: <561C2C3E.1010203@blazrsoft.com> On 10/12/2015 5:32 PM, David Niklas wrote: ... > As for why you can't find my key. I thought that if you upload to one > server it will spread it to them all. ... This is true in the case of servers in the sks pool[1], but not true of all keyservers. Some keyservers are privately operated and do not share keys to other keyservers. The largest pool of public keyservers that I know of is the SKS pool, but there may be others that I'm unaware of. [1]https://sks-keyservers.net/ -- Antony Prince Key ID: 0xAF3D4087301B1B19 Fingerprint: 591F F17F 7A4A A8D0 F659 C482 AF3D 4087 301B 1B19 URL: http://pool.sks-keyservers.net/pks/lookup?op=get&search=0xAF3D4087301B1B19 -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: signature.asc Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 819 bytes Desc: OpenPGP digital signature URL: From 2014-667rhzu3dc-lists-groups at riseup.net Tue Oct 13 01:06:20 2015 From: 2014-667rhzu3dc-lists-groups at riseup.net (MFPA) Date: Tue, 13 Oct 2015 00:06:20 +0100 Subject: How can it be made even easier!? In-Reply-To: <561C18F4.3010701@mail.ru> References: <5id1wu66zp.fsf@fencepost.gnu.org> <561AD5F1.9050108@verizon.net> <20151012153213.GB21049@IUPUI.Edu> <561C18F4.3010701@mail.ru> Message-ID: <1823995953.20151013000620@my_localhost> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA512 Hi On Monday 12 October 2015 at 9:32:52 PM, in , listo factor wrote: > Unfortunately, this approach has been subverted by > several decades of "computer security" doctrine, which > held that encryption must "just work", without any need > on the part of the user to understand the fundamentals. > Which is why doctors and lawyers expect the > communications security to be available as a product, > just as the car they drive, and not as a professional > service, such as their bookkeeping. When I worked in an admin role for the health service a few years ago, we were assured that emails we sent outside our own organisation to other health organisations were encrypted as they left our network and decrypted as they entered the receiving health organisation's network. The IT people never had any answers if asked about email security. - -- Best regards MFPA What's another word for synonym? -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- iQF8BAEBCgBmBQJWHD2qXxSAAAAAAC4AKGlzc3Vlci1mcHJAbm90YXRpb25zLm9w ZW5wZ3AuZmlmdGhob3JzZW1hbi5uZXRCM0FFN0VDQTlBOEM4QjMwMjZBNUEwRjU2 QjdDNzRDRUIzMUYyNUYwAAoJEGt8dM6zHyXwd80H/j/NVe6o73WNWuyMpzFfiqOF pYVwEsfHcrh2EK38c1PvXoTQuqusxZ/K0E4gsiHMmUERQEnMP+/P8OSw0EucSjey Kw75cQNwPyohvlb4vJPZhjecHSxADIZq0RIzEvK6puRtsI7+y28nZvUjr91kImH7 ggXJQeuHI0h0uz5qzUMhk1bbvluffmGQ3eyTYclCJzZR2od4O+ABP0uiKrwPv/iH D5CxBBAjmHVmDxFTDNtvfuunSDTHmD3l1h5yQNdqIMa495YkBj1JjNOxmJ4aGn6r rjR5v9y9wRNFcIbCDJJyLBQGLWR0fjmG2ASwHHL/T+7uCO0DlC/TvpouHNG3h5iI vgQBFgoAZgUCVhw9s18UgAAAAAAuAChpc3N1ZXItZnByQG5vdGF0aW9ucy5vcGVu cGdwLmZpZnRoaG9yc2VtYW4ubmV0MzNBQ0VENEVFOTEzNEVFQkRFNkE4NTA2MTcx MkJDNDYxQUY3NzhFNAAKCRAXErxGGvd45PzFAP93GLKCTgWrFhmQzui7UlR/ehBQ /wCpDaAtUJc3dOAtjgEA2bIfB0lB1VyRrBwj4X/6sMcUTTUpgVKLOSfmJ7AeLgQ= =1/lQ -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From gniibe at fsij.org Tue Oct 13 08:06:40 2015 From: gniibe at fsij.org (NIIBE Yutaka) Date: Tue, 13 Oct 2015 15:06:40 +0900 Subject: cv25519 subkeys not sent in recv-keys or shown in search-keys In-Reply-To: <5618CC63.5070704@sumptuouscapital.com> References: <5618CC63.5070704@sumptuouscapital.com> Message-ID: <561C9F70.2080606@fsij.org> Hello, I think that once newer libgcrypt will be released, cv25519 subkey will be popular. For sks keyserver, I submitted an issue as an remainder. https://bitbucket.org/skskeyserver/sks-keyserver/issues/36/curve25519-oid-for-encryption -- From listofactor at mail.ru Tue Oct 13 08:49:30 2015 From: listofactor at mail.ru (listo factor) Date: Tue, 13 Oct 2015 06:49:30 +0000 Subject: How can it be made even easier!? In-Reply-To: <5ibnc36aiq.fsf@fencepost.gnu.org> References: <5ibnc36aiq.fsf@fencepost.gnu.org> Message-ID: <561CA97A.3020008@mail.ru> On 10/12/2015 09:29 PM, Don Saklad wrote: > For cognoscenti ?... not for greater users that the too steep learning > curve holds back distributing more widely? > http://english.stackexchange.com/questions/6209/what-is-meant-by-steep-learning-curve The assignment of the units on abscissa and the ordinate is completely arbitrary. If the abscissa is the amount of knowledge, and the ordinate is the effort put in to gain it, the curve reflects the popular usage of the phrase quite well. To me, "knowledge" as a unit makes more sense that "learning", and "effort" more than "time". > Would it need an even easier version?... than at > https://emailselfdefense.fsf.org/en/ It is quite comical to see an article advising on measures against "bulk surveillance" urging participation in the "web of trust" and uploading one's key to a keyserver. From bircoph at gmail.com Tue Oct 13 19:45:04 2015 From: bircoph at gmail.com (Andrew Savchenko) Date: Tue, 13 Oct 2015 20:45:04 +0300 Subject: Problems with gnupg-2.1.9 (and gpgme-1.6.0) Message-ID: <20151013204504.1885db3a667c8db8acd95074@gmail.com> Hello, [looks like my original message failed to reach mail list, so I'm resending it with compressed log, so it may pass possible size limits] I updated to gnupg-2.1.9 from 2.0.x on both my desktop and laptop and now I have big problems. My OS is Gentoo Linux. 1. gpgme is now broken. Gpgme consumers (e.g. sylpheed, mcabber) can verify, encrypt and decrypt messages, but can't sign them. On signing I have the following issues: Please enter your PGP passphrase: [17:26:06] GPGME signature error: Unusable secret key Or: ** Sylpheed-WARNING: pgp_sign(): signing failed: User defined error code 1 I _can_ sign using the very same keys and plain gpg -s --default-key $id command. GPG itself works fine, something is amiss with gmgme. I updated gpgme, libgcrypt, libgpg-error and libassuan to the latest versions (gpgme-1.6.0, libgcrypt-1.6.4, libgpg-error-1.20, libassuan-2.3.0) and rebuilt consumer applications. Of course, keys were migrated to the new format using gpg --import ~/.gnupg/secring.gpg and gpg-agent was restarted (I even rebooted the whole host), but problem is still here. The problem is even more strange, since I found a workaround way to sign messages in sylpheed. Program has three options for key selection: a) use default GPG key; b) select key by e-mail; c) use key with provided ID. Options b) and c) cause the error above, while option a) works, so by editing gpg.conf I can set default key id to what I need to sign a message. This is very inconvenient (since I have many keys), but at least works somehow. I attach a GPGME_DEBUG=3 log for the case where key was selected by id. I don't want to attach more verbose logs, since they contain a lot of binary data and I don't want to risk data leak. See sylpheed-gpgme.log. 2. I have duplicated keys in the ring with the same ID and fingerprint. Duplication happens only to _some_ of my keys where I have a secret key, fetched public keys of other users are not duplicated. Examples: a) Here I have the very same key twice: $ gpg --fingerprint -K 0x8EE705C07CFA83D3 sec rsa4096/0x8EE705C07CFA83D3 2012-09-11 [expired: 2015-09-11] Key fingerprint = 3F2D 1E49 4F96 2CE6 1597 F217 8EE7 05C0 7CFA 83D3 uid [ expired] Bircoph sec rsa4096/0x8EE705C07CFA83D3 2012-09-11 [expired: 2015-09-11] Key fingerprint = 3F2D 1E49 4F96 2CE6 1597 F217 8EE7 05C0 7CFA 83D3 uid [ expired] Bircoph b) Now it becomes more interesting: $ gpg --fingerprint -K 0x565953B95372756C sec rsa4096/0x565953B95372756C 2013-02-27 [expires: 2018-02-26] Key fingerprint = 63EB 04FA A30C 76E2 952E 6ED6 5659 53B9 5372 756C uid [ultimate] Andrew Savchenko uid [ultimate] Andrew A. Savchenko (NRNU MEPhI) uid [ultimate] Andrew A. Savchenko (UT Department) uid [ultimate] Andrew Savchenko (Gentoo Dev) uid [ultimate] Andrew A. Savchenko (XMPP) uid [ultimate] Andrew A. Savchenko (UT Department) uid [ultimate] Andrey Savchenko (RHIC) ssb rsa4096/0x7AB649CA518C8321 2013-02-27 [expires: 2018-02-26] ssb rsa4096/0xF6535A33BA1EE48D 2015-01-13 [expires: 2018-01-12] sec rsa4096/0x565953B95372756C 2013-02-27 [expires: 2018-02-26] uid [ultimate] Andrew A. Savchenko (NRNU MEPhI) uid [ultimate] Andrew Savchenko uid [ultimate] Andrew Savchenko (Gentoo Dev) uid [ultimate] Andrew A. Savchenko (XMPP) uid [ultimate] Andrew A. Savchenko (UT Department) uid [ultimate] Andrew A. Savchenko (UT Department) ssb rsa4096/0x7AB649CA518C8321 2013-02-27 [expires: 2018-02-26] ssb rsa4096/0xF6535A33BA1EE48D 2015-01-13 [expires: 2018-01-12] I have two versions of the same key: the latest and previous one (before I added one more e-mail uid to the key). This problem may be related to the first one, may be not, I'm not sure. It is possible that gpgme goes crazy with these duplicates. I have no idea how to remove duplicates and old versions. All gpg commands are tied to either key id, e-mail or fingerprint. They are all not unique to delete such duplicates. I have though that this may happen due to both secring.gpg and private-keys-v1.d present, but moving secring.gpg away doesn't help. Maybe manual editing of pubring.gpg will help to remove duplicates, but it will be quite hard to handle this binary format. Googling gave me very litte here: 1st issue: may happen for some custom gpgme client software, but no data on global failures after gnupg update. 2nd issue: may happen when key is stored in multiple sources and fetched from them, but I have no --keyring options in my gpg.conf (see attached file). Any ideas how to fix these issues, especially the signing failure are much appreciated. Best regards, Andrew Savchenko -------------- next part -------------- An embedded and charset-unspecified text was scrubbed... Name: gpg.conf URL: -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: sylpheed-gpgme.log.xz Type: application/x-xz Size: 1752 bytes Desc: not available URL: -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: not available Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 819 bytes Desc: not available URL: From bircoph at gmail.com Tue Oct 13 18:30:15 2015 From: bircoph at gmail.com (Andrew Savchenko) Date: Tue, 13 Oct 2015 19:30:15 +0300 Subject: Problems with gnupg-2.1.9 (and gpgme-1.6.0) Message-ID: <20151013193015.30b0524d2ec3aa816bfe2685@gmail.com> Hello, I updated to gnupg-2.1.9 from 2.0.x on both my desktop and laptop and now I have big problems. My OS is Gentoo Linux. 1. gpgme is now broken. Gpgme consumers (e.g. sylpheed, mcabber) can verify, encrypt and decrypt messages, but can't sign them. On signing I have the following issues: Please enter your PGP passphrase: [17:26:06] GPGME signature error: Unusable secret key Or: ** Sylpheed-WARNING: pgp_sign(): signing failed: User defined error code 1 I _can_ sign using the very same keys and plain gpg -s --default-key $id command. GPG itself works fine, something is amiss with gmgme. I updated gpgme, libgcrypt, libgpg-error and libassuan to the latest versions (gpgme-1.6.0, libgcrypt-1.6.4, libgpg-error-1.20, libassuan-2.3.0) and rebuilt consumer applications. Of course, keys were migrated to the new format using gpg --import ~/.gnupg/secring.gpg and gpg-agent was restarted (I even rebooted the whole host), but problem is still here. The problem is even more strange, since I found a workaround way to sign messages in sylpheed. Program has three options for key selection: a) use default GPG key; b) select key by e-mail; c) use key with provided ID. Options b) and c) cause the error above, while option a) works, so by editing gpg.conf I can set default key id to what I need to sign a message. This is very inconvenient (since I have many keys), but at least works somehow. I attach a GPGME_DEBUG=3 log for the case where key was selected by id. I don't want to attach more verbose logs, since they contain a lot of binary data and I don't want to risk data leak. See sylpheed-gpgme.log. 2. I have duplicated keys in the ring with the same ID and fingerprint. Duplication happens only to _some_ of my keys where I have a secret key, fetched public keys of other users are not duplicated. Examples: a) Here I have the very same key twice: $ gpg --fingerprint -K 0x8EE705C07CFA83D3 sec rsa4096/0x8EE705C07CFA83D3 2012-09-11 [expired: 2015-09-11] Key fingerprint = 3F2D 1E49 4F96 2CE6 1597 F217 8EE7 05C0 7CFA 83D3 uid [ expired] Bircoph sec rsa4096/0x8EE705C07CFA83D3 2012-09-11 [expired: 2015-09-11] Key fingerprint = 3F2D 1E49 4F96 2CE6 1597 F217 8EE7 05C0 7CFA 83D3 uid [ expired] Bircoph b) Now it becomes more interesting: $ gpg --fingerprint -K 0x565953B95372756C sec rsa4096/0x565953B95372756C 2013-02-27 [expires: 2018-02-26] Key fingerprint = 63EB 04FA A30C 76E2 952E 6ED6 5659 53B9 5372 756C uid [ultimate] Andrew Savchenko uid [ultimate] Andrew A. Savchenko (NRNU MEPhI) uid [ultimate] Andrew A. Savchenko (UT Department) uid [ultimate] Andrew Savchenko (Gentoo Dev) uid [ultimate] Andrew A. Savchenko (XMPP) uid [ultimate] Andrew A. Savchenko (UT Department) uid [ultimate] Andrey Savchenko (RHIC) ssb rsa4096/0x7AB649CA518C8321 2013-02-27 [expires: 2018-02-26] ssb rsa4096/0xF6535A33BA1EE48D 2015-01-13 [expires: 2018-01-12] sec rsa4096/0x565953B95372756C 2013-02-27 [expires: 2018-02-26] uid [ultimate] Andrew A. Savchenko (NRNU MEPhI) uid [ultimate] Andrew Savchenko uid [ultimate] Andrew Savchenko (Gentoo Dev) uid [ultimate] Andrew A. Savchenko (XMPP) uid [ultimate] Andrew A. Savchenko (UT Department) uid [ultimate] Andrew A. Savchenko (UT Department) ssb rsa4096/0x7AB649CA518C8321 2013-02-27 [expires: 2018-02-26] ssb rsa4096/0xF6535A33BA1EE48D 2015-01-13 [expires: 2018-01-12] I have two versions of the same key: the latest and previous one (before I added one more e-mail uid to the key). This problem may be related to the first one, may be not, I'm not sure. It is possible that gpgme goes crazy with these duplicates. I have no idea how to remove duplicates and old versions. All gpg commands are tied to either key id, e-mail or fingerprint. They are all not unique to delete such duplicates. I have though that this may happen due to both secring.gpg and private-keys-v1.d present, but moving secring.gpg away doesn't help. Maybe manual editing of pubring.gpg will help to remove duplicates, but it will be quite hard to handle this binary format. Googling gave me very litte here: 1st issue: may happen for some custom gpgme client software, but no data on global failures after gnupg update. 2nd issue: may happen when key is stored in multiple sources and fetched from them, but I have no --keyring options in my gpg.conf (see attached file). Any ideas how to fix these issues, especially the signing failure are much appreciated. Best regards, Andrew Savchenko -------------- next part -------------- An embedded and charset-unspecified text was scrubbed... Name: gpg.conf URL: -------------- next part -------------- An embedded and charset-unspecified text was scrubbed... Name: sylpheed-gpgme.log URL: -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: not available Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 819 bytes Desc: not available URL: From wk at gnupg.org Tue Oct 13 20:46:30 2015 From: wk at gnupg.org (Werner Koch) Date: Tue, 13 Oct 2015 20:46:30 +0200 Subject: Problems with gnupg-2.1.9 (and gpgme-1.6.0) In-Reply-To: <20151013193015.30b0524d2ec3aa816bfe2685@gmail.com> (Andrew Savchenko's message of "Tue, 13 Oct 2015 19:30:15 +0300") References: <20151013193015.30b0524d2ec3aa816bfe2685@gmail.com> Message-ID: <87zizmtxmh.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> On Tue, 13 Oct 2015 18:30, bircoph at gmail.com said: > I updated to gnupg-2.1.9 from 2.0.x on both my desktop and laptop > and now I have big problems. My OS is Gentoo Linux. > > 1. gpgme is now broken. This is more a likely a problem with Sylpheed (can you test with Claws-Mail instead?). > libassuan-2.3.0) and rebuilt consumer applications. Of course, > keys were migrated to the new format using > gpg --import ~/.gnupg/secring.gpg > and gpg-agent was restarted (I even rebooted the whole host), but (Restart is not necessary.) The problem exists with both, pubring.gpg and pubring.kbx, right? > 2. I have duplicated keys in the ring with the same ID and > fingerprint. > > Duplication happens only to _some_ of my keys where I have a secret > key, fetched public keys of other users are not duplicated. Is that for pubring.kbx only? This is the first report I recall for gpg but we sometimes have such duplicates with gpgsm. What you can do now is: gpg --export-ownertrust >myownertrust.lst gpg --export >allmykeys.gpg rm pubring.kbx gpg --import References: <20151013193015.30b0524d2ec3aa816bfe2685@gmail.com> <87zizmtxmh.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> Message-ID: <20151014010018.8ee7a66770b41178b6d13a32@gmail.com> Hi, On Tue, 13 Oct 2015 20:46:30 +0200 Werner Koch wrote: > On Tue, 13 Oct 2015 18:30, bircoph at gmail.com said: > > I updated to gnupg-2.1.9 from 2.0.x on both my desktop and laptop > > and now I have big problems. My OS is Gentoo Linux. > > > > 1. gpgme is now broken. > > This is more a likely a problem with Sylpheed (can you test with > Claws-Mail instead?). Sylpheed is not the only application affected. Mcabber (http://mcabber.com/) also uses GPGME for GnuPG integration and also fails after 2.0 -> 2.1 GnuPG migration. Right now I have some troubles with building claws-mail with GnuPG support. Will report when I'll be able to test it. > > libassuan-2.3.0) and rebuilt consumer applications. Of course, > > keys were migrated to the new format using > > gpg --import ~/.gnupg/secring.gpg > > and gpg-agent was restarted (I even rebooted the whole host), but > > (Restart is not necessary.) > > The problem exists with both, pubring.gpg and pubring.kbx, right? No, only with pubring.gpg. kbxutil --find-dups ~/.gnupg/pubring.kbx Shows none and --stat shows that only X.509 certs are stored in the pubring.kbx file, no OpenPGP keys here: openpgp: 0 x509: 63 > > 2. I have duplicated keys in the ring with the same ID and > > fingerprint. > > > > Duplication happens only to _some_ of my keys where I have a secret > > key, fetched public keys of other users are not duplicated. > > Is that for pubring.kbx only? This is the first report I recall for gpg > but we sometimes have such duplicates with gpgsm. No, for pubring.gpg only. > What you can do now is: > > gpg --export-ownertrust >myownertrust.lst > gpg --export >allmykeys.gpg > rm pubring.kbx > gpg --import From wk at gnupg.org Wed Oct 14 10:52:14 2015 From: wk at gnupg.org (Werner Koch) Date: Wed, 14 Oct 2015 10:52:14 +0200 Subject: Duplicated keys in pubring.gpg (was: Problems with gnupg-2.1.9) In-Reply-To: <20151014010018.8ee7a66770b41178b6d13a32@gmail.com> (Andrew Savchenko's message of "Wed, 14 Oct 2015 01:00:18 +0300") References: <20151013193015.30b0524d2ec3aa816bfe2685@gmail.com> <87zizmtxmh.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> <20151014010018.8ee7a66770b41178b6d13a32@gmail.com> Message-ID: <87twptu91d.fsf_-_@vigenere.g10code.de> On Wed, 14 Oct 2015 00:00, bircoph at gmail.com said: > No, only with pubring.gpg. Interesting. Never seen that before. I guess is that there is another problem related to skipping of PGP-2 keys. We need to be able to replicate the problem first. Shalom-Salam, Werner -- Die Gedanken sind frei. Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz. From bircoph at gmail.com Wed Oct 14 15:39:09 2015 From: bircoph at gmail.com (Andrew Savchenko) Date: Wed, 14 Oct 2015 16:39:09 +0300 Subject: Duplicated keys in pubring.gpg (was: Problems with gnupg-2.1.9) In-Reply-To: <87twptu91d.fsf_-_@vigenere.g10code.de> References: <20151013193015.30b0524d2ec3aa816bfe2685@gmail.com> <87zizmtxmh.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> <20151014010018.8ee7a66770b41178b6d13a32@gmail.com> <87twptu91d.fsf_-_@vigenere.g10code.de> Message-ID: <20151014163909.d8ba1add6826f0afcd9315df@gmail.com> Hello, On Wed, 14 Oct 2015 10:52:14 +0200 Werner Koch wrote: > On Wed, 14 Oct 2015 00:00, bircoph at gmail.com said: > > No, only with pubring.gpg. > > Interesting. Never seen that before. I guess is that there is another > problem related to skipping of PGP-2 keys. We need to be able to > replicate the problem first. I can send you old pubring.gpg for analysis, if that will help. I'm not really sure when these duplications occur, so I can't tell how to reproduce their occurrence. As for the Sylpheed signing issue. After I fixed pubring, I checked it again and it didn't work. Then i killed gpg-agent, sylpheed and started new one: everything works now. Claws-mail and mcabber works too. Since I checked claws-mail after pubring was fixed, I can't tell whether it was working or not before pubring was fixed. Thank you for your help. Best regards, Andrew Savchenko -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: not available Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 819 bytes Desc: not available URL: From yuri.kanivetsky at gmail.com Thu Oct 15 12:37:55 2015 From: yuri.kanivetsky at gmail.com (Yuri Kanivetsky) Date: Thu, 15 Oct 2015 13:37:55 +0300 Subject: ?: keys.gnupg.net: Host not found In-Reply-To: References: <5613A4CC.60204@sumptuouscapital.com> <56177CD4.1090104@sumptuouscapital.com> <56191421.5020107@sumptuouscapital.com> Message-ID: Hi, I wanted to add, that I can't reproduce the issue with the test program alone. Only after making some gpg runs. Regards, Yuri From dirk.mika at bayer.com Thu Oct 15 14:11:40 2015 From: dirk.mika at bayer.com (Dirk Mika) Date: Thu, 15 Oct 2015 12:11:40 +0000 Subject: Pinentry pops up allthough --passphrase-fd is used Message-ID: Hi, I'm completly new to gpg but have read many helpful webpages and docs. The primary reason for using gpg is to decrypt a downloaded file right after download in a batchjob (I have to use a windows server and the job is configured as a scheduled task, so the environment is a WIN 2008 Server). Almost eveything works as expected but I stumbled across one issue. If the following command is given for the first time and the gpg-agent is not yet running the pinentry-windows pops up asking for the passphrase. (I'm still testing in a cmd-window) echo "-censorship-" | gpg --homedir="C:\Program Files (x86)\HR-Interface\gnupg" --batch --passphrase-fd 0 --decrypt --output M:\data.csv M:\data.csv.gpg When I enter the correct passphrase the command finishes correctly. Each subsequent call of the very same command succeeds without any prompt. Is this intended behavior? Do I need to start the agent in advance (how)? I'm afraid (although not tested yet) having pinentry popping up in a scheduled task without being logged in won't work. Dirk From lechten at wi.uni-muenster.de Thu Oct 15 17:31:43 2015 From: lechten at wi.uni-muenster.de (Jens Lechtenboerger) Date: Thu, 15 Oct 2015 17:31:43 +0200 Subject: gpgsm with empty passphrase? Message-ID: <87eggwkv1c.fsf@wi.uni-muenster.de> Hi there, I fail to use gpgsm from 2.1.9 with empty passphrases for test keys. (2.0.x works with the workaround described there: https://bugs.gnupg.org/gnupg/issue2126) I?m using gpgsm compiled via ?make -f build-aux/speedo.mk native? with exported PATH and LD_LIBRARY_PATH. In the directory with test keys I also created gpg-agent.conf with debug settings. When decrypting as follows $ gpgsm --homedir --decrypt /tmp/gpgsm.enc I see the following debug message from gpg-agent 2.1.9: --8<---------------cut here---------------start------------->8--- can't connect to the PIN entry module '/home/lechten/local/gnupg-2.1.9/PLAY/inst/bin/pinentry': IPC "connect" Aufruf fehlgeschlagen --8<---------------cut here---------------end--------------->8--- IMO, that path should not be used or pinentry should be built. When adding a pinentry option to gpg-agent.conf, I get the following debug messages from gpg-agent after just hitting return or clicking ?OK? in the pinentry window (as I want to use an empty passphrase): --8<---------------cut here---------------start------------->8--- DBG: connection to PIN entry established DBG: chan_5 -> INQUIRE PINENTRY_LAUNCHED 10817 DBG: chan_5 <- END DBG: error calling pinentry: No passphrase given failed to unprotect the secret key: No passphrase given failed to read the secret key command 'PKDECRYPT' failed: No passphrase given DBG: chan_5 -> ERR 67109041 No passphrase given DBG: chan_5 <- [eof] --8<---------------cut here---------------end--------------->8--- Am I doing something wrong or is this a bug? Best wishes Jens From konrad.schwarz at siemens.com Mon Oct 19 10:10:17 2015 From: konrad.schwarz at siemens.com (Schwarz, Konrad) Date: Mon, 19 Oct 2015 08:10:17 +0000 Subject: Importing and using non-self-signed PGP keys Message-ID: Hi, my organization issued to me a public/private PGP keypair that is not self signed. I managed to import these keys into GPG 1.4.19 with the --allow-non-selfsigned-uid flag, as described in https://www.gnupg.org/gph/en/pgp2x/x58.html How can I self-sign the new uid in GPG, or, for that matter, do anything else with it? I keep on getting the errors `User ID ... is not self-signed. Unable to sign.' Regards Konrad From greg at turnstep.com Mon Oct 19 16:47:13 2015 From: greg at turnstep.com (Greg Sabino Mullane) Date: Mon, 19 Oct 2015 14:47:13 -0000 Subject: Pinentry pops up allthough --passphrase-fd is used In-Reply-To: Message-ID: -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: RIPEMD160 Dirk Mika asked: ... > If the following command is given for the first time and the gpg-agent > is not yet running the pinentry-windows pops up ... > echo "-censorship-" | gpg --batch --passphrase-fd 0 ... > > Is this intended behavior? Do I need to start the agent in advance (how)? No, that is not intended. (Please indicate what version of gnupg you are using when you email the list.) You might try to actively discourage the agent from intruding by adding the --no-use-agent option to your call. You can also use the --debug-all flag to see if it gives any hint on why the agent is being called. - -- Greg Sabino Mullane greg at turnstep.com PGP Key: 0x14964AC8 201510191042 http://biglumber.com/x/web?pk=2529DF6AB8F79407E94445B4BC9B906714964AC8 -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- iEYEAREDAAYFAlYlAhYACgkQvJuQZxSWSsi3ZwCePqvdJ9mLRIpw3DLFp6a0zWZS zg8AoLExMjv4HUGz7dKs686q0Smlff92 =NkWU -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From 2014-667rhzu3dc-lists-groups at riseup.net Mon Oct 19 23:55:40 2015 From: 2014-667rhzu3dc-lists-groups at riseup.net (MFPA) Date: Mon, 19 Oct 2015 22:55:40 +0100 Subject: Importing and using non-self-signed PGP keys In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <1166739322.20151019225540@my_localhost> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA512 On Monday 19 October 2015 at 9:10:17 AM, in , Schwarz, Konrad wrote: > my organization issued to me a public/private PGP > keypair that is not self signed. Just out of curiosity, do you know what they used to create the key? I thought all current openPGP applications for quite a few years have automatically self-signed keys they generate. > How can I self-sign the new uid in GPG I thought the answer was just:- gpg --edit-key then setpref But a quick web search showed me [0] which says:- create a new UserID for the key in question sign your old UserID with the same key delete the new UserID [0] - -- Best regards MFPA Look, it's a hat! It's not going to hurt you. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- iQF8BAEBCgBmBQJWJWbiXxSAAAAAAC4AKGlzc3Vlci1mcHJAbm90YXRpb25zLm9w ZW5wZ3AuZmlmdGhob3JzZW1hbi5uZXRCM0FFN0VDQTlBOEM4QjMwMjZBNUEwRjU2 QjdDNzRDRUIzMUYyNUYwAAoJEGt8dM6zHyXwh1MH/0ORQWE35iXvRKmN7W90uEp8 9+gNr/ZT/jOqmVffFIMOjzssxqZ4xexmSIijP5gE3d3O/+rlpm4aGW1CqjSo/1Qx fPOoyTmuA48heMz+W9V1C87vVAyh8jCouJW6ySHIoTnQCRx01BTxOwK5R4N8D9sj AbkOfsm2MqZ4KyZkfxo3PAIye+oZEPEqlXxmrgH9ZE7yJgUP9smVZ5xfSlnIN8hu RyB4Rs2RmV/I2HkrHioHIOFqobeXtCC4PQStvB0A+lUGVwn+i1T3BPzNdZdlbb2A 03LkT66fpO0XgeuRz755LDBvvbHqZqShwz3OMWuE8V+m7otzPSLJN5Qn9zViDVGI vgQBFgoAZgUCViVnEV8UgAAAAAAuAChpc3N1ZXItZnByQG5vdGF0aW9ucy5vcGVu cGdwLmZpZnRoaG9yc2VtYW4ubmV0MzNBQ0VENEVFOTEzNEVFQkRFNkE4NTA2MTcx MkJDNDYxQUY3NzhFNAAKCRAXErxGGvd45JuqAP4qDuW3hxT66r7SsG9La2kI0L9t ZOG80jqX+uPuo8fYRQD/d1uN1JBhxhjFvD9pSPm39T/4MPlhXgJndodWKrV0HwM= =vJ34 -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From rjh at sixdemonbag.org Tue Oct 20 02:13:24 2015 From: rjh at sixdemonbag.org (Robert J. Hansen) Date: Mon, 19 Oct 2015 20:13:24 -0400 Subject: Importing and using non-self-signed PGP keys In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <56258724.4050501@sixdemonbag.org> > my organization issued to me a public/private PGP keypair > that is not self signed. Then they issued you a malformed certificate which cannot and must not be used. The self-sig is an essential part of every correctly-formed OpenPGP certificate. If you were issued a certificate lacking a self-sig, then your issuer has a problem that needs to be corrected. I wish I had better news for you, but a missing self-sig is pretty much a big red stop sign. From dirk.mika at bayer.com Tue Oct 20 11:13:01 2015 From: dirk.mika at bayer.com (Dirk Mika) Date: Tue, 20 Oct 2015 09:13:01 +0000 Subject: Pinentry pops up allthough --passphrase-fd is used Message-ID: >Dirk Mika asked: >... >> If the following command is given for the first time and the gpg-agent >> is not yet running the pinentry-windows pops up ... >> echo "-censorship-" | gpg --batch --passphrase-fd 0 ... >> >> Is this intended behavior? Do I need to start the agent in advance (how)? > >No, that is not intended. (Please indicate what version of gnupg you are using >when you email the list.) You might try to actively discourage the agent >from intruding by adding the --no-use-agent option to your call. I'm using version 2.1.9. And that's the reason why --no-use-agent won't work. :-) And although mentioned in the docs that gpg2 always requires the agent I tried it anyway. :-) >You can also use the --debug-all flag to see if it gives any hint >on why the agent is being called. I've used the flag and got a huge amount of information but nothing that gave me a hint what's causing this issue. I did some more tests and figured out that all passphrase options (--passphrase-fd, --passphrase-file and --passphrase) are ignored. And it doesn't matter if I add one of these to the command line or not. When the agent is not running it is started and pinentry pops up. If the agent is running the passphrase is cached (or the key, I don't know) and pinentry does not appear. I then tried version 2.0 instead of 2.1 and with this version I successfully managed to decrypt a file without having to enter the passphrase. Best regards, Dirk Mika From david at gbenet.com Wed Oct 21 12:30:46 2015 From: david at gbenet.com (david at gbenet.com) Date: Wed, 21 Oct 2015 11:30:46 +0100 Subject: Keys have expired?? Message-ID: <56276956.4080002@gbenet.com> Hello All, Am getting a strange message when signing e-mails - Enigmail says my key can not be found or a sub-key has expired. Yet Enigmail Kleopatra and Kgpg all show my key - and it has no expiry date set in any of the main or sub-keys. I'm using Linux Lubuntu Thunderbird 38.3 Enigmail 1.8.2 and gnupg gpg (GnuPG) 2.0.22 Any help to figuring this out would be appreciated. Thanks David -- ?See the sanity of the man! No gods, no angels, no demons, no body. Nothing of the kind.Stern, sane,every brain-cell perfect and complete even at the moment of death. No delusion.? https://linuxcounter.net/user/512854.html - http://gbenet.com From bernhard at intevation.de Thu Oct 22 17:47:00 2015 From: bernhard at intevation.de (Bernhard Reiter) Date: Thu, 22 Oct 2015 17:47:00 +0200 Subject: libgrypt in Wikipedia? (help wanted) Message-ID: <201510221747.01600.bernhard@intevation.de> Hi, while libgcrypt has an entry in Wikipedia at https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Libgcrypt It probably should also be listed in the tables at https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Comparison_of_Cryptography_Libraries Maye some Wikipedia author can give us a hand here and decide what should go in there. (In wikipedia.de it is good style to not enter information about a product that I am commercially involved with. Some third party can do this with less potential conflict of interest.) Best Regards, Bernhard -- www.intevation.de/~bernhard (CEO) www.fsfe.org (Founding GA Member) Intevation GmbH, Osnabr?ck, Germany; Amtsgericht Osnabr?ck, HRB 18998 Owned and run by Frank Koormann, Bernhard Reiter, Dr. Jan-Oliver Wagner -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: signature.asc Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 473 bytes Desc: This is a digitally signed message part. URL: From martin-gnupg-users at dkyb.de Thu Oct 22 19:03:24 2015 From: martin-gnupg-users at dkyb.de (Martin Behrendt) Date: Thu, 22 Oct 2015 19:03:24 +0200 Subject: libgrypt in Wikipedia? (help wanted) In-Reply-To: <201510221747.01600.bernhard@intevation.de> References: <201510221747.01600.bernhard@intevation.de> Message-ID: <562916DC.2080408@dkyb.de> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 Am 22.10.2015 um 17:47 schrieb Bernhard Reiter: > Maye some Wikipedia author can give us a hand here and decide what > should go in there. > > (In wikipedia.de it is good style to not enter information about a > product that I am commercially involved with. Some third party can > do this with less potential conflict of interest.) I don't consider myself a Wikipedia author but I followed "Sei mutig". ; ) Since I am to lazy to read the manual, there are a lot of blanks because I couldn't identify or find the correct information in the libgcrypt Wikipedia entry. So please put in the missing information yourself, or someone or post them on my discussion page or via e-mail (I would appreciate an easy to c/p format) and I will enter them. Greetings Martin -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1 iEYEARECAAYFAlYpFtsACgkQ/6vdZgk46sgRPACgmT6tjp/2kALYH92vSVaMPsSH wswAnid5ZWfR4hE2H4LxMZeYvqDm8Vd0 =7L7N -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From wk at gnupg.org Fri Oct 23 01:08:54 2015 From: wk at gnupg.org (Werner Koch) Date: Fri, 23 Oct 2015 01:08:54 +0200 Subject: libgrypt in Wikipedia? (help wanted) In-Reply-To: <562916DC.2080408@dkyb.de> (Martin Behrendt's message of "Thu, 22 Oct 2015 19:03:24 +0200") References: <201510221747.01600.bernhard@intevation.de> <562916DC.2080408@dkyb.de> Message-ID: <87io5yfqm1.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> On Thu, 22 Oct 2015 19:03, martin-gnupg-users at dkyb.de said: > So please put in the missing information yourself, or someone or post > them on my discussion page or via e-mail (I would appreciate an easy The license is GNU LGPL v2.1+. Only the manual is under the GPL v2+. The current released version is 1.6.4 with these features not yet shown on the wiki: * Key Generation and Exchange - EDH yes (*) using the lower level interface. - NTRU no - DSS yes * Public Key Cryptography Standards - PKCS#1 yes - all others no (*) done by different libraries/tools * Hash Algorithms - MD2 yes * MAC Algorithms - HMAC-SHA1 yes - HMAC-SHA2 yes - POLY1305-AES no * Block Ciphers You may put a Yes into each clumn * Stream Ciphers - RC4 yes * Hardware Assisted Support - Intel AES-NI: yes - VIA Padlock: yes * Code Size How has this been measured?? * Portability - All 32 bit and 64 bit Unix systems, Windows 32 bit, Windows CE Isn't it a bit strange that OpenSSL is missing on the page? I do not think that the listing is really useful becuase it mixes too much things, protocol things like PKCS#5,#8,#12 should not be considered part of a crypto library. If you want that you need to add more thinsg, for example SSH and TLS. Thanks for adding some stuff about Libgcrypt. Shalom-Salam, Werner -- Die Gedanken sind frei. Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz. From david at gbenet.com Fri Oct 23 01:33:02 2015 From: david at gbenet.com (david at gbenet.com) Date: Fri, 23 Oct 2015 00:33:02 +0100 Subject: Keys have expired?? In-Reply-To: <56276956.4080002@gbenet.com> References: <56276956.4080002@gbenet.com> Message-ID: <5629722E.4070209@gbenet.com> david at gbenet.com: > Hello All, > > Am getting a strange message when signing e-mails - Enigmail says my key can not be found or > a sub-key has expired. Yet Enigmail Kleopatra and Kgpg all show my key - and it has no > expiry date set in any of the main or sub-keys. > > I'm using Linux Lubuntu Thunderbird 38.3 Enigmail 1.8.2 and gnupg gpg (GnuPG) 2.0.22 > > Any help to figuring this out would be appreciated. > > Thanks > > David > Solved: What I had to do was I had to add the following line to /.gnupg/gpg-agent.conf: pinentry-program /usr/bin/pinentry-gtk-2 -- ?See the sanity of the man! No gods, no angels, no demons, no body. Nothing of the kind.Stern, sane,every brain-cell perfect and complete even at the moment of death. No delusion.? https://linuxcounter.net/user/512854.html - http://gbenet.com -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: signature.asc Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 866 bytes Desc: OpenPGP digital signature URL: From johanw at vulcan.xs4all.nl Fri Oct 23 09:54:42 2015 From: johanw at vulcan.xs4all.nl (Johan Wevers) Date: Fri, 23 Oct 2015 09:54:42 +0200 Subject: First quantum gates in silicon In-Reply-To: <5613D58B.7010409@sixdemonbag.org> References: <5613D58B.7010409@sixdemonbag.org> Message-ID: <5629E7C2.4030606@vulcan.xs4all.nl> On 06-10-2015 16:07, Robert J. Hansen wrote: > Australian researchers have figured out how to make a quantum gate on a > silicon chip. This is interesting work, because we've spent a *lot* of > money learning how to etch silicon. Being able to build quantum gates > on the same material that our current systems use is really important > from an engineering perspective. > > So far they've only been able to build a two-qubit chip. This means > there's absolutely nothing to panic over. Still, it's fascinating news. > We live in interesting times. :) > > http://www.engineering.unsw.edu.au/news/quantum-computing-first-two-qubit-logic-gate-in-silicon I just saw this posted in sci.crypt: http://arstechnica.com/security/2015/10/nsa-advisory-sparks-concern-of-secret-advance-ushering-in-cryptoapocalypse/ Short quote from the article linked to above: In August, National Security Agency officials advised US agencies and businesses to prepare for a not-too-distant time when the cryptography protecting virtually all sensitive government and business communications is rendered obsolete by quantum computing. The advisory recommended backing away from plans to deploy elliptic curve cryptography, a form of public key cryptography that the NSA spent the previous 20 years promoting as more secure than the older RSA cryptosystem. Almost immediately, the dramatic about-face generated questions and anxiety. Why would the NSA abruptly abandon a series of ECC specifications it had championed for so long? Why were officials issuing the advice now when a working quantum computer was 10 to 50 years away, and why would they back away from ECC before recommending a suite of quantum-resistant alternatives? The fact that the NSA was continuing to endorse use of RSA, which is also vulnerable to quantum computing, led some observers to speculate there was a secret motivation that had nothing to do with quantum computing. On Tuesday, researchers Neal Koblitz and Alfred J. Menezes published a paper titled A Riddle Wrapped in an Enigma that compiles some of the competing theories behind the August advisory. The researchers stressed that that their paper isn't academic and at times relies on unsourced facts and opinions. And sure enough, some of the theories sound almost conspiratorial. Still, the paper does a good job of evaluating the strengths and weaknesses of the NSA's highly unexpected abandonment of ECC in a post quantum crypto (PQC) world. -- ir. J.C.A. Wevers PGP/GPG public keys at http://www.xs4all.nl/~johanw/pgpkeys.html From markr at signal100.com Fri Oct 23 12:12:59 2015 From: markr at signal100.com (Mark Rousell) Date: Fri, 23 Oct 2015 11:12:59 +0100 Subject: First quantum gates in silicon In-Reply-To: <5629E7C2.4030606@vulcan.xs4all.nl> References: <5613D58B.7010409@sixdemonbag.org> <5629E7C2.4030606@vulcan.xs4all.nl> Message-ID: <562A082B.5000402@signal100.com> On 23/10/2015 08:54, Johan Wevers wrote: > I just saw this posted in sci.crypt: > > http://arstechnica.com/security/2015/10/nsa-advisory-sparks-concern-of-secret-advance-ushering-in-cryptoapocalypse/ > > Short quote from the article linked to above: > > In August, National Security Agency officials advised US agencies > and businesses to prepare for a not-too-distant time when the > cryptography protecting virtually all sensitive government and > business communications is rendered obsolete by quantum computing. > The advisory recommended backing away from plans to deploy elliptic > curve cryptography, a form of public key cryptography that the NSA > spent the previous 20 years promoting as more secure than the older > RSA cryptosystem. > > Almost immediately, the dramatic about-face generated questions and > anxiety. Why would the NSA abruptly abandon a series of ECC > specifications it had championed for so long? Why were officials > issuing the advice now when a working quantum computer was 10 to 50 > years away, and why would they back away from ECC before > recommending a suite of quantum-resistant alternatives? The fact > that the NSA was continuing to endorse use of RSA, which is also > vulnerable to quantum computing, led some observers to speculate > there was a secret motivation that had nothing to do with quantum > computing. > > On Tuesday, researchers Neal Koblitz and Alfred J. Menezes > published a paper titled A Riddle Wrapped in an Enigma that > compiles some of the competing theories behind the August advisory. > The researchers stressed that that their paper isn't academic and > at times relies on unsourced facts and opinions. And sure enough, > some of the theories sound almost conspiratorial. Still, the paper > does a good job of evaluating the strengths and weaknesses of the > NSA's highly unexpected abandonment of ECC in a post quantum crypto > (PQC) world. Sounds like an attempt as mass reverse psychology to me... -- Mark Rousell PGP public key: http://www.signal100.com/markr/pgp Key ID: C9C5C162 From lachlan at twopif.net Fri Oct 23 10:58:22 2015 From: lachlan at twopif.net (Lachlan Gunn) Date: Fri, 23 Oct 2015 10:58:22 +0200 Subject: Direct signatures Message-ID: Hello, Is there any way make GNUPG or libgpgme generate a signature from an externally-computed hash? My justifications for this are twofold: 1. Isolation---by removing the need for gpg to see the original data, it becomes possible to perform signatures on a system that is completely isolated, at least as far as incoming data goes. 2. Process separation---I have ideas involving SELinux that I would like to experiment with, and doing so requires that tasks be split at the process level as I understand. Thanks, Lachlan -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From neal at walfield.org Fri Oct 23 13:41:02 2015 From: neal at walfield.org (Neal H. Walfield) Date: Fri, 23 Oct 2015 13:41:02 +0200 Subject: Direct signatures In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <87k2qd95ip.wl-neal@walfield.org> Hi Lachlan, At Fri, 23 Oct 2015 10:58:22 +0200, Lachlan Gunn wrote: > Is there any way make GNUPG or libgpgme generate a signature from an > externally-computed hash? My justifications for this are twofold: In theory yes, in practice no. To generate an OpenPGP signature, the OpenPGP implementation hashes the concatenation of the data and some metadata. That is, it computes: H(data || metadata). Thus, to do what you want you'd need to give GnuPG not the hash of the data, but the internal state of the hash function before it appends the metadata. Unfortunately, the internal state is implementation and platform dependent. If OpenPGP computed signatures as follows: H(H(data) || metadata), then what you wanted would be straightforward to implement. > 1. Isolation---by removing the need for gpg to see the original data, > it becomes possible to perform signatures on a system that is > completely isolated, at least as far as incoming data goes. > > 2. Process separation---I have ideas involving SELinux that I would > like to experiment with, and doing so requires that tasks be split at > the process level as I understand. There are two ways around this: - You can run gpg on one machine / user account and gpg-agent on another. (Look up the extra-socket option in the GnuPG manual.) Note: I briefly cover this in my "An Advanced Introduction to GnuPG" presentation, which was recorded at RMLL: https://2015.rmll.info/introduction-avancee-sur-gnupg?lang=en - Have GnuPG sign the hash of the data. That is, use something like sha256sum to compute a hash of the data, transfer the hash to the machine running gpg and sign that data. This adds a level of indirection, which the person verifying the hash needs to deal with. :) Neal From rjh at sixdemonbag.org Fri Oct 23 15:27:43 2015 From: rjh at sixdemonbag.org (Robert J. Hansen) Date: Fri, 23 Oct 2015 09:27:43 -0400 Subject: First quantum gates in silicon In-Reply-To: <5629E7C2.4030606@vulcan.xs4all.nl> References: <5613D58B.7010409@sixdemonbag.org> <5629E7C2.4030606@vulcan.xs4all.nl> Message-ID: <562A35CF.10409@sixdemonbag.org> > http://arstechnica.com/security/2015/10/nsa-advisory-sparks-concern-of-secret-advance-ushering-in-cryptoapocalypse/ Interesting. It's worth remembering, though, that users who have a 50-year writ-in-stone absolute need for security are, by their very nature, going to be paranoid gits. :) Imagine that you lived in 1965 and were responsible for composing communications security standards that had to keep secrets safe until 2015. How paranoid would you be? It's easy to not be paranoid enough (in the '80s, Ron Rivest doubted a 512-bit composite would ever be factored; today, RSA-512 is a sad joke) and easy to be too paranoid ("we must consider the possibility space aliens will appear with technology beyond mortal ken"). Hitting the sweet spot is pretty hard. If I was writing a 50-year standard today, I'd probably be concerned about modest-sized quantum computers. ECC is vulnerable to these; RSA, DSA and Elgamal really aren't. To efficiently solve discrete logs with Shor's algorithm requires twice as many qubits as there are bits in the number. A 256-bit ECC key, providing ~128 shannons of uncertainty, could be efficiently broken by a 512-qubit computer. An RSA-3072 key, providing ~128 shannons of uncertainty, would require a 6144-qubit keybreaker. This is all off the top of my head: it's been a long time since I've looked at Shor's. I may be off on my numbers. From bernhard at intevation.de Fri Oct 23 16:55:49 2015 From: bernhard at intevation.de (Bernhard Reiter) Date: Fri, 23 Oct 2015 16:55:49 +0200 Subject: libgrypt in Wikipedia? (help wanted) In-Reply-To: <562916DC.2080408@dkyb.de> References: <201510221747.01600.bernhard@intevation.de> <562916DC.2080408@dkyb.de> Message-ID: <201510231655.55199.bernhard@intevation.de> On Thursday 22 October 2015 at 19:03:24, Martin Behrendt wrote: > I don't consider myself a Wikipedia author but I followed "Sei mutig". ; > ) Thanks! It seems that the page https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Comparison_of_Cryptography_Libraries is not well linked yet, but maybe it will be at some point! Bernhard -- www.intevation.de/~bernhard (CEO) www.fsfe.org (Founding GA Member) Intevation GmbH, Osnabr?ck, Germany; Amtsgericht Osnabr?ck, HRB 18998 Owned and run by Frank Koormann, Bernhard Reiter, Dr. Jan-Oliver Wagner -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: signature.asc Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 473 bytes Desc: This is a digitally signed message part. URL: From wk at gnupg.org Fri Oct 23 21:16:05 2015 From: wk at gnupg.org (Werner Koch) Date: Fri, 23 Oct 2015 21:16:05 +0200 Subject: libgrypt in Wikipedia? (help wanted) In-Reply-To: <201510231655.55199.bernhard@intevation.de> (Bernhard Reiter's message of "Fri, 23 Oct 2015 16:55:49 +0200") References: <201510221747.01600.bernhard@intevation.de> <562916DC.2080408@dkyb.de> <201510231655.55199.bernhard@intevation.de> Message-ID: <87oafpe6q2.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> On Fri, 23 Oct 2015 16:55, bernhard at intevation.de said: > https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Comparison_of_Cryptography_Libraries > is not well linked yet, but maybe it will be at some point! Although, I posted some data last night and Martin quickly updated the page, I am not sure whether that listing is really useful. It mixes crypto algorithms with high level protocols. For the latter there are other and well categorized comparison pages. I also makes me wonder that OpenSSL is missing from that chart. Salam-Shalom, Werner -- Die Gedanken sind frei. Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz. From rose-indorf at gmx.de Sat Oct 24 00:48:47 2015 From: rose-indorf at gmx.de (Sebastian Rose-Indorf) Date: Sat, 24 Oct 2015 00:48:47 +0200 Subject: Installing gpg2/commads? Message-ID: <006601d10de4$ffcaa430$ff5fec90$@de> Hello, are there some commands for installing the gnupg-w32-2.1.x_xxxxxxxx.exe (like -silent or -no_registry)? Sebastian From listofactor at mail.ru Sat Oct 24 05:37:36 2015 From: listofactor at mail.ru (listo factor) Date: Sat, 24 Oct 2015 03:37:36 +0000 Subject: absolutely nothing to panic over In-Reply-To: <5613D58B.7010409@sixdemonbag.org> References: <5613D58B.7010409@sixdemonbag.org> Message-ID: <562AFD00.5060306@mail.ru> On 10/06/2015 02:07 PM, Robert J. Hansen - rjh at sixdemonbag.org wrote: > Australian researchers have figured out how to make a quantum gate on a > silicon chip. [...] there's absolutely nothing to panic over. Yup, instead of panicking, we should simply acknowledge the fact that secret communication is not possible without out-of-channel key exchange. The dream of circumventing this fact of life with the alchemy called "public key cryptography" is quickly coming to its end. It was nice while it lasted, but now is the time to move on. Like every change of massive technical infrastructure built on weak foundations this will be difficult and there will be casualties, but mostly among those that refuse to abandon public key cryptography as soon as they possibly can. From david at gbenet.com Sat Oct 24 05:49:11 2015 From: david at gbenet.com (david at gbenet.com) Date: Sat, 24 Oct 2015 04:49:11 +0100 Subject: absolutely nothing to panic over In-Reply-To: <562AFD00.5060306@mail.ru> References: <5613D58B.7010409@sixdemonbag.org> <562AFD00.5060306@mail.ru> Message-ID: <562AFFB7.9010802@gbenet.com> listo factor: > On 10/06/2015 02:07 PM, Robert J. Hansen - rjh at sixdemonbag.org wrote: >> Australian researchers have figured out how to make a quantum gate on a >> silicon chip. [...] there's absolutely nothing to panic over. > > Yup, instead of panicking, we should simply acknowledge the fact > that secret communication is not possible without out-of-channel > key exchange. The dream of circumventing this fact of life with > the alchemy called "public key cryptography" is quickly coming > to its end. It was nice while it lasted, but now is the time to > move on. Like every change of massive technical infrastructure > built on weak foundations this will be difficult and there > will be casualties, but mostly among those that refuse to > abandon public key cryptography as soon as they possibly can. > > > > _______________________________________________ > Gnupg-users mailing list > Gnupg-users at gnupg.org > http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users > Hmmmm.............., You say time to move on - but what? We may well still have public key cryptology - and avail ourselves of quantum physics on a silicon chip :) David -- ?See the sanity of the man! No gods, no angels, no demons, no body. Nothing of the kind.Stern, sane,every brain-cell perfect and complete even at the moment of death. No delusion.? https://linuxcounter.net/user/512854.html - http://gbenet.com -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: signature.asc Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 866 bytes Desc: OpenPGP digital signature URL: From rjh at sixdemonbag.org Sat Oct 24 10:52:46 2015 From: rjh at sixdemonbag.org (Robert J. Hansen) Date: Sat, 24 Oct 2015 04:52:46 -0400 Subject: absolutely nothing to panic over In-Reply-To: <562AFD00.5060306@mail.ru> References: <5613D58B.7010409@sixdemonbag.org> <562AFD00.5060306@mail.ru> Message-ID: <562B46DE.4020401@sixdemonbag.org> > Yup, instead of panicking, we should simply acknowledge the fact > that secret communication is not possible without out-of-channel > key exchange. The dream of circumventing this fact of life with > the alchemy called "public key cryptography" is quickly coming > to its end. Never heard of McEliece, have you? Quantum-resistant public key crypto. It's pretty cool stuff. I know it's popular to say the sky is falling, but it isn't, and this kind of scaremongering doesn't help anyone. From listofactor at mail.ru Sun Oct 25 08:40:37 2015 From: listofactor at mail.ru (listo factor) Date: Sun, 25 Oct 2015 07:40:37 +0000 Subject: absolutely nothing to panic over In-Reply-To: <562B46DE.4020401@sixdemonbag.org> References: <5613D58B.7010409@sixdemonbag.org> <562AFD00.5060306@mail.ru> <562B46DE.4020401@sixdemonbag.org> Message-ID: <562C8775.2060105@mail.ru> On 10/24/2015 08:52 AM, Robert J. Hansen wrote: > I know it's popular to say the sky is falling, but it isn't, and this > kind of scaremongering doesn't help anyone. I agree that the sky is not falling, at least not for everybody. I do however believe that we must face the future without the hocus-pocus of "public key cryptography". *There is no secure communication over an insecure channel without out-of-channel bootstrap*. For a while, we thought that we can cheat the laws of nature with smoke and mirrors: either "trusted third parties" (a contradiction in term), or public key verification using devices such as "web of trust" (a Rube Goldberg-esque contraption if there ever was one in widespread use) or party-to-party key verification that depended on authentication and information exchange integrity over an insecure channel. As if that was not enough, we now see the cracks in the basement: advances in computing technology are corroding the fundamental algorithms, one by one... Fortunately, this process is slow, and there is ample time to transit. If the sky is falling, it is falling only for those that deal with the reality by burying their heads in the sand. From andrewg at andrewg.com Sun Oct 25 10:20:30 2015 From: andrewg at andrewg.com (Andrew Gallagher) Date: Sun, 25 Oct 2015 09:20:30 +0000 Subject: absolutely nothing to panic over In-Reply-To: <562C8775.2060105@mail.ru> References: <5613D58B.7010409@sixdemonbag.org> <562AFD00.5060306@mail.ru> <562B46DE.4020401@sixdemonbag.org> <562C8775.2060105@mail.ru> Message-ID: <7BB156A4-55FA-4497-949C-FC480F4B98DA@andrewg.com> > On 25 Oct 2015, at 07:40, listo factor wrote: > > I do however believe that we must face the future without the > hocus-pocus of "public key cryptography". By calling PKC "hocus pocus" and using "scare quotes" you won't convince us of your claims, just of your obsession. ;-) > *There is no secure > communication over an insecure channel without out-of-channel > bootstrap*. Correct. And PKC has just such an out of band bootstrap - key verification. > For a while, we thought that we can cheat the laws > of nature with smoke and mirrors: either "trusted third parties" > (a contradiction in term), or public key verification using > devices such as "web of trust" (a Rube Goldberg-esque contraption > if there ever was one in widespread use) or party-to-party key > verification that depended on authentication and information > exchange integrity over an insecure channel. There is nothing wrong in principle with any of these, so long as one understands and accepts the limitations. A trade off between security and practicality will always have to be made at some level. > As if that was not > enough, we now see the cracks in the basement: advances in > computing technology are corroding the fundamental algorithms, > one by one... Advances in computing technology have corroded every encryption algorithm ever made. This is not unique to PKC. Security is and always will be an arms race. > Fortunately, this process is slow, and there is ample time to > transit. If the sky is falling, it is falling only for those that > deal with the reality by burying their heads in the sand. Well, no. If you believe that PKC is fundamentally flawed, it may look that way to you. But you haven't shown any evidence other than your gut instinct. You may be right, or you may not. But gut instinct isn't enough to give up PKC, which is the only PRACTICAL mass-cryptography paradigm we know of. Imagine having to exchange out of band and in advance symmetric keys with every person or company you will ever deal with. Imagine Microsoft, Google, etc having to keep on file AND SECRET a symmetric key for every person on the planet. The drawbacks of a non-PKC future should be blindingly obvious. None of that is to say that some fundamental flaw in PKC won't be found. But all the signs point to the future being quantum-resistant PKC, and there is no point worrying about a future in which even that fails. If we are forced back to symmetric cryptography it will be a disaster, but we have the tools already. And who knows what other algorithms will arise in the meantime. A From ndk.clanbo at gmail.com Sun Oct 25 11:36:05 2015 From: ndk.clanbo at gmail.com (NdK) Date: Sun, 25 Oct 2015 11:36:05 +0100 Subject: absolutely nothing to panic over In-Reply-To: <562C8775.2060105@mail.ru> References: <5613D58B.7010409@sixdemonbag.org> <562AFD00.5060306@mail.ru> <562B46DE.4020401@sixdemonbag.org> <562C8775.2060105@mail.ru> Message-ID: <562CB095.5070803@gmail.com> Il 25/10/2015 08:40, listo factor ha scritto: [...] > enough, we now see the cracks in the basement: advances in > computing technology are corroding the fundamental algorithms, > one by one... Unless you move to another family of algorithms based on information-theoretic limits on what an eavesdropper can know. Some methods I remember involve neural networks in the form of tree parity machines with a hidden layer (mutual learning is provably faster than learn-by-watching), others use noisy channels (say readings from a distant radio-source in deep space), others put a limit on the amount of data an attacker could store... All those have in common is that they require quite large data transfers (so they're quite impractical) and the success probability of an attack is mathematically limited (though quite "high" compared to current PK and SK crypto, but can be made as small as you like by iterating enough times). *No* advance in computing power can break 'em, unless it makes a brute-force attack possible. If the problem is "just" the birth of quantum computers, then there already are some practical algorithms that address the issue (NTRU and McEliece, as already pointed out by others). BYtE, Diego. From janphilipp at litza.de Sat Oct 24 14:56:10 2015 From: janphilipp at litza.de (Jan-Philipp Litza) Date: Sat, 24 Oct 2015 14:56:10 +0200 Subject: gpg-agent: error accessing card: Conflicting use In-Reply-To: <20150814090538.65079202@hsdev.com> References: <20150814090538.65079202@hsdev.com> Message-ID: <562B7FEA.8060204@litza.de> Hi everybody, I'm having the same problem and found the following steps to reproduce: 0. Configure your Yubikey NEO to eject the card on button press: ykneomgr -M81 Re-plug it afterwards! 1. Insert the Yubikey and press button to insert the (virtual) card 2. Use the authentication key stored on the card to log in to a SSH host 3. Press button to remove the (virtual) card (or wait if you have a timeout for auto-eject configured) 4. Press button to insert the (virtual) card again 5. Do anything that requires the card (e.g. gpg -d) gpg: public key decryption failed: Conflicting use Instead of having the SSH session still open, it suffices to have a persistent connection (ControlPersist ssh config option). Apparently, even an authenticated SSH session somehow still uses the agent (even without agent forwarding configured), and if the card was removed and re-inserted, this somehow blocks its usage. So instead of restarting the gpg-agent, you can also kill all open ssh sessions. Best regards, Jan-Philipp Litza -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: signature.asc Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 473 bytes Desc: OpenPGP digital signature URL: From konrad.schwarz at siemens.com Mon Oct 26 09:20:14 2015 From: konrad.schwarz at siemens.com (Schwarz, Konrad) Date: Mon, 26 Oct 2015 08:20:14 +0000 Subject: Importing and using non-self-signed PGP keys In-Reply-To: <1166739322.20151019225540@my_localhost> References: <1166739322.20151019225540@my_localhost> Message-ID: > -----Original Message----- > From: MFPA [mailto:2014-667rhzu3dc-lists-groups at riseup.net] > Sent: Montag, 19. Oktober 2015 23:56 > To: Schwarz, Konrad on GnuPG-Users > Cc: Schwarz, Konrad > Subject: Re: Importing and using non-self-signed PGP keys > > -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- > Hash: SHA512 > > > > On Monday 19 October 2015 at 9:10:17 AM, in > s.net>, > Schwarz, Konrad wrote: > > > > my organization issued to me a public/private PGP keypair that is not > > self signed. > > Just out of curiosity, do you know what they used to create the key? I > thought all current openPGP applications for quite a few years have > automatically self-signed keys they generate. No, I don't know. Various messages generated by GPG indicate PGP 2.x keys. The message digest is MD5, which GPG warns about. What I have found out is that the key is signed by my organization -- although I don't know how to display that in GPG. > > How can I self-sign the new uid in GPG > But a quick web search showed me [0] which says:- Your google-fu certainly outclasses mine! > create a new UserID for the key in question > sign your old UserID with the same key > delete the new UserID Amazingly (considering the time I had invested beforehand), this works. Thank you! Konrad From rjh at sixdemonbag.org Tue Oct 27 04:55:12 2015 From: rjh at sixdemonbag.org (Robert J. Hansen) Date: Mon, 26 Oct 2015 23:55:12 -0400 Subject: absolutely nothing to panic over In-Reply-To: <562C8775.2060105@mail.ru> References: <5613D58B.7010409@sixdemonbag.org> <562AFD00.5060306@mail.ru> <562B46DE.4020401@sixdemonbag.org> <562C8775.2060105@mail.ru> Message-ID: <562EF5A0.9060509@sixdemonbag.org> > *There is no secure communication over an insecure channel > without out-of-channel bootstrap*. At first blush this seems nice and formal, but it's pretty much incoherent. "There is no secure communication over an insecure channel" is a tautology. An insecure channel is one which *by definition* cannot support secure communication. This statement is trivially true. It gets worse if we go on. "There is no secure communication over an insecure channel without out-of-channel bootstrap." Now you've gone from tautology to paradox: you've defined the channel as insecure, except that with some magic pixie fairy dust you can communicate securely over it ... but that would mean the channel was secure, when you defined it as insecure. Paradox. You start from tautology and conclude at paradox. This doesn't appear to be something to be taken seriously. From listofactor at mail.ru Tue Oct 27 08:25:24 2015 From: listofactor at mail.ru (listo factor) Date: Tue, 27 Oct 2015 07:25:24 +0000 Subject: absolutely nothing to panic over In-Reply-To: <562EF5A0.9060509@sixdemonbag.org> References: <5613D58B.7010409@sixdemonbag.org> <562AFD00.5060306@mail.ru> <562B46DE.4020401@sixdemonbag.org> <562C8775.2060105@mail.ru> <562EF5A0.9060509@sixdemonbag.org> Message-ID: <562F26E4.8060302@mail.ru> On 10/27/2015 03:55 AM, Robert J. Hansen wrote: > You start from tautology and conclude at paradox. This doesn't appear > to be something to be taken seriously. Allow me to try again: *There is no secure communication over an insecure channel without out-of-channel bootstrap*. I believe the above can be re-phrased as follows, with no change in meaning: Cryptography is an art of turning large secrets into small secrets. [1] We need a secure channel to transfer small secrets (typically the cryptographic device and the key), so that we can communicate large secrets over an insecure channel. [2] ___________ [1] The definition is of course not mine. [2] It is often forgotten that it is not ~only~ the key that comprises the "bootstrap". The cryptographic device does not need to be secret, but it must be authenticated, which can not be done over an insecure channel. Same holds for the "public" key in asymmetric systems. From daniele at grinta.net Tue Oct 27 11:22:32 2015 From: daniele at grinta.net (Daniele Nicolodi) Date: Tue, 27 Oct 2015 11:22:32 +0100 Subject: absolutely nothing to panic over In-Reply-To: <562F26E4.8060302@mail.ru> References: <5613D58B.7010409@sixdemonbag.org> <562AFD00.5060306@mail.ru> <562B46DE.4020401@sixdemonbag.org> <562C8775.2060105@mail.ru> <562EF5A0.9060509@sixdemonbag.org> <562F26E4.8060302@mail.ru> Message-ID: <562F5068.6010807@grinta.net> On 27/10/15 08:25, listo factor wrote: > On 10/27/2015 03:55 AM, Robert J. Hansen wrote: >> You start from tautology and conclude at paradox. This doesn't appear >> to be something to be taken seriously. > > Allow me to try again: > > *There is no secure communication over an insecure channel > without out-of-channel bootstrap*. > > I believe the above can be re-phrased as follows, with no change > in meaning: > > Cryptography is an art of turning large secrets into small secrets. [1] > > We need a secure channel to transfer small secrets (typically > the cryptographic device and the key), so that we can communicate > large secrets over an insecure channel. [2] If what makes you think that public key cryptography is insecure by definition is the possibility to circumvent any key exchange protocol via quantum computation, please note that the same quantum principles allow for quantum key distribution, which is "quantum secure" key exchange over an insecure channel. In general I find broad and overly simplified statements on complex matter very easy to confute, and I thus believe that they must not be taken too seriously. Cheers, Daniele From felix.klee at inka.de Tue Oct 27 11:11:04 2015 From: felix.klee at inka.de (Felix E. Klee) Date: Tue, 27 Oct 2015 11:11:04 +0100 Subject: =?UTF-8?Q?Generating_4096_bit_key_fails_=E2=80=93_why=3F?= Message-ID: As already mentioned in the October 2015 thread ?Bad secret key? on , I cannot generate a 4096 bit on my [OpenPGP card][1]. What could be the issue? Details: $ uname -a Linux felix-arch 4.2.3-1-ARCH #1 SMP PREEMPT Sat Oct 3 18:52:50 CEST 2015 x86_64 GNU/Linux $ gpg --version gpg (GnuPG) 2.1.9 libgcrypt 1.6.4 [?] $ gpg --card-edit Application ID ...: D2760001240102010005000040D80000 Version ..........: 2.1 Manufacturer .....: ZeitControl Serial number ....: 000040D8 Name of cardholder: Felix Klee Language prefs ...: de Sex ..............: unspecified URL of public key : [not set] Login data .......: [not set] Signature PIN ....: not forced Key attributes ...: rsa2048 rsa2048 rsa2048 Max. PIN lengths .: 32 32 32 PIN retry counter : 3 0 3 Signature counter : 0 Signature key ....: [none] Encryption key....: [none] Authentication key: [none] General key info..: [none] gpg/card> admin Admin commands are allowed gpg/card> generate Make off-card backup of encryption key? (Y/n) n What keysize do you want for the Signature key? (2048) 4096 The card will now be re-configured to generate a key of 4096 bits Note: There is no guarantee that the card supports the requested size. If the key generation does not succeed, please check the documentation of your card to see what sizes are allowed. gpg: error changing size of key 1 to 4096 bits: Invalid data [1]: http://g10code.com/p-card.de.html From wk at gnupg.org Tue Oct 27 21:09:10 2015 From: wk at gnupg.org (Werner Koch) Date: Tue, 27 Oct 2015 21:09:10 +0100 Subject: Generating 4096 bit key fails =?utf-8?Q?=E2=80=93?= why? In-Reply-To: (Felix E. Klee's message of "Tue, 27 Oct 2015 11:11:04 +0100") References: Message-ID: <87oafk9iqh.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> On Tue, 27 Oct 2015 11:11, felix.klee at inka.de said: > gpg: error changing size of key 1 to 4096 bits: Invalid data Please add --8<---------------cut here---------------start------------->8--- debug 1024 debug 2048 log-file /this/is/my/scdaemon.log --8<---------------cut here---------------end--------------->8--- to scdaemon.conf, kill scdaemon, and try again. The log file will then contain a log of all APDUs send and received to/from the card. Post it here. Make sure to change the PINs of the card before you start the logging so that you want reveal your PINs. Salam-Shalom, Werner -- Die Gedanken sind frei. Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz. From mls at dabpunkt.eu Tue Oct 27 20:47:07 2015 From: mls at dabpunkt.eu (Daniel Baur) Date: Tue, 27 Oct 2015 20:47:07 +0100 Subject: =?UTF-8?Q?Re:_Generating_4096_bit_key_fails_=e2=80=93_why=3f?= In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <562FD4BB.7000903@dabpunkt.eu> Hello, Am 27.10.2015 um 11:11 schrieb Felix E. Klee: > As already mentioned in the October 2015 thread ?Bad secret key? on > , I cannot generate a 4096 bit on > my [OpenPGP card][1]. What could be the issue? AFAIK the card doesn?t support 4096 bit keys. The webpage given by you says the same AFAIS: ?Key lengths reducable to 1024 bit; key length of signature keys increasable to 3072 bit. ? Sincerely, DaB. From neal at walfield.org Thu Oct 29 15:06:51 2015 From: neal at walfield.org (Neal H. Walfield) Date: Thu, 29 Oct 2015 15:06:51 +0100 Subject: TOFU for GnuPG Message-ID: <878u6l93b8.wl-neal@walfield.org> Hi, Last week, I checked in the TOFU code for GnuPG. This code will be part of the next release. It would be great to get some additional testing before this happens! Background ---------- TOFU stands for Trust on First Use and is a concept that will be familiar to anyone who regularly uses ssh. When you ssh to a host for the first time, ssh asks you to verify the host's key (most people just say yes here). When connecting to the same host in the future, ssh checks that the key hasn't changed. If it has, ssh displays a warning. TOFU for GnuPG works similarly. When you verify a message from some user for the first time, GnuPG saves the binding between the user id (actually, the normalized email address) and the key. When you verify another message from that user, the saved bindings with that user's address are retrieved. If there is at least one such binding, but none of them include the signer's key, then either the signer is using a new key or someone is attacking you. In this case, GnuPG displays a warning and prompts you to verify the key and set an appropriate policy (e.g., the key should be considered untrusted). In contrast to the Web of Trust (WoT), TOFU's security guarantees are rather weak. When using the WoT correctly, you can have high confidence that if GnuPG says a given key is controlled by a specific user, then it probably is. TOFU, on the other hand, is only able to detect when the key associated with an email address has changed. In other words, TOFU detects inconsistencies. Despite this, TOFU will be more secure than the WoT for most users in practice. This is because using the WoT requires a lot of effort. First, you have to actively exchange fingerprints with other users and sign their keys. Most people can't be bothered to take the time to do this. Second, in order to actually use the WoT to verify keys that you have not directly signed, you need to tell GnuPG how much you trust other people to correctly verify keys the keys that they sign (i.e., you need to set the owner trust). In practice, even fewer people do this. But, even if you do do this, you can only confidently set the owner trust for people that you've actually met. Thus, the WoT can only really be used to verify the keys of friends of friends. This seriously limits the number of people you can securely communicate with. Happily you don't need to choose between TOFU and the WoT. It is possible to combine them using the tofu+pgp trust model. In this model, the trust level for a key under each model is computed and then the maximum is taken according to the following ordering: unknown < undefined < marginal < fully < ultimate < expired < never For users who want TOFU's ability to detect conflicts, but don't like that TOFU assigns positive (marginal) trust to new keys without prompting, it is possible to change the default policy to unknown or to always prompt the user for the policy for new keys using the --tofu-default-policy option. When setting the default policy to unknown, the WoT will be used for all trust judgments unless TOFU detects a conflict. How-to ------ In general, there is no reason to use the bare tofu model. Instead, tofu+pgp is the recommended model. If you've never signed a key, then this effectively degrades back to the tofu model. To set the trust model to tofu+pgp, add the following to your ~/.gnupg/gpg.conf file: trust-model tofu+pgp If you don't want TOFU to assign positive trust to new keys by default, then you should also add the following to your gpg.conf file: tofu-default-policy unknown These and a few other new options are described in detail in the manual (search for tofu). There isn't much more to do. Verifying a message works as usual: $ gpg2 --verify EE37CF96-6.txt gpg: Signature made Fri 18 Sep 2015 03:16:17 PM CEST using RSA key ID EE37CF96 gpg: Good signature from "Testing (insecure!)" [unknown] gpg: Verified 5 messages signed by "Testing (insecure!)" (key: 362D 3527 F53A AD19 71AA FDE6 5885 9975 EE37 CF96, policy: auto) in the past 42 minutes, 59 seconds. gpg: Warning: if you think you've seen more than 5 message signed by this key, then this key might be a forgery! Carefully examine the email address for small variations (e.g., additional white space). If the key is suspect, then use 'gpg --tofu-policy bad "362D 3527 F53A AD19 71AA FDE6 5885 9975 EE37 CF96"' to mark it as being bad. Here, the only change are a few additional messages. First, some statistics are displayed, namely, that we've verified 5 messages signed by this key in the past last hour. Further, a warning is printed that the number of messages that we've verified is rather small and we should be suspicious of this binding. This information is displayed to make it easier to recognize forged keys. Unlike with ssh where the user types the name of the host to connect to, an attacker is able to control the content of the user id field. To work around the protections that TOFU offers, an attacker will use a similarly looking, but different email address. It's impossible to reliably detect these forgeries. Instead, we rely on the email client to compare the sender with the signer and display a warning if these don't match. Further, we provide these statistics so that users will become suspicious if suddenly GnuPG claims that it has only seen a single message from a person with whom they are in regular contact. Here we see what happens when GnuPG verifies a message and there is a conflict: $ gpg2 --verify BC15C85A-1.txt gpg: Signature made Fri 18 Sep 2015 02:06:17 PM CEST using RSA key ID BC15C85A gpg: Good signature from "Testing (insecure!)" [unknown] Please indicate whether you believe the binding <439D 954F 18F7 9CC4 F71B ED91 CACE D996 BC15 C85A, testing (insecure!)> is legitimate (the key belongs to the stated owner) or a forgery (bad). Known user ids associated with this key: Testing (insecure!) (policy: ask) Statistics for keys with the email 'testing (insecure!)': 439D 954F 18F7 9CC4 F71B ED91 CACE D996 BC15 C85A (this key): 0 signed messages. 362D 3527 F53A AD19 71AA FDE6 5885 9975 EE37 CF96 (policy: ask): 6 messages signed over the past 1 month. Normally, there is only a single key associated with an email address. However, people sometimes generate a new key if their key is too old or they think it might be compromised. Alternatively, a new key may indicate a man-in-the-middleattack! Before accepting this key, you should talk to or call the person to make sure this new key is legitimate. (G)ood/(A)ccept once/(U)nknown/(R)eject once/(B)ad? g gpg: Verified 0 messages signed by "Testing (insecure!)" (key: 439D 954F 18F7 9CC4 F71B ED91 CACE D996 BC15 C85A, policy good). In this case, I've marked the key as being good. I'd appreciate any feedback regarding this new feature (both positive and negative!). In particular, I'm interested in learning how well this fits into your work flow and whether or not you'll use it. Note: GpgME has not yet been extended to support TOFU so these messages might not be shown. Thanks! :) Neal From aheinecke at intevation.de Thu Oct 29 15:56:39 2015 From: aheinecke at intevation.de (Andre Heinecke) Date: Thu, 29 Oct 2015 15:56:39 +0100 Subject: Installing gpg2/commads? In-Reply-To: <006601d10de4$ffcaa430$ff5fec90$@de> References: <006601d10de4$ffcaa430$ff5fec90$@de> Message-ID: <2127451.BmLQBSZjsu@esus> Hi, On Saturday 24 October 2015 00:48:47 Sebastian Rose-Indorf wrote: > are there some commands for installing the > gnupg-w32-2.1.x_xxxxxxxx.exe (like -silent or -no_registry)? Afaik only the standard NSIS command line options are supported. /S for silent install and /D to modify the destination directory. Regards, Andre -- Andre Heinecke | ++49-541-335083-262 | http://www.intevation.de/ Intevation GmbH, Neuer Graben 17, 49074 Osnabr?ck | AG Osnabr?ck, HR B 18998 Gesch?ftsf?hrer: Frank Koormann, Bernhard Reiter, Dr. Jan-Oliver Wagner -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: signature.asc Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 181 bytes Desc: This is a digitally signed message part. URL: From ltorvalds024 at gmail.com Thu Oct 29 14:54:05 2015 From: ltorvalds024 at gmail.com (edward torvalds) Date: Thu, 29 Oct 2015 19:24:05 +0530 Subject: unable to encrypt emails in evolution using gpg Message-ID: <1446126845.3056.3.camel@gmail.com> When I encrypt email and click Send I get this error and sending mail fails Because "gpg: CEF41E5C: skipped: unusable public key gpg: [stdin]: encryption failed: unusable public key ", you may need to select different mail options. Where CEF41E5C is my key. Please note: I have imported both private and public keys of mine. Also the paraphrase I enter is correct Please help, thanks. -- edward torvalds From mls at dabpunkt.eu Thu Oct 29 17:23:36 2015 From: mls at dabpunkt.eu (Daniel Baur) Date: Thu, 29 Oct 2015 17:23:36 +0100 Subject: TOFU for GnuPG In-Reply-To: <878u6l93b8.wl-neal@walfield.org> References: <878u6l93b8.wl-neal@walfield.org> Message-ID: <56324808.7000507@dabpunkt.eu> Hello, Am 29.10.2015 um 15:06 schrieb Neal H. Walfield: > First, some > statistics are displayed, namely, that we've verified 5 messages > signed by this key in the past last hour. isn?t it a little bit problematic that GPG now logs how often I received emails by someone else? Sincerely, DaB. From peter at digitalbrains.com Thu Oct 29 19:57:29 2015 From: peter at digitalbrains.com (Peter Lebbing) Date: Thu, 29 Oct 2015 19:57:29 +0100 Subject: TOFU for GnuPG In-Reply-To: <56324808.7000507@dabpunkt.eu> References: <878u6l93b8.wl-neal@walfield.org> <56324808.7000507@dabpunkt.eu> Message-ID: <56326C19.10602@digitalbrains.com> On 29/10/15 17:23, Daniel Baur wrote: > isn?t it a little bit problematic that GPG now logs how often I received > emails by someone else? I would think that in most situations, that is not a problem. If you exclusively use webmail, there isn't such a record directly on your computer's disk, but you also can't use GnuPG with webmail, AFAIK. If you use a regular e-mail program that works with GnuPG, that information is already on your disk and accessible to the user account you run it as, so duplicating that information in the GnuPG home directory adds nothing. Do you know of a scenario where this information is not already available from the e-mail program? Even if the user deletes the mail after they read it, I wouldn't be at all surprised if this just marks the data as deleted rather than that it scrubs the data from the disk. This would muddy the statistics, but hardly be a security feature. Also, you could just disable TOFU if you're worried by it, but you would lose the functionality as well... Maybe there's a use case for optionally not gathering these statistics if key validity is already established through the WoT. That way, if you want to keep the frequency of correspondence a secret, you could use the WoT to establish validity. An option to not gather statistics for specific keys rather calls out those keys as interesting, and an option to disable the statistics for all TOFU keys seems like losing a very valuable tool in assessing which key is the One Key. HTH, Peter. -- I use the GNU Privacy Guard (GnuPG) in combination with Enigmail. You can send me encrypted mail if you want some privacy. My key is available at From johannes at zarl-zierl.at Thu Oct 29 18:48:43 2015 From: johannes at zarl-zierl.at (Johannes Zarl-Zierl) Date: Thu, 29 Oct 2015 18:48:43 +0100 Subject: TOFU for GnuPG In-Reply-To: <878u6l93b8.wl-neal@walfield.org> References: <878u6l93b8.wl-neal@walfield.org> Message-ID: <2716269.7NmZPPvcaD@mani> Hi Neal, Thanks for the heads-up on this. TOFU seems like a really big feature for everyday use! Out of curiosity: Does the TOFU implementation for gpg already allow for key transition statements / is this planned for some point in the future? Cheers, Johannes From neal at walfield.org Thu Oct 29 22:28:54 2015 From: neal at walfield.org (Neal H. Walfield) Date: Thu, 29 Oct 2015 22:28:54 +0100 Subject: TOFU for GnuPG In-Reply-To: <2716269.7NmZPPvcaD@mani> References: <878u6l93b8.wl-neal@walfield.org> <2716269.7NmZPPvcaD@mani> Message-ID: <87611p8iuh.wl-neal@walfield.org> At Thu, 29 Oct 2015 18:48:43 +0100, Johannes Zarl-Zierl wrote: > Out of curiosity: Does the TOFU implementation for gpg already allow for key > transition statements / is this planned for some point in the future? Unfortunately, it doesn't. This is because there is currently no standard way to communicate the id of the new key. I've proposed a solution for this for the next OpenPGP version, which is currently being work on. There appears to be some interest, but unfortunately I haven't had time to work on that recently. Thanks! :) Neal From neal at walfield.org Thu Oct 29 22:38:40 2015 From: neal at walfield.org (Neal H. Walfield) Date: Thu, 29 Oct 2015 22:38:40 +0100 Subject: TOFU for GnuPG In-Reply-To: <56326C19.10602@digitalbrains.com> References: <878u6l93b8.wl-neal@walfield.org> <56324808.7000507@dabpunkt.eu> <56326C19.10602@digitalbrains.com> Message-ID: <874mh98ie7.wl-neal@walfield.org> Hi Peter, At Thu, 29 Oct 2015 19:57:29 +0100, Peter Lebbing wrote: > > On 29/10/15 17:23, Daniel Baur wrote: > > isn?t it a little bit problematic that GPG now logs how often I received > > emails by someone else? > > I would think that in most situations, that is not a problem. If you exclusively > use webmail, there isn't such a record directly on your computer's disk, but you > also can't use GnuPG with webmail, AFAIK. If you use a regular e-mail program > that works with GnuPG, that information is already on your disk and accessible > to the user account you run it as, so duplicating that information in the GnuPG > home directory adds nothing. > > Do you know of a scenario where this information is not already available from > the e-mail program? Even if the user deletes the mail after they read it, I > wouldn't be at all surprised if this just marks the data as deleted rather than > that it scrubs the data from the disk. This would muddy the statistics, but > hardly be a security feature. I think this mostly reflects our thinking. Thanks for the good summary. FWIW, we have thought of aging the data or just storing the hash of the most recent X signatures. But, we decided to defer that discussion until later since it should be easy to add on. > Also, you could just disable TOFU if you're worried by it, but you would lose > the functionality as well... > > Maybe there's a use case for optionally not gathering these statistics if key > validity is already established through the WoT. That way, if you want to keep > the frequency of correspondence a secret, you could use the WoT to establish > validity. > > An option to not gather statistics for specific keys rather calls out those keys > as interesting, and an option to disable the statistics for all TOFU keys seems > like losing a very valuable tool in assessing which key is the One Key. To keep the code simple, I'd prefer to avoid adding options that few people will use and are of questionable utility. In particular, I think if someone's security requirements are such that having a list of the hashes of previously seen messages is too big of a security risk, then they should probably just disable TOFU. Indeed, TOFU itself probably violates their security requirements. Thanks! :) Neal From mmercer at twinprime.com Fri Oct 30 00:25:40 2015 From: mmercer at twinprime.com (Marc Mercer) Date: Thu, 29 Oct 2015 16:25:40 -0700 Subject: Smartcard hotplug gpg-agent refresh/reload Message-ID: Hello folks, I am hoping that someone out there knows what needs to be done to enable the hotplug support of gpg-agent. Scenario: We run gpg-agent with ssh-support enabled, and use yubikeys/nitrokeys with pgp smartcards to provide rsa authentication to servers. On OSX, you can configure your gpg-agent, setup the ttls, etc... You can unplug the smartcard, and of course the information is all cleared... When you re-insert it, the card is reloaded automatically (without having to kill and restart the gpg-agent). On Fedora (22) when I attempt to do this, it never reloads, and I am forced to kill the existing gpg-agent and spawn a new one. Now, I realize that osx is still using gpg2-2.0 while Fedora (22) is using gpg2-2.1, but I would expect there is a setting that can be exposed/set somewhere that would allow the gpg-agent to reload dynamically since these devices *should* be hotplug friendly. Look forward to hearing back from those of you more familiar with this than I. Thanks! -MMercer -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From wk at gnupg.org Fri Oct 30 09:50:04 2015 From: wk at gnupg.org (Werner Koch) Date: Fri, 30 Oct 2015 09:50:04 +0100 Subject: TOFU for GnuPG In-Reply-To: <56324808.7000507@dabpunkt.eu> (Daniel Baur's message of "Thu, 29 Oct 2015 17:23:36 +0100") References: <878u6l93b8.wl-neal@walfield.org> <56324808.7000507@dabpunkt.eu> Message-ID: <87h9l83flv.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> On Thu, 29 Oct 2015 17:23, mls at dabpunkt.eu said: > isn?t it a little bit problematic that GPG now logs how often I received > emails by someone else? Well, you MUA does it already. The IMAP server of your provider also has this information, and, worst of all, your responsible surveillance agency has this information at their fingertips. Protecting mail meta data is pretty hard and close to impossible if you do not want to leave traces on your local machine. For high security areas Tofu is definitely not an option. Salam-Shalom, Werner -- Die Gedanken sind frei. Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz. From 2014-667rhzu3dc-lists-groups at riseup.net Fri Oct 30 12:43:28 2015 From: 2014-667rhzu3dc-lists-groups at riseup.net (MFPA) Date: Fri, 30 Oct 2015 11:43:28 +0000 Subject: TOFU for GnuPG In-Reply-To: <87611p8iuh.wl-neal@walfield.org> References: <878u6l93b8.wl-neal@walfield.org> <2716269.7NmZPPvcaD@mani> <87611p8iuh.wl-neal@walfield.org> Message-ID: <1806988027.20151030114328@my_localhost> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA512 On Thursday 29 October 2015 at 9:28:54 PM, in , Neal H. Walfield wrote: > Unfortunately, it doesn't. This is because there is > currently no standard way to communicate the id of the > new key. I've proposed a solution for this Wouldn't a signature notation (in a self-signature) be sufficient for this? Something like:- NewKey at domain.example.com=[fingerprint] And for key transition statements, perhaps a second notation:- TransitionStatement at domain.example.com=[URL] - -- Best regards MFPA Versifiers write poems for it. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- iQF8BAEBCgBmBQJWM1gGXxSAAAAAAC4AKGlzc3Vlci1mcHJAbm90YXRpb25zLm9w ZW5wZ3AuZmlmdGhob3JzZW1hbi5uZXRCM0FFN0VDQTlBOEM4QjMwMjZBNUEwRjU2 QjdDNzRDRUIzMUYyNUYwAAoJEGt8dM6zHyXwpLcH+wW+rpDMLZiYJnRlvEX/Eil6 V/3LvPvx0HPlY2Khe8xF9tlm+/QDhG9D3b2higZq6KEB5PAYrXIwmAUokNf9uRt2 G++ZGzRtjD1vCD97PDlwf2E7UQm3N0CM7Z8tgaGPworqXYuJJOSGVXcRP/rRQp1L ikfFxtCgZDE9c+3VJGDTGh1Pf1dFQvnsjllh0q1pYi4nrX4ZRZ+mEfuGMJXIjLwK 2pCBf/gUQezeCUCF9XwBlGRRHdMp6o64GHJbp5aZLFqr6vvH4pn9HkMUKnY5zRnc m2kxOstix9yrfDQckao/VThb3MKFPTNDM++lfCJK5Tc2T7fOU6EZOmeaaOL8uYyI vgQBFgoAZgUCVjNYDV8UgAAAAAAuAChpc3N1ZXItZnByQG5vdGF0aW9ucy5vcGVu cGdwLmZpZnRoaG9yc2VtYW4ubmV0MzNBQ0VENEVFOTEzNEVFQkRFNkE4NTA2MTcx MkJDNDYxQUY3NzhFNAAKCRAXErxGGvd45GhkAQCLLEsCe5cZL4XPoZF3nTIBIFyL dycllokt1e67PovWPgEAjmYeoT0I57iQ8tOTVmq7gjslYXNaBsc/FzcVXYht8wE= =Bnqj -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From neal at walfield.org Fri Oct 30 12:51:27 2015 From: neal at walfield.org (Neal H. Walfield) Date: Fri, 30 Oct 2015 12:51:27 +0100 Subject: TOFU for GnuPG In-Reply-To: <1806988027.20151030114328@my_localhost> References: <878u6l93b8.wl-neal@walfield.org> <2716269.7NmZPPvcaD@mani> <87611p8iuh.wl-neal@walfield.org> <1806988027.20151030114328@my_localhost> Message-ID: <871tcc8thc.wl-neal@walfield.org> At Fri, 30 Oct 2015 11:43:28 +0000, MFPA wrote: > On Thursday 29 October 2015 at 9:28:54 PM, in > , Neal H. Walfield wrote: > > > > > Unfortunately, it doesn't. This is because there is > > currently no standard way to communicate the id of the > > new key. I've proposed a solution for this > > Wouldn't a signature notation (in a self-signature) be sufficient for > this? Something like:- > > NewKey at domain.example.com=[fingerprint] > > And for key transition statements, perhaps a second notation:- > > TransitionStatement at domain.example.com=[URL] Sure. But your point is a red herring. There is *currently* no way to do this. However, the next version of the OpenPGP spec should have a way to do this. Neal From 2014-667rhzu3dc-lists-groups at riseup.net Fri Oct 30 13:06:14 2015 From: 2014-667rhzu3dc-lists-groups at riseup.net (MFPA) Date: Fri, 30 Oct 2015 12:06:14 +0000 Subject: TOFU for GnuPG In-Reply-To: <878u6l93b8.wl-neal@walfield.org> References: <878u6l93b8.wl-neal@walfield.org> Message-ID: <1574141659.20151030120614@my_localhost> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA512 Hi On Thursday 29 October 2015 at 2:06:51 PM, in , Neal H. Walfield wrote: > When you verify a > message from some user for the first time, GnuPG saves > the binding between the user id (actually, the > normalized email address) and the key. The email address in the user-id, or the email address the message appears to come from? If it's the email address in the user-id, what happens if the key has multiple UIDs covering several email addresses? Or if the user-ids contain no readable email addresses? > When you verify > another message from that user, the saved bindings with > that user's address are retrieved. If there is at > least one such binding, but none of them include the > signer's key, then either the signer is using a new key > or someone is attacking you. In this case, GnuPG > displays a warning and prompts you to verify the key > and set an appropriate policy (e.g., the key should be > considered untrusted). How does it handle a new signing sub-key? - -- Best regards MFPA I would like to help you out. Which way did you come in? -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- iQF8BAEBCgBmBQJWM10+XxSAAAAAAC4AKGlzc3Vlci1mcHJAbm90YXRpb25zLm9w ZW5wZ3AuZmlmdGhob3JzZW1hbi5uZXRCM0FFN0VDQTlBOEM4QjMwMjZBNUEwRjU2 QjdDNzRDRUIzMUYyNUYwAAoJEGt8dM6zHyXw2nkH/2CkLOat3z/DNWZB8oqVA3un Jlt2G2EjAOjMhmKWMbw8Iw4IY2xDelWZZommxoOi4MZeBVVv7QRhS7XJyHoFmUac 4/p9Vsf9ftp82njw31RxGNZ3uDlEBVr8JnnbrXYcqT7UUvJBgd8Cnj3tZYHISI/v UWUY2wniUT2A7wguPuDnToCVnttFRLU0fbV+1N6nE0h1nBP31yMoweKbFTosSzNF EhPI04uQDoofvgMtNgT3qftqeGUrTi/2sjuScYzXMDbFd0H/XOGGJWpD94GOVm1j MYYIuPwEgWnN7d6ng0cLe2KWliASu9Msb3W37il9Ws+E0d0WWjtZEJRJ5csPcH2I vgQBFgoAZgUCVjNdQ18UgAAAAAAuAChpc3N1ZXItZnByQG5vdGF0aW9ucy5vcGVu cGdwLmZpZnRoaG9yc2VtYW4ubmV0MzNBQ0VENEVFOTEzNEVFQkRFNkE4NTA2MTcx MkJDNDYxQUY3NzhFNAAKCRAXErxGGvd45L/+AQDq9C3vMEi9vaMj7JAgktSE7feq 3dRwtzTWZd+iYWhkIwD8D4iPcInYROnoCDj9+bLEYEpZIllvfCgPqG8rzIrGlQk= =mAZf -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From neal at walfield.org Fri Oct 30 13:09:51 2015 From: neal at walfield.org (Neal H. Walfield) Date: Fri, 30 Oct 2015 13:09:51 +0100 Subject: TOFU for GnuPG In-Reply-To: <1574141659.20151030120614@my_localhost> References: <878u6l93b8.wl-neal@walfield.org> <1574141659.20151030120614@my_localhost> Message-ID: <87y4ek7e28.wl-neal@walfield.org> At Fri, 30 Oct 2015 12:06:14 +0000, MFPA wrote: > On Thursday 29 October 2015 at 2:06:51 PM, in > , Neal H. Walfield wrote: > > > > When you verify a > > message from some user for the first time, GnuPG saves > > the binding between the user id (actually, the > > normalized email address) and the key. > > The email address in the user-id, or the email address the message > appears to come from? > > If it's the email address in the user-id, what happens if the key has > multiple UIDs covering several email addresses? Or if the user-ids > contain no readable email addresses? The user ids are used. These are authorative. If there are N user ids, then N bindings are maintained. > > When you verify > > another message from that user, the saved bindings with > > that user's address are retrieved. If there is at > > least one such binding, but none of them include the > > signer's key, then either the signer is using a new key > > or someone is attacking you. In this case, GnuPG > > displays a warning and prompts you to verify the key > > and set an appropriate policy (e.g., the key should be > > considered untrusted). > > How does it handle a new signing sub-key? The primary key is always used in the binding. Thanks, :) Neal From aheinecke at intevation.de Fri Oct 30 13:23:14 2015 From: aheinecke at intevation.de (Andre Heinecke) Date: Fri, 30 Oct 2015 13:23:14 +0100 Subject: TOFU for GnuPG In-Reply-To: <87611p8iuh.wl-neal@walfield.org> References: <878u6l93b8.wl-neal@walfield.org> <2716269.7NmZPPvcaD@mani> <87611p8iuh.wl-neal@walfield.org> Message-ID: <7199113.qO6LXLehuY@esus> Hi, On Thursday 29 October 2015 22:28:54 Neal H. Walfield wrote: > At Thu, 29 Oct 2015 18:48:43 +0100, > > Johannes Zarl-Zierl wrote: > > Out of curiosity: Does the TOFU implementation for gpg already allow for > > key transition statements / is this planned for some point in the future? > Unfortunately, it doesn't. This is because there is currently no > standard way to communicate the id of the new key. I've proposed a > solution for this for the next OpenPGP version, which is currently > being work on. There appears to be some interest, but unfortunately I > haven't had time to work on that recently. I don't fully understand why you need formalized transition statements. Couldn't you just treat Key / UIDs that are signed by each other as "two valid keys for this UID"? So when I transition to another key I just sign it with the old key and GnuPG can detect that and not show a warning about it? This would also solve the problem that some users may have multiple keys with the same UID's which are both valid. Regards, Andre -- Andre Heinecke | ++49-541-335083-262 | http://www.intevation.de/ Intevation GmbH, Neuer Graben 17, 49074 Osnabr?ck | AG Osnabr?ck, HR B 18998 Gesch?ftsf?hrer: Frank Koormann, Bernhard Reiter, Dr. Jan-Oliver Wagner -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: signature.asc Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 181 bytes Desc: This is a digitally signed message part. URL: From 2014-667rhzu3dc-lists-groups at riseup.net Fri Oct 30 15:32:07 2015 From: 2014-667rhzu3dc-lists-groups at riseup.net (MFPA) Date: Fri, 30 Oct 2015 14:32:07 +0000 Subject: TOFU for GnuPG In-Reply-To: <871tcc8thc.wl-neal@walfield.org> References: <878u6l93b8.wl-neal@walfield.org> <2716269.7NmZPPvcaD@mani> <87611p8iuh.wl-neal@walfield.org> <1806988027.20151030114328@my_localhost> <871tcc8thc.wl-neal@walfield.org> Message-ID: <924151819.20151030143207@my_localhost> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA512 Hi On Friday 30 October 2015 at 11:51:27 AM, in , Neal H. Walfield wrote: > Sure. But your point is a red herring. There is > *currently* no way to do this. However, the next > version of the OpenPGP spec should have a way to do > this. My point was "there is already a way to do this: use signature notations". Is that a red herring? - -- Best regards MFPA Don't talk unless you can improve on the silence -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- iQF8BAEBCgBmBQJWM392XxSAAAAAAC4AKGlzc3Vlci1mcHJAbm90YXRpb25zLm9w ZW5wZ3AuZmlmdGhob3JzZW1hbi5uZXRCM0FFN0VDQTlBOEM4QjMwMjZBNUEwRjU2 QjdDNzRDRUIzMUYyNUYwAAoJEGt8dM6zHyXwkd8H/1u3U7wdJ6XjB2FGcFbf0btw 1yK/xL3RqUxbnVMkVhjoUr98xdM2lm40GPTzhH0vu7CYPgI+xHfZMUJZtoSmBQLS a+6Mp9YY7hyYrRl2SjySMpPuxpzDek62nhdqkEclQglus2ZBcnq+ACrlY1Kj9oYI EXo0i/vMUsPck9xDh2wm+2hIR5f+BMMQk6NRaDgmP1xkktCwkJIcb7BYEEHG11G/ dTQe9QRG5jZ/kozQkmXC+5BokoQeEnHUIFmzQB2E975COH82L/V1lJ+Hj6XnODlN PyzkjJqzT8VB7H5OQJzioctpxgthseodaZrzRmM4+E8Cv0QvkgksqEWchb47kMOI vgQBFgoAZgUCVjN/fl8UgAAAAAAuAChpc3N1ZXItZnByQG5vdGF0aW9ucy5vcGVu cGdwLmZpZnRoaG9yc2VtYW4ubmV0MzNBQ0VENEVFOTEzNEVFQkRFNkE4NTA2MTcx MkJDNDYxQUY3NzhFNAAKCRAXErxGGvd45EwdAQCp/PzcYpl0ln8sjSzNoZgNLR4j U1S1cXg35twroWmADgEAgw6AA1MxU5YjnOS7J5lfCTD8UIhuBzhvXSvcTkZsPAQ= =wcs+ -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From andrewg at andrewg.com Fri Oct 30 16:54:07 2015 From: andrewg at andrewg.com (Andrew Gallagher) Date: Fri, 30 Oct 2015 15:54:07 +0000 Subject: "invalid option: --agent-program" Message-ID: <5633929F.7030600@andrewg.com> I'm using gnupg-agent 2.0.26-6 (jessie) and in the manual page for gpg-connect-agent it says: --agent-program file Specify the agent program to be started if none is running. But when I try it: $ gpg-connect-agent --agent-program gpg-agent gpg-connect-agent: invalid option "--agent-program" $ gpg-connect-agent --dump-options --verbose --quiet --hex --decode --raw-socket --exec --no-ext-connect --run --subst --no-verbose --homedir --dump-options --help --version --warranty Is this a documentation issue or an implementation issue? ;-) Andrew. -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: signature.asc Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 801 bytes Desc: OpenPGP digital signature URL: From neal at walfield.org Fri Oct 30 22:08:25 2015 From: neal at walfield.org (Neal H. Walfield) Date: Fri, 30 Oct 2015 22:08:25 +0100 Subject: TOFU for GnuPG In-Reply-To: <924151819.20151030143207@my_localhost> References: <878u6l93b8.wl-neal@walfield.org> <2716269.7NmZPPvcaD@mani> <87611p8iuh.wl-neal@walfield.org> <1806988027.20151030114328@my_localhost> <871tcc8thc.wl-neal@walfield.org> <924151819.20151030143207@my_localhost> Message-ID: <87wpu46p4m.wl-neal@walfield.org> At Fri, 30 Oct 2015 14:32:07 +0000, MFPA wrote: > On Friday 30 October 2015 at 11:51:27 AM, in > , Neal H. Walfield wrote: > > > > Sure. But your point is a red herring. There is > > *currently* no way to do this. However, the next > > version of the OpenPGP spec should have a way to do > > this. > > My point was "there is already a way to do this: use signature > notations". Is that a red herring? It's not standardized. Sure, GnuPG could use a particular notation for this purpose, but we want to interoperability, which is why this should be standardized in RFC 4880bis. Neal From dkg at fifthhorseman.net Fri Oct 30 23:57:47 2015 From: dkg at fifthhorseman.net (Daniel Kahn Gillmor) Date: Sat, 31 Oct 2015 07:57:47 +0900 Subject: "invalid option: --agent-program" In-Reply-To: <5633929F.7030600@andrewg.com> References: <5633929F.7030600@andrewg.com> Message-ID: <87r3kcrml0.fsf@alice.fifthhorseman.net> On Sat 2015-10-31 00:54:07 +0900, Andrew Gallagher wrote: > I'm using gnupg-agent 2.0.26-6 (jessie) and in the manual page for > gpg-connect-agent it says: > > --agent-program file > Specify the agent program to be started if none is running. > > But when I try it: > > $ gpg-connect-agent --agent-program gpg-agent > gpg-connect-agent: invalid option "--agent-program" [...] > Is this a documentation issue or an implementation issue? ;-) Looks like it's a documentation issue to me. this option is present in 2.1.9-2. There are other bugs with the 2.0.x documentation, i think, where features from the 2.1.x branch slipped into the 2.0 docs. We're in the process of moving off of the 2.0.x branch to the 2.1.x branch in unstable, and this is a minor documentation bug, so it's unlikely to be fixed in the jessie (stable) release. sorry about this, --dkg From felix.klee at inka.de Sat Oct 31 06:18:39 2015 From: felix.klee at inka.de (Felix E. Klee) Date: Sat, 31 Oct 2015 06:18:39 +0100 Subject: =?UTF-8?Q?Re=3A_Generating_4096_bit_key_fails_=E2=80=93_why=3F?= In-Reply-To: <87oafk9iqh.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> References: <87oafk9iqh.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> Message-ID: On Tue, Oct 27, 2015 at 9:09 PM, Werner Koch wrote: > Please add > > --8<---------------cut here---------------start------------->8--- > debug 1024 > debug 2048 > log-file /this/is/my/scdaemon.log > --8<---------------cut here---------------end--------------->8--- > > to scdaemon.conf, kill scdaemon, and try again. The log file will then > contain a log of all APDUs send and received to/from the card. Post it > here. See attachment. And, yes, the OpenPGP card V2.1 does 4096 bit keys, just as V2.0, which I successfully used with such keys. In fact on V2.1, it is printed: ?RSA with up to 4096 bit? -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: scdaemon.log.gz Type: application/x-gzip Size: 2231 bytes Desc: not available URL: From 2014-667rhzu3dc-lists-groups at riseup.net Sat Oct 31 12:57:05 2015 From: 2014-667rhzu3dc-lists-groups at riseup.net (MFPA) Date: Sat, 31 Oct 2015 11:57:05 +0000 Subject: TOFU for GnuPG In-Reply-To: <878u6l93b8.wl-neal@walfield.org> References: <878u6l93b8.wl-neal@walfield.org> Message-ID: <993404345.20151031115705@my_localhost> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA512 Hi On Thursday 29 October 2015 at 2:06:51 PM, in , Neal H. Walfield wrote: > First, some statistics are displayed, namely, that > we've verified 5 messages signed by this key in the > past last hour. Would it say the same if it were not five unique messages? For example, we read the same email five times and verified it each time. And would an option to limit the time period make sense? Meaning that if the limit were set to X days, it would use the actual time period if shorter but only say how many messages were verified in the last X days if the binding were older. (Having thought this sounded like a good idea, I am struggling to think of a use case.) - -- Best regards MFPA If at first you don't succeed, destroy all evidence that you tried. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- iQF8BAEBCgBmBQJWNKyxXxSAAAAAAC4AKGlzc3Vlci1mcHJAbm90YXRpb25zLm9w ZW5wZ3AuZmlmdGhob3JzZW1hbi5uZXRCM0FFN0VDQTlBOEM4QjMwMjZBNUEwRjU2 QjdDNzRDRUIzMUYyNUYwAAoJEGt8dM6zHyXwzQgIAJ9wQnC31708MAVJKiYwug00 oNjMknrPaXrXx+OIG8Vswd4IUCkNo23O9qCXuwvXzzXhYTfhz2nc+AC2uXRD71z8 zWpc3KQeeMon9qSB7ChcVi7u0w7AR+rZXZ21nV+jyQP1E6N2R+MdygmPe2uzH6OM WbW5RI3cqU0CNSQTZDv9lNebKoZQLFDruwYN6YiTp1NA1Q1Esr8jqYkuygS4disr B0CWyb7mKi+wWMUfWYkMXzBUiRI1fKPVG5u9iIvi644H4+VEkGeTvzEpWhLTLAcy 66eogl3CLeM+TpfreQQ9Hl/IwB7ScnPK4EokRE/hTzz5l7cROMzIURmCHLmR2JWI vgQBFgoAZgUCVjSsv18UgAAAAAAuAChpc3N1ZXItZnByQG5vdGF0aW9ucy5vcGVu cGdwLmZpZnRoaG9yc2VtYW4ubmV0MzNBQ0VENEVFOTEzNEVFQkRFNkE4NTA2MTcx MkJDNDYxQUY3NzhFNAAKCRAXErxGGvd45F1eAQD7dBKbkdDf2fdKcr0IliZUaLKT qXkccpNxn13avZwCJgEAvPxXb6zAY+5n865fQ1EhVuEOTF2Jv66EJUQTDd/VUwA= =XGow -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From kristian.fiskerstrand at sumptuouscapital.com Sat Oct 31 14:30:30 2015 From: kristian.fiskerstrand at sumptuouscapital.com (Kristian Fiskerstrand) Date: Sat, 31 Oct 2015 14:30:30 +0100 Subject: cv25519 subkeys not sent in recv-keys or shown in search-keys In-Reply-To: <561C9F70.2080606@fsij.org> References: <5618CC63.5070704@sumptuouscapital.com> <561C9F70.2080606@fsij.org> Message-ID: <5634C276.7060703@sumptuouscapital.com> On 10/13/2015 08:06 AM, NIIBE Yutaka wrote: > Hello, > > I think that once newer libgcrypt will be released, cv25519 subkey > will be popular. For sks keyserver, I submitted an issue as an > remainder. > > https://bitbucket.org/skskeyserver/sks-keyserver/issues/36/curve25519-oid-for-encryption > > Fwiw, this patch is now applied to the servers in the keys2.kfwebs.net cluster and the subkey is listed at http://keys2.kfwebs.net/pks/lookup?op=vindex&search=0x3AED5886 -- ---------------------------- Kristian Fiskerstrand Blog: http://blog.sumptuouscapital.com Twitter: @krifisk ---------------------------- Public OpenPGP key 0xE3EDFAE3 at hkp://pool.sks-keyservers.net fpr:94CB AFDD 3034 5109 5618 35AA 0B7F 8B60 E3ED FAE3 ---------------------------- Carpe noctem Seize the night -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: signature.asc Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 455 bytes Desc: OpenPGP digital signature URL: From neal at walfield.org Sat Oct 31 21:27:09 2015 From: neal at walfield.org (Neal H. Walfield) Date: Sat, 31 Oct 2015 21:27:09 +0100 Subject: TOFU for GnuPG In-Reply-To: <993404345.20151031115705@my_localhost> References: <878u6l93b8.wl-neal@walfield.org> <993404345.20151031115705@my_localhost> Message-ID: <87twp67pia.wl-neal@walfield.org> At Sat, 31 Oct 2015 11:57:05 +0000, MFPA wrote: > > First, some statistics are displayed, namely, that > > we've verified 5 messages signed by this key in the > > past last hour. > > > Would it say the same if it were not five unique messages? For > example, we read the same email five times and verified it each > time. N is the number of unique signatures. If you verify the message signature multiple times, it will only count once. > And would an option to limit the time period make sense? Meaning that > if the limit were set to X days, it would use the actual time period > if shorter but only say how many messages were verified in the last X > days if the binding were older. (Having thought this sounded like a > good idea, I am struggling to think of a use case.) I'm sure we could do something like this, but it sounds like adding complexity, which doesn't seem justified. Thanks, :) Neal From ltorvalds024 at gmail.com Sat Oct 31 18:21:14 2015 From: ltorvalds024 at gmail.com (edward torvalds) Date: Sat, 31 Oct 2015 22:51:14 +0530 Subject: unable to encrypt emails in evolution using gpg In-Reply-To: <1446126845.3056.3.camel@gmail.com> References: <1446126845.3056.3.camel@gmail.com> Message-ID: <1446312074.10520.5.camel@gmail.com> I found the solution myself, luckily. You have two keys, one is pub and other is sub right? (you can find them in `gpg --edit-key CEF41E5C`) so in my case pub key was fine but sub key was expired. Its a long story why. So edited the sub to expire `never` and my problem was solved. Thanks for your interest. On Thu, 2015-10-29 at 19:24 +0530, edward torvalds wrote: > When I encrypt email and click Send I get this error and sending mail > fails > > Because "gpg: CEF41E5C: skipped: unusable public key > gpg: [stdin]: encryption failed: unusable public key > ", you may need to select different mail options. > > Where CEF41E5C is my key. > Please note: I have imported both private and public keys of mine. > Also > the paraphrase I enter is correct > > Please help, thanks. > -- edward torvalds