From frase at frase.id.au  Wed Oct  1 04:48:14 2014
From: frase at frase.id.au (Fraser Tweedale)
Date: Wed, 1 Oct 2014 12:48:14 +1000
Subject: Keyserver on FreeIPA
In-Reply-To: <CAHDYqco7jOmpk2aJ4eVKnXOt3PVOs6t-E7nx8VLHDefke4Lx=Q@mail.gmail.com>
References: <CAHDYqco7jOmpk2aJ4eVKnXOt3PVOs6t-E7nx8VLHDefke4Lx=Q@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <20141001024813.GA55748@bacardi.hollandpark.frase.id.au>

On Tue, Sep 30, 2014 at 02:01:39PM +0530, Sam M wrote:
> Hello.
> 
> Not strictly a GPG question, but posting anyway.
> 
> I need to test setting up of a private GPG keyserver integrated with a
> FreeIPA server. Has anyone done this and had success? I'm trying to figure
> out how to integrate the PGP keyserver schema into the server and am not
> sure if I'm on the right track.
> 
> I also need to integrate the GPG public keys with the user data in the
> server.
> 
> Thanks.
> 
> Sam

Hi Sam,

Have you seen [1]?  It explains how to extend FreeIPA with custom
schema and (if it is neeeded) add plugins for working with the new
schema from the command line.

[1] http://www.freeipa.org/images/5/5b/FreeIPA33-extending-freeipa.pdf

If you get stuck, head over to freeipa-users at redhat.com.  And even
if you don't get stuck, let them** know how you go because this is
an interesting integration story.

** "them" includes me.  I work at Red Hat in the identity management
   team.

Regards,

Fraser

> _______________________________________________
> Gnupg-users mailing list
> Gnupg-users at gnupg.org
> http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users



From robinmathewrajan at yahoo.com  Thu Oct  2 03:09:54 2014
From: robinmathewrajan at yahoo.com (Robin Mathew Rajan)
Date: Wed, 1 Oct 2014 18:09:54 -0700
Subject: NSA, PGP and RSA
Message-ID: <1412212194.11276.YahooMailNeo@web140804.mail.bf1.yahoo.com>

Hi everyone!


I'm Robin Mathew Rajan from India and I'm a new member here. I'm also new to PGP cryptographic concepts. I've some experiences with some other forms of crypto concepts though. I wish to explore more about PGP.

Straight to my question! According to many speculations out in the public, NSA has weakened RSA algorithm. Is it still safe to use the RSA as the underlying algorithm for generating the keys? Are there any viable alternatives which we can choose over RSA and DSA?
Please correct me if I'm wrong. :)


Thanks!
Robin Mathew Rajan
https://www.robinmathewrajan.com/ramblings/
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From rjh at sixdemonbag.org  Thu Oct  2 04:34:57 2014
From: rjh at sixdemonbag.org (Robert J. Hansen)
Date: Wed, 01 Oct 2014 22:34:57 -0400
Subject: NSA, PGP and RSA
In-Reply-To: <1412212194.11276.YahooMailNeo@web140804.mail.bf1.yahoo.com>
References: <1412212194.11276.YahooMailNeo@web140804.mail.bf1.yahoo.com>
Message-ID: <542CB9D1.8080506@sixdemonbag.org>

> Straight to my question! According to many speculations out in the
> public, NSA has weakened RSA algorithm.

No cryptographer of note has made these claims, and the algorithm has
been continuously studied by the world's cryptographic community for
more than three decades.  So -- anything is possible, sure.  But I think
if you think on it some you'll realize some things are more probable
than others.  :)


From pete at heypete.com  Thu Oct  2 11:15:42 2014
From: pete at heypete.com (Pete Stephenson)
Date: Thu, 2 Oct 2014 11:15:42 +0200
Subject: NSA, PGP and RSA
In-Reply-To: <1412212194.11276.YahooMailNeo@web140804.mail.bf1.yahoo.com>
References: <1412212194.11276.YahooMailNeo@web140804.mail.bf1.yahoo.com>
Message-ID: <CA+4dSw5-eYYmKJ4HE-bcMEr6+mDTZ75pwij_7Od_eerXjpg4tg@mail.gmail.com>

On Thu, Oct 2, 2014 at 3:09 AM, Robin Mathew Rajan
<robinmathewrajan at yahoo.com> wrote:
> Hi everyone!
>
> I'm Robin Mathew Rajan from India and I'm a new member here. I'm also new to
> PGP cryptographic concepts. I've some experiences with some other forms of
> crypto concepts though. I wish to explore more about PGP.

Excellent! Welcome!

> Straight to my question! According to many speculations out in the public,
> NSA has weakened RSA algorithm. Is it still safe to use the RSA as the
> underlying algorithm for generating the keys? Are there any viable
> alternatives which we can choose over RSA and DSA?
> Please correct me if I'm wrong. :)

There were some reports of RSA (the company) accepting funds from the
NSA to make Dual_EC_DRBG (a poor-quality and possibly backdoored
pseudorandom number generator) the default in their BSAFE toolkit.

RSA (the algorithm) is, as far as publicly-available knowledge goes,
still secure with appropriate key lengths and the non-existence of
suitably-powerful quantum computers.

Version 2.1 of GnuPG will support elliptic curve crypto, which will be
nice. However, ECDSA and ECDH (the signing and encryption algorithms
used in GnuPG 2.1) are also vulnerable to quantum computers.

Of course, it's certainly possible that the NSA or other adversaries
have compromised RSA or other algorithms, but there's no
publicly-available proof of this.

Cheers!
-Pete

-- 
Pete Stephenson


From mwood at IUPUI.Edu  Thu Oct  2 15:11:19 2014
From: mwood at IUPUI.Edu (Mark H. Wood)
Date: Thu, 2 Oct 2014 09:11:19 -0400
Subject: NSA, PGP and RSA
In-Reply-To: <1412212194.11276.YahooMailNeo@web140804.mail.bf1.yahoo.com>
References: <1412212194.11276.YahooMailNeo@web140804.mail.bf1.yahoo.com>
Message-ID: <20141002131119.GA17451@IUPUI.Edu>

On Wed, Oct 01, 2014 at 06:09:54PM -0700, Robin Mathew Rajan wrote:
> Straight to my question! According to many speculations out in the
> public, NSA has weakened RSA algorithm. Is it still safe to use the
> RSA as the underlying algorithm for generating the keys?

How could anyone honestly answer that question, if the suspected
weakness has never been found?  We don't know that it exists, and if
it does exist we don't know its nature.

-- 
Mark H. Wood
Lead Technology Analyst

University Library
Indiana University - Purdue University Indianapolis
755 W. Michigan Street
Indianapolis, IN 46202
317-274-0749
www.ulib.iupui.edu
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From mail at tgries.de  Thu Oct  2 14:40:30 2014
From: mail at tgries.de (Thomas Gries)
Date: Thu, 02 Oct 2014 14:40:30 +0200
Subject: Generating smart-card stubs on a clean computer? and how to get the
 public key for a key on the card?
Message-ID: <542D47BE.8010301@tgries.de>

RE: http://lists.gnupg.org/pipermail/gnupg-users/2010-September/039488.html

"Generating smart-card stubs on a clean computer?"explains
/that you //need the public key plus a run of --card-status to generate 
the stubs.

But what if you_don't have the public key (for your key on the smart 
card) available ?__
_
Question:
_How can I generate & export public key/s from key/s on the card ?__
_
///
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From rjh at sixdemonbag.org  Thu Oct  2 16:04:22 2014
From: rjh at sixdemonbag.org (Robert J. Hansen)
Date: Thu, 02 Oct 2014 10:04:22 -0400
Subject: RSA in theory (was: Re: NSA, PGP and RSA)
In-Reply-To: <20141002131119.GA17451@IUPUI.Edu>
References: <1412212194.11276.YahooMailNeo@web140804.mail.bf1.yahoo.com>
 <20141002131119.GA17451@IUPUI.Edu>
Message-ID: <542D5B66.7080501@sixdemonbag.org>

> How could anyone honestly answer that question, if the suspected
> weakness has never been found?  We don't know that it exists, and if
> it does exist we don't know its nature.

There are some hints the theoretical underpinnings of RSA aren't quite
what we've always believed them to be.  These hints don't point at a
weakness -- just some weirdness that we don't fully understand.  My
reading of the tea leaves says this weirdness will not result in a
serious attack, but I don't recommend people stake much money on my
hunches.  :)

The security of RSA is predicated on three major conjectures:

1.  P != NP
2.  Integer factorization is really hard
3.  Breaking RSA is equivalent to integer factorization

#1 is strongly believed to be true (but so far there's no proof).  #2 is
strongly believed to be true (and there are good lines of math to
suggest it's so).  #3 is ... now believed to be *false*, [1] which opens
all kinds of doors for cryptographers to study.

Don't panic.  Some top-drawer cryppies are looking at this closely and
so far they keep on using phrases like "Our results do not expose any
weakness in the RSA system" when talking about their findings.  This is
a fascinating area of ongoing research, *not* any indication of weakness
in the overall system.

But yeah, we've got some tantalizing hints that the theoretical
underpinnings of RSA aren't quite what we've always believed them to be.
 It's a fascinating time to be alive!



[1] http://crypto.stanford.edu/~dabo/papers/no_rsa_red.pdf

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From mirimir at riseup.net  Thu Oct  2 20:02:54 2014
From: mirimir at riseup.net (Mirimir)
Date: Thu, 02 Oct 2014 12:02:54 -0600
Subject: producing GnuPG keys as proof of work
In-Reply-To: <54189F4A.1020104@sixdemonbag.org>
References: <3797526.FaRLMEmID1@inno> <541751AA.4060708@fifthhorseman.net>
 <541761E6.2080401@dougbarton.us> <2632435.VKDKWAKhLU@inno>
 <54178083.4030102@sixdemonbag.org> <541814B5.1090003@digitalbrains.com>
 <541849BB.3080600@sixdemonbag.org> <54186B21.4050501@digitalbrains.com>
 <54188445.1010703@sixdemonbag.org> <541886B0.6030309@digitalbrains.com>
 <54188C38.1020400@sixdemonbag.org> <54188FEB.9000506@digitalbrains.com>
 <54189F4A.1020104@sixdemonbag.org>
Message-ID: <542D934E.8060906@riseup.net>

Would it be feasible to use gpg in batch mode to generate numerous keys,
selecting for a particular key ID, or perhaps a longer part of the
fingerprint? I'm aware of shortcuts for creating keys with arbitrary key
IDs, but they produce keys with atypical key lengths etc. Based on
limited experience, I suspect that entropy would be the limiting
resource. Is that correct?

I imagine that websites could provide random alphanumeric strings to new
users, and require them to generate functional GnuPG keys (with normal
key length etc) with fingerprints that begin with the specified strings.
Having accomplished that, new users could edit their key, and specify an
account name and email address.

Is there an existing app or script that does this? Neither marc.info or
Google has led me to one.


From dkg at fifthhorseman.net  Thu Oct  2 20:28:53 2014
From: dkg at fifthhorseman.net (Daniel Kahn Gillmor)
Date: Thu, 02 Oct 2014 14:28:53 -0400
Subject: producing GnuPG keys as proof of work
In-Reply-To: <542D934E.8060906@riseup.net>
References: <3797526.FaRLMEmID1@inno> <541751AA.4060708@fifthhorseman.net>
 <541761E6.2080401@dougbarton.us> <2632435.VKDKWAKhLU@inno>
 <54178083.4030102@sixdemonbag.org> <541814B5.1090003@digitalbrains.com>
 <541849BB.3080600@sixdemonbag.org> <54186B21.4050501@digitalbrains.com>
 <54188445.1010703@sixdemonbag.org> <541886B0.6030309@digitalbrains.com>
 <54188C38.1020400@sixdemonbag.org> <54188FEB.9000506@digitalbrains.com>
 <54189F4A.1020104@sixdemonbag.org> <542D934E.8060906@riseup.net>
Message-ID: <542D9965.20504@fifthhorseman.net>

On 10/02/2014 02:02 PM, Mirimir wrote:
> Would it be feasible to use gpg in batch mode to generate numerous keys,
> selecting for a particular key ID, or perhaps a longer part of the
> fingerprint? I'm aware of shortcuts for creating keys with arbitrary key
> IDs, but they produce keys with atypical key lengths etc. Based on
> limited experience, I suspect that entropy would be the limiting
> resource. Is that correct?

No, this is not a good idea.  Searching for a particular OpenPGP keyid
or substring of a fingerprint is functionally equivalent to searching
for a substring of any other SHA1 digest.

gpg's delay in generating a key is due to trying to generate keys with
specific characteristics, drawn from suitably robust entropy.  It's not
possible in the general case to observe from the generated public part
of the key (much less the fingerprint) whether those constraints were
respected or not, so someone wanting to fake the proof of work could
simply ignore the gpg constraints, use a weaker (or nonexistent) entropy
source, and rapidly generate public keys that a naive (or
resource-constrained) observer couldn't distinguish from a real key.
This effectively cheats the proof-of-work scheme.

If you want proof-of-work, there are many better-evaluated mechanisms
available than using OpenPGP fingerprints.

	--dkg

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From rjh at sixdemonbag.org  Thu Oct  2 20:45:52 2014
From: rjh at sixdemonbag.org (Robert J. Hansen)
Date: Thu, 02 Oct 2014 14:45:52 -0400
Subject: producing GnuPG keys as proof of work
In-Reply-To: <542D934E.8060906@riseup.net>
References: <3797526.FaRLMEmID1@inno> <541751AA.4060708@fifthhorseman.net>
 <541761E6.2080401@dougbarton.us> <2632435.VKDKWAKhLU@inno>
 <54178083.4030102@sixdemonbag.org> <541814B5.1090003@digitalbrains.com>
 <541849BB.3080600@sixdemonbag.org> <54186B21.4050501@digitalbrains.com>
 <54188445.1010703@sixdemonbag.org> <541886B0.6030309@digitalbrains.com>
 <54188C38.1020400@sixdemonbag.org> <54188FEB.9000506@digitalbrains.com>
 <54189F4A.1020104@sixdemonbag.org> <542D934E.8060906@riseup.net>
Message-ID: <542D9D60.6010705@sixdemonbag.org>

> Would it be feasible to use gpg in batch mode to generate numerous keys,
> selecting for a particular key ID, or perhaps a longer part of the
> fingerprint?

Depends.  Expert users, sure; new users, or people who aren't that
interested in GnuPG but just want to get access to a website, not so much.

> I imagine that websites could provide random alphanumeric strings to new
> users, and require them to generate functional GnuPG keys (with normal
> key length etc) with fingerprints that begin with the specified strings.
> Having accomplished that, new users could edit their key, and specify an
> account name and email address.

I have to ask -- why?  What particular use case is this?  Why use GnuPG
as a proof-of-work as opposed to giving someone six bytes and saying,
"find me a SHA256 hash that starts with this, and provide me with it"?



From mirimir at riseup.net  Thu Oct  2 20:52:29 2014
From: mirimir at riseup.net (Mirimir)
Date: Thu, 02 Oct 2014 12:52:29 -0600
Subject: producing GnuPG keys as proof of work
In-Reply-To: <542D9965.20504@fifthhorseman.net>
References: <3797526.FaRLMEmID1@inno> <541751AA.4060708@fifthhorseman.net>
 <541761E6.2080401@dougbarton.us> <2632435.VKDKWAKhLU@inno>
 <54178083.4030102@sixdemonbag.org> <541814B5.1090003@digitalbrains.com>
 <541849BB.3080600@sixdemonbag.org> <54186B21.4050501@digitalbrains.com>
 <54188445.1010703@sixdemonbag.org> <541886B0.6030309@digitalbrains.com>
 <54188C38.1020400@sixdemonbag.org> <54188FEB.9000506@digitalbrains.com>
 <54189F4A.1020104@sixdemonbag.org> <542D934E.8060906@riseup.net>
 <542D9965.20504@fifthhorseman.net>
Message-ID: <542D9EED.8090404@riseup.net>

On 10/02/2014 12:28 PM, Daniel Kahn Gillmor wrote:
> On 10/02/2014 02:02 PM, Mirimir wrote:
>> Would it be feasible to use gpg in batch mode to generate numerous keys,
>> selecting for a particular key ID, or perhaps a longer part of the
>> fingerprint? I'm aware of shortcuts for creating keys with arbitrary key
>> IDs, but they produce keys with atypical key lengths etc. Based on
>> limited experience, I suspect that entropy would be the limiting
>> resource. Is that correct?
> 
> No, this is not a good idea.  Searching for a particular OpenPGP keyid
> or substring of a fingerprint is functionally equivalent to searching
> for a substring of any other SHA1 digest.
> 
> gpg's delay in generating a key is due to trying to generate keys with
> specific characteristics, drawn from suitably robust entropy.  It's not
> possible in the general case to observe from the generated public part
> of the key (much less the fingerprint) whether those constraints were
> respected or not, so someone wanting to fake the proof of work could
> simply ignore the gpg constraints, use a weaker (or nonexistent) entropy
> source, and rapidly generate public keys that a naive (or
> resource-constrained) observer couldn't distinguish from a real key.
> This effectively cheats the proof-of-work scheme.

Thank you. I didn't realize that distinguishing real from fake was hard.

> If you want proof-of-work, there are many better-evaluated mechanisms
> available than using OpenPGP fingerprints.

I haven't found a challenge-based proof-of-work mechanism. Suggestions
or hints would be very helpful.

> 
> 	--dkg
> 


From fmv1992 at gmail.com  Thu Oct  2 19:09:16 2014
From: fmv1992 at gmail.com (Felipe M. Vieira)
Date: Thu, 02 Oct 2014 14:09:16 -0300
Subject: scute for fedora, is it in the reppos?
In-Reply-To: <mailman.15286.1411827532.28939.gnupg-users@gnupg.org>
References: <mailman.15286.1411827532.28939.gnupg-users@gnupg.org>
Message-ID: <542D86BC.2090907@gmail.com>

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA256

Dear Paulo,

I cannot help you on the technical part of your question but I do recommend that you should migrate to a fully
free OS. You have a list here:
https://www.gnu.org/distros/free-distros.html
I started using parabola 3 months ago (migrated from lubuntu) and I'm totally happy with it.
I hope that helps!

On 09/27/2014 11:18 AM, gnupg-users-request at gnupg.org wrote:
> scute for fedora, is it in the reppos?

- -- 
    Felipe Martins Vieira
    Public PGP key: http://pgp.surfnet.nl
    Key Fingerprint: 9640 F192 63DA D637 6750  AC08 7BCA 19BB 0E69 E45D
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: GnuPG v2

iQEcBAEBCAAGBQJULYa8AAoJEHvKGbsOaeRdHiwH/2JuGi41rSi94+qVznNBzRSY
gnEfmBEoyfkc8HrybtLQqejWjiYmA3GND7T8HXGiM1MNIkvkTgCI+8kgBOJfo5L3
sx9V7XxJzB1hNdsUt0+ifwFhNy21Xs7I4DKWGwTcwJHo/xWElw4Xq8AQm+CEECPo
1ROJmqqJYSOFWLWOBTy2/Hv9PV93sRCJaUrBJ3vYrj5cwtxee8fHvRVyV1sAJDYE
Hh99q8kWNS9mSm6/CYaRi8rB0KflJ09m5U3XxF/SjlyekeTuR5p2EIjKVkz+3FHp
v5ev3JQLGVWmrxtaRSpEewBxnCDL7aXr1CXUCVhqcgRwtBP8QQ13l1GyhU3PUv0=
=crF3
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----


From mirimir at riseup.net  Thu Oct  2 21:04:37 2014
From: mirimir at riseup.net (Mirimir)
Date: Thu, 02 Oct 2014 13:04:37 -0600
Subject: producing GnuPG keys as proof of work
In-Reply-To: <542D9D60.6010705@sixdemonbag.org>
References: <3797526.FaRLMEmID1@inno> <541751AA.4060708@fifthhorseman.net>
 <541761E6.2080401@dougbarton.us> <2632435.VKDKWAKhLU@inno>
 <54178083.4030102@sixdemonbag.org> <541814B5.1090003@digitalbrains.com>
 <541849BB.3080600@sixdemonbag.org> <54186B21.4050501@digitalbrains.com>
 <54188445.1010703@sixdemonbag.org> <541886B0.6030309@digitalbrains.com>
 <54188C38.1020400@sixdemonbag.org> <54188FEB.9000506@digitalbrains.com>
 <54189F4A.1020104@sixdemonbag.org> <542D934E.8060906@riseup.net>
 <542D9D60.6010705@sixdemonbag.org>
Message-ID: <542DA1C5.2010601@riseup.net>

On 10/02/2014 12:45 PM, Robert J. Hansen wrote:
>> Would it be feasible to use gpg in batch mode to generate numerous keys,
>> selecting for a particular key ID, or perhaps a longer part of the
>> fingerprint?
> 
> Depends.  Expert users, sure; new users, or people who aren't that
> interested in GnuPG but just want to get access to a website, not so much.

Yes, an app would be needed.

>> I imagine that websites could provide random alphanumeric strings to new
>> users, and require them to generate functional GnuPG keys (with normal
>> key length etc) with fingerprints that begin with the specified strings.
>> Having accomplished that, new users could edit their key, and specify an
>> account name and email address.
> 
> I have to ask -- why?  What particular use case is this?  Why use GnuPG
> as a proof-of-work as opposed to giving someone six bytes and saying,
> "find me a SHA256 hash that starts with this, and provide me with it"?

It struck me that a GnuPG key, produced as proof of work, would be more
generally useful than an arbitrary hash. But now I see that
challenge-based proof of work could just be used to authenticate a GnuPG
key for signing and message encryption.

> _______________________________________________
> Gnupg-users mailing list
> Gnupg-users at gnupg.org
> http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users
> 


From peter at digitalbrains.com  Thu Oct  2 21:10:15 2014
From: peter at digitalbrains.com (Peter Lebbing)
Date: Thu, 02 Oct 2014 21:10:15 +0200
Subject: scute for fedora, is it in the =?UTF-8?Q?reppos=3F?=
In-Reply-To: <542D86BC.2090907@gmail.com>
References: <mailman.15286.1411827532.28939.gnupg-users@gnupg.org>
 <542D86BC.2090907@gmail.com>
Message-ID: <0104da565c7756acc31590310dad1a66@butters.digitalbrains.com>

On 2014-10-02 19:09, Felipe M. Vieira wrote:
> I cannot help you on the technical part of your question but I do
> recommend that you should migrate to a fully
> free OS.

Well there's a reply I didn't expect. Can I ask what triggered you to 
write it?

Peter.

-- 
I use the GNU Privacy Guard (GnuPG) in combination with Enigmail.
You can send me encrypted mail if you want some privacy.
My key is available at 
<http://digitalbrains.com/2012/openpgp-key-peter>


From wk at gnupg.org  Thu Oct  2 21:13:29 2014
From: wk at gnupg.org (Werner Koch)
Date: Thu, 02 Oct 2014 21:13:29 +0200
Subject: Generating smart-card stubs on a clean computer? and how to get
 the public key for a key on the card?
In-Reply-To: <542D47BE.8010301@tgries.de> (Thomas Gries's message of "Thu, 02
 Oct 2014 14:40:30 +0200")
References: <542D47BE.8010301@tgries.de>
Message-ID: <874mvmffom.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>

On Thu,  2 Oct 2014 14:40, mail at tgries.de said:

> But what if you_don't have the public key (for your key on the smart
> card) available ?__

You need the public key becuase it carries all the nifty OpenPGP thinks
like key signatures.  However, if you really lost the public key and you
need it back, it is possible to re-create the public key with the same
fingerprint.  There is no code for this, you need to hack the
source.

What you need is the creation timestamp and the public key parameters
from the card.  You can gather this information using 

  $ gpg-connect-agent
  > scd learn --force
  S SERIALNO D276000124010101000100xxxxxxxxxx  0
  S APPTYPE OPENPGP
[...]
  S KEY-TIME 1 1136130759
  S KEY-TIME 2 1136132140
  S KEY-TIME 3 1136131786
[...]
  OK
  > /decode
  > /hex
  > scd readkey OPENPGP.1
  D[0000]  28 31 30 3A 70 75 62 6C  69 63 2D 6B 65 79 28 33   (10:public-key(3
  D[0010]  3A 72 73 61 28 31 3A 6E  31 32 39 3A 00 D0 99 19   :rsa(1:n129:....
[...]
  OK
  
Take the creation time from the KEY-TIME lines.  I used /decode and /hex
above only for readability.  You should use 

  > /datafile out
  > scd readkey OPENPGP.1
  OK
  > /bye

instead which writes the s-expression with the public key to the file
"out".  The Libgcrypt functions take those s-expressions as arguments.
Now you need to feed it to gpg to create the public key part and the
self-signatures.  You may want to add this as a feature request to the
tracker.


Shalom-Salam,

   Werner

-- 
Die Gedanken sind frei.  Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz.



From dougb at dougbarton.email  Thu Oct  2 20:57:34 2014
From: dougb at dougbarton.email (Doug Barton)
Date: Thu, 02 Oct 2014 11:57:34 -0700
Subject: producing GnuPG keys as proof of work
In-Reply-To: <542D934E.8060906@riseup.net>
References: <3797526.FaRLMEmID1@inno> <541751AA.4060708@fifthhorseman.net>
 <541761E6.2080401@dougbarton.us> <2632435.VKDKWAKhLU@inno>
 <54178083.4030102@sixdemonbag.org> <541814B5.1090003@digitalbrains.com>
 <541849BB.3080600@sixdemonbag.org> <54186B21.4050501@digitalbrains.com>
 <54188445.1010703@sixdemonbag.org> <541886B0.6030309@digitalbrains.com>
 <54188C38.1020400@sixdemonbag.org> <54188FEB.9000506@digitalbrains.com>
 <54189F4A.1020104@sixdemonbag.org> <542D934E.8060906@riseup.net>
Message-ID: <542DA01E.5000608@dougbarton.email>

When starting a new topic please don't reply to a message on the list 
and change the subject line. Doing so causes your new topic to show 
"under" the previous one for those using mail readers that thread 
properly, and may cause your message to be missed altogether if someone 
has blocked that thread.

Instead, please save the list address and then start a completely new 
message.

hope this helps,

Doug


From dougb at dougbarton.email  Thu Oct  2 21:14:18 2014
From: dougb at dougbarton.email (Doug Barton)
Date: Thu, 02 Oct 2014 12:14:18 -0700
Subject: scute for fedora, is it in the reppos?
In-Reply-To: <0104da565c7756acc31590310dad1a66@butters.digitalbrains.com>
References: <mailman.15286.1411827532.28939.gnupg-users@gnupg.org>
 <542D86BC.2090907@gmail.com>
 <0104da565c7756acc31590310dad1a66@butters.digitalbrains.com>
Message-ID: <542DA40A.50506@dougbarton.email>

On 10/2/14 12:10 PM, Peter Lebbing wrote:
> On 2014-10-02 19:09, Felipe M. Vieira wrote:
>> I cannot help you on the technical part of your question but I do
>> recommend that you should migrate to a fully
>> free OS.
>
> Well there's a reply I didn't expect. Can I ask what triggered you to
> write it?

... or better yet, can we keep the off-topic topics off the list? :)

Doug



From rjh at sixdemonbag.org  Thu Oct  2 22:58:42 2014
From: rjh at sixdemonbag.org (Robert J. Hansen)
Date: Thu, 02 Oct 2014 16:58:42 -0400
Subject: producing GnuPG keys as proof of work
In-Reply-To: <542DA1C5.2010601@riseup.net>
References: <3797526.FaRLMEmID1@inno> <541751AA.4060708@fifthhorseman.net>
 <541761E6.2080401@dougbarton.us> <2632435.VKDKWAKhLU@inno>
 <54178083.4030102@sixdemonbag.org> <541814B5.1090003@digitalbrains.com>
 <541849BB.3080600@sixdemonbag.org> <54186B21.4050501@digitalbrains.com>
 <54188445.1010703@sixdemonbag.org> <541886B0.6030309@digitalbrains.com>
 <54188C38.1020400@sixdemonbag.org> <54188FEB.9000506@digitalbrains.com>
 <54189F4A.1020104@sixdemonbag.org> <542D934E.8060906@riseup.net>
 <542D9D60.6010705@sixdemonbag.org> <542DA1C5.2010601@riseup.net>
Message-ID: <542DBC82.8090305@sixdemonbag.org>

> It struck me that a GnuPG key, produced as proof of work, would be
> more generally useful than an arbitrary hash. But now I see that 
> challenge-based proof of work could just be used to authenticate a
> GnuPG key for signing and message encryption.

How?  What is there about the proof of work that can somehow
authenticate a GnuPG certificate?




From mirimir at riseup.net  Thu Oct  2 23:18:50 2014
From: mirimir at riseup.net (Mirimir)
Date: Thu, 02 Oct 2014 15:18:50 -0600
Subject: producing GnuPG keys as proof of work
In-Reply-To: <542DBC82.8090305@sixdemonbag.org>
References: <3797526.FaRLMEmID1@inno> <541751AA.4060708@fifthhorseman.net>
 <541761E6.2080401@dougbarton.us> <2632435.VKDKWAKhLU@inno>
 <54178083.4030102@sixdemonbag.org> <541814B5.1090003@digitalbrains.com>
 <541849BB.3080600@sixdemonbag.org> <54186B21.4050501@digitalbrains.com>
 <54188445.1010703@sixdemonbag.org> <541886B0.6030309@digitalbrains.com>
 <54188C38.1020400@sixdemonbag.org> <54188FEB.9000506@digitalbrains.com>
 <54189F4A.1020104@sixdemonbag.org> <542D934E.8060906@riseup.net>
 <542D9D60.6010705@sixdemonbag.org> <542DA1C5.2010601@riseup.net>
 <542DBC82.8090305@sixdemonbag.org>
Message-ID: <542DC13A.1090707@riseup.net>

On 10/02/2014 02:58 PM, Robert J. Hansen wrote:
>> It struck me that a GnuPG key, produced as proof of work, would be
>> more generally useful than an arbitrary hash. But now I see that 
>> challenge-based proof of work could just be used to authenticate a
>> GnuPG key for signing and message encryption.
> 
> How?  What is there about the proof of work that can somehow
> authenticate a GnuPG certificate?

Sorry, I forgot to explain the context. On the tor-talk list, there's
recently been discussion of Wikimedia's policy to hard-block all Tor
(and other known proxy) IP addresses. It does that to protect against
malicious users who use proxies to evade bans and use sockpuppets.

As an alternative, I suggested that Wikimedia use challenge-response
proof of work to validate accounts created through Tor. Creating an
account might require many hours of computation, with the proper
threshold determined empirically.


From cpollock at embarqmail.com  Fri Oct  3 05:38:56 2014
From: cpollock at embarqmail.com (Chris)
Date: Thu, 02 Oct 2014 22:38:56 -0500
Subject: WARNING: This key is not certified with a trusted signature!
Message-ID: <1412307536.24510.26.camel@embarqmail.com>

I'm having to put my system back together again after my Mandriva box
crashed back in August. I'm up to getting my key installed and when
sending myself a test post I get this:

gpg: armor header: Version: GnuPG v1
gpg: Signature made Thu 02 Oct 2014 10:15:58 PM CDT using DSA key ID
98E6705C
gpg: using PGP trust model
gpg: Good signature from "Chris Pollock (New email address as of
04/21/07) <cpollock at embarqmail.com>"
gpg:                 aka "Chris Pollock <cpollock at earthlink.net>"
gpg: WARNING: This key is not certified with a trusted signature!
gpg:          There is no indication that the signature belongs to the
owner.
Primary key fingerprint: 441D 71BC 727D 0B1C EC1F  6B39 E372 A7DA 98E6
705C
gpg: binary signature, digest algorithm SHA1

It's been so long since I had to set it up that I must be missing
something simple. Possibly a knock on the head with a 2X4 from someone
my jog my memory.

Chris

-- 
Chris
KeyID 0xE372A7DA98E6705C
31.11?N 97.89?W (Elev. 1092 ft)
22:28:26 up 2 days, 6:44, 3 users, load average: 1.39, 1.14, 1.15
Ubuntu 14.04.1 LTS, kernel 3.13.0-37-generic



From mailinglisten at hauke-laging.de  Fri Oct  3 07:40:10 2014
From: mailinglisten at hauke-laging.de (Hauke Laging)
Date: Fri, 03 Oct 2014 07:40:10 +0200
Subject: WARNING: This key is not certified with a trusted signature!
In-Reply-To: <1412307536.24510.26.camel@embarqmail.com>
References: <1412307536.24510.26.camel@embarqmail.com>
Message-ID: <5374986.V8lBLlcLZT@inno>

Am Do 02.10.2014, 22:38:56 schrieb Chris:
> I'm having to put my system back together again after my Mandriva box
> crashed back in August. I'm up to getting my key installed and when
> sending myself a test post I get this:

> gpg: WARNING: This key is not certified with a trusted signature!
> gpg:          There is no indication that the signature belongs to the
> owner.

If you have not restored the whole GnuPG directory (~/.gnupg under 
Linux) but imported the keys only then the problem is that your keys 
have lost their absolute trust.

You can restore that with 

gpg --trusted-key 0xE372A7DA98E6705C --list-keys 0x98E6705C

or

gpg --edit-key 0x98E6705C trust


Hauke
-- 
Crypto f?r alle: http://www.openpgp-schulungen.de/fuer/unterstuetzer/
http://userbase.kde.org/Concepts/OpenPGP_Help_Spread
OpenPGP: 7D82 FB9F D25A 2CE4 5241 6C37 BF4B 8EEF 1A57 1DF5
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From cpollock at embarqmail.com  Fri Oct  3 16:39:26 2014
From: cpollock at embarqmail.com (Chris)
Date: Fri, 03 Oct 2014 09:39:26 -0500
Subject: WARNING: This key is not certified with a trusted signature!
In-Reply-To: <5374986.V8lBLlcLZT@inno>
References: <1412307536.24510.26.camel@embarqmail.com>
 <5374986.V8lBLlcLZT@inno>
Message-ID: <1412347166.24782.1.camel@embarqmail.com>

On Fri, 2014-10-03 at 07:40 +0200, Hauke Laging wrote:
> Am Do 02.10.2014, 22:38:56 schrieb Chris:
> > I'm having to put my system back together again after my Mandriva box
> > crashed back in August. I'm up to getting my key installed and when
> > sending myself a test post I get this:
> 
> > gpg: WARNING: This key is not certified with a trusted signature!
> > gpg:          There is no indication that the signature belongs to the
> > owner.
> 
> If you have not restored the whole GnuPG directory (~/.gnupg under 
> Linux) but imported the keys only then the problem is that your keys 
> have lost their absolute trust.
> 
> You can restore that with 
> 
> gpg --trusted-key 0xE372A7DA98E6705C --list-keys 0x98E6705C
> 
> or
> 
> gpg --edit-key 0x98E6705C trust
> 
> 
> Hauke

Good morning Hauke and thank you for the reply. I ran the above and now
it does seem to show as a trusted key:

gpg: using character set `utf-8'
gpg: armor: BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE
Version: GnuPG v2.0.22 (GNU/Linux)
:signature packet: algo 17, keyid E372A7DA98E6705C
	version 4, created 1412342971, md5len 0, sigclass 0x00
	digest algo 2, begin of digest b6 29
	hashed subpkt 2 len 4 (sig created 2014-10-03)
	subpkt 16 len 8 (issuer key ID E372A7DA98E6705C)
	data: [159 bits]
	data: [157 bits]
gpg: armor header: 
gpg: Signature made Fri 03 Oct 2014 08:29:31 AM CDT using DSA key ID
98E6705C
gpg: using PGP trust model
gpg: key 98E6705C: accepted as trusted key
gpg: Good signature from "Chris Pollock (New email address as of
04/21/07) <cpollock at embarqmail.com>"
gpg:                 aka "Chris Pollock <cpollock at earthlink.net>"
gpg: binary signature, digest algorithm SHA1

Sending a test post to myself shows the above however shouldn't the icon
that Evolution shows for the signature be green instead of red since
it's now ultimately trusted? I seem to remember that being the case. I
published the key last night to

hkp://keyserver.ubuntu.com:11371
hkp://pool.sks-keyservers.net

I'm using Gnomes 'Passwords/Keys' app which looks similar to GPG-Agent
which I was used to using on my Mandriva box before it crashed. I've
installed GPG-Agent on this Ubuntu box however I seem to remember in the
old box a 'user interface' that I could use to retrieve keys and so
forth. Guess when time allows today I'll go in and read the docs on it,
I was just too tired last night to get very involved in it. I should
also be able to import your key to my keyring from one of the key
servers, will have to work on that issue today. All of this is I'm sure
has simple solutions, it's just been so long since I had first installed
it on the old box that I've forgotten a lot of what I did. I shall go
back and Read The Fine Manual today and see if I can figure out what
I've neglected to do.

Thanks very much again Hauke for your reply, it was very helpful. 

Chris


-- 
Chris
KeyID 0xE372A7DA98E6705C
31.11?N 97.89?W (Elev. 1092 ft)
09:38:07 up 2 days, 17:53, 1 user, load average: 0.31, 0.57, 0.77
Ubuntu 14.04.1 LTS, kernel 3.13.0-37-generic
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From wk at gnupg.org  Fri Oct  3 16:35:52 2014
From: wk at gnupg.org (Werner Koch)
Date: Fri, 03 Oct 2014 16:35:52 +0200
Subject: [Announce] The maybe final Beta for GnuPG 2.1
Message-ID: <87sij5cjav.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>

Hello!
    
I just released another *beta* version of GnuPG *2.1*.  It has been
released to give you the opportunity to check out new features and to
help fixing bugs.

  If you need a stable and fully maintained version of GnuPG,
  you should use version 2.0.26 or 1.4.18.

This version is marked as BETA and as such it should in general not be
used for real work.  However, the functionality is solid enough and thus
this may actually be the last beta before we release 2.1.0 some time
this year.


What's new in 2.1.0-beta864 since beta784
=========================================

 * gpg: Removed the GPG_AGENT_INFO related code.  GnuPG does now only
   use a fixed socket name in its home directory.

 * gpg: Renamed --gen-key to --full-gen-key and re-added a --gen-key
   command using less prompts.

 * gpg: Use SHA-256 for all signature types also on RSA keys.

 * gpg: Default keyring is now created with a .kbx suffix.

 * gpg: Add a shortcut to the key capabilies menu (e.g. "=e" sets the
   encryption capabilities).

 * gpg: Fixed obsolete options parsing.

 * speedo: Improved the quick build system.

 Already released with beta834:

 * gpg: Improved passphrase caching.

 * gpg: Switched to algorithm number 22 for EdDSA.

 * gpg: Removed CAST5 from the default preferences.

 * gpg: Order SHA-1 last in the hash preferences.

 * gpg: Changed default cipher for --symmetric to AES-128.

 * gpg: Fixed export of ECC keys and import of EdDSA keys.

 * dirmngr: Fixed the KS_FETCH command.

 * speedo: Downloads related packages and works for non-Windows.


Getting the Software
====================

GnuPG 2.1.0-beta864 is available at

 ftp://ftp.gnupg.org/gcrypt/gnupg/unstable/gnupg-2.1.0-beta864.tar.bz2
 ftp://ftp.gnupg.org/gcrypt/gnupg/unstable/gnupg-2.1.0-beta864.tar.bz2.sig

and soon on all mirrors <http://www.gnupg.org/mirrors.html>.

Please read the README file !


Checking the Integrity
======================

In order to check that the version of GnuPG which you are going to
install is an original and unmodified one, you can do it in one of
the following ways:

 * If you already have a trusted version of GnuPG installed, you
   can simply check the supplied signature.  For example to check the
   signature of the file gnupg-2.1.0-beta864.tar.bz2 you would use
   this command:

     gpg --verify gnupg-2.1.0-beta864.tar.bz2.sig

   Depending on your installation you may use "gpg2" instead of "gpg".
   This checks whether the signature file matches the source file.  You
   should see a message indicating that the signature is good and made
   by that signing key.  Make sure that you have the right key, either
   by checking the fingerprint of that key with other sources or by
   checking that the key has been signed by a trustworthy other key.
   Note, that you can retrieve the signing key using the command

     finger wk ,at' g10code.com

   or using a keyserver like

     gpg --keyserver keys.gnupg.net --recv-key 4F25E3B6

   The distribution key 4F25E3B6 is signed by the well known key:

     pub   dsa2048/1E42B367 2007-12-31 [expires: 2018-12-31]
     Key fingerprint = 8061 5870 F5BA D690 3336  86D0 F2AD 85AC 1E42 B367
     uid                  Werner Koch <wk at gnupg.org>

   Never use a GnuPG version you just downloaded to check the
   integrity of the source - use an existing GnuPG installation!


Building
========

GnuPG requires a couple of extra libraries, which need to be build and
installed before GnuPG.  The configure script will tell you about the
requirements.

You may try the Speedo system as an alternative build method:

  make -f build-aux/speedo.mk native INSTALL_PREFIX=/usr/local

This method downloads all required libraries and does a native build of
GnuPG to "/usr/local" (or to "PLAY/inst/" if you do not specify the
INSTALL_PREFIX).  Note that you need installation privileges on the
install directory, GNU make, and a decent Unix system.  Building for
Windows is in theory possible but has not been tested for this release.


Documentation
=============

The file gnupg.info has the complete user manual of the system.
Separate man pages are included as well; however they have not all the
details available in the manual.  It is also possible to read the
complete manual online in HTML format at

  https://www.gnupg.org/documentation/manuals/gnupg-devel/

The chapters on gpg-agent, gpg and gpgsm include information on how
to set up the whole thing.  You may also want search the GnuPG mailing
list archives or ask on the gnupg-users mailing lists for advise on
how to solve problems.  Many of the new features are around for
several years and thus enough public knowledge is already available.

Almost all mail clients support GnuPG-2.  Mutt users may want to use
the configure option "--enable-gpgme" during build time and put a "set
use_crypt_gpgme" in ~/.muttrc to enable S/MIME support along with the
reworked OpenPGP support.


Support
=======

Please consult the archive of the gnupg-users mailing list before
reporting a bug <https://gnupg.org/documentation/mailing-lists.html>.
We suggest to send bug reports for a new release to this list in favor
of filing a bug at <https://bugs.gnupg.org>.  We also have a dedicated
service directory at:

  https://www.gnupg.org/service.html

Maintaining and improving GnuPG is costly.  For more than a decade,
g10 Code GmbH, a German company owned and headed by GnuPG's principal
author Werner Koch, is bearing the majority of these costs.  To help
them carry on this work, they need your support.  See

  https://gnupg.org/donate/

For reasons why donating to free software projects is beneficial for
everyone, please read Poul-Henning Kamp's "Quality Software Costs Money
- Heartbleed Was Free" at https://queue.acm.org/detail.cfm?id=2636165 .


Thanks
======

We have to thank all the people who helped with this release, be it
testing, coding, translating, suggesting, auditing, administering the
servers, spreading the word, and answering questions on the mailing
lists.


Salam-Shalom,

   Werner


-- 
Die Gedanken sind frei.  Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz.
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_______________________________________________
Gnupg-announce mailing list
Gnupg-announce at gnupg.org
http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-announce

From pete at heypete.com  Fri Oct  3 17:40:38 2014
From: pete at heypete.com (Pete Stephenson)
Date: Fri, 3 Oct 2014 17:40:38 +0200
Subject: [Announce] The maybe final Beta for GnuPG 2.1
In-Reply-To: <87sij5cjav.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
References: <87sij5cjav.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
Message-ID: <CA+4dSw6zCHD8K3KOZ52EXMAD5BxoHPwcx5OvaCWeMeQPU05kLw@mail.gmail.com>

On Fri, Oct 3, 2014 at 4:35 PM, Werner Koch <wk at gnupg.org> wrote:
> Hello!
>
> I just released another *beta* version of GnuPG *2.1*.  It has been
> released to give you the opportunity to check out new features and to
> help fixing bugs.

Excellent!

[snip]

> GnuPG requires a couple of extra libraries, which need to be build and
> installed before GnuPG.  The configure script will tell you about the
> requirements.
>
> You may try the Speedo system as an alternative build method:
>
>   make -f build-aux/speedo.mk native INSTALL_PREFIX=/usr/local

When I run

make -f build-aux/speedo.mk native

it does quite a bit, but always seems to spit out the following errors
and fails to complete. The bit about gnutls is non-critical for me,
but it'd be nice to resolve it. The "required libraries not found"
error seems to be a showstopper, though.

I'm doing the build on a stock Ubuntu Server 14.04 32-bit system. I've
installed the "build-essential" package from the repo, so I have gcc,
make, etc.

configure: WARNING:
***
*** Building without NTBTLS and GNUTLS - no TLS access to keyservers.
***
*** No package 'gnutls' found
***
configure: error:
***
*** Required libraries not found. Please consult the above messages
*** and install them before running configure again.
***
make[1]: *** [/home/pete/gpg/gnupg-2.1.0-beta864/PLAY/stamps/stamp-gnupg-01-configure]
Error 1
make[1]: Leaving directory `/home/pete/gpg/gnupg-2.1.0-beta864'
make: *** [native] Error 2

Any ideas?

> Maintaining and improving GnuPG is costly.  For more than a decade,
> g10 Code GmbH, a German company owned and headed by GnuPG's principal
> author Werner Koch, is bearing the majority of these costs.  To help
> them carry on this work, they need your support.  See
>
>   https://gnupg.org/donate/

Thanks for the reminder.

Cheers!
-Pete

-- 
Pete Stephenson


From wk at gnupg.org  Fri Oct  3 18:39:54 2014
From: wk at gnupg.org (Werner Koch)
Date: Fri, 03 Oct 2014 18:39:54 +0200
Subject: [Announce] The maybe final Beta for GnuPG 2.1
In-Reply-To: <CA+4dSw6zCHD8K3KOZ52EXMAD5BxoHPwcx5OvaCWeMeQPU05kLw@mail.gmail.com>
 (Pete Stephenson's message of "Fri, 3 Oct 2014 17:40:38 +0200")
References: <87sij5cjav.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
 <CA+4dSw6zCHD8K3KOZ52EXMAD5BxoHPwcx5OvaCWeMeQPU05kLw@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <877g0hcdk5.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>

On Fri,  3 Oct 2014 17:40, pete at heypete.com said:

> make -f build-aux/speedo.mk native
>
> it does quite a bit, but always seems to spit out the following errors
> and fails to complete. The bit about gnutls is non-critical for me,
> but it'd be nice to resolve it. The "required libraries not found"

That is easy: Install the libgnutls-dev package.

> error seems to be a showstopper, though.

> configure: error:
> ***
> *** Required libraries not found. Please consult the above messages
> *** and install them before running configure again.
> ***

You should see other warning messages in the config log which tells you
which library is missing.  You should find the full config long in
PLAY/build/gnupg/config.log.  My guess is that there is some problem
with libiconv which is expected to exist. It is usually part of glibc
but you need to install the development package.


Shalom-Salam,

   Werner

-- 
Die Gedanken sind frei.  Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz.



From rjh at sixdemonbag.org  Fri Oct  3 19:15:54 2014
From: rjh at sixdemonbag.org (Robert J. Hansen)
Date: Fri, 03 Oct 2014 13:15:54 -0400
Subject: [Announce] The maybe final Beta for GnuPG 2.1
In-Reply-To: <CA+4dSw6zCHD8K3KOZ52EXMAD5BxoHPwcx5OvaCWeMeQPU05kLw@mail.gmail.com>
References: <87sij5cjav.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
 <CA+4dSw6zCHD8K3KOZ52EXMAD5BxoHPwcx5OvaCWeMeQPU05kLw@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <542ED9CA.8010308@sixdemonbag.org>

>> Maintaining and improving GnuPG is costly.  For more than a decade,
>> g10 Code GmbH, a German company owned and headed by GnuPG's principal
>> author Werner Koch, is bearing the majority of these costs.  To help
>> them carry on this work, they need your support.  See
>>
>>   https://gnupg.org/donate/
> 
> Thanks for the reminder.

Indeed.  Today's also Tag der Deutschen Einheit ("German Unity Day"),
which celebrates the end of the GDR -- whose secret police service, the
Ministerium fuer Staatsicherheit[*], commonly known as Stasi, practiced
surveillance of its own citizens on a scale that's hard to imagine.  So,
celebrate your privacy by donating to GnuPG and sitting down with the
movie _Das Leben der Anderen_, released in English-speaking countries as
_The Lives of Others_.  It's a remarkable film and worth seeing.


[*] Werner, Wikipedia lists it as Staatssicherheit, but for some reason
that just doesn't look right to me.  Is it?


From peter at digitalbrains.com  Fri Oct  3 19:47:11 2014
From: peter at digitalbrains.com (Peter Lebbing)
Date: Fri, 03 Oct 2014 19:47:11 +0200
Subject: [Announce] The maybe final Beta for GnuPG 2.1
In-Reply-To: <542ED9CA.8010308@sixdemonbag.org>
References: <87sij5cjav.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
 <CA+4dSw6zCHD8K3KOZ52EXMAD5BxoHPwcx5OvaCWeMeQPU05kLw@mail.gmail.com>
 <542ED9CA.8010308@sixdemonbag.org>
Message-ID: <542EE11F.7010604@digitalbrains.com>

On 03/10/14 19:15, Robert J. Hansen wrote:
> [*] Werner, Wikipedia lists it as Staatssicherheit, but for some reason
> that just doesn't look right to me.  Is it?

Disclaimer: I'm not Werner, and I'm Dutch.

It is most definitely Staatssicherheit as in "die Sicherheit des
Staat(e)s". It's a genetive, just like it's People's Republic of China
and not People Republic of China.

In my mind, I pronounce the two esses. Not sure how much you would
notice that, though.

HTH,

Peter.

-- 
I use the GNU Privacy Guard (GnuPG) in combination with Enigmail.
You can send me encrypted mail if you want some privacy.
My key is available at <http://digitalbrains.com/2012/openpgp-key-peter>


From rjh at sixdemonbag.org  Fri Oct  3 20:16:04 2014
From: rjh at sixdemonbag.org (Robert J. Hansen)
Date: Fri, 03 Oct 2014 14:16:04 -0400
Subject: [Announce] The maybe final Beta for GnuPG 2.1
In-Reply-To: <542EE11F.7010604@digitalbrains.com>
References: <87sij5cjav.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
 <CA+4dSw6zCHD8K3KOZ52EXMAD5BxoHPwcx5OvaCWeMeQPU05kLw@mail.gmail.com>
 <542ED9CA.8010308@sixdemonbag.org> <542EE11F.7010604@digitalbrains.com>
Message-ID: <542EE7E4.20709@sixdemonbag.org>

> Disclaimer: I'm not Werner, and I'm Dutch.

These are forgivable character flaws.  :)

> It is most definitely Staatssicherheit as in "die Sicherheit des
> Staat(e)s". It's a genetive, just like it's People's Republic of China
> and not People Republic of China.

Ah, that explains my difficulty.  My usual grammatical rule of thumb for
German is "imagine 18th-century English," which works fine most of the
time but breaks for the genitive case (on account of English not having
one -- the way we structure possessives is a remnant of the Saxon
genitive, but it does not represent an actual grammatical case).

Thanks.  :)


From mlisten at hammernoch.net  Fri Oct  3 20:50:24 2014
From: mlisten at hammernoch.net (=?windows-1252?Q?Ludwig_H=FCgelsch=E4fer?=)
Date: Fri, 03 Oct 2014 20:50:24 +0200
Subject: [Announce] The maybe final Beta for GnuPG 2.1
In-Reply-To: <542EE11F.7010604@digitalbrains.com>
References: <87sij5cjav.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
 <CA+4dSw6zCHD8K3KOZ52EXMAD5BxoHPwcx5OvaCWeMeQPU05kLw@mail.gmail.com>
 <542ED9CA.8010308@sixdemonbag.org> <542EE11F.7010604@digitalbrains.com>
Message-ID: <542EEFF0.3060801@hammernoch.net>

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA512

On 03.10.14 19:47, Peter Lebbing wrote:

> It is most definitely Staatssicherheit as in "die Sicherheit des 
> Staat(e)s". It's a genetive, just like it's People's Republic of
> China and not People Republic of China.

Perfect explanation!

> In my mind, I pronounce the two esses.

A german news speaker would do it so, but you wouldn't notice it in
every day german.

Ludwig

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: GnuPG v2

iQEcBAEBCgAGBQJULu/uAAoJEA52XAUJWdLjObIH/RBFQM4x+0D7Yk4EBfo/4+7u
zMtcOM+0WJ/nYRFCdpW0lt+tyZSSzxi1FLaVypktowV3W3DdSvIbMpZ8ZffyqXn8
M/xeyifD4faV+5EfFf7KETj231y2PVxwygFEW4jfepvjrDNz4dsI7BkXrP+zItUm
C+JgysES8Hq2e0bW0fyCyjoit0CTeLpAtN5OFnT7//SayGWYpH05QwlEjQ2I/MJ5
dnXG6I1y3ys8lgLFJme5oJCumSLc8NLt92f28rVaIDv/A9lNphY/Xwtmk/DLl3N5
bSC5nJJwDjrbC4FJbpt6K282VwYMxwo1VOQALS54Gi89O8ej+38giOzLEk2501o=
=aSew
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----


From davids at russellhospital.org  Fri Oct  3 20:09:01 2014
From: davids at russellhospital.org (David Schraeder)
Date: Fri, 03 Oct 2014 13:09:01 -0500
Subject: [Announce] The maybe final Beta for GnuPG 2.1
In-Reply-To: <877g0hcdk5.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
References: <87sij5cjav.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
 <CA+4dSw6zCHD8K3KOZ52EXMAD5BxoHPwcx5OvaCWeMeQPU05kLw@mail.gmail.com>
 <877g0hcdk5.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
Message-ID: <542EE63D.8010800@russellhospital.org>

I am getting the same problem.   I already have that package installed.


On 10/3/2014 11:39 AM, Werner Koch wrote:
> On Fri,  3 Oct 2014 17:40, pete at heypete.com said:
>
>> make -f build-aux/speedo.mk native
>>
>> it does quite a bit, but always seems to spit out the following errors
>> and fails to complete. The bit about gnutls is non-critical for me,
>> but it'd be nice to resolve it. The "required libraries not found"
> That is easy: Install the libgnutls-dev package.
>
>> error seems to be a showstopper, though.
>> configure: error:
>> ***
>> *** Required libraries not found. Please consult the above messages
>> *** and install them before running configure again.
>> ***
> You should see other warning messages in the config log which tells you
> which library is missing.  You should find the full config long in
> PLAY/build/gnupg/config.log.  My guess is that there is some problem
> with libiconv which is expected to exist. It is usually part of glibc
> but you need to install the development package.
>
>
> Shalom-Salam,
>
>    Werner
>

-- 



David Schraeder
Russell Regional Hospital
Direct Dial: 785-483-0890
Direct Fax:  785-483-0891
Davids at RussellHospital.org



**************************************************************************************
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This electronic mail message and all attachments may contain confidential
information belonging to the sender or the intended recipient(s).  This
information is intended ONLY for the use of the individual or entity named
above.  If you are not the intended recipient(s), you are hereby notified that
any disclosure, copying, distribution (electronic or otherwise), forwarding
or taking any action in reliance on the contents of this information is
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If you have received this electronic transmission in error, please
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all materials from any and all computers.
 
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**************************************************************************************



From peter at digitalbrains.com  Fri Oct  3 21:35:21 2014
From: peter at digitalbrains.com (Peter Lebbing)
Date: Fri, 03 Oct 2014 21:35:21 +0200
Subject: [Announce] The maybe final Beta for GnuPG 2.1
In-Reply-To: <542EE63D.8010800@russellhospital.org>
References: <87sij5cjav.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
 <CA+4dSw6zCHD8K3KOZ52EXMAD5BxoHPwcx5OvaCWeMeQPU05kLw@mail.gmail.com>
 <877g0hcdk5.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> <542EE63D.8010800@russellhospital.org>
Message-ID: <542EFA79.6070208@digitalbrains.com>

> I am getting the same problem.   I already have that package installed.

Please try to get the relevant part of the error message that actually tells
what it didn't find, because the log posted by Pete is cut down too far to
actually tell. You could also include the whole log, I think. Or would that hit
some size limit, either technical or social?

If so, would sharing it as a gist on github be an acceptable way? I've never
seen it suggested on this mailing list, but I encountered it while doing bug
reports, and it seems like a reasonable way to share a big make log...

Peter.

PS: Please don't top-quote. The usual way to explain it is:
A: Because it messes up the reading order
Q: Why is it annoying?
A: Top-posting
Q: What is the wrong way to quote?
But while remembering this, I'm suddenly reminded of Time-Reversed Owls and I
like that one better now: http://www.smbc-comics.com/?id=2684

-- 
I use the GNU Privacy Guard (GnuPG) in combination with Enigmail.
You can send me encrypted mail if you want some privacy.
My key is available at <http://digitalbrains.com/2012/openpgp-key-peter>


From mac3iii at gmail.com  Fri Oct  3 23:09:47 2014
From: mac3iii at gmail.com (Murphy)
Date: Fri, 03 Oct 2014 17:09:47 -0400
Subject: [Announce] The maybe final Beta for GnuPG 2.1
In-Reply-To: <CA+4dSw6zCHD8K3KOZ52EXMAD5BxoHPwcx5OvaCWeMeQPU05kLw@mail.gmail.com>
References: <CA+4dSw6zCHD8K3KOZ52EXMAD5BxoHPwcx5OvaCWeMeQPU05kLw@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <542F109B.4000809@gmail.com>

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA1

Pete - beta 864 compiled perfectly for me in Ubuntu 14.04 LTS.  I
suspect you need to use super user powers here.  If you want a
practice version try in a safe directory try:

sudo make -f build-aux/speedo.mk native

otherwise if you want it installed on your machine ready to go use

sudo make -f build-aux/speedo.mk native INSTALL_PREFIX=/usr/local

and Thanks Werner for putting in the INSTALL_PREFIX=/usr/local to make
it work instantly, for us non-unix gurus :)  I am now using gpg2.1 as
my main version 2.  If there is anything truly mission critical I can
always use version 1.x until the stable version of 2.1 comes out.

Cheers!
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: GnuPG v1

iJwEAQECAAYFAlQvEJoACgkQUVKxkWZz2Q0/VQQAjrks7Dvhi5LZZMapE4i+qKnG
3oHyRyD6Q9K2T05zR9sWBAI2ZJwE5z3soOH/2+vcazy/uLyl1qN68cFIaE86k75T
QZ4S/1UilHV8SBnP91nS2xSRLr4TyuKWGTZrEaF0EZtV8XN8TY9a00NtJ+RsTsmo
1eK141d/t2yOaWmFNOs=
=X5VP
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----


From pete at heypete.com  Sat Oct  4 00:28:15 2014
From: pete at heypete.com (Pete Stephenson)
Date: Sat, 4 Oct 2014 00:28:15 +0200
Subject: [Announce] The maybe final Beta for GnuPG 2.1
In-Reply-To: <877g0hcdk5.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
References: <87sij5cjav.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
 <CA+4dSw6zCHD8K3KOZ52EXMAD5BxoHPwcx5OvaCWeMeQPU05kLw@mail.gmail.com>
 <877g0hcdk5.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
Message-ID: <CA+4dSw4E=mkeaw1eDaC_jzwS3qHvG68awHUgKEh2Gjr4hcXGyg@mail.gmail.com>

On Fri, Oct 3, 2014 at 6:39 PM, Werner Koch <wk at gnupg.org> wrote:
> On Fri,  3 Oct 2014 17:40, pete at heypete.com said:
>
>> make -f build-aux/speedo.mk native
>>
>> it does quite a bit, but always seems to spit out the following errors
>> and fails to complete. The bit about gnutls is non-critical for me,
>> but it'd be nice to resolve it. The "required libraries not found"
>
> That is easy: Install the libgnutls-dev package.

Now I get "Requested 'gnutls >= 3.0' but version of GnuTLS is 2.12.23"
-- again, this isn't a big deal. I'm just trying to do a test build,
and I'm not worried about TLS connectivity to keyservers.

That said, if I did want to compile the latest version of GnuTLS from
source, where should one place the compiled results so that the GnuPG
build process would know about it?

>> error seems to be a showstopper, though.
>
>> configure: error:
>> ***
>> *** Required libraries not found. Please consult the above messages
>> *** and install them before running configure again.
>> ***
>
> You should see other warning messages in the config log which tells you
> which library is missing.  You should find the full config long in
> PLAY/build/gnupg/config.log.  My guess is that there is some problem
> with libiconv which is expected to exist. It is usually part of glibc
> but you need to install the development package.

To my untrained, non-developer[1] eye, there appears to be several
things that failed though I'm not sure how to interpret things
correctly. The full config log is ~250kB. I've posted it to a Pastebin
at http://pastebin.com/xZjzsZju if that would help.

[1] I've written and compiled a few ad-hoc C programs for my research,
but I'm very much a beginner at this sort of thing. I apologize for my
lack of knowledge in this regard. Thank you (and others) for your
patience and help.

Cheers!
-Pete



-- 
Pete Stephenson


From cpollock at embarqmail.com  Sat Oct  4 03:29:44 2014
From: cpollock at embarqmail.com (Chris)
Date: Fri, 03 Oct 2014 20:29:44 -0500
Subject: signed message test
Message-ID: <1412386184.24782.7.camel@embarqmail.com>

I sent myself a post and signed it. The icon for the signed message
stays red (I seem to remember on my old Mandriva box it would be green
if valid). Clicking the icon the output shows:

gpg: using character set `utf-8'
gpg: armor: BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE
Version: GnuPG v2.0.22 (GNU/Linux)
:signature packet: algo 17, keyid E372A7DA98E6705C
	version 4, created 1412384205, md5len 0, sigclass 0x00
	digest algo 2, begin of digest 52 ba
	hashed subpkt 2 len 4 (sig created 2014-10-04)
	subpkt 16 len 8 (issuer key ID E372A7DA98E6705C)
	data: [158 bits]
	data: [159 bits]
gpg: armor header: 
gpg: Signature made Fri 03 Oct 2014 07:56:45 PM CDT using DSA key ID
98E6705C
gpg: using PGP trust model
gpg: key 98E6705C: accepted as trusted key
gpg: Good signature from "Chris Pollock (New email address as of
04/21/07) <cpollock at embarqmail.com>"
gpg:                 aka "Chris Pollock <cpollock at earthlink.net>"
gpg: binary signature, digest algorithm SHA1

I'm still trying to work out glitches in this new Ubuntu install and I'm
wondering if this is an issue with my setup or with Evolution.

Thanks in advance for any advice

Chris

-- 
Chris
KeyID 0xE372A7DA98E6705C
31.11?N 97.89?W (Elev. 1092 ft)
20:25:32 up 3 days, 4:41, 2 users, load average: 0.10, 0.17, 0.20
Ubuntu 14.04.1 LTS, kernel 3.13.0-37-generic



From johanw at vulcan.xs4all.nl  Sat Oct  4 23:19:22 2014
From: johanw at vulcan.xs4all.nl (Johan Wevers)
Date: Sat, 04 Oct 2014 23:19:22 +0200
Subject: [Announce] The maybe final Beta for GnuPG 2.1
In-Reply-To: <87sij5cjav.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
References: <87sij5cjav.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
Message-ID: <5430645A.1030005@vulcan.xs4all.nl>

On 3-10-2014 16:35, Werner Koch wrote:

> This version is marked as BETA and as such it should in general not be
> used for real work.  However, the functionality is solid enough and thus
> this may actually be the last beta before we release 2.1.0 some time
> this year.

2.1.0 final? Shoudn't that be 2.2.0, or did GnuPG stop with the old
version numbering system of the Linux kernel?

-- 
ir. J.C.A. Wevers
PGP/GPG public keys at http://www.xs4all.nl/~johanw/pgpkeys.html



From johanw at vulcan.xs4all.nl  Sat Oct  4 23:31:38 2014
From: johanw at vulcan.xs4all.nl (Johan Wevers)
Date: Sat, 04 Oct 2014 23:31:38 +0200
Subject: [Announce] The maybe final Beta for GnuPG 2.1
In-Reply-To: <542ED9CA.8010308@sixdemonbag.org>
References: <87sij5cjav.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
 <CA+4dSw6zCHD8K3KOZ52EXMAD5BxoHPwcx5OvaCWeMeQPU05kLw@mail.gmail.com>
 <542ED9CA.8010308@sixdemonbag.org>
Message-ID: <5430673A.1050005@vulcan.xs4all.nl>

On 3-10-2014 19:15, Robert J. Hansen wrote:

> Ministerium fuer Staatsicherheit[*], commonly known as Stasi, practiced
> surveillance of its own citizens on a scale that's hard to imagine.

Is this a sollicitation for remarks about the NSA, FBI, DEA, etc. etc.? :-)

-- 
ir. J.C.A. Wevers
PGP/GPG public keys at http://www.xs4all.nl/~johanw/pgpkeys.html



From ben at adversary.org  Sun Oct  5 09:13:53 2014
From: ben at adversary.org (Ben McGinnes)
Date: Sun, 05 Oct 2014 18:13:53 +1100
Subject: [Announce] The maybe final Beta for GnuPG 2.1
In-Reply-To: <87sij5cjav.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
References: <87sij5cjav.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
Message-ID: <5430EFB1.7040809@adversary.org>

On 4/10/2014 12:35 am, Werner Koch wrote:
> Hello!
>     
> I just released another *beta* version of GnuPG *2.1*.  It has been
> released to give you the opportunity to check out new features and to
> help fixing bugs.

I'm most of the way through a test compile (in /opt/local) on OS X
10.9 (64-bit) here and it's mostly okay, save for pinentry.  This is
where I encounter what is likely to be a *big* deal in the not too
distant future.

Specifically with OS X Apple have moved from using libstdc++ as the
default to libc++ as the default and they're not binary compatible.
Since Apple's decision apparently relates to the license, there's a
lot of speculation that libstdc++ will be dropped entirely in a future
release of OS X.

Now since the configure script for pinentry is about 13,000 lines
long, I'd appreciate some pointers regarding which bit I need to
change to tell it to use libstdc++ and behave itself (obviously
getting the code to work with libc++ is a much bigger job).


Regards,
Ben

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From philip.jackson at nordnet.fr  Sun Oct  5 20:44:47 2014
From: philip.jackson at nordnet.fr (Philip Jackson)
Date: Sun, 05 Oct 2014 20:44:47 +0200
Subject: gpg offering to encrypt to an unwanted key
Message-ID: <5431919F.9010704@nordnet.fr>

During a recent encryption of a file, I made a mistake in the command options
and gpg looked as if it was going to encrypt to another key. It picked a key
which was in my keyring but not specified as a default in gpg.conf.  (my own key
is specified as default in the gpg.conf)

My mistake was to mis-spell  the encrypt part :

I put '-encrypt'  instead of '-e' or '--encrypt'

This is what I got :

> desktop:~$ gpg2 -encrypt filename.txt

(pinentry asked my password, then second confirmation entry) then

> gpg: 0xDCEA1B7C6B136ECF: There is no assurance this key belongs to the named user
> 
> pub  4077g/0xDCEA1B7C6B136ECF 2004-06-06 TrueCrypt Foundation <contact at truecrypt.org>
>  Primary key fingerprint: C5F4 BAC4 A7B2 2DB8 B8F8  5538 E3BA 73CA F0D6 B1E0
>       Subkey fingerprint: EB79 356A 3AFA B492 66A3  322F DCEA 1B7C 6B13 6ECF
> 
> It is NOT certain that the key belongs to the person named
> in the user ID.  If you *really* know what you are doing,
> you may answer the next question with yes.
> 
> Use this key anyway? (y/N) N
> gpg: filename.txt: encryption failed: Unusable public key
> desktop:~$ 

This is repeatable as often as I want.  If I use one of the correct options for
encrypt, the operation goes perfectly.

Why would gnupg pick an unwanted key for encryption ?  That seems a potentially
dangerous thing to do even though there was a warning message.

Philip

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From peter at digitalbrains.com  Sun Oct  5 21:18:45 2014
From: peter at digitalbrains.com (Peter Lebbing)
Date: Sun, 05 Oct 2014 21:18:45 +0200
Subject: gpg offering to encrypt to an unwanted key
In-Reply-To: <5431919F.9010704@nordnet.fr>
References: <5431919F.9010704@nordnet.fr>
Message-ID: <54319995.3020401@digitalbrains.com>

On 05/10/14 20:44, Philip Jackson wrote:
>> desktop:~$ gpg2 -encrypt filename.txt

Remember that a single dash introduces *short* options, so each letter is an
option. I think this becomes:

$ gpg2 --encrypt --dry-run --symmetric --recipient ypt filename.txt

As you see, you've specified the recipient "ypt" because the short option -r
takes an argument, making the rest of the string the argument. The key you mention

>> pub  4077g/0xDCEA1B7C6B136ECF 2004-06-06 TrueCrypt Foundation <contact at truecrypt.org>

has the string "ypt" in its name.

> (pinentry asked my password, then second confirmation entry)

Actually, pinentry asks for the password for --symmetric. The fact that it asks
for confirmation indicates that it is prompting you for a new password, rather
than existing one, which it would only prompt again if you got it wrong.

> Why would gnupg pick an unwanted key for encryption ?  That seems a potentially
> dangerous thing to do even though there was a warning message.

The command line is a potentially dangerous place! ;)

HTH,

Peter.

-- 
I use the GNU Privacy Guard (GnuPG) in combination with Enigmail.
You can send me encrypted mail if you want some privacy.
My key is available at <http://digitalbrains.com/2012/openpgp-key-peter>


From philip.jackson at nordnet.fr  Sun Oct  5 23:41:23 2014
From: philip.jackson at nordnet.fr (Philip Jackson)
Date: Sun, 05 Oct 2014 23:41:23 +0200
Subject: gpg offering to encrypt to an unwanted key
In-Reply-To: <54319995.3020401@digitalbrains.com>
References: <5431919F.9010704@nordnet.fr> <54319995.3020401@digitalbrains.com>
Message-ID: <5431BB03.8040102@nordnet.fr>

On 05/10/14 21:18, Peter Lebbing wrote:
> On 05/10/14 20:44, Philip Jackson wrote:
>>> desktop:~$ gpg2 -encrypt filename.txt
> 
> Remember that a single dash introduces *short* options, so each letter is an
> option. I think this becomes:
> 
> $ gpg2 --encrypt --dry-run --symmetric --recipient ypt filename.txt
> 
> As you see, you've specified the recipient "ypt" because the short option -r
> takes an argument, making the rest of the string the argument. The key you mention
> 
>>> pub  4077g/0xDCEA1B7C6B136ECF 2004-06-06 TrueCrypt Foundation <contact at truecrypt.org>
> 
> has the string "ypt" in its name.
> 
>> (pinentry asked my password, then second confirmation entry)
> 
> Actually, pinentry asks for the password for --symmetric. The fact that it asks
> for confirmation indicates that it is prompting you for a new password, rather
> than existing one, which it would only prompt again if you got it wrong.
> 

Thank you for the explanation, Peter.  It all sounds rather logical.

Philip



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From mailinglisten at hauke-laging.de  Tue Oct  7 02:01:37 2014
From: mailinglisten at hauke-laging.de (Hauke Laging)
Date: Tue, 07 Oct 2014 02:01:37 +0200
Subject: OpenPGP understanding test (German)
Message-ID: <2343776.bXjaA4WBYo@inno>

Hello,

a few days ago at a Cryptoparty I noticed that it is not only important 
to teach people. Determining how much they have understood is important, 
too. After all, the overall security you get from real world crypto is 
technical in nature only in a minority share. More important is that you 
know what you are doing.

Thus there should be online tests which allow people on different levels 
of knowlege (beginners, experienced users) to find out how much they 
have really understood.

As I am not aware of something like that I did it myself:

http://www.openpgp-schulungen.de/verstaendnistest/

The first version is for beginners and in German only. Translating that 
should not be too much work thus I will probably make an English version 
myself (if noone else does before me). But maybe someone here likes the 
idea and does something like that for another language (if so then I 
would like to be noticed so that I can set a link to the other 
versions).

The Germans here may find it useful if they teach others how to use 
OpenPGP. I am interested in the experiences you gain with it (for 
improving the test).


Hauke
-- 
Crypto f?r alle: http://www.openpgp-schulungen.de/fuer/unterstuetzer/
http://userbase.kde.org/Concepts/OpenPGP_Help_Spread
OpenPGP: 7D82 FB9F D25A 2CE4 5241 6C37 BF4B 8EEF 1A57 1DF5
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From wk at gnupg.org  Wed Oct  8 15:48:43 2014
From: wk at gnupg.org (Werner Koch)
Date: Wed, 08 Oct 2014 15:48:43 +0200
Subject: [Announce] The maybe final Beta for GnuPG 2.1
In-Reply-To: <5430EFB1.7040809@adversary.org> (Ben McGinnes's message of "Sun, 
 05 Oct 2014 18:13:53 +1100")
References: <87sij5cjav.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
 <5430EFB1.7040809@adversary.org>
Message-ID: <87h9ze7jus.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>

On Sun,  5 Oct 2014 09:13, ben at adversary.org said:

> Now since the configure script for pinentry is about 13,000 lines

That is generated.  The actual configure.ac script is 565 lines.

I do not understand you remarks about libc++ - is that required for the
Qt version of Pinentry?  The other pinentryies do not use any C++ code.

You may build a ncurses only pinentry by disabling all other
pinentries.  See ./configure --help.


Shalom-Salam,

   Werner

-- 
Die Gedanken sind frei.  Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz.



From wk at gnupg.org  Wed Oct  8 15:45:08 2014
From: wk at gnupg.org (Werner Koch)
Date: Wed, 08 Oct 2014 15:45:08 +0200
Subject: [Announce] The maybe final Beta for GnuPG 2.1
In-Reply-To: <CA+4dSw4E=mkeaw1eDaC_jzwS3qHvG68awHUgKEh2Gjr4hcXGyg@mail.gmail.com>
 (Pete Stephenson's message of "Sat, 4 Oct 2014 00:28:15 +0200")
References: <87sij5cjav.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
 <CA+4dSw6zCHD8K3KOZ52EXMAD5BxoHPwcx5OvaCWeMeQPU05kLw@mail.gmail.com>
 <877g0hcdk5.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
 <CA+4dSw4E=mkeaw1eDaC_jzwS3qHvG68awHUgKEh2Gjr4hcXGyg@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <87lhoq7k0r.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>

On Sat,  4 Oct 2014 00:28, pete at heypete.com said:

> That said, if I did want to compile the latest version of GnuTLS from
> source, where should one place the compiled results so that the GnuPG
> build process would know about it?

That depends on your system.  It is hard to put this all into the Speedo
script because we will run into too many dependency problems.  This is one
of the reasons why I am working on a stripped down TLS library which
utilizes Libgcrypt and Libksba - which we need anyway.

> correctly. The full config log is ~250kB. I've posted it to a Pastebin
> at http://pastebin.com/xZjzsZju if that would help.

I am sorry, I can't help right now.


Salam-Shalom,

   Werner

-- 
Die Gedanken sind frei.  Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz.



From wk at gnupg.org  Wed Oct  8 15:57:34 2014
From: wk at gnupg.org (Werner Koch)
Date: Wed, 08 Oct 2014 15:57:34 +0200
Subject: [Announce] The maybe final Beta for GnuPG 2.1
In-Reply-To: <5430645A.1030005@vulcan.xs4all.nl> (Johan Wevers's message of
 "Sat, 04 Oct 2014 23:19:22 +0200")
References: <87sij5cjav.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
 <5430645A.1030005@vulcan.xs4all.nl>
Message-ID: <87d2a27jg1.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>

On Sat,  4 Oct 2014 23:19, johanw at vulcan.xs4all.nl said:

> 2.1.0 final? Shoudn't that be 2.2.0, or did GnuPG stop with the old
> version numbering system of the Linux kernel?

Good question.  From my experience only a few people look at development
versions/beta/whatever-you call it.  Those who are really interested in
the development are building directly from GIT.  Thus I doubt that a
pure development branch makes much sense.

My plan is to offer 2.1 as the new feature branch of GnuPG which may
actually be used but might not be as stable as the, well, stable branch.
As soon as this has stabilized the version will be bumped up to 2.2 and
earmarked as the new stable branch (LTS in modern parlance).  At that
time an end-of-life date will be announced for 2.0.

The question is on how long it will take until we can do that.  Maybe we
can look at the number of ECC keys on the keyservers to decide whether
ECC and thus 2.2 can go mainstream.


Salam-Shalom,

   Werner

-- 
Die Gedanken sind frei.  Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz.



From ben at adversary.org  Wed Oct  8 20:35:40 2014
From: ben at adversary.org (Ben McGinnes)
Date: Thu, 09 Oct 2014 05:35:40 +1100
Subject: [Announce] The maybe final Beta for GnuPG 2.1
In-Reply-To: <87h9ze7jus.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
References: <87sij5cjav.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>	<5430EFB1.7040809@adversary.org>
 <87h9ze7jus.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
Message-ID: <543583FC.5060005@adversary.org>

On 9/10/2014 12:48 am, Werner Koch wrote:
> On Sun,  5 Oct 2014 09:13, ben at adversary.org said:
> 
>> Now since the configure script for pinentry is about 13,000 lines
> 
> That is generated.  The actual configure.ac script is 565 lines.
> 
> I do not understand you remarks about libc++ - is that required for the
> Qt version of Pinentry?  The other pinentryies do not use any C++ code.

After a standard configure (no extra flags) the result of make is:

nefarious:pinentry-0.8.4 ben$ make
/Applications/Xcode.app/Contents/Developer/usr/bin/make  all-recursive
Making all in assuan
/Applications/Xcode.app/Contents/Developer/usr/bin/make  all-am
make[3]: Nothing to be done for `all-am'.
Making all in secmem
make[2]: Nothing to be done for `all'.
Making all in pinentry
make[2]: Nothing to be done for `all'.
Making all in curses
make[2]: Nothing to be done for `all'.
Making all in gtk+-2
gcc  -g -O2 -Wall -Wcast-align -Wshadow -Wstrict-prototypes
-Wno-pointer-sign   -o pinentry-gtk-2 pinentry-gtk-2.o gtksecentry.o
../pinentry/libpinentry.a ../assuan/libassuan.a ../secmem/libsecmem.a
-L/opt/local/lib -lgtk-x11-2.0 -lgdk-x11-2.0 -lpangocairo-1.0 -lgio-2.0
-lXrender -lXinerama -lXi -lXrandr -lXcursor -lXcomposite -lXdamage
-lXfixes -lX11 -lXext -latk-1.0 -lcairo -lgdk_pixbuf-2.0 -lgio-2.0
-lpangoft2-1.0 -lpango-1.0 -lm -lgobject-2.0 -lglib-2.0 -lintl
-lfontconfig -lfreetype  ../pinentry/libpinentry-curses.a -lncurses -liconv
Undefined symbols for architecture x86_64:
  "_iconv", referenced from:
      _pinentry_utf8_to_local in libpinentry.a(pinentry.o)
      _pinentry_local_to_utf8 in libpinentry.a(pinentry.o)
  "_iconv_close", referenced from:
      _pinentry_utf8_to_local in libpinentry.a(pinentry.o)
      _pinentry_local_to_utf8 in libpinentry.a(pinentry.o)
  "_iconv_open", referenced from:
      _pinentry_utf8_to_local in libpinentry.a(pinentry.o)
      _pinentry_local_to_utf8 in libpinentry.a(pinentry.o)
ld: symbol(s) not found for architecture x86_64
clang: error: linker command failed with exit code 1 (use -v to see
invocation)
make[2]: *** [pinentry-gtk-2] Error 1
make[1]: *** [all-recursive] Error 1
make: *** [all] Error 2
nefarious:pinentry-0.8.4 ben$

I went looking for an explanation for the ld and clang errors and
found a rather large amount of grief on StackOverflow where people had
discovered the libstdc++ vs libc++ issue.  Clearly here it's tied to
gtk2 stuff, whereas Qt should be able to be handled by installing the
Qt libs directly.

Anyway, if it is the C++ thing, then in theory pointing things to
/usr/lib/libstdc++* instead of /usr/lib/libc++* should do the trick.
It's just that none of the options I tried to pass to LDFLAGS seemed
to do anything.  Plus the view that Apple deliberately broke something
seems pretty much typical of them.

> You may build a ncurses only pinentry by disabling all other
> pinentries.  See ./configure --help.

I'll try that later.  At least this time it's getting a lot further
than the last beta I took a swing at (I can't remember which, it was a
while ago).


Regards,
Ben

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From dougb at dougbarton.email  Thu Oct  9 06:54:31 2014
From: dougb at dougbarton.email (Doug Barton)
Date: Wed, 08 Oct 2014 21:54:31 -0700
Subject: How do I see what algorithm is used for a signature
Message-ID: <54361507.2040608@dougbarton.email>

I refreshed my key tonight in preparation for a key signing party and 
came across this message:

gpg: Note: signatures using the MD5 algorithm are rejected

I'm sure there is a way to determine what algorithm a signature was 
created with, but the mechanism wasn't obvious to me on an (admittedly 
cursory) exam of the docs.

Not urgent, but if someone has the answer handy ...  :)

Doug


From rjh at sixdemonbag.org  Thu Oct  9 08:20:37 2014
From: rjh at sixdemonbag.org (Robert J. Hansen)
Date: Thu, 09 Oct 2014 02:20:37 -0400
Subject: How do I see what algorithm is used for a signature
In-Reply-To: <54361507.2040608@dougbarton.email>
References: <54361507.2040608@dougbarton.email>
Message-ID: <54362935.2020608@sixdemonbag.org>

On 10/9/2014 12:54 AM, Doug Barton wrote:
> I'm sure there is a way to determine what algorithm a signature was 
> created with...

gpg2 --fixed-list-mode --with-colons --list-key [keyID]

Once you learn how to read that output, you get a *ton* of information.
 It's kind of overkill for most tasks, but it's kind of like learning
how to use flex and bison: once you get the knowledge, you wind up using
it in places you never thought you would before.

Look for lines that look roughly like:

"sig:::17:..."

The number in the fourth field (third, if you're zero-indexing), which
here is 17, is the algorithm descriptor.

1: RSA (encrypt or sign)
2: RSA (encrypt-only -- if you see a sig with this, something's wrong)
3: RSA (sign-only)
16: Elgamal (encrypt-only -- ditto)
17: DSA
19: Reserved for ECDSA



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From ben at adversary.org  Thu Oct  9 11:42:15 2014
From: ben at adversary.org (Ben McGinnes)
Date: Thu, 09 Oct 2014 20:42:15 +1100
Subject: How do I see what algorithm is used for a signature
In-Reply-To: <54362935.2020608@sixdemonbag.org>
References: <54361507.2040608@dougbarton.email>
 <54362935.2020608@sixdemonbag.org>
Message-ID: <54365877.2030808@adversary.org>

On 9/10/2014 5:20 pm, Robert J. Hansen wrote:
> On 10/9/2014 12:54 AM, Doug Barton wrote:
>> I'm sure there is a way to determine what algorithm a signature was 
>> created with...
> 
> gpg2 --fixed-list-mode --with-colons --list-key [keyID]
> 
> Once you learn how to read that output, you get a *ton* of information.
>  It's kind of overkill for most tasks, but it's kind of like learning
> how to use flex and bison: once you get the knowledge, you wind up using
> it in places you never thought you would before.

Except the reference to MD5 indicates the interest is more in which
hashing algorithm was used on a particular message.  In that case, the
solution is gpg --list-packets message.txt.asc (or whatever),
alternatively the pgpdump program displays this data in a more human
friendly format.

The pgpdump source is available here (for Doug's benefit, I'm sure you
have it):

http://www.mew.org/~kazu/proj/pgpdump/en/


Regards,
Ben

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From wk at gnupg.org  Thu Oct  9 14:29:11 2014
From: wk at gnupg.org (Werner Koch)
Date: Thu, 09 Oct 2014 14:29:11 +0200
Subject: How do I see what algorithm is used for a signature
In-Reply-To: <54365877.2030808@adversary.org> (Ben McGinnes's message of "Thu, 
 09 Oct 2014 20:42:15 +1100")
References: <54361507.2040608@dougbarton.email>
 <54362935.2020608@sixdemonbag.org> <54365877.2030808@adversary.org>
Message-ID: <87fvex4eaw.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>

On Thu,  9 Oct 2014 11:42, ben at adversary.org said:

> Except the reference to MD5 indicates the interest is more in which
> hashing algorithm was used on a particular message.  In that case, the

Add --verbose (or -v) to the gpg command line and it will show you that.
For scripting use --status-fd and watch out for a VALIDSIG status line
like

[GNUPG:] VALIDSIG D8692123C4065DEA5E0F3AB5249B39D24F25E3B6 \
         2014-10-03 1412344497 0 4 0 1 8 00                \
         D8692123C4065DEA5E0F3AB5249B39D24F25E3B6

    The args are:

    - <fingerprint_in_hex>
    - <sig_creation_date>
    - <sig-timestamp>
    - <expire-timestamp>
    - <sig-version>
    - <reserved>
    - <pubkey-algo>
    - <hash-algo>
    - <sig-class>
    - [ <primary-key-fpr> ]

We see 8 here which is SHA256.  See doc/DETAILS for the full reference.


Salam-Shalom,

   Werner

-- 
Die Gedanken sind frei.  Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz.



From 2014-667rhzu3dc-lists-groups at riseup.net  Thu Oct  9 23:19:01 2014
From: 2014-667rhzu3dc-lists-groups at riseup.net (MFPA)
Date: Thu, 9 Oct 2014 22:19:01 +0100
Subject: How do I see what algorithm is used for a signature
In-Reply-To: <54365877.2030808@adversary.org>
References: <54361507.2040608@dougbarton.email>
 <54362935.2020608@sixdemonbag.org> <54365877.2030808@adversary.org>
Message-ID: <1932984610.20141009221901@my_localhost>

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA512

Hi


On Thursday 9 October 2014 at 10:42:15 AM, in
<mid:54365877.2030808 at adversary.org>, Ben McGinnes wrote:


> Except the reference to MD5 indicates the interest is more in which
> hashing algorithm was used on a particular message.

Or, indeed, which hashing algorithm was used when a signature was
applied to a key. (-;




- --
Best regards

MFPA                    mailto:2014-667rhzu3dc-lists-groups at riseup.net

Adults are obsolete children.
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From rjh at sixdemonbag.org  Fri Oct 10 02:48:59 2014
From: rjh at sixdemonbag.org (Robert J. Hansen)
Date: Thu, 09 Oct 2014 20:48:59 -0400
Subject: How do I see what algorithm is used for a signature
In-Reply-To: <1932984610.20141009221901@my_localhost>
References: <54361507.2040608@dougbarton.email>
 <54362935.2020608@sixdemonbag.org> <54365877.2030808@adversary.org>
 <1932984610.20141009221901@my_localhost>
Message-ID: <54372CFB.3090302@sixdemonbag.org>

> Or, indeed, which hashing algorithm was used when a signature was 
> applied to a key. (-;

... which is exactly what my method does, so I don't understand what
you're saying here.



From dougb at dougbarton.email  Fri Oct 10 05:27:25 2014
From: dougb at dougbarton.email (Doug Barton)
Date: Thu, 09 Oct 2014 20:27:25 -0700
Subject: How do I see what algorithm is used for a signature
In-Reply-To: <87fvex4eaw.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
References: <54361507.2040608@dougbarton.email>
 <54362935.2020608@sixdemonbag.org> <54365877.2030808@adversary.org>
 <87fvex4eaw.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
Message-ID: <5437521D.8080005@dougbarton.email>

On 10/9/14 5:29 AM, Werner Koch wrote:
> Add --verbose (or -v) to the gpg command line and it will show you that.

That was my first thought, but adding -v to either --check-sigs or 
--list-sigs provides no additional information. Is what you're looking 
at a 2.1 feature?

Thanks to everyone for the tips in any case. :)

Doug


From wk at gnupg.org  Fri Oct 10 11:43:00 2014
From: wk at gnupg.org (Werner Koch)
Date: Fri, 10 Oct 2014 11:43:00 +0200
Subject: How do I see what algorithm is used for a signature
In-Reply-To: <5437521D.8080005@dougbarton.email> (Doug Barton's message of
 "Thu, 09 Oct 2014 20:27:25 -0700")
References: <54361507.2040608@dougbarton.email>
 <54362935.2020608@sixdemonbag.org> <54365877.2030808@adversary.org>
 <87fvex4eaw.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
 <5437521D.8080005@dougbarton.email>
Message-ID: <87h9zc2rbv.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>

On Fri, 10 Oct 2014 05:27, dougb at dougbarton.email said:

> That was my first thought, but adding -v to either --check-sigs or
> --list-sigs provides no additional information. Is what you're looking
> at a 2.1 feature?

No space in the listing for all the deails.  The question was about a
signed message.  For key listings you need to use a decent gpg version
(any branch), --with-colons, and awk.


Salam-Shalom,

   Werner

-- 
Die Gedanken sind frei.  Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz.



From dougb at dougbarton.email  Fri Oct 10 16:15:20 2014
From: dougb at dougbarton.email (Doug Barton)
Date: Fri, 10 Oct 2014 07:15:20 -0700
Subject: How do I see what algorithm is used for a signature
In-Reply-To: <87h9zc2rbv.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
References: <54361507.2040608@dougbarton.email>	<54362935.2020608@sixdemonbag.org>
 <54365877.2030808@adversary.org>	<87fvex4eaw.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>	<5437521D.8080005@dougbarton.email>
 <87h9zc2rbv.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
Message-ID: <5437E9F8.3070407@dougbarton.email>

On 10/10/14 2:43 AM, Werner Koch wrote:
> On Fri, 10 Oct 2014 05:27, dougb at dougbarton.email said:
>
>> That was my first thought, but adding -v to either --check-sigs or
>> --list-sigs provides no additional information. Is what you're looking
>> at a 2.1 feature?
>
> No space in the listing for all the deails.  The question was about a
> signed message.

It wasn't, actually. :)  It was about signatures on my keys.

> For key listings you need to use a decent gpg version
> (any branch), --with-colons, and awk.

Makes sense. I use --with-colons for other things, I really should not 
have been so lazy and looked up the answer in Details.

Doug




From 2014-667rhzu3dc-lists-groups at riseup.net  Sat Oct 11 02:36:07 2014
From: 2014-667rhzu3dc-lists-groups at riseup.net (MFPA)
Date: Sat, 11 Oct 2014 01:36:07 +0100
Subject: How do I see what algorithm is used for a signature
In-Reply-To: <54372CFB.3090302@sixdemonbag.org>
References: <54361507.2040608@dougbarton.email>
 <54362935.2020608@sixdemonbag.org> <54365877.2030808@adversary.org>
 <1932984610.20141009221901@my_localhost> <54372CFB.3090302@sixdemonbag.org>
Message-ID: <119483214.20141011013607@my_localhost>

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA512

Hi


On Friday 10 October 2014 at 1:48:59 AM, in
<mid:54372CFB.3090302 at sixdemonbag.org>, Robert J. Hansen wrote:


> ... which is exactly what my method does, so I don't
> understand what you're saying here.

My posting was a reply to Ben's posting, which I quoted. I didn't say
anything either way about yours.

- --
Best regards

MFPA                    mailto:2014-667rhzu3dc-lists-groups at riseup.net

I hit the CTRL key but I'm still not in control!
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From ben at adversary.org  Sun Oct 12 12:36:29 2014
From: ben at adversary.org (Ben McGinnes)
Date: Sun, 12 Oct 2014 21:36:29 +1100
Subject: [Announce] The maybe final Beta for GnuPG 2.1
In-Reply-To: <87h9ze7jus.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
References: <87sij5cjav.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>	<5430EFB1.7040809@adversary.org>
 <87h9ze7jus.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
Message-ID: <543A59AD.8060809@adversary.org>

On 9/10/2014 12:48 am, Werner Koch wrote:
> On Sun,  5 Oct 2014 09:13, ben at adversary.org said:
> 
>> Now since the configure script for pinentry is about 13,000 lines
> 
> That is generated.  The actual configure.ac script is 565 lines.
> 
> I do not understand you remarks about libc++ - is that required for the
> Qt version of Pinentry?  The other pinentryies do not use any C++ code.
> 
> You may build a ncurses only pinentry by disabling all other
> pinentries.  See ./configure --help.

Okay, restricting the pinentry config to ncurses did indeed do the
job.  Unfortunately OS X still hates GPG 2.1 (standard configure
options except for installing to /opt/local so it doesn't break
anything in /usr/local):

        GnuPG v2.1.0-beta864 has been configured as follows:

        Revision:  0943c7c  (2371)
        Platform:  Darwin (x86_64-apple-darwin13.4.0)

        OpenPGP:   yes
        S/MIME:    yes
        Agent:     yes
        Smartcard: yes (without internal CCID driver)
        G13:       yes
        Dirmngr:   yes
        Gpgtar:    yes

        Protect tool:      (default)
        LDAP wrapper:      (default)
        Default agent:     (default)
        Default pinentry:  (default)
        Default scdaemon:  (default)
        Default dirmngr:   (default)

        Dirmngr auto start:  yes
        Readline support:    yes
        DNS SRV support:     no
        TLS support:         gnutls

bash-4.3# make
/Applications/Xcode.app/Contents/Developer/usr/bin/make  all-recursive
Making all in m4
make[2]: Nothing to be done for `all'.
Making all in gl
{ echo '/* DO NOT EDIT! GENERATED AUTOMATICALLY! */'; \
	  cat ./alloca_.h; \
	} > alloca.h-t
mv -f alloca.h-t alloca.h
rm -f stdint.h-t stdint.h
{ echo '/* DO NOT EDIT! GENERATED AUTOMATICALLY! */'; \
	  sed -e 's/@''HAVE_WCHAR_H''@/1/g' \
	      -e 's/@''HAVE_STDINT_H''@/1/g' \
	      -e
's|@''ABSOLUTE_STDINT_H''@|"///Applications/Xcode.app/Contents/Developer/Toolchains/XcodeDefault.xctoolchain/usr/bin/../lib/clang/6.0/include/stdint.h"|g'
\
	      -e 's/@''HAVE_SYS_TYPES_H''@/1/g' \
	      -e 's/@''HAVE_INTTYPES_H''@/1/g' \
	      -e 's/@''HAVE_SYS_INTTYPES_H''@/0/g' \
	      -e 's/@''HAVE_SYS_BITYPES_H''@/0/g' \
	      -e 's/@''HAVE_LONG_LONG_INT''@/1/g' \
	      -e 's/@''HAVE_UNSIGNED_LONG_LONG_INT''@/1/g' \
	      -e 's/@''BITSIZEOF_PTRDIFF_T''@/64/g' \
	      -e 's/@''PTRDIFF_T_SUFFIX''@/l/g' \
	      -e 's/@''BITSIZEOF_SIG_ATOMIC_T''@/32/g' \
	      -e 's/@''HAVE_SIGNED_SIG_ATOMIC_T''@/1/g' \
	      -e 's/@''SIG_ATOMIC_T_SUFFIX''@//g' \
	      -e 's/@''BITSIZEOF_SIZE_T''@/64/g' \
	      -e 's/@''SIZE_T_SUFFIX''@/ul/g' \
	      -e 's/@''BITSIZEOF_WCHAR_T''@/32/g' \
	      -e 's/@''HAVE_SIGNED_WCHAR_T''@/1/g' \
	      -e 's/@''WCHAR_T_SUFFIX''@//g' \
	      -e 's/@''BITSIZEOF_WINT_T''@/32/g' \
	      -e 's/@''HAVE_SIGNED_WINT_T''@/1/g' \
	      -e 's/@''WINT_T_SUFFIX''@//g' \
	      < ./stdint_.h; \
	} > stdint.h-t
mv stdint.h-t stdint.h
/Applications/Xcode.app/Contents/Developer/usr/bin/make  all-am
gcc -DHAVE_CONFIG_H -I. -I..   -I/opt/local/include  -g -O2 -Wall
-Wno-pointer-sign -Wpointer-arith -MT allocsa.o -MD -MP -MF
.deps/allocsa.Tpo -c -o allocsa.o allocsa.c
In file included from allocsa.c:21:
In file included from ./allocsa.h:23:
In file included from /usr/include/stdlib.h:65:
In file included from /usr/include/sys/wait.h:110:
In file included from /usr/include/sys/resource.h:72:
In file included from ./stdint.h:76:
/usr/include/inttypes.h:235:8: error: unknown type name 'intmax_t'
extern intmax_t
       ^
/usr/include/inttypes.h:236:9: error: unknown type name 'intmax_t'
imaxabs(intmax_t j);
        ^
/usr/include/inttypes.h:240:2: error: unknown type name 'intmax_t'
        intmax_t quot;
        ^
/usr/include/inttypes.h:241:2: error: unknown type name 'intmax_t'
        intmax_t rem;
        ^
/usr/include/inttypes.h:246:9: error: unknown type name 'intmax_t'
imaxdiv(intmax_t __numer, intmax_t __denom);
        ^
/usr/include/inttypes.h:246:27: error: unknown type name 'intmax_t'
imaxdiv(intmax_t __numer, intmax_t __denom);
                          ^
/usr/include/inttypes.h:250:8: error: unknown type name 'intmax_t'
extern intmax_t
       ^
/usr/include/inttypes.h:256:8: error: unknown type name 'uintmax_t'; did you
      mean 'uintptr_t'?
extern uintmax_t
       ^
/usr/include/sys/_types/_uintptr_t.h:30:24: note: 'uintptr_t' declared here
typedef unsigned long           uintptr_t;
                                ^
In file included from allocsa.c:21:
In file included from ./allocsa.h:23:
In file included from /usr/include/stdlib.h:65:
In file included from /usr/include/sys/wait.h:110:
In file included from /usr/include/sys/resource.h:72:
In file included from ./stdint.h:76:
/usr/include/inttypes.h:263:8: error: unknown type name 'intmax_t'
extern intmax_t
       ^
/usr/include/inttypes.h:269:8: error: unknown type name 'uintmax_t'; did you
      mean 'uintptr_t'?
extern uintmax_t
       ^
/usr/include/sys/_types/_uintptr_t.h:30:24: note: 'uintptr_t' declared here
typedef unsigned long           uintptr_t;
                                ^
10 errors generated.
make[3]: *** [allocsa.o] Error 1
make[2]: *** [all] Error 2
make[1]: *** [all-recursive] Error 1
make: *** [all] Error 2
bash-4.3#

Still, this is what betas are for.


Regards,
Ben

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From mlisten at hammernoch.net  Sun Oct 12 13:30:58 2014
From: mlisten at hammernoch.net (=?UTF-8?B?THVkd2lnIEjDvGdlbHNjaMOkZmVy?=)
Date: Sun, 12 Oct 2014 13:30:58 +0200
Subject: [Announce] The maybe final Beta for GnuPG 2.1
In-Reply-To: <543A59AD.8060809@adversary.org>
References: <87sij5cjav.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>	<5430EFB1.7040809@adversary.org>
 <87h9ze7jus.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> <543A59AD.8060809@adversary.org>
Message-ID: <543A6672.4020505@hammernoch.net>

On 12.10.14 12:36, Ben McGinnes wrote:

> (...) /usr/include/inttypes.h:235:8: error: unknown type name
> 'intmax_t' extern intmax_t ^ /usr/include/inttypes.h:236:9: error:
> unknown type name 'intmax_t' imaxabs(intmax_t j); ^ 
> /usr/include/inttypes.h:240:2: error: unknown type name 'intmax_t' 
> intmax_t quot; ^ /usr/include/inttypes.h:241:2: error: unknown type
> name 'intmax_t' intmax_t rem; ^ /usr/include/inttypes.h:246:9:
> error: unknown type name 'intmax_t' imaxdiv(intmax_t __numer,
> intmax_t __denom); ^ /usr/include/inttypes.h:246:27: error: unknown
> type name 'intmax_t' imaxdiv(intmax_t __numer, intmax_t __denom); 
> ^ /usr/include/inttypes.h:250:8: error: unknown type name
> 'intmax_t' extern intmax_t ^ /usr/include/inttypes.h:256:8: error:
> unknown type name 'uintmax_t'; did you mean 'uintptr_t'? extern
> uintmax_t ^ /usr/include/sys/_types/_uintptr_t.h:30:24: note:
> 'uintptr_t' declared here typedef unsigned long
> uintptr_t; ^ In file included from allocsa.c:21: In file included
> from ./allocsa.h:23: In file included from
> /usr/include/stdlib.h:65: In file included from
> /usr/include/sys/wait.h:110: In file included from
> /usr/include/sys/resource.h:72: In file included from
> ./stdint.h:76: /usr/include/inttypes.h:263:8: error: unknown type
> name 'intmax_t' extern intmax_t ^ /usr/include/inttypes.h:269:8:
> error: unknown type name 'uintmax_t'; did you mean 'uintptr_t'? 
> extern uintmax_t ^ /usr/include/sys/_types/_uintptr_t.h:30:24:
> note: 'uintptr_t' declared here typedef unsigned long
> uintptr_t; ^ 10 errors generated. make[3]: *** [allocsa.o] Error 1 
> make[2]: *** [all] Error 2 make[1]: *** [all-recursive] Error 1 
> make: *** [all] Error 2

Ben, does

export
gl_cv_absolute_stdint_h=/Applications/Xcode.app/Contents/Developer/Platforms/MacOSX.platform/Developer/SDKs/MacOSX10.9.sdk/usr/include/stdint.h
(or wherever your used SDK is located)

help your case?

Ludwig


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From pvoigt at uos.de  Sun Oct 12 23:35:16 2014
From: pvoigt at uos.de (Dr. Peter Voigt)
Date: Sun, 12 Oct 2014 23:35:16 +0200
Subject: Renewal of revocation certificate required after adding a new
 identity?
Message-ID: <20141012233516.6f799ca6@kirk.drpetervoigt.private>

Recently I have added a new identity to my GPG key pair. Can I still
use my existing revocation certificate with my key pair or do I have to
renew it because of the added identity?

I am supposing the revocation certificate just refers to my main
key ID regardless of the identities belonging to the key pair. I have
discussed this with some colleagues but we could not fully clarify the
issue.

Thanks for your feedback.

Regards,
Peter
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From mailinglisten at hauke-laging.de  Mon Oct 13 00:35:20 2014
From: mailinglisten at hauke-laging.de (Hauke Laging)
Date: Mon, 13 Oct 2014 00:35:20 +0200
Subject: Renewal of revocation certificate required after adding a new
 identity?
In-Reply-To: <20141012233516.6f799ca6@kirk.drpetervoigt.private>
References: <20141012233516.6f799ca6@kirk.drpetervoigt.private>
Message-ID: <2688360.WQ98SDYlWN@inno>

Am So 12.10.2014, 23:35:16 schrieb Dr. Peter Voigt:
> Can I still use my existing revocation certificate with my key pair

Yes.


> I am supposing the revocation certificate just refers to my main
> key ID regardless of the identities belonging to the key pair.

To the fingerprint (or: the key data itself).

http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4880#section-5.2.1

0x1F: Signature directly on a key
       This signature is calculated directly on a key.  It binds the
       information in the Signature subpackets to the key, and is
       appropriate to be used for subpackets that provide information
       about the key, such as the Revocation Key subpacket. [...]

BTW: You can test this. You don't kill the key / certificate as long as 
you do not upload the revocation certificate to the keyservers. Just 
make a backup of the public and the private keys (maybe not even 
necessary but may be easier).

As long as you import the rev cert just locally you can delete it. Or 
delete (and restore from backup) the whole key if the rev sig cannot be 
deleted alone.


Something else, doesn't have anything to do with your question but may 
be of interest as you work at a university:

http://www.openpgp-schulungen.de/fuer/hochschulen/


Hauke
-- 
Crypto f?r alle: http://www.openpgp-schulungen.de/fuer/unterstuetzer/
http://userbase.kde.org/Concepts/OpenPGP_Help_Spread
OpenPGP: 7D82 FB9F D25A 2CE4 5241 6C37 BF4B 8EEF 1A57 1DF5
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From flapflap at riseup.net  Mon Oct 13 01:01:10 2014
From: flapflap at riseup.net (flapflap)
Date: Sun, 12 Oct 2014 23:01:10 +0000
Subject: Renewal of revocation certificate required after adding a new
 identity?
In-Reply-To: <20141012233516.6f799ca6@kirk.drpetervoigt.private>
References: <20141012233516.6f799ca6@kirk.drpetervoigt.private>
Message-ID: <543B0836.2080108@riseup.net>

Dr. Peter Voigt:
> Recently I have added a new identity to my GPG key pair. Can I still
> use my existing revocation certificate with my key pair or do I have to
> renew it because of the added identity?
> 
> I am supposing the revocation certificate just refers to my main
> key ID regardless of the identities belonging to the key pair. I have
> discussed this with some colleagues but we could not fully clarify the
> issue.
AFAIK, that is correct.  With the revocation certificate you revoke the
(main) key -- not a UID.



From mailinglisten at hauke-laging.de  Mon Oct 13 05:53:10 2014
From: mailinglisten at hauke-laging.de (Hauke Laging)
Date: Mon, 13 Oct 2014 05:53:10 +0200
Subject: OpenPGP understanding test (now in English)
In-Reply-To: <2343776.bXjaA4WBYo@inno>
References: <2343776.bXjaA4WBYo@inno>
Message-ID: <3064615.G84z0FY00c@inno>

Am Di 07.10.2014, 02:01:37 schrieb Hauke Laging:

> The first version is for beginners and in German only. Translating
> that should not be too much work thus I will probably make an English
> version myself (if noone else does before me).

And there it is:

http://www.openpgp-courses.org/comprehension-test/

I hope many of you find that useful (for new users, not for yourselves).


Hauke
-- 
Crypto f?r alle: http://www.openpgp-schulungen.de/fuer/unterstuetzer/
http://userbase.kde.org/Concepts/OpenPGP_Help_Spread
OpenPGP: 7D82 FB9F D25A 2CE4 5241 6C37 BF4B 8EEF 1A57 1DF5
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From pvoigt at uos.de  Mon Oct 13 18:17:28 2014
From: pvoigt at uos.de (Dr. Peter Voigt)
Date: Mon, 13 Oct 2014 18:17:28 +0200
Subject: Renewal of revocation certificate required after adding a new
 identity?
In-Reply-To: <2688360.WQ98SDYlWN@inno>
References: <20141012233516.6f799ca6@kirk.drpetervoigt.private>
 <2688360.WQ98SDYlWN@inno>
Message-ID: <20141013181728.4a5d6f8f@kirk.drpetervoigt.private>

On Mon, 13 Oct 2014 00:35:20 +0200
Hauke Laging <mailinglisten at hauke-laging.de> wrote:

> Am So 12.10.2014, 23:35:16 schrieb Dr. Peter Voigt:
> > Can I still use my existing revocation certificate with my key pair
> 
> Yes.
> 
>
Thanks to all confirming my assumption.

> > I am supposing the revocation certificate just refers to my main
> > key ID regardless of the identities belonging to the key pair.
> 
> To the fingerprint (or: the key data itself).
> 
> http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4880#section-5.2.1
> 
> 0x1F: Signature directly on a key
>        This signature is calculated directly on a key.  It binds the
>        information in the Signature subpackets to the key, and is
>        appropriate to be used for subpackets that provide information
>        about the key, such as the Revocation Key subpacket. [...]
>
> BTW: You can test this. You don't kill the key / certificate as long
> as you do not upload the revocation certificate to the keyservers.
> Just make a backup of the public and the private keys (maybe not even 
> necessary but may be easier).
> 
> As long as you import the rev cert just locally you can delete it. Or 
> delete (and restore from backup) the whole key if the rev sig cannot
> be deleted alone.
> 
To be honest I have little knowledge about what is going on when a key
pair is revoked. I just know that I would have to import the revocation
certificate to my public key ring. And as soon as I have freshly
published it to a keyserver my key pair is marked revoked.

I suppose the revocation certificate being a kind of replacement of my
public key. As it is bound to the fingerprint of a key pair it can mark
the key pair revoked as a whole. I suppose such a key can never be
activated again. This is somewhat opposed to a key pair with all of its
identities being revoked. Some or all identities could later be
activated again and - moreover - this key pair could later even get
new identities not being revoked.

I would greatly appreciate anybody to confirm or correct my rough
understanding of the revocation certificate and process.

> 
> Something else, doesn't have anything to do with your question but
> may be of interest as you work at a university:
> 
> http://www.openpgp-schulungen.de/fuer/hochschulen/
> 
Nice side information.

> 
> Hauke
Regards,
Peter
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From peter at digitalbrains.com  Mon Oct 13 18:33:10 2014
From: peter at digitalbrains.com (Peter Lebbing)
Date: Mon, 13 Oct 2014 18:33:10 +0200
Subject: Renewal of revocation certificate required after adding a new
 identity?
In-Reply-To: <20141013181728.4a5d6f8f@kirk.drpetervoigt.private>
References: <20141012233516.6f799ca6@kirk.drpetervoigt.private>
 <2688360.WQ98SDYlWN@inno> <20141013181728.4a5d6f8f@kirk.drpetervoigt.private>
Message-ID: <543BFEC6.4070007@digitalbrains.com>

On 13/10/14 18:17, Dr. Peter Voigt wrote:
> I suppose the revocation certificate being a kind of replacement of my
> public key. As it is bound to the fingerprint of a key pair it can mark
> the key pair revoked as a whole. I suppose such a key can never be
> activated again. This is somewhat opposed to a key pair with all of its
> identities being revoked. Some or all identities could later be
> activated again and - moreover - this key pair could later even get
> new identities not being revoked.
> 
> I would greatly appreciate anybody to confirm or correct my rough
> understanding of the revocation certificate and process.

I think that's a good way of summing it up.

Cheers,

Peter.

PS: You could nitpick about "bound to the fingerprint", I think it
should be "bound to the public key itself". But it makes no real
difference, I'm just being fussy.

-- 
I use the GNU Privacy Guard (GnuPG) in combination with Enigmail.
You can send me encrypted mail if you want some privacy.
My key is available at <http://digitalbrains.com/2012/openpgp-key-peter>


From peter at digitalbrains.com  Mon Oct 13 18:40:06 2014
From: peter at digitalbrains.com (Peter Lebbing)
Date: Mon, 13 Oct 2014 18:40:06 +0200
Subject: Renewal of revocation certificate required after adding a new
 identity?
In-Reply-To: <543BFEC6.4070007@digitalbrains.com>
References: <20141012233516.6f799ca6@kirk.drpetervoigt.private>
 <2688360.WQ98SDYlWN@inno> <20141013181728.4a5d6f8f@kirk.drpetervoigt.private>
 <543BFEC6.4070007@digitalbrains.com>
Message-ID: <543C0066.8040309@digitalbrains.com>

On 13/10/14 18:33, Peter Lebbing wrote:
> PS: You could nitpick about "bound to the fingerprint", I think it
> should be "bound to the public key itself". But it makes no real
> difference, I'm just being fussy.

In fact, I think it is more informative to think of it being bound to
the fingerprint, even though this is not true. The fingerprint
corresponds one-to-one to the public key for all practical purposes, and
the revocation certificate is bound to the public key. However, "public
key" is ill-defined without context. It can also refer to the whole
thing with UID's and signatures and so on, which is not what I mean in
this context.

So, yes, the revocation certificate is on the fingerprint ;).

HTH,

Peter.

-- 
I use the GNU Privacy Guard (GnuPG) in combination with Enigmail.
You can send me encrypted mail if you want some privacy.
My key is available at <http://digitalbrains.com/2012/openpgp-key-peter>


From pvoigt at uos.de  Mon Oct 13 19:14:57 2014
From: pvoigt at uos.de (Dr. Peter Voigt)
Date: Mon, 13 Oct 2014 19:14:57 +0200
Subject: Renewal of revocation certificate required after adding a new
 identity?
In-Reply-To: <543BFEC6.4070007@digitalbrains.com>
References: <20141012233516.6f799ca6@kirk.drpetervoigt.private>
 <2688360.WQ98SDYlWN@inno>
 <20141013181728.4a5d6f8f@kirk.drpetervoigt.private>
 <543BFEC6.4070007@digitalbrains.com>
Message-ID: <20141013191457.15ab142f@kirk.drpetervoigt.private>

On Mon, 13 Oct 2014 18:33:10 +0200
Peter Lebbing <peter at digitalbrains.com> wrote:

> On 13/10/14 18:17, Dr. Peter Voigt wrote:
> > I suppose the revocation certificate being a kind of replacement of
> > my public key. As it is bound to the fingerprint of a key pair it
> > can mark the key pair revoked as a whole. I suppose such a key can
> > never be activated again. This is somewhat opposed to a key pair
> > with all of its identities being revoked. Some or all identities
> > could later be activated again and - moreover - this key pair could
> > later even get new identities not being revoked.
> > 
> > I would greatly appreciate anybody to confirm or correct my rough
> > understanding of the revocation certificate and process.
> 
> I think that's a good way of summing it up.
> 
> Cheers,
> 
> Peter.
> 
> PS: You could nitpick about "bound to the fingerprint", I think it
> should be "bound to the public key itself". But it makes no real
> difference, I'm just being fussy.
> 

Thank you for your confirmation.

Regards,
Peter
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From 2014-667rhzu3dc-lists-groups at riseup.net  Mon Oct 13 21:45:25 2014
From: 2014-667rhzu3dc-lists-groups at riseup.net (MFPA)
Date: Mon, 13 Oct 2014 20:45:25 +0100
Subject: Renewal of revocation certificate required after adding a new
 identity?
In-Reply-To: <543C0066.8040309@digitalbrains.com>
References: <20141012233516.6f799ca6@kirk.drpetervoigt.private>
 <2688360.WQ98SDYlWN@inno> <20141013181728.4a5d6f8f@kirk.drpetervoigt.private>
 <543BFEC6.4070007@digitalbrains.com> <543C0066.8040309@digitalbrains.com>
Message-ID: <1936594303.20141013204525@my_localhost>

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA512

Hi


On Monday 13 October 2014 at 5:40:06 PM, in
<mid:543C0066.8040309 at digitalbrains.com>, Peter Lebbing wrote:



> However, "public key" is ill-defined without context.
> It can also refer to the whole thing with UID's and
> signatures and so on, which is not what I mean in this
> context.

I would have thought "the whole thing with UID's and signatures and so
on" was exactly what was being revoked by means of a revocation
certificate.


- --
Best regards

MFPA                    mailto:2014-667rhzu3dc-lists-groups at riseup.net

Nothing a Pan-Galactic Gargle Blaster won't cure!
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From rfg at tristatelogic.com  Mon Oct 13 21:14:23 2014
From: rfg at tristatelogic.com (Ronald F. Guilmette)
Date: Mon, 13 Oct 2014 12:14:23 -0700
Subject: Libcrypt examples?
Message-ID: <39947.1413227663@server1.tristatelogic.com>



Greetings,

I have a program that will frequently need to store modest-size
chunks of of data on disk, perhaps 1-4kB per chunk.  The data is
sensitive, but not ultra top secret.  I would like to make a
reasonable effort to keep it from prying eyes.  After being stored,
the data will later on need to be read back in, perhaps by the
same program or perhaps by a different one, and will then need to
be decrypted.

I don't need anything facy here.  A symmetric-key encryption/
decryption would be just fine, I think.  Mostly I just need
something that will be simple for me to implement in my program,
even though I am by no means knowledgable about cryptography
generally.  (Most of what little I do know has been garnered from
with Wikipedia.)

So anyway, last night I spent a lot of time googling to try to
find some simple code examples which would illustrate Libcrypt
being used for simple tasks, such as the one I've just described,
but I didn't find any.  I also looked over the Libcrypt manual,
which promised near the start that there were some programming
example near the end, but I could not find those either. :-(
(In fact, a search of the whole document for the word "example"
turned up only one hit, i.e. on the part in the very beginning of
the manual where later examples were promised.)

So, can anybody point me at some _really_ simple examples of
how to use Libcrypt to so simple things, e.g. encrypt a block
of data and then decrypt it?


Regards,
rfg


P.S.  On my FreeBSD system, un-updated as it may be, there seems
to be a crypt(3) in the standard C library.  I suppose that I might
just be able to use that, but here again, I'm not finding any simple
coding examples for that either.  And more importantly, the man page
for it gives this omnious warning:

     All routines are designed to be time-consuming.  A brief test on a
     Pentium 166/MMX shows the DES crypt to do approximately 2640 crypts a
     CPU second and MD5 to do about 62 crypts a CPU second.

Fortunately, I *do* have something that's a bit faster than A Pentium 166
:-) but I'm still rather baffled by the meaning of the phrase "designed
to be time-consuming" in this context.  I understand that encryption
generally is intended to be very time-consuming FOR AN ATTACKER WHO
DOESN'T KNOW THE KEY, but the quote above does not clarify that this
is the only party for whom use of the FreeBSD libc crypt(3) function
will be "time-consuming".  (If it ends up being time consuming *for me*,
then this could be real a problem.)


From rejo at zenger.nl  Tue Oct 14 10:55:17 2014
From: rejo at zenger.nl (Rejo Zenger)
Date: Tue, 14 Oct 2014 10:55:17 +0200
Subject: emails snowden and poitras
Message-ID: <20141014085517.GL1746@ix.home>

Hi,

At <http://www.wired.com/2014/10/snowdens-first-emails-to-poitras/> 
there are some snippets of the e-mails Snowden sent to Poitras as an 
introduction. One of those e-mails says:

  "I would like to confirm out of email that the keys we exchanged were 
  not intercepted and replaced by your surveillants. Please confirm that 
  no one has ever had a copy of your private key and that it uses a 
  strong passphrase."

Of course, we don't have the full picture, but from the information that 
has been released, this seems to be surprising question: how would you 
be able to confirm that the keys are not replaced by asking to confirm 
that no one has ever had a copy of the private key? If they keys have 
been obtained by the adversary, the answer may be altered or not. In any 
case, the answer doesn't prove anything.

Of course, if Poitras would answer that her private key is in the hands 
of some other person, I expect her to have revoked to key anyways. 

So, what's the objective of Snowden, you think?

And yes, I am aware that Snowden says these steps are not bullet proof. 


-- 
Rejo Zenger
E rejo at zenger.nl | P +31(0)639642738 | W https://rejo.zenger.nl  
T @rejozenger | J rejo at zenger.nl
OpenPGP   1FBF 7B37 6537 68B1 2532  A4CB 0994 0946 21DB EFD4
XMPP OTR  271A 9186 AFBC 8124 18CF  4BE2 E000 E708 F811 5ACF
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From peter at digitalbrains.com  Tue Oct 14 11:05:18 2014
From: peter at digitalbrains.com (Peter Lebbing)
Date: Tue, 14 Oct 2014 11:05:18 +0200
Subject: Renewal of revocation certificate required after adding a new
 identity?
In-Reply-To: <1936594303.20141013204525@my_localhost>
References: <20141012233516.6f799ca6@kirk.drpetervoigt.private>
 <2688360.WQ98SDYlWN@inno> <20141013181728.4a5d6f8f@kirk.drpetervoigt.private>
 <543BFEC6.4070007@digitalbrains.com> <543C0066.8040309@digitalbrains.com>
 <1936594303.20141013204525@my_localhost>
Message-ID: <543CE74E.6020500@digitalbrains.com>

On 13/10/14 21:45, MFPA wrote:
> I would have thought "the whole thing with UID's and signatures and so
> on" was exactly what was being revoked by means of a revocation
> certificate.

Yes, everything is revoked.

But that is implicitly. What the revocation actually revokes is the
actual primary key itself. It revokes the same part that the fingerprint
is computed over. Mathematically, it is computed over the numbers that
make up the primary public key and its creation time.

So no matter what UID's or signatures are later added (or already
existed), from the moment the revocation certificate is published and
combined with the primary public key, that public key can never be used
again.

Remember that the original question was: do I need a new revocation
certificate when I add UID's? The answer to that is: no, because the
revocation certificate is not computed over the UID's and hence doesn't
change.

So in that sense the revocation certificate is not bound to the UID's as
I stated. However, it does also revoke the UID's in the sense you mean.

Does this make sense?

HTH,

Peter.

-- 
I use the GNU Privacy Guard (GnuPG) in combination with Enigmail.
You can send me encrypted mail if you want some privacy.
My key is available at <http://digitalbrains.com/2012/openpgp-key-peter>


From martin-gnupg-users at dkyb.de  Tue Oct 14 11:18:14 2014
From: martin-gnupg-users at dkyb.de (Martin Behrendt)
Date: Tue, 14 Oct 2014 11:18:14 +0200
Subject: emails snowden and poitras
In-Reply-To: <20141014085517.GL1746@ix.home>
References: <20141014085517.GL1746@ix.home>
Message-ID: <543CEA56.5000905@dkyb.de>

Am 14.10.2014 um 10:55 schrieb Rejo Zenger:
>
> So, what's the objective of Snowden, you think?

I assume that Laura Poitras never used gpg before or at least Snowden
assumed so. I guess the main intend of the question were to sensitize
her of the topic and make her think about possible threats and teach her.
And he explicitly asks to confirm that on a different communication
channel to avoid the problem you mentioned.

>
> Of course, if Poitras would answer that her private key is in the
> hands of some other person, I expect her to have revoked to key
> anyways.
>

If you assume she is new to gpg I guess that is a wrong expectation.

greetings
Martin


From rejo at zenger.nl  Tue Oct 14 11:34:32 2014
From: rejo at zenger.nl (Rejo Zenger)
Date: Tue, 14 Oct 2014 11:34:32 +0200
Subject: emails snowden and poitras
In-Reply-To: <543CEA56.5000905@dkyb.de>
References: <20141014085517.GL1746@ix.home>
 <543CEA56.5000905@dkyb.de>
Message-ID: <20141014093432.GQ1746@ix.home>

++ 14/10/14 11:18 +0200 - Martin Behrendt:
>> So, what's the objective of Snowden, you think?
>
>I assume that Laura Poitras never used gpg before or at least Snowden
>assumed so. I guess the main intend of the question were to sensitize
[...]

Didn't think of that option. Thanks.

-- 
Rejo Zenger
E rejo at zenger.nl | P +31(0)639642738 | W https://rejo.zenger.nl  
T @rejozenger | J rejo at zenger.nl
OpenPGP   1FBF 7B37 6537 68B1 2532  A4CB 0994 0946 21DB EFD4
XMPP OTR  271A 9186 AFBC 8124 18CF  4BE2 E000 E708 F811 5ACF
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From martijn.list at gmail.com  Tue Oct 14 11:25:15 2014
From: martijn.list at gmail.com (martijn.list)
Date: Tue, 14 Oct 2014 11:25:15 +0200
Subject: emails snowden and poitras
In-Reply-To: <20141014085517.GL1746@ix.home>
References: <20141014085517.GL1746@ix.home>
Message-ID: <543CEBFB.4050907@gmail.com>

On 10/14/2014 10:55 AM, Rejo Zenger wrote:
> At <http://www.wired.com/2014/10/snowdens-first-emails-to-poitras/> 
> there are some snippets of the e-mails Snowden sent to Poitras as an 
> introduction. One of those e-mails says:
> 
>   "I would like to confirm out of email that the keys we exchanged were 
>   not intercepted and replaced by your surveillants. Please confirm that 
>   no one has ever had a copy of your private key and that it uses a 
>   strong passphrase."
> 
> Of course, we don't have the full picture, but from the information that 
> has been released, this seems to be surprising question: how would you 
> be able to confirm that the keys are not replaced by asking to confirm 
> that no one has ever had a copy of the private key? If they keys have 
> been obtained by the adversary, the answer may be altered or not. In any 
> case, the answer doesn't prove anything.
> 
> Of course, if Poitras would answer that her private key is in the hands 
> of some other person, I expect her to have revoked to key anyways. 
> 
> So, what's the objective of Snowden, you think?
> 
> And yes, I am aware that Snowden says these steps are not bullet proof. 


Just speculating but this question might help in case of a "gag order".
If Poitras was under a gag order, the best thing to do is to not reply
to that messages. By not replying you are not breaking the gag order
(not sure about that though). The sender however might infer from not
getting a reply that the answer was yes, "my keys were compromised".
Only by actively faking a signed and encrypted email, could the
adversary pretend that the keys were not leaked. It might be that there
are legal reasons why this is not allowed or it might be a little easier
to detect that this message was not from Poitras. Again, all speculation.

Kind regards,

Martijn


-- 
CipherMail email encryption

Open source email encryption gateway with support for S/MIME, OpenPGP
and PDF messaging.

http://www.ciphermail.com

Twitter: http://twitter.com/CipherMail


From 2014-667rhzu3dc-lists-groups at riseup.net  Tue Oct 14 21:33:26 2014
From: 2014-667rhzu3dc-lists-groups at riseup.net (MFPA)
Date: Tue, 14 Oct 2014 20:33:26 +0100
Subject: Renewal of revocation certificate required after adding a new
 identity?
In-Reply-To: <543CE74E.6020500@digitalbrains.com>
References: <20141012233516.6f799ca6@kirk.drpetervoigt.private>
 <2688360.WQ98SDYlWN@inno> <20141013181728.4a5d6f8f@kirk.drpetervoigt.private>
 <543BFEC6.4070007@digitalbrains.com> <543C0066.8040309@digitalbrains.com>
 <1936594303.20141013204525@my_localhost> <543CE74E.6020500@digitalbrains.com>
Message-ID: <313921713.20141014203326@my_localhost>

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA512

Hi


On Tuesday 14 October 2014 at 10:05:18 AM, in
<mid:543CE74E.6020500 at digitalbrains.com>, Peter Lebbing wrote:



> So in that sense the revocation certificate is not
> bound to the UID's as I stated. However, it does also
> revoke the UID's in the sense you mean.

> Does this make sense?


Yes.




- --
Best regards

MFPA                    mailto:2014-667rhzu3dc-lists-groups at riseup.net

People who throw kisses are hopelessly lazy.
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N0VDQTAzAAoJEKipC46tDG5pE/0D/0GwvxMbCI56Oz/FlyTfvLEii/QIfCRAY1PG
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From peter at digitalbrains.com  Wed Oct 15 11:21:18 2014
From: peter at digitalbrains.com (Peter Lebbing)
Date: Wed, 15 Oct 2014 11:21:18 +0200
Subject: Libcrypt examples?
In-Reply-To: <39947.1413227663@server1.tristatelogic.com>
References: <39947.1413227663@server1.tristatelogic.com>
Message-ID: <543E3C8E.3030200@digitalbrains.com>

On 13/10/14 21:14, Ronald F. Guilmette wrote:
> Mostly I just need
> something that will be simple for me to implement in my program,
> even though I am by no means knowledgable about cryptography
> generally.  (Most of what little I do know has been garnered from
> with Wikipedia.)

>From the release announcements of Libgcrypt:

> Thorough understanding of applied cryptography is required for proper
> use Libgcrypt.

(the word "of" seems to be missing)

So you're using the wrong tool for the job. Have you thought about using
off-the-shelf full disk encryption, perhaps restricted to a partition
where the data is stored?

Cryptography is very hard to get right. You shouldn't be designing your
own stuff based on such a low-level library as Libgcrypt; you need a
higher level thing where all the important bits have already been done
for you.

That previous paragraph is very important, the most important one of
this mail by a long shot.

> P.S.  On my FreeBSD system, un-updated as it may be, there seems
> to be a crypt(3) in the standard C library.

That function is for one use and one use only: password storage and
checking. It just has a misleading name.

> I'm still rather baffled by the meaning of the phrase "designed
> to be time-consuming" in this context.

That is a desirable property in password storage, hence the oddly
looking design choice.

HTH,

Peter.

-- 
I use the GNU Privacy Guard (GnuPG) in combination with Enigmail.
You can send me encrypted mail if you want some privacy.
My key is available at <http://digitalbrains.com/2012/openpgp-key-peter>


From peter at digitalbrains.com  Wed Oct 15 13:00:52 2014
From: peter at digitalbrains.com (Peter Lebbing)
Date: Wed, 15 Oct 2014 13:00:52 +0200
Subject: [Announce] The maybe final Beta for GnuPG 2.1
In-Reply-To: <CA+4dSw4E=mkeaw1eDaC_jzwS3qHvG68awHUgKEh2Gjr4hcXGyg@mail.gmail.com>
References: <87sij5cjav.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
 <CA+4dSw6zCHD8K3KOZ52EXMAD5BxoHPwcx5OvaCWeMeQPU05kLw@mail.gmail.com>
 <877g0hcdk5.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
 <CA+4dSw4E=mkeaw1eDaC_jzwS3qHvG68awHUgKEh2Gjr4hcXGyg@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <543E53E4.2080904@digitalbrains.com>

On 04/10/14 00:28, Pete Stephenson wrote:
> To my untrained, non-developer[1] eye, there appears to be several
> things that failed though I'm not sure how to interpret things
> correctly. The full config log is ~250kB. I've posted it to a Pastebin
> at http://pastebin.com/xZjzsZju if that would help.

Wow, that is one verbose log. I started reading from the top, but
switched to reading from the bottom up, which is more useful for
configure logs. I didn't expect it to be quite that long at first.

Near the end, there's this bit:

-------------------8<---------------->8-------------------
***
*** The Dirmngr part requires an LDAP library
*** Check out
***    http://www.openldap.org
*** for a suitable implementation.
***
configure:16877: error:
***
*** Required libraries not found. Please consult the above messages
*** and install them before running configure again.
***
-------------------8<---------------->8-------------------

Note how it says to consult the above messages. You should not interpret
this as all lines up to that bit, but rather the bits that immediately
precede that final message.

I don't see any other showstoppers. It is normal that a lot of tests
"fail". For instance, it's not really realistic to expect the file
ac_nonexistent.h to exist; it's all just part of the tests.

The format of the message above made me look for three consecutive stars
in the output, which only turned up the one you mentioned:

-------------------8<---------------->8-------------------
***
*** Building without NTBTLS and GNUTLS - no TLS access to keyservers.
***
*** Requested 'gnutls >= 3.0' but version of GnuTLS is 2.12.23
*** You may find new versions of GnuTLS at
http://www.gnu.org/software/gnutls/
***
-------------------8<---------------->8-------------------

HTH,

Peter.

-- 
I use the GNU Privacy Guard (GnuPG) in combination with Enigmail.
You can send me encrypted mail if you want some privacy.
My key is available at <http://digitalbrains.com/2012/openpgp-key-peter>


From pete at heypete.com  Wed Oct 15 14:54:46 2014
From: pete at heypete.com (Pete Stephenson)
Date: Wed, 15 Oct 2014 14:54:46 +0200
Subject: [Announce] The maybe final Beta for GnuPG 2.1
In-Reply-To: <543E53E4.2080904@digitalbrains.com>
References: <87sij5cjav.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
 <CA+4dSw6zCHD8K3KOZ52EXMAD5BxoHPwcx5OvaCWeMeQPU05kLw@mail.gmail.com>
 <877g0hcdk5.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
 <CA+4dSw4E=mkeaw1eDaC_jzwS3qHvG68awHUgKEh2Gjr4hcXGyg@mail.gmail.com>
 <543E53E4.2080904@digitalbrains.com>
Message-ID: <CA+4dSw4oAeCx_0WrM2FKTUdpa=+0SH_xfB3e15dN_36PnfixpA@mail.gmail.com>

On Wed, Oct 15, 2014 at 1:00 PM, Peter Lebbing <peter at digitalbrains.com> wrote:
> On 04/10/14 00:28, Pete Stephenson wrote:
>> To my untrained, non-developer[1] eye, there appears to be several
>> things that failed though I'm not sure how to interpret things
>> correctly. The full config log is ~250kB. I've posted it to a Pastebin
>> at http://pastebin.com/xZjzsZju if that would help.
>
> Wow, that is one verbose log. I started reading from the top, but
> switched to reading from the bottom up, which is more useful for
> configure logs. I didn't expect it to be quite that long at first.

Indeed.

> Near the end, there's this bit:
>
> -------------------8<---------------->8-------------------
> ***
> *** The Dirmngr part requires an LDAP library
> *** Check out
> ***    http://www.openldap.org
> *** for a suitable implementation.
> ***
> configure:16877: error:
> ***
> *** Required libraries not found. Please consult the above messages
> *** and install them before running configure again.
> ***
> -------------------8<---------------->8-------------------
>
> Note how it says to consult the above messages. You should not interpret
> this as all lines up to that bit, but rather the bits that immediately
> precede that final message.
>
> I don't see any other showstoppers. It is normal that a lot of tests
> "fail". For instance, it's not really realistic to expect the file
> ac_nonexistent.h to exist; it's all just part of the tests.
>
> The format of the message above made me look for three consecutive stars
> in the output, which only turned up the one you mentioned:

Thanks!

Success! Installing the libldap2-dev package resolves the issue and
the build process completes with no other errors.

When I add PLAY/inst/bin/ to my path and PLAY/inst/lib/ to the list of
shared libraries, everything works as expected.

Many thanks for your help and patience.

Cheers!
-Pete

-- 
Pete Stephenson


From wk at gnupg.org  Wed Oct 15 16:25:09 2014
From: wk at gnupg.org (Werner Koch)
Date: Wed, 15 Oct 2014 16:25:09 +0200
Subject: [Announce] The maybe final Beta for GnuPG 2.1
In-Reply-To: <543E53E4.2080904@digitalbrains.com> (Peter Lebbing's message of
 "Wed, 15 Oct 2014 13:00:52 +0200")
References: <87sij5cjav.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
 <CA+4dSw6zCHD8K3KOZ52EXMAD5BxoHPwcx5OvaCWeMeQPU05kLw@mail.gmail.com>
 <877g0hcdk5.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
 <CA+4dSw4E=mkeaw1eDaC_jzwS3qHvG68awHUgKEh2Gjr4hcXGyg@mail.gmail.com>
 <543E53E4.2080904@digitalbrains.com>
Message-ID: <87a94xo1fe.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>

Hi Pete,

thanks for looking at this case.

FWIW, I am consider to make LDAP and optional feature.  Most users are
likely interested in OpenPGP and thus keyserver access and don't need
the former main feature of Dirmngr (LDAP based X.509 certifciate
lookup).


Salam-Shalom,

   Werner

-- 
Die Gedanken sind frei.  Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz.



From ca+gnupg-users at esmtp.org  Wed Oct 15 16:40:05 2014
From: ca+gnupg-users at esmtp.org (Claus Assmann)
Date: Wed, 15 Oct 2014 07:40:05 -0700
Subject: GnuPG 2.1: make LDAP optional
In-Reply-To: <87a94xo1fe.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
References: <87sij5cjav.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
 <CA+4dSw6zCHD8K3KOZ52EXMAD5BxoHPwcx5OvaCWeMeQPU05kLw@mail.gmail.com>
 <877g0hcdk5.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
 <CA+4dSw4E=mkeaw1eDaC_jzwS3qHvG68awHUgKEh2Gjr4hcXGyg@mail.gmail.com>
 <543E53E4.2080904@digitalbrains.com>
 <87a94xo1fe.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
Message-ID: <20141015144005.GA22256@x2.esmtp.org>

On Wed, Oct 15, 2014, Werner Koch wrote:

> FWIW, I am consider to make LDAP and optional feature.  Most users are

Yes, please!


From gnupg at jelmail.com  Wed Oct 15 21:26:40 2014
From: gnupg at jelmail.com (gnupg at jelmail.com)
Date: Wed, 15 Oct 2014 20:26:40 +0100
Subject: Pinentry curses fallback for gpg
Message-ID: <543ECA70.2040009@jelmail.com>




From rfg at tristatelogic.com  Wed Oct 15 23:45:35 2014
From: rfg at tristatelogic.com (Ronald F. Guilmette)
Date: Wed, 15 Oct 2014 14:45:35 -0700
Subject: Libcrypt examples?
In-Reply-To: <543E3C8E.3030200@digitalbrains.com>
Message-ID: <61842.1413409535@server1.tristatelogic.com>


In message <543E3C8E.3030200 at digitalbrains.com>, 
Peter Lebbing <peter at digitalbrains.com> wrote:

>On 13/10/14 21:14, Ronald F. Guilmette wrote:
>> Mostly I just need
>> something that will be simple for me to implement in my program,
>> even though I am by no means knowledgable about cryptography
>> generally.  (Most of what little I do know has been garnered from
>> with Wikipedia.)
>
>>From the release announcements of Libgcrypt:
>
>> Thorough understanding of applied cryptography is required for proper
>> use Libgcrypt.
>
>So you're using the wrong tool for the job. Have you thought about using
>off-the-shelf full disk encryption,

I'm sorry.  It appears that I did not explain my requirements sufficiently
well for you to be able to immediately grasp that what you just proposed
is absolutely not a viable solution in the context of my application.

Let me try again.

I have a program.  It's written in C.  I intend to distribute it, in
binary form only, to other sites.  I do not and will not control how
any fo the local disks are configured at those other sites.

I think that you are making this far more complex than it has to be.
I stated what I needed to do, and it is quite simple.  The program
must write some small bits of data to a local disk. Ideally, these
small hunks of data should not be _easily_ decypherable.  The program
will later read the data back in, decypher it, then use it.

There *are* simply solutions to this rather trivial and common problem.
If worse comes to worse, I will cook up something rather rudimentary
myself.  But I would prefer to use something stronger.  I had hoped to
get some help with this rather simple task here, but obviously I hoped
in vain.

I should say that it seems to me rather entirely bizzare, preplexing,
and downright silly that *somebody* went to the trouble to write a
detailed, 134 page (PDF) manual for the library, and yet prospective
users of the library, such as myself, cannot find even a single modest,
real-world example of how to use the bloody thing.

If there exists a universe in which that makes sense, I'm obviously
not in it.

>Cryptography is very hard to get right. You shouldn't be designing your
>own stuff based on such a low-level library as Libgcrypt; you need a
>higher level thing where all the important bits have already been done
>for you.
>
>That previous paragraph is very important, the most important one of
>this mail by a long shot.

OK.  Swell.  Ignoring, for the moment, the personal condescension
implicit in your comments, and accepting your premise that I should
be using some ``higher level'' library, the question remains:  Which
one?

I understand that you may have been attempting to be helpful, and for
that I am grateful.  However you've utterly failed to provide me with
any useful or actionable information.


P.S.  I'm still looking for the "examples at the end of the manual"
which were explicitly promised in Section 1.1 ("Getting Started")
of the Libcrypt manual.

Was that promise just inserted into the manual as some sort of cruel
joke, you know, to get naive people like me to waste a lot of time
looking for examples that aren't even actually in there?

If so, then it is working perfectly.


From wk at gnupg.org  Thu Oct 16 11:54:10 2014
From: wk at gnupg.org (Werner Koch)
Date: Thu, 16 Oct 2014 11:54:10 +0200
Subject: Libcrypt examples?
In-Reply-To: <61842.1413409535@server1.tristatelogic.com> (Ronald
 F. Guilmette's message of "Wed, 15 Oct 2014 14:45:35 -0700")
References: <61842.1413409535@server1.tristatelogic.com>
Message-ID: <8738aomjb1.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>

On Wed, 15 Oct 2014 23:45, rfg at tristatelogic.com said:

> detailed, 134 page (PDF) manual for the library, and yet prospective
> users of the library, such as myself, cannot find even a single modest,
> real-world example of how to use the bloody thing.

IIRC, it has already been quoted from the introduction:

  The reader is assumed to possess basic knowledge about applied
  cryptography.

That is really important and it means that the reader knows what an IV
is, what an encryption mode is and which one first which purpose,why
padding is required, and so on.  Well, maybe this is a bit more than
?basic knowledge? but for us crypto plumbers this is basic.

> OK.  Swell.  Ignoring, for the moment, the personal condescension
> implicit in your comments, and accepting your premise that I should
> be using some ``higher level'' library, the question remains:  Which
> one?

I would suggest GPGME.  However, there is a lot of extra baggage which
comes with that, for example you need to install GnuPG proper, because
GPGME makes use of it.

Thus for your goal, direct use of Libgcrypt might me right.  However,
before you can use it you need to answer seeveral design questions.  For
example:

 - From where do I take the key?
 - Do I need to derive the key from Passphrase.
 - Which cipher mode to use.
 - Where do I store extra data like an IV
 - Do I need padding.
 - Do I need authenticated encryption?
 
To answer this it would be best to first describe the thread model.
However, there are some standard solutions which may fit for you.  There
are good books which describe how to come up with a good solution.  For
example

@Book{Fer:03:PC,
  author =      "Niels Ferguson and Bruce Schneier",
  title =       "Practical Cryptography",
  language =    "USenglish",
  edition =     "first",
  publisher =   pub-WIL,
  address =     pub-WIL:adr,
  pages =       "xx + 410",
  year =        "2003",
  ISBN =        "0-471-22357-3",
  URL =         "http://www.macfergus.com/pc/"
}

> P.S.  I'm still looking for the "examples at the end of the manual"
> which were explicitly promised in Section 1.1 ("Getting Started")
> of the Libcrypt manual.

Thanks for the hint; it is probably missing.  We should fix the manual
in some way.


Salam-Shalom,

   Werner

-- 
Die Gedanken sind frei.  Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz.



From peter at digitalbrains.com  Thu Oct 16 19:52:35 2014
From: peter at digitalbrains.com (Peter Lebbing)
Date: Thu, 16 Oct 2014 19:52:35 +0200
Subject: Libcrypt examples?
In-Reply-To: <61842.1413409535@server1.tristatelogic.com>
References: <61842.1413409535@server1.tristatelogic.com>
Message-ID: <544005E3.2040901@digitalbrains.com>

On 15/10/14 23:45, Ronald F. Guilmette wrote:
> There *are* simply solutions to this rather trivial and common 
> problem.

I don't consider that a trivial problem, actually. I can think of
many threat models where it is entirely non-trivial. You never mentioned
a threat model.

> OK.  Swell.  Ignoring, for the moment, the personal condescension 
> implicit in your comments

There was no condescension in there; none at all whatsoever. I don't
consider myself knowledgeable enough to write such an implementation.
And I'm not condescending towards myself.

I'm sorry that you felt it that way; if I had ever considered that you
might find it condescending I would have included a disclaimer. However,
I thought the following two quotes together already made it clear that
it was no condescension.

>From the release announcement:

> Thorough understanding of applied cryptography is required for proper
> use Libgcrypt.

>From your own words:

> [...] even though I am by no means knowledgable about cryptography 
> generally.  (Most of what little I do know has been garnered from 
> with Wikipedia.)


> Was that promise just inserted into the manual as some sort of cruel
>  joke, you know, to get naive people like me to waste a lot of time 
> looking for examples that aren't even actually in there?

<Sigh>. If this is how you wish this conversation to go, I don't feel
like helping. When we start out assuming bad faith on everything that in
some completely unlikely scenario could possibly be bad faith, then I am
done with this.

You have my apologies for writing something you misread as
condescending. Other than that, I'm done here.

Good luck,

Peter.

-- 
I use the GNU Privacy Guard (GnuPG) in combination with Enigmail.
You can send me encrypted mail if you want some privacy.
My key is available at <http://digitalbrains.com/2012/openpgp-key-peter>


From rjh at sixdemonbag.org  Thu Oct 16 20:58:31 2014
From: rjh at sixdemonbag.org (Robert J. Hansen)
Date: Thu, 16 Oct 2014 14:58:31 -0400
Subject: Libcrypt examples?
In-Reply-To: <39947.1413227663@server1.tristatelogic.com>
References: <39947.1413227663@server1.tristatelogic.com>
Message-ID: <54401557.1030105@sixdemonbag.org>

> I have a program that will frequently need to store modest-size
> chunks of of data on disk, perhaps 1-4kB per chunk.  The data is
> sensitive, but not ultra top secret.  I would like to make a
> reasonable effort to keep it from prying eyes.

Please don't take this the wrong way, but -- please don't.  Libgcrypt is
not particularly friendly to novices.  It exposes a *lot* of dials and
switches in the interests of letting experts do weird and useful things.
 Novices will be better-suited with something like Peter Gutmann's
cryptlib, which is high-quality and well-regarded and is probably more
newbie-friendly.

> P.S.  On my FreeBSD system, un-updated as it may be, there seems
> to be a crypt(3) in the standard C library.

I believe on FreeBSD this is just bog-standard DES, but I could be
mistaken.  DES is not a strong cipher.

> Fortunately, I *do* have something that's a bit faster than A Pentium 166
> :-) but I'm still rather baffled by the meaning of the phrase "designed
> to be time-consuming" in this context.

To help foil brute-force attacks.  crypt(3) is normally used with really
short pieces of text -- passwords.  As such, one way to attack passwords
is to get a large dictionary of words and run each word through crypt(3)
and store the result.  If you want to break a password, look at its
crypt(3)ed value and compare it to your database of computed values.  If
you get a hit, then look back at what the original word was.

To foil these sorts of attacks ("dictionary attacks"), crypt(3) has been
built to be very, very slow.


From rjh at sixdemonbag.org  Thu Oct 16 21:15:55 2014
From: rjh at sixdemonbag.org (Robert J. Hansen)
Date: Thu, 16 Oct 2014 15:15:55 -0400
Subject: Libcrypt examples?
In-Reply-To: <61842.1413409535@server1.tristatelogic.com>
References: <61842.1413409535@server1.tristatelogic.com>
Message-ID: <5440196B.8070808@sixdemonbag.org>

> I have a program.  It's written in C.  I intend to distribute it, in
> binary form only, to other sites.  I do not and will not control how
> any fo the local disks are configured at those other sites.

The question then becomes, "who are you securing this data against?"  If
your goal is to keep data on someone else's computer in a form that they
can't read, you should be advised going in that it's a fool's errand.
Can't be done.

As an example of how it can be foiled: while your program is running,
tell the computer to hibernate.  It writes a memory image to disk.  Load
the memory image into a tool like Volatility and start searching through
memory looking for AES key schedules.  There won't be more than a
handful of them.  Recreate the key from the key schedules and bam,
you've got the original key and can read/write this data stream at-will.

This is not an abstract or theoretical thing.  This is real.  I've done
it.  If you're interested in reading more, check out "The Persistence of
Memory: Forensic Identification and Extraction of Cryptographic Keys."
It was presented at DFRWS back in '09, and is available online at:

http://www.dfrws.org/2009/proceedings/p132-moe.pdf

It's a good read, including a footnote where they talk about how they
managed to break PGP 8 this way.

> There *are* simply solutions to this rather trivial and common problem.

If you're doing what I suspect you're doing, there really aren't any.
There are a lot of techniques that don't work at all, and of those some
are simple, and a lot of people use them without knowing that they don't
work, instead believing that everything's going swimmingly because they
don't, themselves, know how to break it.

> I should say that it seems to me rather entirely bizzare, preplexing,
> and downright silly that *somebody* went to the trouble to write a
> detailed, 134 page (PDF) manual for the library, and yet prospective
> users of the library, such as myself, cannot find even a single modest,
> real-world example of how to use the bloody thing.

The manual is sufficient for its intended audience.  Crypto has a steep
learning curve and no one manual can reach all audiences.  Some crypto
libraries are meant for people who don't care about the difference
between CBC mode and Galois Counter Mode; others are meant for people
who care quite a lot.  Libgcrypt is in the latter category.

I'm sorry if you find the libgcrypt manual to be of no use, but if it's
of no use, please consider the possibility that you are not libgcrypt's
intended audience.  That's no slight on you, on your coding ability, or
your professionalism.  I'm a highly-skilled data forensics nerd, but
when I have to do digital signal processing my eyes glaze over when the
A/V nerds start talking about how the butterfly interleave of the fast
Fourier transform is fundamentally and deeply connected to the roots of
unity.  There's no shame in not knowing everything, because really, how
could anyone be expected to?


From gnupg at jelmail.com  Thu Oct 16 22:02:43 2014
From: gnupg at jelmail.com (John Lane)
Date: Thu, 16 Oct 2014 21:02:43 +0100
Subject: Pinentry curses fallback for gpg
Message-ID: <54402463.3090404@jelmail.com>

Hello, I am trying to work out a few things with GnuPG that aren't clear
to me after reading the available documentation. I hope it's ok to ask
for some help?

Here's my first problem:

I cannot work our how to tell my desktop-less system to use the curses
pinentry program. I can see that is is configurable for gpg-agent.conf
but I see no equivalent for gpg.conf. The only way I have been able to
do this is to re-point a symlink /usr/bin/pinentry to point to
/usr/bin/pinentry-curses instead of /usr/bin/pinentry-gtk.

I have read the pinentry readme and see the configure options for it. I
have cross checked with how the package is built for Arch Linux, which
is the Linux distribution that I use. The configure options are

 ./configure --prefix=/usr \
        --enable-pinentry-curses \
        --disable-pinentry-gtk \
        --disable-pinentry-qt \
        --enable-pinentry-gtk2 \
        --enable-pinentry-qt4 \
        --enable-fallback-curses

The installed binaries are like this:

lrwxrwxrwx 1 root root     14 May  6  2013 /usr/bin/pinentry ->
/usr/bin/pinentry-gtk2
-rwxr-xr-x 1 root root  48216 May  6  2013 /usr/bin/pinentry-curses
-rwxr-xr-x 1 root root 107384 May  6  2013 /usr/bin/pinentry-gtk-2
-rwxr-xr-x 1 root root 153064 May  6  2013 /usr/bin/pinentry-qt4

It isn't possible to launch the gtk-2 or qt4 versions without the
requisite libraries being installed, so both fail rather than fall back
to the curses version:

# /usr/bin/pinentry-qt4
/usr/bin/pinentry-qt4: error while loading shared libraries:
libQtCore.so.4: cannot open shared object file: No such file or directory

# /usr/bin/pinentry-gtk-2
/usr/bin/pinentry-gtk-2: error while loading shared libraries:
libgtk-x11-2.0.so.0: cannot open shared object file: No such file or
directory

The curses version works fine. Now, as far as I understand, the gnupg
binary uses the symlink "/usr/bin/pinentry" and, with the above
configuration that means the gtk2 version. And, if the system doesn't
have that installed then it fails.

I can obviously change the symlink to point to the curses version but,
if I do, it'll eventually get reset by my distributions package manager.

As far as I can tell, it's the pinentry package's "make install" that
creates this symlink rather than something distribution-specific.

So, what is the correct, approved way to get gpg to use the curses
pinentry ?

Thanks.


From mailing-lists at asatiifm.net  Thu Oct 16 22:23:01 2014
From: mailing-lists at asatiifm.net (=?iso-8859-1?Q?Ville_M=E4=E4tt=E4?=)
Date: Thu, 16 Oct 2014 23:23:01 +0300
Subject: Pinentry curses fallback for gpg
In-Reply-To: <54402463.3090404@jelmail.com>
References: <54402463.3090404@jelmail.com>
Message-ID: <58A357A4-E471-499A-A371-E24148852933@asatiifm.net>

Hi John,

You could try the following environment variable:

export PINENTRY_USER_DATA="USE_CURSES=1?

If that?s no good maybe something in following thread helps:

http://lists.gnupg.org/pipermail/gnupg-users/2009-June/036583.html

-- 
Ville

On 16 Oct 2014, at 23:02, John Lane <gnupg at jelmail.com> wrote:

> Hello, I am trying to work out a few things with GnuPG that aren't clear
> to me after reading the available documentation. I hope it's ok to ask
> for some help?
> 
> Here's my first problem:
> 
> I cannot work our how to tell my desktop-less system to use the curses
> pinentry program. I can see that is is configurable for gpg-agent.conf
> but I see no equivalent for gpg.conf. The only way I have been able to
> do this is to re-point a symlink /usr/bin/pinentry to point to
> /usr/bin/pinentry-curses instead of /usr/bin/pinentry-gtk.
> 
> I have read the pinentry readme and see the configure options for it. I
> have cross checked with how the package is built for Arch Linux, which
> is the Linux distribution that I use. The configure options are
> 
> ./configure --prefix=/usr \
>        --enable-pinentry-curses \
>        --disable-pinentry-gtk \
>        --disable-pinentry-qt \
>        --enable-pinentry-gtk2 \
>        --enable-pinentry-qt4 \
>        --enable-fallback-curses
> 
> The installed binaries are like this:
> 
> lrwxrwxrwx 1 root root     14 May  6  2013 /usr/bin/pinentry ->
> /usr/bin/pinentry-gtk2
> -rwxr-xr-x 1 root root  48216 May  6  2013 /usr/bin/pinentry-curses
> -rwxr-xr-x 1 root root 107384 May  6  2013 /usr/bin/pinentry-gtk-2
> -rwxr-xr-x 1 root root 153064 May  6  2013 /usr/bin/pinentry-qt4
> 
> It isn't possible to launch the gtk-2 or qt4 versions without the
> requisite libraries being installed, so both fail rather than fall back
> to the curses version:
> 
> # /usr/bin/pinentry-qt4
> /usr/bin/pinentry-qt4: error while loading shared libraries:
> libQtCore.so.4: cannot open shared object file: No such file or directory
> 
> # /usr/bin/pinentry-gtk-2
> /usr/bin/pinentry-gtk-2: error while loading shared libraries:
> libgtk-x11-2.0.so.0: cannot open shared object file: No such file or
> directory
> 
> The curses version works fine. Now, as far as I understand, the gnupg
> binary uses the symlink "/usr/bin/pinentry" and, with the above
> configuration that means the gtk2 version. And, if the system doesn't
> have that installed then it fails.
> 
> I can obviously change the symlink to point to the curses version but,
> if I do, it'll eventually get reset by my distributions package manager.
> 
> As far as I can tell, it's the pinentry package's "make install" that
> creates this symlink rather than something distribution-specific.
> 
> So, what is the correct, approved way to get gpg to use the curses
> pinentry ?
> 
> Thanks.
> 
> _______________________________________________
> Gnupg-users mailing list
> Gnupg-users at gnupg.org
> http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users

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From rfg at tristatelogic.com  Fri Oct 17 01:21:26 2014
From: rfg at tristatelogic.com (Ronald F. Guilmette)
Date: Thu, 16 Oct 2014 16:21:26 -0700
Subject: Libcrypt examples?
In-Reply-To: <8738aomjb1.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
Message-ID: <76268.1413501686@server1.tristatelogic.com>


I'm sorry that I could not reply right away.  I was called to other
duties.

In message <8738aomjb1.fsf at vigenere.g10code.de>, 
Werner Koch <wk at gnupg.org> wrote:

>On Wed, 15 Oct 2014 23:45, rfg at tristatelogic.com said:
>
>> detailed, 134 page (PDF) manual for the library, and yet prospective
>> users of the library, such as myself, cannot find even a single modest,
>> real-world example of how to use the bloody thing.
>
>IIRC, it has already been quoted from the introduction:
>
>  The reader is assumed to possess basic knowledge about applied
>  cryptography.

I believe that I do indeed already have "basic" knowledge of the subject.

>That is really important and it means that the reader knows what an IV
>is, what an encryption mode is and which one first which purpose,why
>padding is required, and so on.  Well, maybe this is a bit more than
>"basic knowledge" but for us crypto plumbers this is basic.

I understand why padding may be required, I'm not sure what you mean
by "IV", and as regards to the "mode", I think that I specified in my
original post that symmetric key would be just fine for my purposes.
(Did you mean something else by your use of the term "mode" in this
context?  If so, what?)

>> OK.  Swell.  Ignoring, for the moment, the personal condescension
>> implicit in your comments, and accepting your premise that I should
>> be using some ``higher level'' library, the question remains:  Which
>> one?
>
>I would suggest GPGME.

Ah!  Thank you.  Now *that* looks like it may in fact be a useful and
actionable bit of information.  I did not know about that alternate
library until just now.  I confess that missed it, when looking at this
page:

  https://www.gnupg.org/related_software/libraries.html

because it wasn't immediately obvious that this was even a library, as
opposed to a program.  (Even though this is a page decicated to listing
"libraries" I guess I was thrown off by the first entry on that page,
which appears to refer to something which I gather is most likely a
program, and not a library at all.)

>However, there is a lot of extra baggage which
>comes with that, for example you need to install GnuPG proper, because
>GPGME makes use of it.

I'm OK with "extra baggage".

>Thus for your goal, direct use of Libgcrypt might me right.  However,
>before you can use it you need to answer seeveral design questions.  For
>example:
>
> - From where do I take the key?

The key will be embedded in the compiled binary of the program I'm building.

> - Do I need to derive the key from Passphrase.

I hope not.  I want this simple.  There should be no pass phrase... just
a pre-manufactured key.

> - Which cipher mode to use.

As I said, syymetric key will be just fine for me.  I most certainly
*do not* need public key cryptography.

And while we are on that subject please allow me to point out what may
perhaps be a deal-breaker for me when it comes to the GPGME library.
I'm looking at this page:

  https://www.gnupg.org/documentation/manuals/gpgme/Algorithms.html#Algorithms

and I am *not* seeing any mention of any symmetric key stuff.

Was that stuff just not considered sufficiently important to put interfaces
for it into GPGME?  (Correct me if I'm wrong, but there _is_ some syymetric
key stuff within Libcrypt itself, right?)

> - Where do I store extra data like an IV

As per above, I don't know what you are referring to.

> - Do I need padding.

I will assume so until advised otherwise.

> - Do I need authenticated encryption?

Nope.

>To answer this it would be best to first describe the thread model.

Did you mean to say "threat model"?  I'll assume that you did since,
in a subsequent posrt, I see that Peter Lebbing also asked about my
"threat model".

So, I'll do my best to try to respond to that question.

As I said at the outset, my current intention is to have/build a compiled
binary program which will be distributed to many sites and many parties.
(In fact it will most probably be available for free download.)  The
program in question will, when properly installed, provide some useful
functionality within the general "security" space.  (Anybody who googles
me for about 10 minutes will probably uncover my particular area of
interest, but that's not really important now.) The program's actions
and decisions will be driven by a set of external data tables, which
will be stored on disk and which will change over time.  The program
itself will be proprietary, i.e. I will not wish for either customers
or competitors to have ridiculously easy time determinding either what
it does, exactly, or how it does it.  More essentially, I will not want
it to be ridiculously easy for ``attackers'' to figure out what the
program does, exactly, or how it does it.  If they do, then the effective-
ness of the program itself will be rendered... in the words of Ronald
Regan...  "impotent and obsolete".

My assumption from the outset is that *any* seriously determined customer,
competitor, or attacker *will* be able to disassemble the program, recon-
struct its logic, and thus figure out entirely what it is doing and how
it is doing it.  I further assume that this possibility will not by
any means be limited to nation states.  (Note that under this scenario,
it would not even be necessary for the attacker to _completely_ disassemble
and reconstruct the entire logic of the program in order to see what it
is doing and how it is doing it.  If disassembly and analysis only went
deep enough to obatin from the program the embedded decryption key that
it uses to obtain the plain text version of the on-disk data file, then
this would be enough, by itself, to fully compromise the program, because
the data file, in plain text, would pretty much give away what the program
is doing and how it is doing it.)

An alternative attack which would not involve disassembly of the compiled
binary would be to for the attacker to simply decrypt the associated
on-disk data file.  I mentioned just above, the plain text of the data
file would itself pretty completely give away both (a) what the program
is doing and also (b) how it is doing it.  It is this precisely and only
this alternative attack scenario that I am keen to avoid, or at least
render equally as difficiult, or more difficult than the disassembly
approach (which itself is not really that hard).

In short, I do not need iron-clad or world-beating cryptography here.
Dissasembly of the binary will always be possible, and I cannot stop
that.  I just want some encryption applied to the data file which will
make the disassembly route the _easier_ route to breaking into the logic
of the program.  (I also do not want to use something so lame, in the
way of encrption, that I'll embarass myself in front of the potential
users of the program.)

I suspect that this may be the source of what I sense is a bit of a
disconnect between myself and other participants on this maling list,
perhaps including, but not limited to you.  I understand that
cryptographers generally are _not_ in the habit of producing tools
or methods that are ``just good enough'' for applications such a
mine, but rather are constantly striving to produce tools and methods
that are sufficiently iron clad to be entirely impenetrable, even to
nation states.  That is of course laudable, and as events of the past
year have shown, desperately needed by all of us, e.g. to protect our
privacy from extraordinarily well-funded adversaries.  But for this
one application, for the reasons I've described above, I really do
just need soething that is only just good enough.

>However, there are some standard solutions which may fit for you.  There
>are good books which describe how to come up with a good solution.  For
>example...

Books are good.  I like books.  Schneier's are especially good.  But
I'm not looking for a course on cryptography generally.  I'm looking
for _specific_ information about how to use _your_ libraries, very
specifically.  Some modest examples would help.

Unless Schneier has written a book which describes the interfaces and
semantics of either Libcrypt or GPGME, his books won't help me.  But
you still could... with some trivial examples.

>> P.S.  I'm still looking for the "examples at the end of the manual"
>> which were explicitly promised in Section 1.1 ("Getting Started")
>> of the Libcrypt manual.
>
>Thanks for the hint; it is probably missing.

That appears to be the case.

Don't get me wrong.  I am quite completely sure, even from just briefly
skimming the manual, that it is, in the tradition of all GNU manuals,
well written, comprehensive, and exquisitely detailed in its description
of its subject matter.  Unfortunately, I'm sad to say, I just don't have
the time right now to read and comprehend 134 pages of technically dense
material, most of which is surely going to be new to me.  I'd enjoy
doing that, but I have a product to build.

Given my time pressure, I latched on to the following statement, which
appears in Section 1.1 of the manual:

   "Experienced programmers might want to start looking at the examples
   at the end of the manual, and then only read up those parts of the
   interface which are unclear."

As it happens, I do in fact qualify as an "experienced programmer", and
thus I had hoped to be able to do as advised (by the above quote).

>We should fix the manual in some way.

That would almost certainly be helpful, however please don't feel in any
way obliged, either to wait until you can generate and perfectly format
some examples within the PDF, or INFO, or HTML versions of the manual,
or until you have time to develop some really excellent examples of how
to use each and every feature of the library.  Rather, I would be very
happy if you could just post a short example here, on list, and in plain
text, of a simple code snippet that would do just the one small thing
I need to have done.  (You can always go back and fix the manual at a
later time.)

Thank you for your fine library, for the generally well-crafted documen-
tation, and for your attention to my own unque and somewhat unusual use
case.


Regards,
rfg


From rfg at tristatelogic.com  Fri Oct 17 01:44:21 2014
From: rfg at tristatelogic.com (Ronald F. Guilmette)
Date: Thu, 16 Oct 2014 16:44:21 -0700
Subject: Libcrypt examples?
In-Reply-To: <544005E3.2040901@digitalbrains.com>
Message-ID: <76391.1413503061@server1.tristatelogic.com>


In message <544005E3.2040901 at digitalbrains.com>, 
Peter Lebbing <peter at digitalbrains.com> wrote:

>On 15/10/14 23:45, Ronald F. Guilmette wrote:
>> There *are* simply solutions to this rather trivial and common 
>> problem.
>
>I don't consider that a trivial problem, actually. I can think of
>many threat models where it is entirely non-trivial. You never mentioned
>a threat model.

Please see the other reply I just now posted in this thread.  I believe
that should completely clarify the "threat model".

>> OK.  Swell.  Ignoring, for the moment, the personal condescension 
>> implicit in your comments
>
>There was no condescension in there; none at all whatsoever. I don't
>consider myself knowledgeable enough to write such an implementation.
>And I'm not condescending towards myself.
>
>I'm sorry that you felt it that way; if I had ever considered that you
>might find it condescending I would have included a disclaimer. However,
>I thought the following two quotes together already made it clear that
>it was no condescension.

OK, to clarify, I made my first ever posting to this list.  In it I asked
(in effect) "How can I use tool X to achieve goal Y".  In your reply,
you said, in effect, "Using X is too complicated" and you suggested no
other alternatives.  I was left with the distinct impression that you
had concluded that I posses neither the requsite knowledge _nor_ even
the capacity to learn how to apply or use Libcrypt in any way that might
be useful to me.

I might be ignorant, and indeed, as I already myself confessed, I *am*
rather entirely ignorant, both of the deep underpinnings of modern
cryptography generally, and of Libcrypt's public interfaces specifically.
However my feeling is that anyone who jumps to a conclusion, based on
that, that I either cannot learn or cannot be taught is doing me a
profound disservice.  (And yes, I do tend to take such slights personally,
perhaps improperly so, particularly when it is late at night, when I am
tired and frustrated, e.g. by missing bits of documentation, and when
I find myself still in need of a solution, to which I seem to be comming
no closer.)

>You have my apologies for writing something you misread as
>condescending. Other than that, I'm done here.

Apology accepted.

I construed and summarized your entire reply as being basically equivalent
to:

   "You {Ron Guilmette} cannot use tool X to achieve goal Y."

In the absence of any suggestions, on your part, for alternatives, this
did indeed seem like a rather dismissive brush off, and most probably a
personal one.

If that was indeed not at all what you meant, then I also offer _my_
apology, i.e. for having misconstrued.


Regards,
rfg


From rfg at tristatelogic.com  Fri Oct 17 01:54:47 2014
From: rfg at tristatelogic.com (Ronald F. Guilmette)
Date: Thu, 16 Oct 2014 16:54:47 -0700
Subject: Libcrypt examples?
In-Reply-To: <54401557.1030105@sixdemonbag.org>
Message-ID: <76423.1413503687@server1.tristatelogic.com>


In message <54401557.1030105 at sixdemonbag.org>, 
"Robert J. Hansen" <rjh at sixdemonbag.org> wrote:

>> I have a program that will frequently need to store modest-size
>> chunks of of data on disk, perhaps 1-4kB per chunk.  The data is
>> sensitive, but not ultra top secret.  I would like to make a
>> reasonable effort to keep it from prying eyes.
>
>Please don't take this the wrong way, but -- please don't.  Libgcrypt is
>not particularly friendly to novices.  It exposes a *lot* of dials and
>switches in the interests of letting experts do weird and useful things.
> Novices will be better-suited with something like Peter Gutmann's
>cryptlib, which is high-quality and well-regarded and is probably more
>newbie-friendly.

This is helpful.  Very much so.  Thank you.  I will quite certainly
look into that other library.

(I am not at all ashamed to admit than in the realm of crypto generally,
I *do* most probably qualify as a "newbie", or perhaps at best a Padawan.)

>> P.S.  On my FreeBSD system, un-updated as it may be, there seems
>> to be a crypt(3) in the standard C library.
>
>I believe on FreeBSD this is just bog-standard DES, but I could be
>mistaken.  DES is not a strong cipher.

Yes, I believe that I saw some public comments somewhere to that effect,
i.e. the part about DES being not-so-hot-anymore.

>> Fortunately, I *do* have something that's a bit faster than A Pentium 166
>> :-) but I'm still rather baffled by the meaning of the phrase "designed
>> to be time-consuming" in this context.
>
>To help foil brute-force attacks.  crypt(3) is normally used with really
>short pieces of text -- passwords.  As such, one way to attack passwords
>is to get a large dictionary of words and run each word through crypt(3)
>and store the result.  If you want to break a password, look at its
>crypt(3)ed value and compare it to your database of computed values.  If
>you get a hit, then look back at what the original word was.
>
>To foil these sorts of attacks ("dictionary attacks"), crypt(3) has been
>built to be very, very slow.

OK.  Thanks!  I got it.  So just as a literal reading of the man page
would suggest, the thing is indeed slow for *everybody* and not just an
attacker.

That slowness is sure to be helpful in the context you elaborated, but
for my purposes it would definitely be entirely unhelpful.  Thus, as
you've helped me to understand, I best bet is to steer clear os using
that one within the thing I'm building.

Thanks again.


Regards,
rfg


From kristian.fiskerstrand at sumptuouscapital.com  Fri Oct 17 04:01:13 2014
From: kristian.fiskerstrand at sumptuouscapital.com (Kristian fiskerstrand)
Date: Thu, 16 Oct 2014 22:01:13 -0400
Subject: Libcrypt examples?
In-Reply-To: <76268.1413501686@server1.tristatelogic.com>
References: <76268.1413501686@server1.tristatelogic.com>
Message-ID: <E78B92D1-0609-4080-AF7B-FBF81889CC25@sumptuouscapital.com>

Not really sure how good it is to get involved in this discussion, but, ... see answers inline

Sent from my iPad

> On 16 Oct 2014, at 19:21, "Ronald F. Guilmette" <rfg at tristatelogic.com> wrote:
> 
> 
> I'm sorry that I could not reply right away.  I was called to other
> duties.
> 
> In message <8738aomjb1.fsf at vigenere.g10code.de>, 
> Werner Koch <wk at gnupg.org> wrote:
> 
>> On Wed, 15 Oct 2014 23:45, rfg at tristatelogic.com said:
>> 
>>> detailed, 134 page (PDF) manual for the library, and yet prospective
>>> users of the library, such as myself, cannot find even a single modest,
>>> real-world example of how to use the bloody thing.
>> 
>> IIRC, it has already been quoted from the introduction:
>> 
>> The reader is assumed to possess basic knowledge about applied
>> cryptography.
> 
> I believe that I do indeed already have "basic" knowledge of the subject.
> 
>> That is really important and it means that the reader knows what an IV
>> is, what an encryption mode is and which one first which purpose,why
>> padding is required, and so on.  Well, maybe this is a bit more than
>> "basic knowledge" but for us crypto plumbers this is basic.
> 
> I understand why padding may be required, I'm not sure what you mean
> by "IV", and as regards to the "mode", I think that I specified in my
> original post that symmetric key would be just fine for my purposes.

ehrm... have a look at http://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Block_cipher_mode_of_operation

> (Did you mean something else by your use of the term "mode" in this
> context?  If so, what?)
> 

...

>> - From where do I take the key?
> 
> The key will be embedded in the compiled binary of the program I'm building.

This would be easily extracted and only offer limited protection

> 
>> - Do I need to derive the key from Passphrase.
> 
> I hope not.  I want this simple.  There should be no pass phrase... just
> a pre-manufactured key.
> 
>> - Which cipher mode to use.
> 
> As I said, syymetric key will be just fine for me.  I most certainly
> *do not* need public key cryptography.

See link above

From rfg at tristatelogic.com  Fri Oct 17 05:33:41 2014
From: rfg at tristatelogic.com (Ronald F. Guilmette)
Date: Thu, 16 Oct 2014 20:33:41 -0700
Subject: Libcrypt examples?
In-Reply-To: <5440196B.8070808@sixdemonbag.org>
Message-ID: <77939.1413516821@server1.tristatelogic.com>


In message <5440196B.8070808 at sixdemonbag.org>, 
"Robert J. Hansen" <rjh at sixdemonbag.org> wrote:

>> I have a program.  It's written in C.  I intend to distribute it, in
>> binary form only, to other sites.  I do not and will not control how
>> any fo the local disks are configured at those other sites.
>
>The question then becomes, "who are you securing this data against?"  If
>your goal is to keep data on someone else's computer in a form that they
>can't read, you should be advised going in that it's a fool's errand.
>Can't be done.

See my other post from today.  Yes.  I know.  I understand that my program
will be decrypting the data block, and that my program can be disassembled,
and thus, the lock effectively picked.  And I most assuredly do understand
that such disassembly & analysis doesn't even involve, as they say "rocket
surgery".

Fortunately, I am not attempting to defend the data from nation states,
nor even from anyone who is seriously motivated, i.e. to do the disassembly
and subsequent analysis.  I just want to keep out those with ernest, but
not too intensely motivated curiosity.

>As an example of how it can be foiled: while your program is running,
>tell the computer to hibernate....

Yes, and yada yada yada.  I get it.  In this case, breaking the security
wouldn't even be that complicated.  Just disassemble the bloody thing,
look for the routine that does the decryption and see what key is being
passed to that.  Easy.  I cannot prevent _any_ of the numerous scenarios
along these lines, and I'm not going to be trying to do so.

Security is all relative... relative to what you are trying to protect.
I just read this story the other day, which I suspect many others on
this list probably also saw, in one place or another:

   http://www.popsci.com/article/technology/security-experts-build-150-safecracker

Do we think that everybody we read this story immediately threw out their
old combination lock safes?  No, of course not.  Nor has that become even
advisable in all cases.  If you have 20 full-sized bars of gold in your
combination lock safe, then yea, you might want to start thinking about
alternatives.  But if attackers only hope to pry from you your bottle of
Chivas Regal 25 and your favorite Reggie Jackson baseball card, then they
aren't going to bother _manufacturing_ one of those devices described in
the above news story, let alone babysitting it for up to four days while
it tries every combination until it gets the right one.

Alas, I don't have anything of equivalent value to a gold bar to protect.
Just some rather modest secrets.

>This is not an abstract or theoretical thing.  This is real.

I know.  I understand.  My program will be hackable.  I understand the
threat, I understand that it is real, and I have already accepted it as
part of the price for doing things the way I want to do them.  Now I
just need something that doesn't make the threat any _more_ real, in
practice, than it already needs to be, based on what I want to do and
how I plan to do it.  And I prefer not to invest too much time & energy
into this part of the project, precisely because I do know that the
program itself will always be hackable, e.g. to tease the key(s) out
it.

>> There *are* simply solutions to this rather trivial and common problem.
>
>If you're doing what I suspect you're doing, there really aren't any.
>There are a lot of techniques that don't work at all, and of those some
>are simple, and a lot of people use them without knowing that they don't
>work, instead believing that everything's going swimmingly because they
>don't, themselves, know how to break it.

Perhaps I understated my knowledge level, thereby leading you to the
conclusion that I have inadequate understanding of the risks inherent
in my plan.  However I do believe that I do understand those risks,
and that I've made an informed engineering decision to accept them, but
do not wish to make them any worse than they already need to be, based
on the plan (i.e. of embedding the decryption, including any and all
necessary keys, direcly into a binary which will then be released to
any old Tom, Dick and Harry).  I understand that this sort of thing
would never be recommended by any self-respecting cryptographer in this
day and age, because of the obvious and serious insecurities that would
thus be created.  However as I say, I am _not_ protecting anything as
valuable as gold bars here.  Just some modest secrets which I would
prefer that people not have unless and until they apply some talent and
at least a little ernest elbow grease to obtain them.

>I'm sorry if you find the libgcrypt manual to be of no use, but if it's
>of no use, please consider the possibility that you are not libgcrypt's
>intended audience.

That is indeed appearing, more and more, as a self-evident truth.  But
I thank you for stating in plainly.

>That's no slight on you, on your coding ability, or your professionalism.

Thank you for the courteous way in which you've made this entirely salient
point, i.e. that I'm perhaps not the intended audience for the libcrypt
manual.

>I'm a highly-skilled data forensics nerd, but
>when I have to do digital signal processing my eyes glaze over when the
>A/V nerds start talking about how the butterfly interleave of the fast
>Fourier transform is fundamentally and deeply connected to the roots of
>unity.  There's no shame in not knowing everything, because really, how
>could anyone be expected to?

Quite right sir.

Believe me, when posting my question, I went out of my way to make no
pretense at being any sort of a crypto guru (which I am clearly not).
I selected the (technically) lowest-level list I could find, relating
to GnuPG and its libraries before posting my question.  If there had been
a libcrypt-for-newbies or libcrypt--for-dummies mailing list, I would
have posted my original question(s) there instead of here.  But this
list seemed to be the one most likely to be tolerant of non-guru-level
questions, so I posted here and hoped for the best.  I was thus perhaps
understandably dismayed when, after waiting a day, the only response I
got seemed to be along the lines of "This is too complicated for you".
That was, to say the least, not really satisfying.  But now I've gotten
several responses with useful pointers to other libraries that might
better suit my needs, so I'm a happy camper again.


Regards,
rfg



From rfg at tristatelogic.com  Fri Oct 17 05:48:26 2014
From: rfg at tristatelogic.com (Ronald F. Guilmette)
Date: Thu, 16 Oct 2014 20:48:26 -0700
Subject: Libcrypt examples?
In-Reply-To: <E78B92D1-0609-4080-AF7B-FBF81889CC25@sumptuouscapital.com>
Message-ID: <78023.1413517706@server1.tristatelogic.com>


In message <E78B92D1-0609-4080-AF7B-FBF81889CC25 at sumptuouscapital.com>,
Kristian fiskerstrand <kristian.fiskerstrand at sumptuouscapital.com> wrote:

>>>...
>>> - From where do I take the key?
>>
>> The key will be embedded in the compiled binary of the program I'm building.
>
>This would be easily extracted and only offer limited protection

As stated in my other replies:  Yes, I know.


P.S.  Whereas at the outset of this thread, with all due and proper
modesty, I disclaimed deep knowledge of most things crypto, I am not
entirely unfamiliar with the tools, including gdb, that are available
for dissecting compiled code.  Indeed, once upon a time I worked on
such tools professionally.


From rjh at sixdemonbag.org  Fri Oct 17 06:00:41 2014
From: rjh at sixdemonbag.org (Robert J. Hansen)
Date: Fri, 17 Oct 2014 00:00:41 -0400
Subject: Libcrypt examples?
In-Reply-To: <77939.1413516821@server1.tristatelogic.com>
References: <77939.1413516821@server1.tristatelogic.com>
Message-ID: <54409469.9090504@sixdemonbag.org>

> I just want to keep out those with ernest, but
> not too intensely motivated curiosity.

Crypto comes in only two varieties: the kinds that will keep secrets
safe against a motivated thirteen-year-old, and the kinds that will keep
secrets safe against space aliens from Zarbnulax.[*]

It's kind of the nature of this list to believe there's no point in the
former and to obsess over the latter -- when neither dismissal nor
obsession is actually a very good policy.  I'm not going to dismiss the
former kind of crypto: my only lookout is making sure that you're fully
appraised of the risks.  Which it seems like you are, so go with God and
happy hacking.  :)

[*] "the space aliens from Zarbnulax" is my usual shorthand for "an
adversary with knowledge of mathematics and science far beyond ours, and
computers that operate at the outer edge of what the universe will
bear".  Most of the regulars on the list have heard me talk about the
Zarbnulaxians before, but I figure a heads-up for the newcomer might be
polite.

> That was, to say the least, not really satisfying.  But now I've gotten
> several responses with useful pointers to other libraries that might
> better suit my needs, so I'm a happy camper again.

Excellent!  I'm glad we could point you in a useful direction.

Incidentally, the author of cryptlib is a pretty reasonable guy.  If you
have questions shout out to him and I suspect you'll get reasonable
answers.  :)


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From peter at digitalbrains.com  Fri Oct 17 11:47:36 2014
From: peter at digitalbrains.com (Peter Lebbing)
Date: Fri, 17 Oct 2014 11:47:36 +0200
Subject: Libcrypt examples?
In-Reply-To: <76391.1413503061@server1.tristatelogic.com>
References: <76391.1413503061@server1.tristatelogic.com>
Message-ID: <5440E5B8.4090309@digitalbrains.com>

On 17/10/14 01:44, Ronald F. Guilmette wrote:
> In your reply, you said, in effect, "Using X is too complicated" and
> you suggested no other alternatives.

This is simply not true. I had very little information to go on, but I
did suggest that perhaps full-disk encryption was something that might
be an alternative. That this wasn't a viable solution wasn't something I
could know, but I suggested an alternative.

Other than that, I think I simply do not know any alternatives. I was
happy with Rob's post about Peter Gutmann's cryptlib because I might be
able to use that hint myself one day.

And ultimately, I don't feel like the rest of my contribution somehow
obliged me to point out alternatives anyway.

Peter.

-- 
I use the GNU Privacy Guard (GnuPG) in combination with Enigmail.
You can send me encrypted mail if you want some privacy.
My key is available at <http://digitalbrains.com/2012/openpgp-key-peter>


From wk at gnupg.org  Fri Oct 17 19:09:39 2014
From: wk at gnupg.org (Werner Koch)
Date: Fri, 17 Oct 2014 19:09:39 +0200
Subject: The return of the crypto wars ?
Message-ID: <87lhoelj1o.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>

Hi,

maybe the decision to keep GnuPG infrastructure out of the US - even
after the lifting of the export restrictions - was not too bad.

  <http://www.goodwinprocter.com/Publications/Newsletters/Client-Alert/2014/1015_Software-Companies-Now-on-Notice-That-Encryption-Exports-May-Be-Treated-More-Seriously.aspx>

  We believe this to be the first penalty BIS has ever issued for the
  unlicensed export of encryption software that did not also involve
  comprehensively sanctioned countries (e.g., Cuba, Iran, North Korea,
  Sudan or Syria). This suggests a fundamental change in BIS?s treatment
  of violations of the encryption regulations.
[...]
  Encryption is ubiquitous in software products. Companies making these
  products should reexamine their product classifications, export
  eligibility, and internal policies and procedures regarding the export
  of software that uses or leverages encryption (even open source or
                                                      ^^^^^^^^^^^
  third-party encryption libraries), particularly where a potential
  transaction on the horizon ? e.g., an acquisition, financing, or


What do we have to expect next?  US hackers again not allowed to work on
or "export" open source software?


Salam-Shalom,

   Werner


-- 
Die Gedanken sind frei.  Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz.



From rjh at sixdemonbag.org  Fri Oct 17 20:23:25 2014
From: rjh at sixdemonbag.org (Robert J. Hansen)
Date: Fri, 17 Oct 2014 14:23:25 -0400
Subject: The return of the crypto wars ?
In-Reply-To: <87lhoelj1o.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
References: <87lhoelj1o.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
Message-ID: <54415E9D.4000304@sixdemonbag.org>

> What do we have to expect next?  US hackers again not allowed to work
> on or "export" open source software?

Warning: I am not a lawyer.  But that's okay, because this law firm
doesn't appear to have any lawyers, either.

In 1995, Dan Bernstein wanted to electronically publish an academic
paper and supporting source code which implemented a cryptosystem.
Under the regulations in place in '95, this was a violation of ITAR and
EAR, the two comprehensive set of rules that govern how munitions and
sensitive information may be exported.  Bernstein filed a lawsuit
claiming this was a violation of his First Amendment right to speak freely.

The trial court, administered by Judge Marilyn Patel, agreed with
Bernstein.  So did the appellate court (Judges Bright, Fletcher and
Nelson).  The government asked for a third level of appeal, the
so-called "en banc review." [1]  The appellate court withdrew their
decision pending the en banc review -- but at the last minute the
government changed the ITAR and EAR regulations in ways that would let
Bernstein post his source code, so the entire case became moot.

There's another case that's on-point here -- _Junger v Daley_, coming
out of the Sixth Circuit in ... uh ... I don't know: '96?  The decision
came down in 2000, at any rate.  The Sixth Circuit held that source code
is protected by the First Amendment.  The government has no more
authority to prevent a U.S. person from publishing source code
internationally than it would have authority to prevent a U.S. person
from sending a painting to the Louvre, or a copy of a book to a friend
overseas.

So, yeah.  I am not in any way worried.  The U.S. government has argued
*five times* in federal court that libre hackers may be prohibited from
sharing our source code internationally... and *five times* the federal
courts have smacked it down as unconstitutional.  There's a lot of
precedent protecting libre hackers.  For once, the system worked the way
it's supposed to.




[1] The United States federal judicial system is broken up into what are
called "circuits".  California, Hawai'i, Alaska, Oregon, Washington and
some other states comprise the Ninth Circuit.  In every circuit but the
Ninth, en banc review means *every* appeals judge on the circuit is
asked to weigh in on a decision.  The Ninth Circuit is so large, though,
that polling every appellate judge is considered impractical.  Instead,
in the Ninth Circuit an en banc hearing means the case is heard before
11 different appellate judges.

If you get the idea en banc review is a big deal, you're right.  Very
few cases receive en banc review, and those are usually ones that the
appellate court believes are making a beeline for SCOTUS.

The reason why I called it the "so-called 'en banc review'" is because
it's a misnomer.  In the Ninth Circuit, an en banc review isn't really
an en banc review -- it's just 11 judges, not all 45.



From rjh at sixdemonbag.org  Fri Oct 17 20:29:20 2014
From: rjh at sixdemonbag.org (Robert J. Hansen)
Date: Fri, 17 Oct 2014 14:29:20 -0400
Subject: The return of the crypto wars ?
In-Reply-To: <54415E9D.4000304@sixdemonbag.org>
References: <87lhoelj1o.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
 <54415E9D.4000304@sixdemonbag.org>
Message-ID: <54416000.8090104@sixdemonbag.org>

> So, yeah.  I am not in any way worried.  The U.S. government has
> argued *five times* in federal court that libre hackers may be
> prohibited from sharing our source code internationally... and *five
> times* the federal courts have smacked it down as unconstitutional.

Err, sorry.  Argued five times in federal court, been smacked down four
times.  They would've been smacked down a fifth, but the government
mooted the case by capitulating to Bernstein.

I apologize for the error.  Still, it doesn't change the bottom line:

> There's a lot of precedent protecting libre hackers.  For once, the
> system worked the way it's supposed to.




From rfg at tristatelogic.com  Fri Oct 17 20:38:42 2014
From: rfg at tristatelogic.com (Ronald F. Guilmette)
Date: Fri, 17 Oct 2014 11:38:42 -0700
Subject: Libcrypt examples?
In-Reply-To: <54409469.9090504@sixdemonbag.org>
Message-ID: <90028.1413571122@server1.tristatelogic.com>


In message <54409469.9090504 at sixdemonbag.org>, 
"Robert J. Hansen" <rjh at sixdemonbag.org> wrote:

>> I just want to keep out those with ernest, but
>> not too intensely motivated curiosity.
>
>Crypto comes in only two varieties: the kinds that will keep secrets
>safe against a motivated thirteen-year-old, and the kinds that will keep
>secrets safe against space aliens from Zarbnulax.[*]
>
>It's kind of the nature of this list to believe there's no point in the
>former and to obsess over the latter

Yea, I'm starting to get that.

> -- when neither dismissal nor
>obsession is actually a very good policy.  I'm not going to dismiss the
>former kind of crypto: my only lookout is making sure that you're fully
>appraised of the risks.  Which it seems like you are, so go with God and
>happy hacking.  :)

Thank you sir.

>[*] "the space aliens from Zarbnulax" is my usual shorthand for "an
>adversary with knowledge of mathematics and science far beyond ours,

Not to disagree with your way of categorizing threat levels, but won't
those Zarbnulaxians have quantum computers which render all of our
current crypto stuff impotent?

I think you may want to add a middle category to your threat taxonomy:

1)  Motivated thirteen year olds.
2)  The NSA.
3)  Space aliens from Zarbnulax.

I suspect that most here would be satisfied with provably strong defenses
against 1 and 2.  (And, as I've mentioned, for my own rather specialzed
project at the moment, a decent defense against only category 1 will
be sufficient.)


Regards,
rfg


From rfg at tristatelogic.com  Fri Oct 17 20:46:00 2014
From: rfg at tristatelogic.com (Ronald F. Guilmette)
Date: Fri, 17 Oct 2014 11:46:00 -0700
Subject: Libcrypt examples?
In-Reply-To: <5440E5B8.4090309@digitalbrains.com>
Message-ID: <90059.1413571560@server1.tristatelogic.com>


In message <5440E5B8.4090309 at digitalbrains.com>, 
Peter Lebbing <peter at digitalbrains.com> wrote:

>On 17/10/14 01:44, Ronald F. Guilmette wrote:
>> In your reply, you said, in effect, "Using X is too complicated" and
>> you suggested no other alternatives.
>
>This is simply not true. I had very little information to go on, but I
>did suggest that perhaps full-disk encryption was something

OK.  Yes.   I stand corrected.

However I think that you may understand (now) that from my perspective,
that was not a real alternative.  From where I was/am sitting, it was
almost as if I made a post saying that I needed to protect my money
and you told me to go and buy myself a bank vault.

In any case, I do apologize for my admittedly short-tempered response.
I've been cranky of late, for reasons having nothing to do with either
you or your response, and I'm sorry.


Regards,
rfg


From wk at gnupg.org  Fri Oct 17 21:07:54 2014
From: wk at gnupg.org (Werner Koch)
Date: Fri, 17 Oct 2014 21:07:54 +0200
Subject: The return of the crypto wars ?
In-Reply-To: <54415E9D.4000304@sixdemonbag.org> (Robert J. Hansen's message of
 "Fri, 17 Oct 2014 14:23:25 -0400")
References: <87lhoelj1o.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
 <54415E9D.4000304@sixdemonbag.org>
Message-ID: <8761fildkl.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>

On Fri, 17 Oct 2014 20:23, rjh at sixdemonbag.org said:

> Warning: I am not a lawyer.  But that's okay, because this law firm
> doesn't appear to have any lawyers, either.

You mean the "open source part", okay.  Thanks for the summary of the
cour decisions.

> courts have smacked it down as unconstitutional.  There's a lot of
> precedent protecting libre hackers.  For once, the system worked the way

But not for the companies who allow them to make a living.  That is not
protected by the right to speak freely, or are there other cases where
limitations on the restriction of export of goods are help
unconstitutional?


Salam-Shalom,

   Werner


-- 
Die Gedanken sind frei.  Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz.



From rjh at sixdemonbag.org  Fri Oct 17 22:04:28 2014
From: rjh at sixdemonbag.org (Robert J. Hansen)
Date: Fri, 17 Oct 2014 16:04:28 -0400
Subject: The return of the crypto wars ?
In-Reply-To: <8761fildkl.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
References: <87lhoelj1o.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>	<54415E9D.4000304@sixdemonbag.org>
 <8761fildkl.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
Message-ID: <5441764C.40203@sixdemonbag.org>

> But not for the companies who allow them to make a living.  That is not
> protected by the right to speak freely, or are there other cases where
> limitations on the restriction of export of goods are help
> unconstitutional?

Commercial speech receives fewer legal protections than political,
artistic, or scientific speech, but it's not unprotected.  Basically,
corporations can be required to file paperwork before exporting crypto.
 It's not much paperwork, either: I think it's only a couple of pages'
worth that have to be faxed over to the Department of State.

In the case you're talking about, Wind River wasn't punished for
exporting crypto -- they were punished for not filing two pages of
information with the Department of State.  If they had they would've
been just fine.


From sudhir at sudhirkhanger.com  Fri Oct 17 21:17:46 2014
From: sudhir at sudhirkhanger.com (Sudhir Khanger)
Date: Sat, 18 Oct 2014 00:47:46 +0530
Subject: Encrypt folders which include audio video and text files
Message-ID: <CAPJdnyKB=2WAabXZWQK0+g9dBCp0ohdBt4eUFF-cp76xA6GgAQ@mail.gmail.com>

What do you guys use to encrypt folders which may include audio, video
and text files?

-- 
Regards,
Sudhir Khanger,
sudhirkhanger.com,
github.com/donniezazen,
5577 8CDB A059 085D 1D60  807F 8C00 45D9 F5EF C394.


From rjh at sixdemonbag.org  Fri Oct 17 22:12:46 2014
From: rjh at sixdemonbag.org (Robert J. Hansen)
Date: Fri, 17 Oct 2014 16:12:46 -0400
Subject: Libcrypt examples?
In-Reply-To: <90028.1413571122@server1.tristatelogic.com>
References: <90028.1413571122@server1.tristatelogic.com>
Message-ID: <5441783E.1070108@sixdemonbag.org>

> Not to disagree with your way of categorizing threat levels, but won't
> those Zarbnulaxians have quantum computers which render all of our
> current crypto stuff impotent?

No.  Quantum computers still obey the mathematical laws of computation
as formulated by Turing and Church and others, and obey physical
constraints like the Landauer bound, the Margolus-Levitin limit,
Bremermann's limit, the Jarzynski equality, and more.  If you take all
of these principles and plug them together, you get what's called
"quantum information theory" -- a framework that lets you put limits on
how fast computers can operate and what minimum energy is required to
run them.

It's pretty easy to show, for instance, that breaking a 256-bit cipher
with a Zarbnulaxian quantum computer would release so much heat the
earth would be uninhabitable.  That's why I'm pretty sure no one on
earth is anywhere near close to being able to break it: because if they
were, none of us would be alive to talk about it.  :)

The coolest thing about quantum information theory, though?  You can
sing it to the Teenage Mutant Ninja Turtles theme song.  "Quantum
information theory!  Shannon is my homeboy!  QUANTUM POWER!"

> 1)  Motivated thirteen year olds.
> 2)  Lord Voldemort.
> 3)  Space aliens from Zarbnulax.

I changed #2 for you.  :)

The reason why I never talk about "the [insert-three-letters-here]" is
because those conversations deteriorate very quickly.  Once you invoke
those three letters, many otherwise-rational people turn into unhinged
conspiracy theorists who buy even the most absurd claims.  As an
example, over on the Enigmail list there was someone who sincerely
believed that a site parodying the [insert-three-letters-here], which
*explicitly said it was a parody*, was in reality the real deal and
everything it said should be believed.

Once you start using those letters the overall quality of the
conversation gets degraded.  I prefer to avoid that.


From rjh at sixdemonbag.org  Fri Oct 17 22:15:36 2014
From: rjh at sixdemonbag.org (Robert J. Hansen)
Date: Fri, 17 Oct 2014 16:15:36 -0400
Subject: Encrypt folders which include audio video and text files
In-Reply-To: <CAPJdnyKB=2WAabXZWQK0+g9dBCp0ohdBt4eUFF-cp76xA6GgAQ@mail.gmail.com>
References: <CAPJdnyKB=2WAabXZWQK0+g9dBCp0ohdBt4eUFF-cp76xA6GgAQ@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <544178E8.5020008@sixdemonbag.org>

> What do you guys use to encrypt folders which may include audio, video
> and text files?

On Windows I use BitLocker; on Mac OS X I use FileVault; on Linux I use
an encrypted loopback filesystem.  Folders are a property of the
filesystem, and it's usually best to solve filesystem issues at the
filesystem level.


From peter at digitalbrains.com  Fri Oct 17 22:20:29 2014
From: peter at digitalbrains.com (Peter Lebbing)
Date: Fri, 17 Oct 2014 22:20:29 +0200
Subject: Libcrypt examples?
In-Reply-To: <5441783E.1070108@sixdemonbag.org>
References: <90028.1413571122@server1.tristatelogic.com>
 <5441783E.1070108@sixdemonbag.org>
Message-ID: <54417A0D.1040808@digitalbrains.com>

On 17/10/14 22:12, Robert J. Hansen wrote:
> The coolest thing about quantum information theory, though?  You can
> sing it to the Teenage Mutant Ninja Turtles theme song.  "Quantum
> information theory!  Shannon is my homeboy!  QUANTUM POWER!"

http://xkcd.com/1412/

I only see "Quantum vacuum plasma thruster", but not yours. Kudos on the nice
addition, including followup lines!

> Once you start using those letters the overall quality of the
> conversation gets degraded.  I prefer to avoid that.

I hope you agree this doesn't go for the four letters I just threw in the mix :).

Peter.

-- 
I use the GNU Privacy Guard (GnuPG) in combination with Enigmail.
You can send me encrypted mail if you want some privacy.
My key is available at <http://digitalbrains.com/2012/openpgp-key-peter>


From rfg at tristatelogic.com  Sat Oct 18 01:45:43 2014
From: rfg at tristatelogic.com (Ronald F. Guilmette)
Date: Fri, 17 Oct 2014 16:45:43 -0700
Subject: Libcrypt examples?
In-Reply-To: <5441783E.1070108@sixdemonbag.org>
Message-ID: <91918.1413589543@server1.tristatelogic.com>


In message <5441783E.1070108 at sixdemonbag.org>, 
"Robert J. Hansen" <rjh at sixdemonbag.org> wrote:

>It's pretty easy to show, for instance, that breaking a 256-bit cipher
>with a Zarbnulaxian quantum computer would release so much heat the
>earth would be uninhabitable.

Well, I'm damn glad I asked then.

I *had* invited a friend of mine from Zarbnulax over this weekend.
We *were* going to fry up some steaks, have a couple of beers, and
try out his new computer on a 256-bit cipher, but I'm emailing him
now and telling him that the barbecue is off for now... both our
little one, and also the earth-sized one.

>The reason why I never talk about "the [insert-three-letters-here]" is
>because those conversations deteriorate very quickly.  Once you invoke
>those three letters, many otherwise-rational people turn into unhinged
>conspiracy theorists who buy even the most absurd claims.

Can't speak for anyone else, obviously, but I promise to keep my hinges
on.

>As an
>example, over on the Enigmail list there was someone who sincerely
>believed that a site parodying the [insert-three-letters-here], which
>*explicitly said it was a parody*, was in reality the real deal and
>everything it said should be believed.

Well, you know what they say... You can't prove a negative. :-)

>Once you start using those letters the overall quality of the
>conversation gets degraded.  I prefer to avoid that.

I'm with you.  I'll refrain from mentioning Bleep.Bleep.Bleep in
future. (I suspect that we're all gonna have our hands full with
looney Ebola conspiracy theories for the next couple of months at
least anyway, so yea, no need to add more fuel to the fire.)


Regards,
rfg


From peter at digitalbrains.com  Sat Oct 18 12:55:36 2014
From: peter at digitalbrains.com (Peter Lebbing)
Date: Sat, 18 Oct 2014 12:55:36 +0200
Subject: Libcrypt examples?
In-Reply-To: <90059.1413571560@server1.tristatelogic.com>
References: <90059.1413571560@server1.tristatelogic.com>
Message-ID: <54424728.5090000@digitalbrains.com>

On 17/10/14 20:46, Ronald F. Guilmette wrote:
> In any case, I do apologize for my admittedly short-tempered response.
> I've been cranky of late, for reasons having nothing to do with either
> you or your response, and I'm sorry.

I'm sorry to hear that. Thank you for the apology.

Peter.

-- 
I use the GNU Privacy Guard (GnuPG) in combination with Enigmail.
You can send me encrypted mail if you want some privacy.
My key is available at <http://digitalbrains.com/2012/openpgp-key-peter>


From johanw at vulcan.xs4all.nl  Sat Oct 18 15:59:36 2014
From: johanw at vulcan.xs4all.nl (Johan Wevers)
Date: Sat, 18 Oct 2014 15:59:36 +0200
Subject: The return of the crypto wars ?
In-Reply-To: <54416000.8090104@sixdemonbag.org>
References: <87lhoelj1o.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
 <54415E9D.4000304@sixdemonbag.org> <54416000.8090104@sixdemonbag.org>
Message-ID: <54427248.7080200@vulcan.xs4all.nl>

On 17-10-2014 20:29, Robert J. Hansen wrote:

> Err, sorry.  Argued five times in federal court, been smacked down four
> times.

I don't see any reason why they might not change the law, as the FBI is
proposing, or try to bancrupt a sixt person by going to court again
against someone with limited financial resources.  There is the extra
burden that in the US judges can check laws against the constitution
(one of the few things I really like about the US law system) but
someone smart might just overcome that. Perhaps they will fail a few
more times, but just as with the "fre trade" treaties, fail once and try
again and keep trying until you succeed.

And that is assuming the government is playing it fair. They seem quite
fanatic since Snowden's revelations. If you have done something in your
younger years you don't want to become general knowledge you do might
have a problem.

>> There's a lot of precedent protecting libre hackers.  For once, the
>> system worked the way it's supposed to.

If you have the resources to defend yourself. If you don't want to spend
that juch money, or prefer to spend your time on different matters,
you'd better keep your crypto development outside the US.

-- 
ir. J.C.A. Wevers
PGP/GPG public keys at http://www.xs4all.nl/~johanw/pgpkeys.html



From johanw at vulcan.xs4all.nl  Sat Oct 18 16:03:58 2014
From: johanw at vulcan.xs4all.nl (Johan Wevers)
Date: Sat, 18 Oct 2014 16:03:58 +0200
Subject: Libcrypt examples?
In-Reply-To: <76268.1413501686@server1.tristatelogic.com>
References: <76268.1413501686@server1.tristatelogic.com>
Message-ID: <5442734E.6080500@vulcan.xs4all.nl>

On 17-10-2014 1:21, Ronald F. Guilmette wrote:

> I understand why padding may be required, I'm not sure what you mean
> by "IV",

Initialization vector: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Initialization_vector

> and as regards to the "mode", I think that I specified in my
> original post that symmetric key would be just fine for my purposes.

Yes, but you can use (most) symmetric blockciphers in different modes. I
suggest you read
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Block_cipher_mode_of_operation for a
general introduction.

I'm not claiming to have expert knowledge on these subjects but at least
I have some impressions where I lack on knowledge to implement things.

-- 
ir. J.C.A. Wevers
PGP/GPG public keys at http://www.xs4all.nl/~johanw/pgpkeys.html



From johanw at vulcan.xs4all.nl  Sat Oct 18 16:05:00 2014
From: johanw at vulcan.xs4all.nl (Johan Wevers)
Date: Sat, 18 Oct 2014 16:05:00 +0200
Subject: Encrypt folders which include audio video and text files
In-Reply-To: <CAPJdnyKB=2WAabXZWQK0+g9dBCp0ohdBt4eUFF-cp76xA6GgAQ@mail.gmail.com>
References: <CAPJdnyKB=2WAabXZWQK0+g9dBCp0ohdBt4eUFF-cp76xA6GgAQ@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <5442738C.9040901@vulcan.xs4all.nl>

On 17-10-2014 21:17, Sudhir Khanger wrote:

> What do you guys use to encrypt folders which may include audio, video
> and text files?

TrueCrypt.

-- 
ir. J.C.A. Wevers
PGP/GPG public keys at http://www.xs4all.nl/~johanw/pgpkeys.html



From johanw at vulcan.xs4all.nl  Sat Oct 18 16:09:54 2014
From: johanw at vulcan.xs4all.nl (Johan Wevers)
Date: Sat, 18 Oct 2014 16:09:54 +0200
Subject: Libcrypt examples?
In-Reply-To: <5441783E.1070108@sixdemonbag.org>
References: <90028.1413571122@server1.tristatelogic.com>
 <5441783E.1070108@sixdemonbag.org>
Message-ID: <544274B2.2090301@vulcan.xs4all.nl>

On 17-10-2014 22:12, Robert J. Hansen wrote:

> It's pretty easy to show, for instance, that breaking a 256-bit cipher
> with a Zarbnulaxian quantum computer would release so much heat the
> earth would be uninhabitable.

Assuming they have no better way than brute-forcing it. If their
knowledge of mathematics is much larger than ours (the NSA knew about
some attacks before the civil crypto community as proved by their
optimization of DES against differential cryptanalysis) that might be a
questionable assumption.

Otherwise there is still rubber-hose cryptography (torture) and the
aliens might be telepaths or have advanced brain scanners (side channel
attack).

-- 
ir. J.C.A. Wevers
PGP/GPG public keys at http://www.xs4all.nl/~johanw/pgpkeys.html



From mailinglisten at hauke-laging.de  Sun Oct 19 00:56:09 2014
From: mailinglisten at hauke-laging.de (Hauke Laging)
Date: Sun, 19 Oct 2014 00:56:09 +0200
Subject: new helper program for configuration import / export
Message-ID: <1573300.ozIxrjrrJI@inno>

Hello,

I am often asked whether (and how) it is possible to use OpenPGP on 
several systems with the same keys. You are probably aware that this is 
also asked here, not often but regularly. And then the "copy everything 
except random_seed" fun begins again.

I just noticed how strange it is that there is no function for an easy 
export (and import) of the whole configuration (including the key 
rings). Strange because this is on the one hand vital as it is not just 
for configuration and key synchronization but the same for backup and on 
the other hand contains risks (random_seed; having secring.gpg with 
rather weak passphrases on a cleartext backup volume). And is so 
extremely easy to solve.

Thus I would like to emphaticly suggest rather not to extend gpg but to 
add a very small helper program to the GnuPG suite. There is already 
gpg-zip. It may be enough to write a wrapper around that. The result 
shall be a program with only two commands:

a) save the complete configuration (optionally protexted with a 
passphrase) to a single file

gpg-backup --with-passphrase --save /path/to/targetfile


b) restore the complete configuration from a single file (with the 
option to overwrite or import)

gpg-backup --overwrite --restore /path/to/sourcefile


This could be easily added to the GUIs as they would just need a new 
menu entry and a file dialog. Doesn't makse sense that they invent their 
own backup / sync features.


I could do this myself ? but as a script only (which would not be 
portable). But if it helps then I would write that so that there is 
something to lookt at what the result would look like and play with.


Hauke
-- 
Crypto f?r alle: http://www.openpgp-schulungen.de/fuer/unterstuetzer/
http://userbase.kde.org/Concepts/OpenPGP_Help_Spread
OpenPGP: 7D82 FB9F D25A 2CE4 5241 6C37 BF4B 8EEF 1A57 1DF5
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From rjh at sixdemonbag.org  Sun Oct 19 03:08:30 2014
From: rjh at sixdemonbag.org (Robert J. Hansen)
Date: Sat, 18 Oct 2014 21:08:30 -0400
Subject: new helper program for configuration import / export
In-Reply-To: <1573300.ozIxrjrrJI@inno>
References: <1573300.ozIxrjrrJI@inno>
Message-ID: <54430F0E.1050903@sixdemonbag.org>

> Thus I would like to emphaticly suggest rather not to extend gpg but
> to add a very small helper program to the GnuPG suite.

It sounds reasonable.  Why not write it yourself?

> I could do this myself ? but as a script only (which would not be 
> portable).

It's not hard to make highly portable Perl or Python scripts.  I think
you're overestimating the difficulty here.


From mailinglisten at hauke-laging.de  Sun Oct 19 03:39:05 2014
From: mailinglisten at hauke-laging.de (Hauke Laging)
Date: Sun, 19 Oct 2014 03:39:05 +0200
Subject: new helper program for configuration import / export
In-Reply-To: <54430F0E.1050903@sixdemonbag.org>
References: <1573300.ozIxrjrrJI@inno> <54430F0E.1050903@sixdemonbag.org>
Message-ID: <5400031.g77FQuvlJV@inno>

Am Sa 18.10.2014, 21:08:30 schrieb Robert J. Hansen:

> > I could do this myself ? but as a script only (which would not be
> > portable).
> 
> It's not hard to make highly portable Perl or Python scripts.  I think
> you're overestimating the difficulty here.

I am aware of that. The first point is that I am much more familiar with 
bash than with Python (but I would get that done). The more important 
point is that I guess that GnuPG currently has no dependency to Python 
and that this probably shall not be changed. I.e. this would not work 
under Windows. Is it possible to compile Windows binaries from Python 
code (something like a Python to C converter)?

But most probably someone would volunteer to port that to C I assume.


Hauke
-- 
Crypto f?r alle: http://www.openpgp-schulungen.de/fuer/unterstuetzer/
http://userbase.kde.org/Concepts/OpenPGP_Help_Spread
OpenPGP: 7D82 FB9F D25A 2CE4 5241 6C37 BF4B 8EEF 1A57 1DF5
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From rjh at sixdemonbag.org  Sun Oct 19 04:16:05 2014
From: rjh at sixdemonbag.org (Robert J. Hansen)
Date: Sat, 18 Oct 2014 22:16:05 -0400
Subject: new helper program for configuration import / export
In-Reply-To: <5400031.g77FQuvlJV@inno>
References: <1573300.ozIxrjrrJI@inno> <54430F0E.1050903@sixdemonbag.org>
 <5400031.g77FQuvlJV@inno>
Message-ID: <54431EE5.5080001@sixdemonbag.org>

> Is it possible to compile Windows binaries from Python 
> code (something like a Python to C converter)?

py2exe, yes.



From dougb at dougbarton.email  Sun Oct 19 08:26:26 2014
From: dougb at dougbarton.email (Doug Barton)
Date: Sat, 18 Oct 2014 23:26:26 -0700
Subject: new helper program for configuration import / export
In-Reply-To: <1573300.ozIxrjrrJI@inno>
References: <1573300.ozIxrjrrJI@inno>
Message-ID: <54435992.6020106@dougbarton.email>

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA256

On 10/18/14 3:56 PM, Hauke Laging wrote:
| Hello,
|
| I am often asked whether (and how) it is possible to use OpenPGP
| on several systems with the same keys. You are probably aware that
| this is also asked here, not often but regularly. And then the
| "copy everything except random_seed" fun begins again.

... and since that answer is correct, and works, why is it not
sufficient?

Doug

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Version: GnuPG v2

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=8Cu+
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From ml at sudhirkhanger.com  Sun Oct 19 11:48:18 2014
From: ml at sudhirkhanger.com (Sudhir Khanger)
Date: Sun, 19 Oct 2014 15:18:18 +0530
Subject: Restoring GnuPG
Message-ID: <CAPJdnyJ758XP6kXk1wqSW5L32-D-w7yXP1paZD07ZWkKROibJQ@mail.gmail.com>

Hello,

I have a few questions regarding GnuPG.

1. Is secret key the most important part of GnuPG? By important I mean
if you only had your secret key could get back to your original setup
ignoring the imported public keys. My original setup included signing
and encryption key created along with the creation of the key, public
key part and revocation certificate generated by me and uid attached
to the key, of course by me. Can all these be recreated from your
secret key? So as long as you have your secret key you are good to go.

2. "gpg --import secret.key" I suppose this is the command I have to
use to import the secret key on a new system.

-- 
Regards,
Sudhir Khanger,
sudhirkhanger.com,
github.com/donniezazen,
5577 8CDB A059 085D 1D60  807F 8C00 45D9 F5EF C394.


From peter at digitalbrains.com  Sun Oct 19 13:18:29 2014
From: peter at digitalbrains.com (Peter Lebbing)
Date: Sun, 19 Oct 2014 13:18:29 +0200
Subject: Restoring GnuPG
In-Reply-To: <CAPJdnyJ758XP6kXk1wqSW5L32-D-w7yXP1paZD07ZWkKROibJQ@mail.gmail.com>
References: <CAPJdnyJ758XP6kXk1wqSW5L32-D-w7yXP1paZD07ZWkKROibJQ@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <54439E05.9010208@digitalbrains.com>

On 19/10/14 11:48, Sudhir Khanger wrote:
> By important I mean
> if you only had your secret key could get back to your original setup
> ignoring the imported public keys.

Yes; also ignoring all assigned ownertrust values.

Public key and revocation certificate can be recreated; the latter is
usually only used precisely when you have lost access to the secret key.

I'm fairly sure even certifications from other users are included in the
private key, as long as you don't specify options scrubbing them from
the key on export.

> 2. "gpg --import secret.key" I suppose this is the command I have to
> use to import the secret key on a new system.

Additionally, you'll most likely want to assign ultimate ownertrust to
the key; this is automatically done when using --gen-key, but not on
importing a secret key.

$ gpg2 --edit-key YOURKEYID trust

HTH,

Peter.


-- 
I use the GNU Privacy Guard (GnuPG) in combination with Enigmail.
You can send me encrypted mail if you want some privacy.
My key is available at <http://digitalbrains.com/2012/openpgp-key-peter>


From peter at digitalbrains.com  Sun Oct 19 13:22:07 2014
From: peter at digitalbrains.com (Peter Lebbing)
Date: Sun, 19 Oct 2014 13:22:07 +0200
Subject: Encrypt folders which include audio video and text files
In-Reply-To: <CAPJdnyKB=2WAabXZWQK0+g9dBCp0ohdBt4eUFF-cp76xA6GgAQ@mail.gmail.com>
References: <CAPJdnyKB=2WAabXZWQK0+g9dBCp0ohdBt4eUFF-cp76xA6GgAQ@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <54439EDF.8010804@digitalbrains.com>

On 17/10/14 21:17, Sudhir Khanger wrote:
> What do you guys use to encrypt folders which may include audio, video
> and text files?

I'm still missing my favourite alternative in the suggestions.

device-mapper's dm-crypt target together with LUKS (Linux Unified Key
Setup). dm-crypt is somewhat the successor to encrypted loopback
mentioned by Rob, and fixes some of the issues perceived in encrypted
loopback. Some of those where subsequently also fixed in encrypted
loopback itself, to make things more clear for everyone ;P.

In Debian, the package cryptsetup provides all the goodness.

HTH,

Peter.

-- 
I use the GNU Privacy Guard (GnuPG) in combination with Enigmail.
You can send me encrypted mail if you want some privacy.
My key is available at <http://digitalbrains.com/2012/openpgp-key-peter>


From htd+ml at fritha.org  Sun Oct 19 13:26:03 2014
From: htd+ml at fritha.org (Heinz Diehl)
Date: Sun, 19 Oct 2014 13:26:03 +0200
Subject: Restoring GnuPG
In-Reply-To: <CAPJdnyJ758XP6kXk1wqSW5L32-D-w7yXP1paZD07ZWkKROibJQ@mail.gmail.com>
References: <CAPJdnyJ758XP6kXk1wqSW5L32-D-w7yXP1paZD07ZWkKROibJQ@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <20141019112603.GA32707@fritha.org>

On 19.10.2014, Sudhir Khanger wrote: 

> 1. Is secret key the most important part of GnuPG? By important I mean
> if you only had your secret key could get back to your original setup
> ignoring the imported public keys.

Of course, you can omit/delete your pubring.gpg, if you like. However, unless
you import a public key, you won't be able to communicate using gpg
encryption.

> 2. "gpg --import secret.key" I suppose this is the command I have to
> use to import the secret key on a new system.

You can just copy your secring.gpg into your freshly installed
~/.gnupg directory. Importing your secret key would also re-install
your public key..



From peter at digitalbrains.com  Sun Oct 19 13:26:55 2014
From: peter at digitalbrains.com (Peter Lebbing)
Date: Sun, 19 Oct 2014 13:26:55 +0200
Subject: new helper program for configuration import / export
In-Reply-To: <1573300.ozIxrjrrJI@inno>
References: <1573300.ozIxrjrrJI@inno>
Message-ID: <54439FFF.906@digitalbrains.com>

On 19/10/14 00:56, Hauke Laging wrote:
> [...] having secring.gpg with 
> rather weak passphrases on a cleartext backup volume)

> a) save the complete configuration (optionally protexted with a 
> passphrase) to a single file
> 
> gpg-backup --with-passphrase --save /path/to/targetfile

I'm not sure how you envision this, but wouldn't it be much easier, and
sufficient, to have a prompt on startup that read:

***WARNING*** Make sure all your secret keys are protected by an
adequate password before making a backup. Are you sure you wish to
proceed? [y/N]

Something in that vein.

Maybe even more verbose, explaining that the password is enough to get
the key from the backup. Or do that in the manual or something like that.

I think it might boil down to a simple file copy excluding some unwanted
files, and including everything else. Also remeber that the keybox
format is different between GnuPG versions (secring.gpg vs.
private-keys-v1.d); this suggests an "include everything except these
specific files" approach to me.

HTH,

Peter.

-- 
I use the GNU Privacy Guard (GnuPG) in combination with Enigmail.
You can send me encrypted mail if you want some privacy.
My key is available at <http://digitalbrains.com/2012/openpgp-key-peter>


From ml at sudhirkhanger.com  Sun Oct 19 13:27:20 2014
From: ml at sudhirkhanger.com (ml at sudhirkhanger.com)
Date: Sun, 19 Oct 2014 16:57:20 +0530
Subject: Encrypt folders which include audio video and text files
In-Reply-To: <54439EDF.8010804@digitalbrains.com>
References: <CAPJdnyKB=2WAabXZWQK0+g9dBCp0ohdBt4eUFF-cp76xA6GgAQ@mail.gmail.com>
 <54439EDF.8010804@digitalbrains.com>
Message-ID: <1865013.qE3mjWRrXj@fedora>

On Sunday, October 19, 2014 01:22:07 PM you wrote:
> device-mapper's dm-crypt target together with LUKS (Linux Unified Key
> Setup). dm-crypt is somewhat the successor to encrypted loopback
> mentioned by Rob, and fixes some of the issues perceived in encrypted
> loopback. Some of those where subsequently also fixed in encrypted
> loopback itself, to make things more clear for everyone ;P.

I use Gnome EncFS Manager. It leaves a lot of metadata as it encrypts per file 
basis but works fine generally. I was hoping to get away by not having to rely 
on remembering passwords or using password manager but looks separate 
solutions are more popular.

Regards,
Sudhir.


From 2014-667rhzu3dc-lists-groups at riseup.net  Sun Oct 19 14:40:49 2014
From: 2014-667rhzu3dc-lists-groups at riseup.net (MFPA)
Date: Sun, 19 Oct 2014 13:40:49 +0100
Subject: Restoring GnuPG
In-Reply-To: <20141019112603.GA32707@fritha.org>
References: <CAPJdnyJ758XP6kXk1wqSW5L32-D-w7yXP1paZD07ZWkKROibJQ@mail.gmail.com>
 <20141019112603.GA32707@fritha.org>
Message-ID: <9610713073.20141019134049@my_localhost>

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA512

Hi


On Sunday 19 October 2014 at 12:26:03 PM, in
<mid:20141019112603.GA32707 at fritha.org>, Heinz Diehl wrote:


> You can just copy your secring.gpg into your freshly
> installed ~/.gnupg directory. Importing your secret key
> would also re-install your public key..


In order to achieve that, don't you have to run something like:-

   gpgsplit --secret-to-public YourPrivateKeyFile.asc

Or, if the public key had been published to a server it could simply
be fetched back.


- --
Best regards

MFPA                    mailto:2014-667rhzu3dc-lists-groups at riseup.net

Reality is nothing but a collective hunch.
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From 2014-667rhzu3dc-lists-groups at riseup.net  Sun Oct 19 14:48:54 2014
From: 2014-667rhzu3dc-lists-groups at riseup.net (MFPA)
Date: Sun, 19 Oct 2014 13:48:54 +0100
Subject: Restoring GnuPG
In-Reply-To: <54439E05.9010208@digitalbrains.com>
References: <CAPJdnyJ758XP6kXk1wqSW5L32-D-w7yXP1paZD07ZWkKROibJQ@mail.gmail.com>
 <54439E05.9010208@digitalbrains.com>
Message-ID: <541149853.20141019134854@my_localhost>

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA512

Hi


On Sunday 19 October 2014 at 12:18:29 PM, in
<mid:54439E05.9010208 at digitalbrains.com>, Peter Lebbing wrote:


> I'm fairly sure even certifications from other users
> are included in the private key,

I'd always thought this is not the case. Don't you re-reate the public
key from the private key, rather than have a copy of the public key
stored with the private key?




- --
Best regards

MFPA                    mailto:2014-667rhzu3dc-lists-groups at riseup.net

It is not necessary to have enemies if you go out of your way to make friends hate you.
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From mailinglisten at hauke-laging.de  Sun Oct 19 15:32:36 2014
From: mailinglisten at hauke-laging.de (Hauke Laging)
Date: Sun, 19 Oct 2014 15:32:36 +0200
Subject: new helper program for configuration import / export
In-Reply-To: <54439FFF.906@digitalbrains.com>
References: <1573300.ozIxrjrrJI@inno> <54439FFF.906@digitalbrains.com>
Message-ID: <2360505.HckeCOVoo5@inno>

Am So 19.10.2014, 13:26:55 schrieb Peter Lebbing:

> > a) save the complete configuration (optionally protexted with a
> > passphrase) to a single file

> I'm not sure how you envision this, but wouldn't it be much easier,
> and sufficient, to have a prompt on startup that read:
> 
> ***WARNING*** Make sure all your secret keys are protected by an
> adequate password before making a backup. Are you sure you wish to
> proceed? [y/N]

I am quite sure that this is the opposite of easier. Why?

a) Because you have to change the passphrase of each secret key.

b) Because you have to change them back after exporting.

c) Because "make sure" is generally a bad idea for a certain group of 
users ? at which this tool is targeted.


> Or do that in the manual

See (c)...


> I think it might boil down to a simple file copy excluding some
> unwanted files, and including everything else.

I was rather thinking of a whitelist (excluding e.g. editor backup 
files).


> Also remeber that the
> keybox format is different between GnuPG versions (secring.gpg vs.
> private-keys-v1.d)

I must admit that I didn't know that. I hardly use 1.4.x.

What does that mean? Can 1.4.x and 2.0.x not operate on the same secret 
key ring? Is it converted automatically (in which direction)? I guess 
this problem does not affect exporting secret keys.

Maybe you have a pointer for this problem.


Hauke
-- 
Crypto f?r alle: http://www.openpgp-schulungen.de/fuer/unterstuetzer/
http://userbase.kde.org/Concepts/OpenPGP_Help_Spread
OpenPGP: 7D82 FB9F D25A 2CE4 5241 6C37 BF4B 8EEF 1A57 1DF5
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From ml at sudhirkhanger.com  Sun Oct 19 17:25:36 2014
From: ml at sudhirkhanger.com (ml at sudhirkhanger.com)
Date: Sun, 19 Oct 2014 20:55:36 +0530
Subject: Restoring GnuPG
In-Reply-To: <20141019112603.GA32707@fritha.org>
References: <CAPJdnyJ758XP6kXk1wqSW5L32-D-w7yXP1paZD07ZWkKROibJQ@mail.gmail.com>
 <20141019112603.GA32707@fritha.org>
Message-ID: <2203873.Xvtr6zeXvJ@fedora>

On Sunday, October 19, 2014 01:26:03 PM Heinz Diehl wrote:
> Of course, you can omit/delete your pubring.gpg, if you like. However,
> unless you import a public key, you won't be able to communicate using gpg
> encryption.

Are you trying to say if I don't import pubring.gpg I won't import the 
previously exchanged keys and hence I won't be able to send them encrypted 
messages as I won't have access to other people's public keys?

I currently don't have any public keys imported/exchanged. I am just learning 
GnuPG.

-- 
Regards,
Sudhir Khanger,
sudhirkhanger.com,
github.com/donniezazen,
5577 8CDB A059 085D 1D60  807F 8C00 45D9 F5EF C394.
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From ml at sudhirkhanger.com  Sun Oct 19 17:35:10 2014
From: ml at sudhirkhanger.com (ml at sudhirkhanger.com)
Date: Sun, 19 Oct 2014 21:05:10 +0530
Subject: Restoring GnuPG
In-Reply-To: <54439E05.9010208@digitalbrains.com>
References: <CAPJdnyJ758XP6kXk1wqSW5L32-D-w7yXP1paZD07ZWkKROibJQ@mail.gmail.com>
 <54439E05.9010208@digitalbrains.com>
Message-ID: <1504170.aCHAQCli5s@fedora>

On Sunday, October 19, 2014 01:18:29 PM you wrote:
> On 19/10/14 11:48, Sudhir Khanger wrote:
> > By important I mean
> > if you only had your secret key could get back to your original setup
> > ignoring the imported public keys.
> 
> Yes; also ignoring all assigned ownertrust values.
> 
> Public key and revocation certificate can be recreated; the latter is
> usually only used precisely when you have lost access to the secret key.
> 
> I'm fairly sure even certifications from other users are included in the
> private key, as long as you don't specify options scrubbing them from
> the key on export.
> 
> > 2. "gpg --import secret.key" I suppose this is the command I have to
> > use to import the secret key on a new system.
> 
> Additionally, you'll most likely want to assign ultimate ownertrust to
> the key; this is automatically done when using --gen-key, but not on
> importing a secret key.
> 
> $ gpg2 --edit-key YOURKEYID trust
> 
> HTH,
> 
> Peter.

Thanks. Here is what I did and it worked fine.

gpg --import secretkey.asc
gpg --edit-key KEYID trust
gpg --edit-key KEYID > Chose primary uid > primary > save

It imported both secret and public key with both uid and everything seems to 
work fine as far as I can tell.

-- 
Regards,
Sudhir Khanger,
sudhirkhanger.com,
github.com/donniezazen,
5577 8CDB A059 085D 1D60  807F 8C00 45D9 F5EF C394.
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From htd+ml at fritha.org  Sun Oct 19 20:26:54 2014
From: htd+ml at fritha.org (Heinz Diehl)
Date: Sun, 19 Oct 2014 20:26:54 +0200
Subject: Restoring GnuPG
In-Reply-To: <2203873.Xvtr6zeXvJ@fedora>
References: <CAPJdnyJ758XP6kXk1wqSW5L32-D-w7yXP1paZD07ZWkKROibJQ@mail.gmail.com>
 <20141019112603.GA32707@fritha.org> <2203873.Xvtr6zeXvJ@fedora>
Message-ID: <20141019182654.GA5616@fritha.org>

On 19.10.2014, ml at sudhirkhanger.com wrote: 

> Are you trying to say if I don't import pubring.gpg I won't import the 
> previously exchanged keys and hence I won't be able to send them encrypted 
> messages as I won't have access to other people's public keys?

Exactly. In order to be able to send an encrypted mail to somebody,
you have to encrypt it with the appropriate public key of the
receiver.

> I currently don't have any public keys imported/exchanged.

So you won't be able to send any encrypted mail.

> I am just learning GnuPG.

You're welcome!

If you have to move your gpg installation to a new system, just copy the
secring.gpg, pubring.gpg, trustdb.gpg and gpg.conf from your ~/.gnupg 
directory into your new installation. It's not necessary to
export/import keys from the keyrings.



From peter at digitalbrains.com  Sun Oct 19 21:10:20 2014
From: peter at digitalbrains.com (Peter Lebbing)
Date: Sun, 19 Oct 2014 21:10:20 +0200
Subject: new helper program for configuration import / export
In-Reply-To: <2360505.HckeCOVoo5@inno>
References: <1573300.ozIxrjrrJI@inno> <54439FFF.906@digitalbrains.com>
 <2360505.HckeCOVoo5@inno>
Message-ID: <54440C9C.7080507@digitalbrains.com>

On 19/10/14 15:32, Hauke Laging wrote:
> I am quite sure that this is the opposite of easier. Why?
> 
> a) Because you have to change the passphrase of each secret key.
> 
> b) Because you have to change them back after exporting.

It is clear you are not working on the same assumption as I did: that
there were already good passphrases on the keys, because this is simply
good practice, and that the extra thing was just to prevent accidents by
making people think for a moment. Like you pat your pocket before you
close your front door, to make sure you have your keys in your pocket.

Have you thought of a way to only have to enter a password once and use
that for each (sub)key you wish to change, without keeping it in
swap-eligible memory? Or am I still not comprehending what it is you
want to do? Perhaps you could elaborate on the procedure you have in mind.

>> Also remeber that the
>> keybox format is different between GnuPG versions (secring.gpg vs.
>> private-keys-v1.d)
> 
> I must admit that I didn't know that. I hardly use 1.4.x.

1.4 and 2.0 as they are now both use secring.gpg, I think. I don't know
in detail which versions use secring.gpg and which use
private-keys-v1.d, and neither do I know how this will be in the future.
And there's the kicker: if you just exclude the harmful files, you pick
up any later additions that don't exist yet but are worth it to backup.
I think it is more likely that things you want to backup are later
added, than that things that you wish to exclude are later added. But
this is an assessment, not knowledge.

> What does that mean? Can 1.4.x and 2.0.x not operate on the same secret 
> key ring? Is it converted automatically (in which direction)? I guess 
> this problem does not affect exporting secret keys.
> 
> Maybe you have a pointer for this problem.

I've forgotten. I think gpgsm already uses private-keys-v1.d and GnuPG
2.1 will be using them for OpenPGP as well. But Werner surely knows
better. I do know that just backing up pubring.gpg and secring.gpg will
soon mean you're not backing up the secret key.

HTH,

Peter.

-- 
I use the GNU Privacy Guard (GnuPG) in combination with Enigmail.
You can send me encrypted mail if you want some privacy.
My key is available at <http://digitalbrains.com/2012/openpgp-key-peter>


From rfg at tristatelogic.com  Sun Oct 19 21:21:39 2014
From: rfg at tristatelogic.com (Ronald F. Guilmette)
Date: Sun, 19 Oct 2014 12:21:39 -0700
Subject: Wind River
Message-ID: <19849.1413746499@server1.tristatelogic.com>


I just saw this news story yesterday, and I wasn't sure if folks
around here already knew about it or not, but since the subject
of silly export restrictions had come up on this list recently,
I thought that I should share...

 http://www.theregister.co.uk/2014/10/17/intel_subsidiary_crypto_export_fine/




From htd at fritha.org  Sun Oct 19 16:12:58 2014
From: htd at fritha.org (Heinz Diehl)
Date: Sun, 19 Oct 2014 16:12:58 +0200
Subject: Restoring GnuPG
In-Reply-To: <9610713073.20141019134049@my_localhost>
References: <CAPJdnyJ758XP6kXk1wqSW5L32-D-w7yXP1paZD07ZWkKROibJQ@mail.gmail.com>
 <20141019112603.GA32707@fritha.org>
 <9610713073.20141019134049@my_localhost>
Message-ID: <20141019141258.GA3593@fritha.org>

On 19.10.2014, MFPA wrote: 

> Importing your secret key would also re-install your public key..

> In order to achieve that, don't you have to run something like:-
>    gpgsplit --secret-to-public YourPrivateKeyFile.asc

No, that's not neccessary. 

A "gpg --import your_secret_key.asc" into a freshly installed and
completely clean gpg system would restore your public key as
well.



From sudhir at sudhirkhanger.com  Sun Oct 19 21:57:29 2014
From: sudhir at sudhirkhanger.com (Sudhir Khanger)
Date: Mon, 20 Oct 2014 01:27:29 +0530
Subject: Restoring GnuPG
In-Reply-To: <20141019182654.GA5616@fritha.org>
References: <CAPJdnyJ758XP6kXk1wqSW5L32-D-w7yXP1paZD07ZWkKROibJQ@mail.gmail.com>
 <2203873.Xvtr6zeXvJ@fedora> <20141019182654.GA5616@fritha.org>
Message-ID: <5348593.97cbZOQyQ0@fedora>

On Sunday, October 19, 2014 08:26:54 PM Heinz Diehl wrote:
> > I am just learning GnuPG.
> 
> You're welcome!

Just trying to develop good online habits.

> If you have to move your gpg installation to a new system, just copy the
> secring.gpg, pubring.gpg, trustdb.gpg and gpg.conf from your ~/.gnupg 
> directory into your new installation. It's not necessary to
> export/import keys from the keyrings.

I might simply delete existing ~/.gnupg folder from the new install and copy 
my presonal ~/.gnupg folder next time I have to do, like it says on several 
websites.

Thanks.

-- 
Regards,
Sudhir Khanger,
sudhirkhanger.com,
github.com/donniezazen,
5577 8CDB A059 085D 1D60  807F 8C00 45D9 F5EF C394.
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From mailinglisten at hauke-laging.de  Sun Oct 19 22:08:01 2014
From: mailinglisten at hauke-laging.de (Hauke Laging)
Date: Sun, 19 Oct 2014 22:08:01 +0200
Subject: new helper program for configuration import / export
In-Reply-To: <54440C9C.7080507@digitalbrains.com>
References: <1573300.ozIxrjrrJI@inno> <2360505.HckeCOVoo5@inno>
 <54440C9C.7080507@digitalbrains.com>
Message-ID: <3825325.LMoabrQ0Rp@inno>

Am So 19.10.2014, 21:10:20 schrieb Peter Lebbing:

> It is clear you are not working on the same assumption as I did: that
> there were already good passphrases on the keys, because this is
> simply good practice

A good passphrase doesn't help against online attacks. The usual 
protection against offline attacks is volume encryption. Thus a strong 
passphrase (and who wants to enter that often?) is useful for those 
people without volume encryption only. But my experience is that many 
people do not use a good passphrase even without volume encryption. We 
have to accept that. But it seems to me to make sense to suggest a 
better passphrase at least for key files which are send via email or 
stored on USB sticks.


> Have you thought of a way to only have to enter a password once and
> use that for each (sub)key you wish to change, without keeping it in
> swap-eligible memory?

No. Why should that be better / easier than encrypting the whole 
archive? Especially as there may be other information in ~/.gnupg which 
you don't want to become public.


> Perhaps you could elaborate on the procedure you have in mind.

1) Select the files.
2) Create the archive.
3) Encrypt the archive. (I just realize that gpg-zip does not encrypt 
the whole archive)


Hauke
-- 
Crypto f?r alle: http://www.openpgp-schulungen.de/fuer/unterstuetzer/
http://userbase.kde.org/Concepts/OpenPGP_Help_Spread
OpenPGP: 7D82 FB9F D25A 2CE4 5241 6C37 BF4B 8EEF 1A57 1DF5
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From rjh at sixdemonbag.org  Sun Oct 19 22:34:50 2014
From: rjh at sixdemonbag.org (Robert J. Hansen)
Date: Sun, 19 Oct 2014 16:34:50 -0400
Subject: Wind River
In-Reply-To: <19849.1413746499@server1.tristatelogic.com>
References: <19849.1413746499@server1.tristatelogic.com>
Message-ID: <5444206A.4020808@sixdemonbag.org>

> I just saw this news story yesterday, and I wasn't sure if folks
> around here already knew about it or not, but since the subject
> of silly export restrictions had come up on this list recently,
> I thought that I should share...

It was brought up and discussed at length less than two days ago.  Check
the archives.


From peter at digitalbrains.com  Mon Oct 20 10:55:48 2014
From: peter at digitalbrains.com (Peter Lebbing)
Date: Mon, 20 Oct 2014 10:55:48 +0200
Subject: new helper program for configuration import / export
In-Reply-To: <3825325.LMoabrQ0Rp@inno>
References: <1573300.ozIxrjrrJI@inno> <2360505.HckeCOVoo5@inno>
 <54440C9C.7080507@digitalbrains.com> <3825325.LMoabrQ0Rp@inno>
Message-ID: <5444CE14.701@digitalbrains.com>

On 19/10/14 22:08, Hauke Laging wrote:
> No. Why should that be better / easier than encrypting the whole 
> archive?

It wouldn't; I simply hadn't thought of it. In other words:

>> Or am I still not comprehending what it is you want to do?

Indeed.

;)

When at some point my thoughts strayed to this mail thread, I suddenly
thought "D'Oh! Of course, it's much better to simply wrap it in a
symmetrically encrypted archive!". It seems we're on the same page again :).

> Especially as there may be other information in ~/.gnupg which you
> don't want to become public.

trustdb.gpg, yes.

I proposed using a blacklist rather than a whitelist, because I suspect
useful files might later crop up. I came to realise a trade-off there
which needs to be mentioned: if you use a whitelist and miss useful
files, your backup is possibly not useful. That's bad. But if you use a
blacklist and a file is later added that compromises your security and
is included in the backup, that is a security issue. That's worse. But
this is mitigated by encrypting the whole backup with a good password.

HTH,

Peter.

-- 
I use the GNU Privacy Guard (GnuPG) in combination with Enigmail.
You can send me encrypted mail if you want some privacy.
My key is available at <http://digitalbrains.com/2012/openpgp-key-peter>


From philip.jackson at nordnet.fr  Tue Oct 21 00:36:41 2014
From: philip.jackson at nordnet.fr (Philip Jackson)
Date: Tue, 21 Oct 2014 00:36:41 +0200
Subject: smart card under linux
Message-ID: <54458E79.4000904@nordnet.fr>

After a couple of weeks away from the smartcard issue, I've tried again from
scratch.  Under Windows7 using GpG4win 2.2.2 with an SCM3512 reader, SCM's
drivers and G10's openpgp v2 card, gpg --card-status provides the following output :

Application ID ...: D2760001240102000005000028700000
Version ..........: 2.0
Manufacturer .....: ZeitControl
Serial number ....: 00002870
Name of cardholder: [not set]
Language prefs ...: [not set]
Sex ..............: unspecified
URL of public key : [not set]
Login data .......: [not set]
Signature PIN ....: forced
Key attributes ...: 2048R 2048R 2048R
Max. PIN lengths .: 0 0 0
PIN retry counter : 0 0 0
Signature counter : 0
Signature key ....: [none]
Encryption key....: [none]
Authentication key: [none]
General key info..: [none]

This looks promising but I didn't take it any further because I want to get it
going under my UbuntuStudio 1404 linux. Using gnupg2 2.0.26.

Trying to use the GnuPG driver to access CCID cards, "gpg2 --card-status" yields
the following output :

gpg: selecting openpgp failed: Card error
gpg: OpenPGP card not available: Card error


I've followed, I believe, all the instructions in the gnupg.com smartcard howto.
 In para 2.3.1 CCID : I've tried both the instructions under 'with udev
(preferred installation)' and further down 'with hotplug (deprecated in modern
systems)'

In the /etc/udev/rules.d/ directory there is a README which says that symbolic
links should not be used in Ubuntu (unlike Debian) so I placed a copy of
gnupg-ccid.rules directly in that directory.  But that didn't help.

lsusb shows that the SCM card reader is recognised and present but gpg doesn't
seem to be able to make contact.

I'd appreciate any ideas for what to try next.

Philip

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From pete at heypete.com  Tue Oct 21 09:25:44 2014
From: pete at heypete.com (Pete Stephenson)
Date: Tue, 21 Oct 2014 09:25:44 +0200
Subject: smart card under linux
In-Reply-To: <54458E79.4000904@nordnet.fr>
References: <54458E79.4000904@nordnet.fr>
Message-ID: <CA+4dSw4owct+OpOJq06agT5y5jz_+TeyY4bO=0EqP_jm1YkrYw@mail.gmail.com>

On Tue, Oct 21, 2014 at 12:36 AM, Philip Jackson
<philip.jackson at nordnet.fr> wrote:
[snip]
> This looks promising but I didn't take it any further because I want to get it
> going under my UbuntuStudio 1404 linux. Using gnupg2 2.0.26.
>
> Trying to use the GnuPG driver to access CCID cards, "gpg2 --card-status" yields
> the following output :
>
> gpg: selecting openpgp failed: Card error
> gpg: OpenPGP card not available: Card error
>
>
> I've followed, I believe, all the instructions in the gnupg.com smartcard howto.
>  In para 2.3.1 CCID : I've tried both the instructions under 'with udev
> (preferred installation)' and further down 'with hotplug (deprecated in modern
> systems)'
>
> In the /etc/udev/rules.d/ directory there is a README which says that symbolic
> links should not be used in Ubuntu (unlike Debian) so I placed a copy of
> gnupg-ccid.rules directly in that directory.  But that didn't help.
>
> lsusb shows that the SCM card reader is recognised and present but gpg doesn't
> seem to be able to make contact.
>
> I'd appreciate any ideas for what to try next.

What is the result of running the command:

echo $GPG_AGENT_INFO

Cheers!
-Pete

-- 
Pete Stephenson


From micha137 at gmx.de  Tue Oct 21 09:37:04 2014
From: micha137 at gmx.de (Michael Anders)
Date: Tue, 21 Oct 2014 09:37:04 +0200
Subject: Wind river
In-Reply-To: <mailman.15985.1413845196.28939.gnupg-users@gnupg.org>
References: <mailman.15985.1413845196.28939.gnupg-users@gnupg.org>
Message-ID: <1413877024.11821.12.camel@micha137-myAMD-CM1740>

On Tue, 2014-10-21 at 00:46 +0200, gnupg-users-request at gnupg.org wrote:

> 
> I just saw this news story yesterday, ...
>  http://www.theregister.co.uk/2014/10/17/intel_subsidiary_crypto_export_fine/
> 
This doesn't make any sense to me.
Either US administration has completely gone nuts and assumes others are
too stupid to implement strong crypto by themselves or else -and this
semms more probable to me- they go for a cheap short term advantage and
stage a theater to make others believe the software that was exported
would be secure while it is not...

regards
  Michael Anders



From tristan.santore at internexusconnect.net  Tue Oct 21 12:59:26 2014
From: tristan.santore at internexusconnect.net (Tristan Santore)
Date: Tue, 21 Oct 2014 11:59:26 +0100
Subject: smart card under linux
In-Reply-To: <54458E79.4000904@nordnet.fr>
References: <54458E79.4000904@nordnet.fr>
Message-ID: <54463C8E.1070606@internexusconnect.net>

On 20/10/14 23:36, Philip Jackson wrote:
> After a couple of weeks away from the smartcard issue, I've tried again from
> scratch.  Under Windows7 using GpG4win 2.2.2 with an SCM3512 reader, SCM's
> drivers and G10's openpgp v2 card, gpg --card-status provides the following output :
>
> Application ID ...: D2760001240102000005000028700000
> Version ..........: 2.0
> Manufacturer .....: ZeitControl
> Serial number ....: 00002870
> Name of cardholder: [not set]
> Language prefs ...: [not set]
> Sex ..............: unspecified
> URL of public key : [not set]
> Login data .......: [not set]
> Signature PIN ....: forced
> Key attributes ...: 2048R 2048R 2048R
> Max. PIN lengths .: 0 0 0
> PIN retry counter : 0 0 0
> Signature counter : 0
> Signature key ....: [none]
> Encryption key....: [none]
> Authentication key: [none]
> General key info..: [none]
>
> This looks promising but I didn't take it any further because I want to get it
> going under my UbuntuStudio 1404 linux. Using gnupg2 2.0.26.
>
> Trying to use the GnuPG driver to access CCID cards, "gpg2 --card-status" yields
> the following output :
>
> gpg: selecting openpgp failed: Card error
> gpg: OpenPGP card not available: Card error
>
>
> I've followed, I believe, all the instructions in the gnupg.com smartcard howto.
>  In para 2.3.1 CCID : I've tried both the instructions under 'with udev
> (preferred installation)' and further down 'with hotplug (deprecated in modern
> systems)'
>
> In the /etc/udev/rules.d/ directory there is a README which says that symbolic
> links should not be used in Ubuntu (unlike Debian) so I placed a copy of
> gnupg-ccid.rules directly in that directory.  But that didn't help.
>
> lsusb shows that the SCM card reader is recognised and present but gpg doesn't
> seem to be able to make contact.
>
> I'd appreciate any ideas for what to try next.
>
> Philip
>
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> Gnupg-users mailing list
> Gnupg-users at gnupg.org
> http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users
> Philip,

Further, to the previous question, which distribution are you currently
using ? There is a locking issue in Fedora with pcscd. I have not had
time to dig deeper yet, but libvirt and some other binaries appear to be
blocking the card.

Temporary fix is to add a sudo line to restart pcscd or to disable the
affected binaries, which might not be desirable.

I will be looking into this further soon, just have some other work and
also travel for work approaching, so I have not had much time yet.

Regards,

Tristan

-- 

Tristan Santore BSc MBCS
TS4523-RIPE
Network and Infrastructure Operations
InterNexusConnect
Mobile +44-78-55069812
Tristan.Santore at internexusconnect.net

Former Thawte Notary
(Please note: Thawte has closed its WoT programme down,
and I am therefore no longer able to accredit trust)

For Fedora related issues, please email me at:
TSantore at fedoraproject.org

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From mail at tgries.de  Tue Oct 21 13:54:28 2014
From: mail at tgries.de (Thomas Gries)
Date: Tue, 21 Oct 2014 13:54:28 +0200
Subject: smart card under linux
In-Reply-To: <54463C8E.1070606@internexusconnect.net>
References: <54458E79.4000904@nordnet.fr>
 <54463C8E.1070606@internexusconnect.net>
Message-ID: <54464974.7050402@tgries.de>


>> gpg: selecting openpgp failed: Card error
>> gpg: OpenPGP card not available: Card error
>>
>>
>> I've followed, I believe, all the instructions in the gnupg.com smartcard howto.
>>
>> Philip,
>
> Further, to the previous question, which distribution are you 
> currently using ? There is a locking issue in Fedora with pcscd. I 
> have not had time to dig deeper yet, but libvirt and some other 
> binaries appear to be blocking the card.
>
> Temporary fix is to add a sudo line to restart pcscd or to disable the 
> affected binaries, which might not be desirable.
>
> I will be looking into this further soon, just have some other work 
> and also travel for work approaching, so I have not had much time yet.
>
> Regards,
>
> Tristan
>
> -- 
Same problems for OpenSuse 13.1, Factory, 13.2 rc1.


From philip.jackson at nordnet.fr  Tue Oct 21 14:50:24 2014
From: philip.jackson at nordnet.fr (Philip Jackson)
Date: Tue, 21 Oct 2014 14:50:24 +0200
Subject: smart card under linux
In-Reply-To: <CA+4dSw4owct+OpOJq06agT5y5jz_+TeyY4bO=0EqP_jm1YkrYw@mail.gmail.com>
References: <54458E79.4000904@nordnet.fr>
 <CA+4dSw4owct+OpOJq06agT5y5jz_+TeyY4bO=0EqP_jm1YkrYw@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <54465690.7060108@nordnet.fr>

On 21/10/14 09:25, Pete Stephenson wrote:
> On Tue, Oct 21, 2014 at 12:36 AM, Philip Jackson
> <philip.jackson at nordnet.fr> wrote:
> [snip]
>> This looks promising but I didn't take it any further because I want to get it
>> going under my UbuntuStudio 1404 linux. Using gnupg2 2.0.26.
>>
>> Trying to use the GnuPG driver to access CCID cards, "gpg2 --card-status" yields
>> the following output :
>>
>> gpg: selecting openpgp failed: Card error
>> gpg: OpenPGP card not available: Card error
>>
>>
>> I've followed, I believe, all the instructions in the gnupg.com smartcard howto.
>>  In para 2.3.1 CCID : I've tried both the instructions under 'with udev
>> (preferred installation)' and further down 'with hotplug (deprecated in modern
>> systems)'
>>
>> In the /etc/udev/rules.d/ directory there is a README which says that symbolic
>> links should not be used in Ubuntu (unlike Debian) so I placed a copy of
>> gnupg-ccid.rules directly in that directory.  But that didn't help.
>>
>> lsusb shows that the SCM card reader is recognised and present but gpg doesn't
>> seem to be able to make contact.
>>
>> I'd appreciate any ideas for what to try next.
> 
> What is the result of running the command:
> 
> echo $GPG_AGENT_INFO

echo $GPG_AGENT_INFO
/tmp/gpg-9S6s3F/S.gpg-agent:1611:1

Philip



From pete at heypete.com  Tue Oct 21 14:58:24 2014
From: pete at heypete.com (Pete Stephenson)
Date: Tue, 21 Oct 2014 14:58:24 +0200
Subject: smart card under linux
In-Reply-To: <54465690.7060108@nordnet.fr>
References: <54458E79.4000904@nordnet.fr>
 <CA+4dSw4owct+OpOJq06agT5y5jz_+TeyY4bO=0EqP_jm1YkrYw@mail.gmail.com>
 <54465690.7060108@nordnet.fr>
Message-ID: <CA+4dSw7OrhYcgmKR4OW0Fn_--RbtPZRC7hXna=NM3jKbZ9BrMw@mail.gmail.com>

On Tue, Oct 21, 2014 at 2:50 PM, Philip Jackson
<philip.jackson at nordnet.fr> wrote:
> On 21/10/14 09:25, Pete Stephenson wrote:
>> What is the result of running the command:
>>
>> echo $GPG_AGENT_INFO
>
> echo $GPG_AGENT_INFO
> /tmp/gpg-9S6s3F/S.gpg-agent:1611:1

Interesting, thanks.

In the past when I've had issues similar to yours it turns out to be
the Gnome Keyring's GPG agent causing trouble[1] since it doesn't
support smartcards. However, that doesn't seem to be the case with
your issue (if it was, the command would mention "keyring" rather than
"gpg-agent").

Perhaps others have a better idea what's going on?

Cheers!
-Pete

[1] https://bugs.launchpad.net/ubuntu/+source/gnome-keyring/+bug/884856/comments/8

-- 
Pete Stephenson


From philip.jackson at nordnet.fr  Tue Oct 21 15:10:58 2014
From: philip.jackson at nordnet.fr (Philip Jackson)
Date: Tue, 21 Oct 2014 15:10:58 +0200
Subject: smart card under linux
In-Reply-To: <54463C8E.1070606@internexusconnect.net>
References: <54458E79.4000904@nordnet.fr>
 <54463C8E.1070606@internexusconnect.net>
Message-ID: <54465B62.2070905@nordnet.fr>

On 21/10/14 12:59, Tristan Santore wrote:
> On 20/10/14 23:36, Philip Jackson wrote:

........snip....

>> going under my UbuntuStudio 1404 linux. Using gnupg2 2.0.26.
>>
>> Trying to use the GnuPG driver to access CCID cards, "gpg2 --card-status" yields
>> the following output :
>>
>> gpg: selecting openpgp failed: Card error
>> gpg: OpenPGP card not available: Card error
>>
>>
>> I've followed, I believe, all the instructions in the gnupg.com smartcard howto.
>>  In para 2.3.1 CCID : I've tried both the instructions under 'with udev
>> (preferred installation)' and further down 'with hotplug (deprecated in modern
>> systems)'
>>
>> In the /etc/udev/rules.d/ directory there is a README which says that symbolic
>> links should not be used in Ubuntu (unlike Debian) so I placed a copy of
>> gnupg-ccid.rules directly in that directory.  But that didn't help.
>>
>> lsusb shows that the SCM card reader is recognised and present but gpg doesn't
>> seem to be able to make contact.
>>
>> I'd appreciate any ideas for what to try next.

>> Philip,
> 
> Further, to the previous question, which distribution are you currently using ?
> There is a locking issue in Fedora with pcscd. I have not had time to dig deeper
> yet, but libvirt and some other binaries appear to be blocking the card.
> 

I'm using UbuntuStudio 1404 - one of the Ubuntu flavours.

Practically all I know about smart cards is from the GnuPG smartcard howto on
gnupg.org website. There, it makes reference to 'Two standard protocols are used
by GnuPG to access card readers.' and then proceeds to cover CCID in some detail
with three apparent alternatives being detailed.

It then treats the other protocol, PC/SC, but all it says is "TODO - To use
PC/SC make sure you disable CCID by passing the --disable-ccid option to GnuPG."

>From this I assumed that CCID was perhaps either preferred / more important /
more useful / or more modern so I didn't touch anything about PCSC and this
means that pcscd is not running on my system.

Is this a major error on my part ?

Philip



From tristan.santore at internexusconnect.net  Tue Oct 21 15:33:44 2014
From: tristan.santore at internexusconnect.net (Tristan Santore)
Date: Tue, 21 Oct 2014 14:33:44 +0100
Subject: smart card under linux
In-Reply-To: <54465B62.2070905@nordnet.fr>
References: <54458E79.4000904@nordnet.fr>
 <54463C8E.1070606@internexusconnect.net> <54465B62.2070905@nordnet.fr>
Message-ID: <544660B8.2010105@internexusconnect.net>

On 21/10/14 14:10, Philip Jackson wrote:
> On 21/10/14 12:59, Tristan Santore wrote:
>> On 20/10/14 23:36, Philip Jackson wrote:
> ........snip....
>
>>> going under my UbuntuStudio 1404 linux. Using gnupg2 2.0.26.
>>>
>>> Trying to use the GnuPG driver to access CCID cards, "gpg2 --card-status" yields
>>> the following output :
>>>
>>> gpg: selecting openpgp failed: Card error
>>> gpg: OpenPGP card not available: Card error
>>>
>>>
>>> I've followed, I believe, all the instructions in the gnupg.com smartcard howto.
>>>  In para 2.3.1 CCID : I've tried both the instructions under 'with udev
>>> (preferred installation)' and further down 'with hotplug (deprecated in modern
>>> systems)'
>>>
>>> In the /etc/udev/rules.d/ directory there is a README which says that symbolic
>>> links should not be used in Ubuntu (unlike Debian) so I placed a copy of
>>> gnupg-ccid.rules directly in that directory.  But that didn't help.
>>>
>>> lsusb shows that the SCM card reader is recognised and present but gpg doesn't
>>> seem to be able to make contact.
>>>
>>> I'd appreciate any ideas for what to try next.
>>> Philip,
>> Further, to the previous question, which distribution are you currently using ?
>> There is a locking issue in Fedora with pcscd. I have not had time to dig deeper
>> yet, but libvirt and some other binaries appear to be blocking the card.
>>
> I'm using UbuntuStudio 1404 - one of the Ubuntu flavours.
>
> Practically all I know about smart cards is from the GnuPG smartcard howto on
> gnupg.org website. There, it makes reference to 'Two standard protocols are used
> by GnuPG to access card readers.' and then proceeds to cover CCID in some detail
> with three apparent alternatives being detailed.
>
> It then treats the other protocol, PC/SC, but all it says is "TODO - To use
> PC/SC make sure you disable CCID by passing the --disable-ccid option to GnuPG."
>
> From this I assumed that CCID was perhaps either preferred / more important /
> more useful / or more modern so I didn't touch anything about PCSC and this
> means that pcscd is not running on my system.
>
> Is this a major error on my part ?
>
> Philip
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> Gnupg-users mailing list
> Gnupg-users at gnupg.org
> http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users

Find out where your library for libpcsclite is, then run lsof on it like below:

lsof /usr/lib64/libpcsclite.so.1.0.0


lsof: WARNING: can't stat() fuse.gvfsd-fuse file system /run/user/1000/gvfs
      Output information may be incomplete.
COMMAND   PID USER  FD   TYPE DEVICE SIZE/OFF    NODE NAME
libvirtd 3461 root mem    REG  253,2    47896 1081788 /usr/lib64/libpcsclite.so.1.0.0
pcscd    3462 root mem    REG  253,2    47896 1081788 /usr/lib64/libpcsclite.so.1.0.0
upowerd  3606 root mem    REG  253,2    47896 1081788 /usr/lib64/libpcsclite.so.1.0.0

You will probably get output similar to this. Then  you can kill the pids, of the processes that are blocking the card.

However, as I said, add systemctl restart pcscd a s a sudo option, which should be much easier and not interfere with the other processes.

I hope this helps.


Regards,
Tristan

-- 

Tristan Santore BSc MBCS
TS4523-RIPE
Network and Infrastructure Operations
InterNexusConnect
Mobile +44-78-55069812
Tristan.Santore at internexusconnect.net

Former Thawte Notary
(Please note: Thawte has closed its WoT programme down,
and I am therefore no longer able to accredit trust)

For Fedora related issues, please email me at:
TSantore at fedoraproject.org



From philip.jackson at nordnet.fr  Tue Oct 21 15:51:46 2014
From: philip.jackson at nordnet.fr (Philip Jackson)
Date: Tue, 21 Oct 2014 15:51:46 +0200
Subject: smart card under linux
In-Reply-To: <CA+4dSw7OrhYcgmKR4OW0Fn_--RbtPZRC7hXna=NM3jKbZ9BrMw@mail.gmail.com>
References: <54458E79.4000904@nordnet.fr>	<CA+4dSw4owct+OpOJq06agT5y5jz_+TeyY4bO=0EqP_jm1YkrYw@mail.gmail.com>	<54465690.7060108@nordnet.fr>
 <CA+4dSw7OrhYcgmKR4OW0Fn_--RbtPZRC7hXna=NM3jKbZ9BrMw@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <544664F2.5@nordnet.fr>

On 21/10/14 14:58, Pete Stephenson wrote:
> On Tue, Oct 21, 2014 at 2:50 PM, Philip Jackson
> <philip.jackson at nordnet.fr> wrote:
>> On 21/10/14 09:25, Pete Stephenson wrote:
>>> What is the result of running the command:
>>>
>>> echo $GPG_AGENT_INFO
>>
>> echo $GPG_AGENT_INFO
>> /tmp/gpg-9S6s3F/S.gpg-agent:1611:1
> 
> Interesting, thanks.
> 
> In the past when I've had issues similar to yours it turns out to be
> the Gnome Keyring's GPG agent causing trouble[1] since it doesn't
> support smartcards. However, that doesn't seem to be the case with
> your issue (if it was, the command would mention "keyring" rather than
> "gpg-agent").

I've seen other threads about the interference made by Gnome's keyring with
gpg-agent.  I don't knowingly use any gnome application which requires its
keyring management but I do note from the system monitor that the
gnome-keyring-daemon is running sometimes (not every time).  I have supposed
that it gets started at bootup (but if that's so, why isn't it always running
?).   And the UbuntuStudio flavour doesn't use the Unity desktop but xfce.

Philip




From rjh at sixdemonbag.org  Tue Oct 21 16:49:51 2014
From: rjh at sixdemonbag.org (Robert J. Hansen)
Date: Tue, 21 Oct 2014 10:49:51 -0400
Subject: Wind river
In-Reply-To: <1413877024.11821.12.camel@micha137-myAMD-CM1740>
References: <mailman.15985.1413845196.28939.gnupg-users@gnupg.org>
 <1413877024.11821.12.camel@micha137-myAMD-CM1740>
Message-ID: <5446728F.6070906@sixdemonbag.org>

> This doesn't make any sense to me.

Makes perfect sense to me, once you understand three things:

(a) at one point all the good crypto came out of either the US, UK,
    or France,
(b) nuclear weapons are scary, and
(c) laws and regulations change so slowly they make glaciers look swift.

A lot of WW2 historians believe the Allies' ability to read Purple and
Enigma traffic at-will resulted in the war being shortened by a few
years and saved millions of lives.  The lesson politicians learned was,
"we must protect our communications and exploit those of other nations."
 Prior to the advent of the civilian cryptographic community, it was
perfectly rational to restrict the export of strong cryptography in
order to help keep the nation secure.

The dawn of the nuclear age happened to occur at the same time.  The
importance there is that it's really, really hard to validate a nuclear
weapon design without computers.  It can be done -- the U.S. did it,
twice -- but it's really hard.  With computers, machining and building a
nuclear weapon is mostly pretty easy.  (Enriching U-235 and/or creating
Pu-239 is still really hard, but it's the only really hard step.)  So,
for a long time, it was perfectly rational to restrict the export of
high-powered computers in order to limit nuclear proliferation.

The world has moved on, though, and Congress has shown itself mostly
either unable or unwilling to recognize this.  When the PlayStation 2
was coming to market Sony discovered that it couldn't be exported out of
the U.S. without an arms control export license -- the laws hadn't kept
pace with technology, and by the (outdated) standards in the laws the
PlayStation 2 was a supercomputer.  Oops.  Sony pushed for changes in
the definition of 'supercomputer', and the PS2 suddenly could be
exported worldwide.  (Mostly due to the console gaming market, the
definition of 'supercomputer' keeps on creeping upwards.  Sony and
Microsoft really, really want to be able to export their consoles
worldwide without worrying about ITAR compliance.)

The internet is a fascinating place, but it's also a world completely
unlike the one that existed when Congress drafted its laws.  As libre
hackers who like crypto, we run smack into ITAR and EAR on two fronts.
Our computers keep getting more and more powerful, which runs afoul of
the regulations originally designed to counter nuclear proliferation,
and our crypto keeps getting better and better, which runs afoul of the
regulations originally designed to make sure only the good guys had
strong crypto.

All this being said, the laws aren't *wholly* stupid.  ITAR has a couple
of nice commonsense exceptions.  (See, e.g., ITAR 120.10 (5): ITAR "does
not include information concerning general scientific, mathematical, or
engineering principles commonly taught in schools, colleges, and
universities or information in the public domain.")

Unfortunately, those exceptions aren't enough to save you from really
expensive legal bills.

When I was assisting in the teaching of a a graduate-level computer
security course at the University of Iowa back in 2007, we had to get
briefed by the University's lawyers about the foreign students in our
class and what we were and were not allowed to say in front of them
about computer security subjects (!!).  The University's concern wasn't
that we could be successfully prosecuted for violating ITAR -- the First
Amendment and the ITAR's own provisions for education provided safe
harbors.  It was that we could be prosecuted *at all*, and forced to
spend money we didn't have resolving a legal headache.  Better by far,
in the University's view, to be very careful what information we taught
to foreign graduate students and avoid any possible legal headache.

Anyway.

These regulations make sense when you consider the historical context in
which they were created, and consider just how hard it is to get old and
outdated laws changed.  Are they stupid in the present day?  Yeah.  But
they're also still the law, and Wind River was *freaking* *stupid* to
knowingly, willfully violate ITAR/EAR some 50-odd times.

Now, before armchair lawyers leap up to say, "$750,000?  For that money,
I'd take the case to court and see if I could get the court to agree
that ITAR doesn't apply to what I was exporting!"... Wind River has
lawyers, too, and the lawyers signed off on this.  For whatever reason,
Wind River's lawyers thought this was a good plan.  Maybe they were
worried about what other violations the USG might find and they were
able to fold an amnesty into the deal.  Maybe they were concerned about
the hit in the court of public opinion.  Maybe... etc.  We don't know
why Wind River chose to pay the fine instead of challenge it in court.
We just know they decided that paying this fine was in their company's
best interests.

> Either US administration has completely gone nuts and assumes others are
> too stupid to implement strong crypto by themselves or else -and this
> semms more probable to me- they go for a cheap short term advantage and
> stage a theater to make others believe the software that was exported
> would be secure while it is not...

Wait, you mean like the U.K. did after WW2 when it sold Enigma machines
to half the world and told them that it was a strong, unbreakable
system?  Color me shocked.

(Yes, the U.K. was selling Enigma machines as late as the 1970s.  That's
why ULTRA remained so secret for so long: revealing ULTRA would have
told all these Enigma customers that the U.K. was able to read their
traffic at-will.)



From philip.jackson at nordnet.fr  Tue Oct 21 17:26:54 2014
From: philip.jackson at nordnet.fr (Philip Jackson)
Date: Tue, 21 Oct 2014 17:26:54 +0200
Subject: smart card under linux
In-Reply-To: <544660B8.2010105@internexusconnect.net>
References: <54458E79.4000904@nordnet.fr>
 <54463C8E.1070606@internexusconnect.net> <54465B62.2070905@nordnet.fr>
 <544660B8.2010105@internexusconnect.net>
Message-ID: <54467B3E.70406@nordnet.fr>

On 21/10/14 15:33, Tristan Santore wrote:
> On 21/10/14 14:10, Philip Jackson wrote:
>> On 21/10/14 12:59, Tristan Santore wrote:
>>> On 20/10/14 23:36, Philip Jackson wrote:
>> ........snip....
>>
>>>> going under my UbuntuStudio 1404 linux. Using gnupg2 2.0.26.
>>>>
>>>> Trying to use the GnuPG driver to access CCID cards, "gpg2 --card-status" yields
>>>> the following output :
>>>>
>>>> gpg: selecting openpgp failed: Card error
>>>> gpg: OpenPGP card not available: Card error
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> I've followed, I believe, all the instructions in the gnupg.com smartcard howto.
>>>>  In para 2.3.1 CCID : I've tried both the instructions under 'with udev
>>>> (preferred installation)' and further down 'with hotplug (deprecated in modern
>>>> systems)'
>>>>
>>>> In the /etc/udev/rules.d/ directory there is a README which says that symbolic
>>>> links should not be used in Ubuntu (unlike Debian) so I placed a copy of
>>>> gnupg-ccid.rules directly in that directory.  But that didn't help.
>>>>
>>>> lsusb shows that the SCM card reader is recognised and present but gpg doesn't
>>>> seem to be able to make contact.
>>>>
>>>> I'd appreciate any ideas for what to try next.
>>>> Philip,
>>> Further, to the previous question, which distribution are you currently using ?
>>> There is a locking issue in Fedora with pcscd. I have not had time to dig deeper
>>> yet, but libvirt and some other binaries appear to be blocking the card.
>>>
>> I'm using UbuntuStudio 1404 - one of the Ubuntu flavours.
>>
>> Practically all I know about smart cards is from the GnuPG smartcard howto on
>> gnupg.org website. There, it makes reference to 'Two standard protocols are used
>> by GnuPG to access card readers.' and then proceeds to cover CCID in some detail
>> with three apparent alternatives being detailed.
>>
>> It then treats the other protocol, PC/SC, but all it says is "TODO - To use
>> PC/SC make sure you disable CCID by passing the --disable-ccid option to GnuPG."
>>
>> From this I assumed that CCID was perhaps either preferred / more important /
>> more useful / or more modern so I didn't touch anything about PCSC and this
>> means that pcscd is not running on my system.
>>
>> Is this a major error on my part ?
>>
>> Philip
>>
>>
>> _______________________________________________
>> Gnupg-users mailing list
>> Gnupg-users at gnupg.org
>> http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users
> 
> Find out where your library for libpcsclite is, then run lsof on it like below:
> 
> lsof /usr/lib64/libpcsclite.so.1.0.0
> 
> 
> lsof: WARNING: can't stat() fuse.gvfsd-fuse file system /run/user/1000/gvfs
>       Output information may be incomplete.
> COMMAND   PID USER  FD   TYPE DEVICE SIZE/OFF    NODE NAME
> libvirtd 3461 root mem    REG  253,2    47896 1081788 /usr/lib64/libpcsclite.so.1.0.0
> pcscd    3462 root mem    REG  253,2    47896 1081788 /usr/lib64/libpcsclite.so.1.0.0
> upowerd  3606 root mem    REG  253,2    47896 1081788 /usr/lib64/libpcsclite.so.1.0.0
> 
> You will probably get output similar to this. Then  you can kill the pids, of the processes that are blocking the card.
> 
> However, as I said, add systemctl restart pcscd a s a sudo option, which should be much easier and not interfere with the other processes.
> 
lsof doesn't produce anything except :

lsof: WARNING: can't stat() fuse.gvfsd-fuse file system /run/user/1000/gvfs
      Output information may be incomplete.

So libpcsclite is not in use which kind of lines up with what I wrote above
about choosing to try the howto CCID protocol rather than the pcsc protocol.

Philip


From lechten at wi.uni-muenster.de  Wed Oct 22 09:34:21 2014
From: lechten at wi.uni-muenster.de (Jens Lechtenboerger)
Date: Wed, 22 Oct 2014 09:34:21 +0200
Subject: smart card under linux
References: <54458E79.4000904@nordnet.fr>
 <54463C8E.1070606@internexusconnect.net>
 <54465B62.2070905__27821.3760153905$1413897152$gmane$org@nordnet.fr>
Message-ID: <87y4s8a77m.fsf@pcwi7557.uni-muenster.de>

On 2014-10-21, Philip Jackson wrote:

> It then treats the other protocol, PC/SC, but all it says is "TODO
> - To use PC/SC make sure you disable CCID by passing the
> --disable-ccid option to GnuPG."
>
> From this I assumed that CCID was perhaps either preferred / more
> important / more useful / or more modern so I didn't touch
> anything about PCSC and this means that pcscd is not running on my
> system.

Did you really verify that pcscd is not running?  It can cause your
error messages: https://blogs.fsfe.org/jens.lechtenboerger/?p=89

Best wishes
Jens



From peter at digitalbrains.com  Wed Oct 22 11:19:30 2014
From: peter at digitalbrains.com (Peter Lebbing)
Date: Wed, 22 Oct 2014 11:19:30 +0200
Subject: smart card under linux
In-Reply-To: <54458E79.4000904@nordnet.fr>
References: <54458E79.4000904@nordnet.fr>
Message-ID: <544776A2.1020905@digitalbrains.com>

On 21/10/14 00:36, Philip Jackson wrote:
> I've followed, I believe, all the instructions in the gnupg.com smartcard howto.
>  In para 2.3.1 CCID : I've tried both the instructions under 'with udev
> (preferred installation)' and further down 'with hotplug (deprecated in modern
> systems)'

These steps were superfluous for me for Debian jessie/testing because the
necessary udev rules are included in the gnupg package already. However, I use
an SPR532 here. The SCM3512 is not mentioned in the rules file, so you might
need to add an entry.

Here's how it looks for me:

----------------------8<------------------->8----------------------
$ lsusb
[...]
Bus 005 Device 005: ID 04e6:e003 SCM Microsystems, Inc. SPR532 PinPad SmartCard
Reader
[...]

$ cd /dev/bus/usb/005
$ ls -l
total 0
crw-rw-r--  1 root root 189, 512 Oct 22  2014 001
crw-rw-r--  1 root root 189, 513 Oct 22  2014 002
crw-rw-r--  1 root root 189, 514 Oct 22  2014 003
crw-rw-r--  1 root root 189, 515 Oct 22  2014 004
crw-rw-r--+ 1 root root 189, 516 Oct 22 10:53 005
----------------------8<------------------->8----------------------

Notice the +. There's an ACL active here.

----------------------8<------------------->8----------------------
$ getfacl 005
# file: 005
# owner: root
# group: root
user::rw-
user:peter:rw-
group::rw-
mask::rw-
other::r--
----------------------8<------------------->8----------------------

Ah, I have write access! You will definitely need write access, although maybe
not for this specific character device. An USB device might create several
"nodes" in /dev, I'm not sure which one you need write access to.

And here is the file that gives me the access:

----------------------8<------------------->8----------------------
$ cat /lib/udev/rules.d/60-gnupg.rules
# do not edit this file, it will be overwritten on update

SUBSYSTEM!="usb", GOTO="gnupg_rules_end"
ACTION!="add", GOTO="gnupg_rules_end"

# USB SmartCard Readers
[...]
## SCM Microsystems, Inc (SCR331-DI, SCR335, SCR3320, SCR331, SCR3310 and SPR532)
[...]
ATTR{idVendor}=="04e6", ATTR{idProduct}=="e003", ENV{ID_SMARTCARD_READER}="1",
ENV{ID_SMARTCARD_READER_DRIVER}="gnupg"
[...]
----------------------8<------------------->8----------------------

The ID_SMARTCARD_READER environment variable is used in
/lib/udev/rules.d/70-uaccess.rules and /lib/udev/rules.d/99-systemd.rules.
Somewhere there the write access is actually set up. These files are from the
systemd package. Note that I actually use sysvinit as init system, not systemd,
but this is still where it is set up for Debian. It allows access to smartcard
readers for people who are logged in to a "head" of the system (I presume).

So let's suppose your device is not 04e6:e003 but 04e6:1234. If I were to have
that device, I would need to add the following file:

----------------------8<------------------->8----------------------
$ cat >/etc/udev/rules.d/60-gnupg-extra.rules <<EOF
SUBSYSTEM!="usb", GOTO="gnupg_extra_rules_end"
ACTION!="add", GOTO="gnupg_extra_rules_end"

# The venerable SCM 1234 reader (it can count!)
ATTR{idVendor}=="04e6", ATTR{idProduct}=="1234", ENV{ID_SMARTCARD_READER}="1",
ENV{ID_SMARTCARD_READER_DRIVER}="gnupg"

LABEL="gnupg_extra_rules_end"
EOF
----------------------8<------------------->8----------------------

That last line is not part of the file, it signals end-of-file to the cat
command. Also, there's a long line that's split but shouldn't be.

And that would be all I need to add to udev! And it would work for anyone
logging into X on your monitor and keyboard (the "head").

TL;DR: Make sure your user has write access to the USB device. Also, differences
in Linux distributions mean the HOWTO might not be the optimal way to do it, or
even that you might not need to do anything at all.

HTH,

Peter.

-- 
I use the GNU Privacy Guard (GnuPG) in combination with Enigmail.
You can send me encrypted mail if you want some privacy.
My key is available at <http://digitalbrains.com/2012/openpgp-key-peter>


From philip.jackson at nordnet.fr  Wed Oct 22 15:24:05 2014
From: philip.jackson at nordnet.fr (Philip Jackson)
Date: Wed, 22 Oct 2014 15:24:05 +0200
Subject: smart card under linux
In-Reply-To: <87y4s8a77m.fsf@pcwi7557.uni-muenster.de>
References: <54458E79.4000904@nordnet.fr>
 <54463C8E.1070606@internexusconnect.net>
 <54465B62.2070905__27821.3760153905$1413897152$gmane$org@nordnet.fr>
 <87y4s8a77m.fsf@pcwi7557.uni-muenster.de>
Message-ID: <5447AFF5.2050803@nordnet.fr>

On 22/10/14 09:34, Jens Lechtenboerger wrote:
> On 2014-10-21, Philip Jackson wrote:
> 
>> It then treats the other protocol, PC/SC, but all it says is "TODO
>> - To use PC/SC make sure you disable CCID by passing the
>> --disable-ccid option to GnuPG."
>>
>> From this I assumed that CCID was perhaps either preferred / more
>> important / more useful / or more modern so I didn't touch
>> anything about PCSC and this means that pcscd is not running on my
>> system.
> 
> Did you really verify that pcscd is not running?  It can cause your
> error messages: https://blogs.fsfe.org/jens.lechtenboerger/?p=89
> 
Jens -

Yes - I checked every time and there is no pcsc process running at all.
gpg-agent runs ok and it starts scdaemon when I try gpg2 --card-status so my
difficulty lies with reading the card.

(the card and reader are good because I can access them with the card-status
command in Windows7 using gpg4win)

Thankyou for the link to your blog.  I'll get back into it a bit later when I've
more time.

Philip


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From philip.jackson at nordnet.fr  Wed Oct 22 15:43:15 2014
From: philip.jackson at nordnet.fr (Philip Jackson)
Date: Wed, 22 Oct 2014 15:43:15 +0200
Subject: smart card under linux
In-Reply-To: <544776A2.1020905@digitalbrains.com>
References: <54458E79.4000904@nordnet.fr> <544776A2.1020905@digitalbrains.com>
Message-ID: <5447B473.8070002@nordnet.fr>

Thank you for all this, Peter.  It will take me a little while to digest and
check out.

Philip

On 22/10/14 11:19, Peter Lebbing wrote:
> On 21/10/14 00:36, Philip Jackson wrote:
>> I've followed, I believe, all the instructions in the gnupg.com smartcard howto.
>>  In para 2.3.1 CCID : I've tried both the instructions under 'with udev
>> (preferred installation)' and further down 'with hotplug (deprecated in modern
>> systems)'
> 
> These steps were superfluous for me for Debian jessie/testing because the
> necessary udev rules are included in the gnupg package already. However, I use
> an SPR532 here. The SCM3512 is not mentioned in the rules file, so you might
> need to add an entry.
> 
> Here's how it looks for me:
> 
> ----------------------8<------------------->8----------------------
> $ lsusb
> [...]
> Bus 005 Device 005: ID 04e6:e003 SCM Microsystems, Inc. SPR532 PinPad SmartCard
> Reader
> [...]
> 
> $ cd /dev/bus/usb/005
> $ ls -l
> total 0
> crw-rw-r--  1 root root 189, 512 Oct 22  2014 001
> crw-rw-r--  1 root root 189, 513 Oct 22  2014 002
> crw-rw-r--  1 root root 189, 514 Oct 22  2014 003
> crw-rw-r--  1 root root 189, 515 Oct 22  2014 004
> crw-rw-r--+ 1 root root 189, 516 Oct 22 10:53 005
> ----------------------8<------------------->8----------------------
> 
> Notice the +. There's an ACL active here.
> 
> ----------------------8<------------------->8----------------------
> $ getfacl 005
> # file: 005
> # owner: root
> # group: root
> user::rw-
> user:peter:rw-
> group::rw-
> mask::rw-
> other::r--
> ----------------------8<------------------->8----------------------
> 
> Ah, I have write access! You will definitely need write access, although maybe
> not for this specific character device. An USB device might create several
> "nodes" in /dev, I'm not sure which one you need write access to.
> 
> And here is the file that gives me the access:
> 
> ----------------------8<------------------->8----------------------
> $ cat /lib/udev/rules.d/60-gnupg.rules
> # do not edit this file, it will be overwritten on update
> 
> SUBSYSTEM!="usb", GOTO="gnupg_rules_end"
> ACTION!="add", GOTO="gnupg_rules_end"
> 
> # USB SmartCard Readers
> [...]
> ## SCM Microsystems, Inc (SCR331-DI, SCR335, SCR3320, SCR331, SCR3310 and SPR532)
> [...]
> ATTR{idVendor}=="04e6", ATTR{idProduct}=="e003", ENV{ID_SMARTCARD_READER}="1",
> ENV{ID_SMARTCARD_READER_DRIVER}="gnupg"
> [...]
> ----------------------8<------------------->8----------------------
> 
> The ID_SMARTCARD_READER environment variable is used in
> /lib/udev/rules.d/70-uaccess.rules and /lib/udev/rules.d/99-systemd.rules.
> Somewhere there the write access is actually set up. These files are from the
> systemd package. Note that I actually use sysvinit as init system, not systemd,
> but this is still where it is set up for Debian. It allows access to smartcard
> readers for people who are logged in to a "head" of the system (I presume).
> 
> So let's suppose your device is not 04e6:e003 but 04e6:1234. If I were to have
> that device, I would need to add the following file:
> 
> ----------------------8<------------------->8----------------------
> $ cat >/etc/udev/rules.d/60-gnupg-extra.rules <<EOF
> SUBSYSTEM!="usb", GOTO="gnupg_extra_rules_end"
> ACTION!="add", GOTO="gnupg_extra_rules_end"
> 
> # The venerable SCM 1234 reader (it can count!)
> ATTR{idVendor}=="04e6", ATTR{idProduct}=="1234", ENV{ID_SMARTCARD_READER}="1",
> ENV{ID_SMARTCARD_READER_DRIVER}="gnupg"
> 
> LABEL="gnupg_extra_rules_end"
> EOF
> ----------------------8<------------------->8----------------------
> 
> That last line is not part of the file, it signals end-of-file to the cat
> command. Also, there's a long line that's split but shouldn't be.
> 
> And that would be all I need to add to udev! And it would work for anyone
> logging into X on your monitor and keyboard (the "head").
> 
> TL;DR: Make sure your user has write access to the USB device. Also, differences
> in Linux distributions mean the HOWTO might not be the optimal way to do it, or
> even that you might not need to do anything at all.
> 
> HTH,
> 
> Peter.
> 



From rjh at sixdemonbag.org  Wed Oct 22 17:19:18 2014
From: rjh at sixdemonbag.org (Robert J. Hansen)
Date: Wed, 22 Oct 2014 11:19:18 -0400
Subject: Wind river
In-Reply-To: <201410221421.s9MELaBJ000945@fire.js.berklix.net>
References: <201410221421.s9MELaBJ000945@fire.js.berklix.net>
Message-ID: <5447CAF6.90400@sixdemonbag.org>

> http://www.ecfr.gov/cgi-bin/text-idx?SID=f8a7e639bbbcdd460e881f7ae4a927b3&node=pt22.1.120&rgn=div5#se22.1.120_110
>
>  Has 120.10 a & b but no 5.

See:

http://pmddtc.state.gov/regulations_laws/documents/official_itar/ITAR_Part_120.pdf

That dates from April 1, 2013, and apparently has been updated since
then -- but yes, I was quoting from an official ITAR issuance.  :)


From jhs at berklix.com  Wed Oct 22 16:21:36 2014
From: jhs at berklix.com (Julian H. Stacey)
Date: Wed, 22 Oct 2014 16:21:36 +0200
Subject: Wind river
In-Reply-To: Your message "Tue, 21 Oct 2014 10:49:51 -0400."
 <5446728F.6070906@sixdemonbag.org>
Message-ID: <201410221421.s9MELaBJ000945@fire.js.berklix.net>

"Robert J. Hansen" wrote:
...
> All this being said, the laws aren't *wholly* stupid.  ITAR has a couple
> of nice commonsense exceptions.  (See, e.g., ITAR 120.10 (5): ITAR "does
> not include information concerning general scientific, mathematical, or
> engineering principles commonly taught in schools, colleges, and
> universities or information in the public domain.")

FYI:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_Traffic_in_Arms_Regulations
USA national regs.

http://www.ecfr.gov/cgi-bin/text-idx?SID=f8a7e639bbbcdd460e881f7ae4a927b3&node=pt22.1.120&rgn=div5#se22.1.120_110

Has 120.10 a & b but no 5.

http://www.ecfr.gov/cgi-bin/text-idx?SID=f8a7e639bbbcdd460e881f7ae4a927b3&node=20140513y1.10
"e-CFR Data is current as of October 20, 2014"
"or information in the public domain as defined in \xa7120.11 of this subchapter"


PS
> Wait, you mean like the U.K. did after WW2 when it sold Enigma machines

Fascinating (well, I'm British :-) 

Cheers,
Julian
-- 
Julian Stacey, BSD Linux Unix C Sys Eng Consultant Munich http://berklix.com
 Indent previous with "> ".  Interleave reply paragraphs like a play script.
 Send plain text, not quoted-printable, HTML, base64, or multipart/alternative.


From philip.jackson at nordnet.fr  Wed Oct 22 21:07:03 2014
From: philip.jackson at nordnet.fr (Philip Jackson)
Date: Wed, 22 Oct 2014 21:07:03 +0200
Subject: smart card under linux
In-Reply-To: <544776A2.1020905@digitalbrains.com>
References: <54458E79.4000904@nordnet.fr> <544776A2.1020905@digitalbrains.com>
Message-ID: <54480057.3090307@nordnet.fr>

Peter, I've had time to read and try to get to grips with the contents of your
email.  They've helped me make some progress :

On 22/10/14 11:19, Peter Lebbing wrote:
> On 21/10/14 00:36, Philip Jackson wrote:
>> I've followed, I believe, all the instructions in the gnupg.com smartcard howto.
>>  In para 2.3.1 CCID : I've tried both the instructions under 'with udev
>> (preferred installation)' and further down 'with hotplug (deprecated in modern
>> systems)'
> 
> These steps were superfluous for me for Debian jessie/testing because the
> necessary udev rules are included in the gnupg package already. However, I use
> an SPR532 here. The SCM3512 is not mentioned in the rules file, so you might
> need to add an entry.
> 
> Here's how it looks for me:
> 
> ----------------------8<------------------->8----------------------
> $ lsusb
> [...]
> Bus 005 Device 005: ID 04e6:e003 SCM Microsystems, Inc. SPR532 PinPad SmartCard
> Reader
> [...]
> 
I got (and get) for the SCT3512 :

Bus 002 Device 009: ID 04e6:5410 SCM Microsystems, Inc. SCR35xx Smart Card Reader

The SCT3512 is seen as an SCR35xx reader and I took the value 5410 for the
idProduct.

> $ cd /dev/bus/usb/005
> $ ls -l
> total 0
> crw-rw-r--  1 root root 189, 512 Oct 22  2014 001
> crw-rw-r--  1 root root 189, 513 Oct 22  2014 002
> crw-rw-r--  1 root root 189, 514 Oct 22  2014 003
> crw-rw-r--  1 root root 189, 515 Oct 22  2014 004
> crw-rw-r--+ 1 root root 189, 516 Oct 22 10:53 005
> ----------------------8<------------------->8----------------------
> 
> Notice the +. There's an ACL active here.
> 
> ----------------------8<------------------->8----------------------
> $ getfacl 005
> # file: 005
> # owner: root
> # group: root
> user::rw-
> user:peter:rw-
> group::rw-
> mask::rw-
> other::r--
> ----------------------8<------------------->8----------------------
> 
> Ah, I have write access! You will definitely need write access, although maybe
> not for this specific character device. An USB device might create several
> "nodes" in /dev, I'm not sure which one you need write access to.
> 

I get similar indications but don't see myself listed as a user - not to worry
for the moment.

> And here is the file that gives me the access:
> 
> ----------------------8<------------------->8----------------------
> $ cat /lib/udev/rules.d/60-gnupg.rules
> # do not edit this file, it will be overwritten on update
> 
> SUBSYSTEM!="usb", GOTO="gnupg_rules_end"
> ACTION!="add", GOTO="gnupg_rules_end"
> 
> # USB SmartCard Readers
> [...]
> ## SCM Microsystems, Inc (SCR331-DI, SCR335, SCR3320, SCR331, SCR3310 and SPR532)
> [...]
> ATTR{idVendor}=="04e6", ATTR{idProduct}=="e003", ENV{ID_SMARTCARD_READER}="1",
> ENV{ID_SMARTCARD_READER_DRIVER}="gnupg"
> [...]
> ----------------------8<------------------->8----------------------

I found two such files :

/lib/udev/rules.d/40-gnupg.rules
/lib/udev/rules.d/40-gnupg2.rules


> The ID_SMARTCARD_READER environment variable is used in
> /lib/udev/rules.d/70-uaccess.rules and /lib/udev/rules.d/99-systemd.rules.
> Somewhere there the write access is actually set up. These files are from the
> systemd package. Note that I actually use sysvinit as init system, not systemd,
> but this is still where it is set up for Debian. It allows access to smartcard
> readers for people who are logged in to a "head" of the system (I presume).

I found the 70-uaccess.rules file but nothing for systemd

> 
> So let's suppose your device is not 04e6:e003 but 04e6:1234. If I were to have
> that device, I would need to add the following file:
> 
> ----------------------8<------------------->8----------------------
> $ cat >/etc/udev/rules.d/60-gnupg-extra.rules <<EOF
> SUBSYSTEM!="usb", GOTO="gnupg_extra_rules_end"
> ACTION!="add", GOTO="gnupg_extra_rules_end"
> 
> # The venerable SCM 1234 reader (it can count!)
> ATTR{idVendor}=="04e6", ATTR{idProduct}=="1234", ENV{ID_SMARTCARD_READER}="1",
> ENV{ID_SMARTCARD_READER_DRIVER}="gnupg"
> 
> LABEL="gnupg_extra_rules_end"
> EOF
> ----------------------8<------------------->8----------------------

based on your code above, I prepared a couple of files for /etc/udev/rules.d/

40-gnupg-extra.rules
40-gnupg2-extra.rules    with appropriate modifications and using the idProduct
value = 5410


> That last line is not part of the file, it signals end-of-file to the cat
> command. Also, there's a long line that's split but shouldn't be.
> 
> And that would be all I need to add to udev! And it would work for anyone
> logging into X on your monitor and keyboard (the "head").

The result was definitely showing some progress has been achieved :

gpg2 --card-status
scdaemon[5697]: PC/SC OPEN failed: no service (0x8010001d)
scdaemon[5697]: PC/SC OPEN failed: no service (0x8010001d)
gpg: selecting openpgp failed: Card error
gpg: OpenPGP card not available: Card error
:~$ scdaemon[5697]: scdaemon (GnuPG) 2.0.26 stopped

Although not success, it was different. scdaemon tried to use PC/SC and failed.
 Up until present, all I got from gpg2 --card-status was the 2 gpg lines.  the
scdaemon process that was stopped [5697] was not the process I have seen open
prior to this attempt and which is still open [2997].

So why would this attempt at gpg2 --card-status open another process rather than
use the one already open ?


Using gpg was more successful :

gpg --card-status
Application ID ...: D2760001240102000005000028700000
Version ..........: 2.0
Manufacturer .....: ZeitControl
Serial number ....: 00002870
Name of cardholder: [not set]
Language prefs ...: de
Sex ..............: unspecified
URL of public key : [not set]
Login data .......: [not set]
Private DO 1 .....: [not set]
Private DO 2 .....: [not set]
Signature PIN ....: forced
Key attributes ...: 2048R 2048R 2048R
Max. PIN lengths .: 32 32 32
PIN retry counter : 3 0 3
Signature counter : 0
Signature key ....: [none]
Encryption key....: [none]
Authentication key: [none]
General key info..: [none]

This is very similar but not identical to what I got under Windows7 with Gpg4win
2.2.2 ( language prefs has changed from 'not set' to de and some other
parameters appear which were not shown, and others have some different values)
but the essential is that the reader was recognised and the card was clearly
read.  So under gnupg 1.4.16 (the standard Ubuntu distro install) I now have
access to the card.

But I still have a bit more work to do for gnupg2 2.0.26

Thanks for your help,

Philip



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From philip.jackson at nordnet.fr  Wed Oct 22 21:36:34 2014
From: philip.jackson at nordnet.fr (Philip Jackson)
Date: Wed, 22 Oct 2014 21:36:34 +0200
Subject: smart card under linux
In-Reply-To: <87y4s8a77m.fsf@pcwi7557.uni-muenster.de>
References: <54458E79.4000904@nordnet.fr>
 <54463C8E.1070606@internexusconnect.net>
 <54465B62.2070905__27821.3760153905$1413897152$gmane$org@nordnet.fr>
 <87y4s8a77m.fsf@pcwi7557.uni-muenster.de>
Message-ID: <54480742.1070907@nordnet.fr>

On 22/10/14 09:34, Jens Lechtenboerger wrote:
> On 2014-10-21, Philip Jackson wrote:
> 
> Did you really verify that pcscd is not running?  It can cause your
> error messages: https://blogs.fsfe.org/jens.lechtenboerger/?p=89
> 

Your blog provides a lot of good stuff that I shall use when I get round to
populating the card.

The link to the card reader setup (udev) howto,

https://wiki.fsfe.org/Card_howtos/Card_reader_setup_%28udev%29

which I came upon reading your blog and following the links, contains
essentially the same stuff I found on the gnupg.org howto.  I had already tried
the downloads of the two files gnupg-ccid.rules and gnupg-ccid script and the
associated instructions for placing them.  This did not work for me.

Peter L provided something similar in many respects but different in others and
this did work for me with gnupg 1.4.16  but not yet for gnupg2 2.0.26.

So I am still trying to get gpg2 to work.

Regards,
Philip



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From micha137 at gmx.de  Thu Oct 23 10:58:41 2014
From: micha137 at gmx.de (Michael Anders)
Date: Thu, 23 Oct 2014 10:58:41 +0200
Subject: Wind river
In-Reply-To: <mailman.16041.1413969576.28939.gnupg-users@gnupg.org>
References: <mailman.16041.1413969576.28939.gnupg-users@gnupg.org>
Message-ID: <1414054721.3472.73.camel@micha137-myAMD-CM1740>

@rjh
  thanks for your earnest answer to my sloppy and somewhat provocative
post.
> 
> > This doesn't make any sense to me.
> 
> Makes perfect sense to me, once you understand three things:
> 
> (a) at one point all the good crypto came out of either the US, UK,
>     or France,

I have to concede that I mostly agree with you.
While i think the most dangerous current threat to our freedom and
democracy is ubiquitous eavesdropping and spoofing by NSA, GCHQ and
their likes, I admit US scientists also gave us the means to defend
against it(strong cryptography).
After reading an Scientific American Article about asymmetric
cryptography by Adleman (not the original one in 1977, but a later one
from the 1990ies ;-) I was fascinated. Then I heard about the issues
around export restrictions and immediately sat down and coded it as an
act of a physicists self respect. For me the claim to "own some
mathematics" by an administration is pure hybris and ignorance. My
little exercise didn't get any momentum back then and I ceased to pursue
that any further.
And yes, if you want to discuss matters of cryptography seriously, there
are hardly any quality posts in german language.

I have some trust in the strength of the opposition against ubiquitous
government  surveillance within the US and hope they will overcome
current antidemocratic moves. Presumably and sadly the opposition
against such tendencies is weaker in germany. 

If you google "open source elliptic curve cryptography" you will find my
current activities regarding cryptography. You might notice that the
softwares menus as well as the documentation is held almost completely
in english language. One reason is to keep dumb german nationalistic
morons off. 
In my opinion the current behavior of the US soup letter agencies
nourishes dumb nationalistic anti-us tendencies in other countries
including mine! I don't want to be forced into an alliance with
nationalistic people.
The US judicial system should IMHO no longer let people, who lie to
congress under oath, go unharmed and pursue people, telling the truth,
with all might.
Please apologize me having gone somewhat off topic here....

> (c) laws and regulations change so slowly they make glaciers look swift.

agreed.
Probably my (the german) administration isn't any better in this aspect.
I respect you for defending your (the us) administration, yet in my
opinion both our administrations deserve some bashing once in a while
for excessive ignorance and/or sluggishness.

Cheers,
   Michael Anders



From wk at gnupg.org  Thu Oct 23 12:00:55 2014
From: wk at gnupg.org (Werner Koch)
Date: Thu, 23 Oct 2014 12:00:55 +0200
Subject: smart card under linux
In-Reply-To: <544776A2.1020905@digitalbrains.com> (Peter Lebbing's message of
 "Wed, 22 Oct 2014 11:19:30 +0200")
References: <54458E79.4000904@nordnet.fr> <544776A2.1020905@digitalbrains.com>
Message-ID: <87iojbds14.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>

On Wed, 22 Oct 2014 11:19, peter at digitalbrains.com said:

> necessary udev rules are included in the gnupg package already. However, I use
> an SPR532 here. The SCM3512 is not mentioned in the rules file, so you might
> need to add an entry.

BTW, is it still not possible to enable the access using the device
class?  Many years ago I tried this but it stopped to work during one of
the udev changes.  Something like

  ATTR{configuration}=="CCID Class", MODE:="660", GROUP:="scard"

but today it should somehow check whether there is an interface
descriptor with bInterfaceClass == 11.


Shalom-Salam,

   Werner

-- 
Die Gedanken sind frei.  Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz.



From rjh at sixdemonbag.org  Thu Oct 23 20:02:36 2014
From: rjh at sixdemonbag.org (Robert J. Hansen)
Date: Thu, 23 Oct 2014 14:02:36 -0400
Subject: Wind river
In-Reply-To: <1414054721.3472.73.camel@micha137-myAMD-CM1740>
References: <mailman.16041.1413969576.28939.gnupg-users@gnupg.org>
 <1414054721.3472.73.camel@micha137-myAMD-CM1740>
Message-ID: <544942BC.901@sixdemonbag.org>

> While i think the most dangerous current threat to our freedom and 
> democracy is ubiquitous eavesdropping and spoofing by NSA, GCHQ and 
> their likes...

It's a popular opinion.

> I admit US scientists also gave us the means to defend against
> it(strong cryptography).

In the immediate postwar period up until, oh, maybe 1980, most of the
good civilian cryptographic work came out of the United States.  But
since then, it's very much been a collaboration from around the world.
AES was developed by a pair of Belgians, for instance.

> I respect you for defending your (the us) administration...

That wasn't my intent.  I think ITAR and EAR are remarkably silly
regulations when it comes to crypto.  However, it's a good idea to learn
about the historical forces that shaped ITAR and EAR.  :)


From mailinglisten at hauke-laging.de  Sat Oct 25 20:09:13 2014
From: mailinglisten at hauke-laging.de (Hauke Laging)
Date: Sat, 25 Oct 2014 20:09:13 +0200
Subject: auto refresh for expired certificates
Message-ID: <2877022.PvSyQxtp5e@inno>

Hello,

I would like to suggest a new option for GnuPG (mainly intended for the 
config file) which would automatically try to import an update for the 
certificate if it has expired (both from the standard key server and 
from the preferred one if set).

I guess that many users don't understand that in case of certificate 
expiration it is often the solution to just refresh the certificate. 
This feature would avoid problems for these users (and encourage the use 
of expiration dates which IMHO is useful). Of course, this could be done 
in the GUIs but this seems to be a trivial extension and would avoid 
having to wait for all GUIs to care. And it's not on "high GUI level" 
but relevant for console usage, too.


In the long term each certificate should get a timestamp entry in 
trustdb for the last update check. With that a new option could be 
defined which causes gpg to check for updates of a certain certificate 
if it is to be used and has not been checked for updates for more than x 
days. Refresh discipline seems to me to be a serious problem. And just 
checking the whole key ring every x days would be a waste of resources 
(especially on the key servers).


Hauke
-- 
Crypto f?r alle: http://www.openpgp-schulungen.de/fuer/unterstuetzer/
http://userbase.kde.org/Concepts/OpenPGP_Help_Spread
OpenPGP: 7D82 FB9F D25A 2CE4 5241 6C37 BF4B 8EEF 1A57 1DF5
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From ndk.clanbo at gmail.com  Sun Oct 26 08:19:28 2014
From: ndk.clanbo at gmail.com (NdK)
Date: Sun, 26 Oct 2014 08:19:28 +0100
Subject: auto refresh for expired certificates
In-Reply-To: <2877022.PvSyQxtp5e@inno>
References: <2877022.PvSyQxtp5e@inno>
Message-ID: <544CA080.5040402@gmail.com>

Il 25/10/2014 20:09, Hauke Laging ha scritto:

> I would like to suggest a new option for GnuPG (mainly intended for the 
> config file) which would automatically try to import an update for the 
> certificate if it has expired (both from the standard key server and 
> from the preferred one if set).
IIRC a tool exists to do that, in a way that makes it hard for keyserver
owners to extract "social" metadata (like "these keys are on a single
keyring"). Too bad I can't recall its name :(

BYtE,
 Diego



From 2014-667rhzu3dc-lists-groups at riseup.net  Sun Oct 26 11:32:47 2014
From: 2014-667rhzu3dc-lists-groups at riseup.net (MFPA)
Date: Sun, 26 Oct 2014 10:32:47 +0000
Subject: auto refresh for expired certificates
In-Reply-To: <544CA080.5040402@gmail.com>
References: <2877022.PvSyQxtp5e@inno> <544CA080.5040402@gmail.com>
Message-ID: <361885674.20141026103247@my_localhost>

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA512

Hi


On Sunday 26 October 2014 at 7:19:28 AM, in
<mid:544CA080.5040402 at gmail.com>, NdK wrote:



> IIRC a tool exists to do that, in a way that makes it hard for keyserver
> owners to extract "social" metadata (like "these keys are on a single
> keyring"). Too bad I can't recall its name :(

I remember reading about a tool to refresh the keys on your keyring
from keyservers, one key at a time at random intervals (and if I
recall correctly, picking a random keyserver from a list). But I can't
remember the name either, and I couldn't come up with search terms to
find it with a search engine.


- --
Best regards

MFPA                    mailto:2014-667rhzu3dc-lists-groups at riseup.net

When it comes to humility, I'm the greatest.
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From peter at digitalbrains.com  Sun Oct 26 12:44:53 2014
From: peter at digitalbrains.com (Peter Lebbing)
Date: Sun, 26 Oct 2014 12:44:53 +0100
Subject: auto refresh for expired certificates
In-Reply-To: <361885674.20141026103247@my_localhost>
References: <2877022.PvSyQxtp5e@inno> <544CA080.5040402@gmail.com>
 <361885674.20141026103247@my_localhost>
Message-ID: <544CDEB5.1000004@digitalbrains.com>

On 26/10/14 11:32, MFPA wrote:
> I couldn't come up with search terms to
> find it with a search engine.

After several tries I finally had luck. I also forgot the name :). But it's
parcimonie. It seems to live at https://github.com/EtiennePerot/parcimonie.sh .

HTH,

Peter.


-- 
I use the GNU Privacy Guard (GnuPG) in combination with Enigmail.
You can send me encrypted mail if you want some privacy.
My key is available at <http://digitalbrains.com/2012/openpgp-key-peter>


From roam at ringlet.net  Sun Oct 26 11:42:35 2014
From: roam at ringlet.net (Peter Pentchev)
Date: Sun, 26 Oct 2014 12:42:35 +0200
Subject: auto refresh for expired certificates
In-Reply-To: <361885674.20141026103247@my_localhost>
References: <2877022.PvSyQxtp5e@inno> <544CA080.5040402@gmail.com>
 <361885674.20141026103247@my_localhost>
Message-ID: <20141026104235.GF2545@straylight.m.ringlet.net>

On Sun, Oct 26, 2014 at 10:32:47AM +0000, MFPA wrote:
> Hi
> 
> 
> On Sunday 26 October 2014 at 7:19:28 AM, in
> <mid:544CA080.5040402 at gmail.com>, NdK wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> > IIRC a tool exists to do that, in a way that makes it hard for keyserver
> > owners to extract "social" metadata (like "these keys are on a single
> > keyring"). Too bad I can't recall its name :(
> 
> I remember reading about a tool to refresh the keys on your keyring
> from keyservers, one key at a time at random intervals (and if I
> recall correctly, picking a random keyserver from a list). But I can't
> remember the name either, and I couldn't come up with search terms to
> find it with a search engine.

parcimonie?

https://gaffer.ptitcanardnoir.org/intrigeri/code/parcimonie/
(although I'm having some trouble connecting to the webserver right now)

https://packages.debian.org/sid/parcimonie

G'luck,
Peter

-- 
Peter Pentchev  roam at ringlet.net roam at FreeBSD.org p.penchev at storpool.com
PGP key:        http://people.FreeBSD.org/~roam/roam.key.asc
Key fingerprint 2EE7 A7A5 17FC 124C F115  C354 651E EFB0 2527 DF13
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From peter at digitalbrains.com  Sun Oct 26 12:50:53 2014
From: peter at digitalbrains.com (Peter Lebbing)
Date: Sun, 26 Oct 2014 12:50:53 +0100
Subject: auto refresh for expired certificates
In-Reply-To: <544CDEB5.1000004@digitalbrains.com>
References: <2877022.PvSyQxtp5e@inno> <544CA080.5040402@gmail.com>
 <361885674.20141026103247@my_localhost> <544CDEB5.1000004@digitalbrains.com>
Message-ID: <544CE01D.4070009@digitalbrains.com>

On 26/10/14 12:44, Peter Lebbing wrote:
> After several tries I finally had luck.

By the way, my search string was "keyserver lookup exposes keyring"

> It seems to live at https://github.com/EtiennePerot/parcimonie.sh .

But this e-mail is to correct this bit: this is actually a reimplementation of
parcimonie. I hadn't looked at it well enough to notice this very obvious bit :).

Peter.

-- 
I use the GNU Privacy Guard (GnuPG) in combination with Enigmail.
You can send me encrypted mail if you want some privacy.
My key is available at <http://digitalbrains.com/2012/openpgp-key-peter>


From telegraph at gmx.net  Sun Oct 26 11:47:31 2014
From: telegraph at gmx.net (Gregor Zattler)
Date: Sun, 26 Oct 2014 11:47:31 +0100
Subject: auto refresh for expired certificates
In-Reply-To: <361885674.20141026103247@my_localhost>
References: <2877022.PvSyQxtp5e@inno> <544CA080.5040402@gmail.com>
 <361885674.20141026103247@my_localhost>
Message-ID: <20141026104731.GF10367@boo.workgroup>

Hi MFPA, gnupg users,
* MFPA <2014-667rhzu3dc-lists-groups at riseup.net> [26. Oct. 2014]:
> Hi
> 
> 
> On Sunday 26 October 2014 at 7:19:28 AM, in
> <mid:544CA080.5040402 at gmail.com>, NdK wrote:
> 
> 
> 
>> IIRC a tool exists to do that, in a way that makes it hard for keyserver
>> owners to extract "social" metadata (like "these keys are on a single
>> keyring"). Too bad I can't recall its name :(
> 
> I remember reading about a tool to refresh the keys on your keyring
> from keyservers, one key at a time at random intervals (and if I
> recall correctly, picking a random keyserver from a list). But I can't
> remember the name either, and I couldn't come up with search terms to
> find it with a search engine.

It's name is  parcimonie:
https://gaffer.ptitcanardnoir.org/intrigeri/code/parcimonie/
There is also a reimplementation as a bash shell script:
https://github.com/EtiennePerot/parcimonie.sh
which claims: "Unlike the original Parcimonie, parcimonie.sh
guarantees that each key refresh happens over a unique Tor
circuit even when multiple refreshes happen at the same time. "


Ciao, Gregor
-- 
 -... --- .-. . -.. ..--.. ...-.-


From peter at digitalbrains.com  Sun Oct 26 12:42:36 2014
From: peter at digitalbrains.com (Peter Lebbing)
Date: Sun, 26 Oct 2014 12:42:36 +0100
Subject: smart card under linux
In-Reply-To: <87iojbds14.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
References: <54458E79.4000904@nordnet.fr> <544776A2.1020905@digitalbrains.com>
 <87iojbds14.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
Message-ID: <544CDE2C.4050603@digitalbrains.com>

On 23/10/14 12:00, Werner Koch wrote:
> BTW, is it still not possible to enable the access using the device
> class?

I've had a good look at this. On Debian stable, I couldn't get it to
work, but maybe it's possible.

The SCM SPR532 seems an unlikely candidate; it's not of the correct
device class:

---------------------------8<--------------------->8---------------------------
# lsusb -v -s 2:6
Bus 002 Device 006: ID 04e6:e003 SCM Microsystems, Inc. SPR532 PinPad
SmartCard Re
ader
Device Descriptor:
  bLength                18
  bDescriptorType         1
  bcdUSB               2.00
  bDeviceClass            0 (Defined at Interface level)
  bDeviceSubClass         0
  bDeviceProtocol         0
  bMaxPacketSize0        16
  idVendor           0x04e6 SCM Microsystems, Inc.
  idProduct          0xe003 SPR532 PinPad SmartCard Reader
  bcdDevice            5.10
  iManufacturer           1 SCM Microsystems Inc.
  iProduct                2 SPRx32 USB Smart Card Reader
  iSerial                 5 60200D5E
  bNumConfigurations      1
  Configuration Descriptor:
    bLength                 9
    bDescriptorType         2
    wTotalLength           93
    bNumInterfaces          1
    bConfigurationValue     1
    iConfiguration          3 Vendor Class
    bmAttributes         0xa0
      (Bus Powered)
      Remote Wakeup
    MaxPower              100mA
    Interface Descriptor:
      bLength                 9
      bDescriptorType         4
      bInterfaceNumber        0
      bAlternateSetting       0
      bNumEndpoints           3
      bInterfaceClass       255 Vendor Specific Class
      bInterfaceSubClass      0
      bInterfaceProtocol      0
      iInterface              4 Vendor Interface
      ** UNRECOGNIZED:  36 21 00 01 00 01 03 00 00 00 a0 0f 00 00 40 1f
00 00 00 01 2a 00 00 29 40 05 00 00 fe 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
ba 00 01 00 0e 01 00 00 ff ff 00 00 03 01
      Endpoint Descriptor:
        bLength                 7
        bDescriptorType         5
        bEndpointAddress     0x01  EP 1 OUT
        bmAttributes            2
          Transfer Type            Bulk
          Synch Type               None
          Usage Type               Data
        wMaxPacketSize     0x0040  1x 64 bytes
        bInterval               0
      Endpoint Descriptor:
        bLength                 7
        bDescriptorType         5
        bEndpointAddress     0x82  EP 2 IN
        bmAttributes            2
          Transfer Type            Bulk
          Synch Type               None
          Usage Type               Data
        wMaxPacketSize     0x0040  1x 64 bytes
        bInterval               0
      Endpoint Descriptor:
        bLength                 7
        bDescriptorType         5
        bEndpointAddress     0x83  EP 3 IN
        bmAttributes            3
          Transfer Type            Interrupt
          Synch Type               None
          Usage Type               Data
        wMaxPacketSize     0x0010  1x 16 bytes
        bInterval              16
Device Status:     0x0000
  (Bus Powered)
---------------------------8<--------------------->8---------------------------

---------------------------8<--------------------->8---------------------------
# udevadm info -a -n /dev/bus/usb/002/006
[...]
  looking at device '/devices/pci0000:00/0000:00:1d.0/usb2/2-2':
    KERNEL=="2-2"
    SUBSYSTEM=="usb"
    DRIVER=="usb"
    ATTR{configuration}=="Vendor Class"
    ATTR{bNumInterfaces}==" 1"
    ATTR{bConfigurationValue}=="1"
    ATTR{bmAttributes}=="a0"
    ATTR{bMaxPower}=="100mA"
    ATTR{urbnum}=="31"
    ATTR{idVendor}=="04e6"
    ATTR{idProduct}=="e003"
    ATTR{bcdDevice}=="0510"
    ATTR{bDeviceClass}=="00"
    ATTR{bDeviceSubClass}=="00"
    ATTR{bDeviceProtocol}=="00"
    ATTR{bNumConfigurations}=="1"
    ATTR{bMaxPacketSize0}=="16"
    ATTR{speed}=="12"
    ATTR{busnum}=="2"
    ATTR{devnum}=="6"
    ATTR{devpath}=="2"
    ATTR{version}==" 2.00"
    ATTR{maxchild}=="0"
    ATTR{quirks}=="0x0"
    ATTR{avoid_reset_quirk}=="0"
    ATTR{authorized}=="1"
    ATTR{manufacturer}=="SCM Microsystems Inc."
    ATTR{product}=="SPRx32 USB Smart Card Reader"
    ATTR{serial}=="60200D5E"
[...]
---------------------------8<--------------------->8---------------------------

However, I have another card reader, an SCM SCR3310. It was sold as a
ChipDrive MyKey, and had a different product number on the original
case. However, that case didn't keep the connector clean in my pocket,
so I put it in a different case. I don't know what the original product
number was anymore. Anyway:

---------------------------8<--------------------->8---------------------------
# lsusb -s 2:7 -v
Bus 002 Device 007: ID 04e6:5116 SCM Microsystems, Inc. SCR331-LC1 /
SCR3310 SmartCard Reader
Device Descriptor:
  bLength                18
  bDescriptorType         1
  bcdUSB               2.00
  bDeviceClass            0 (Defined at Interface level)
  bDeviceSubClass         0
  bDeviceProtocol         0
  bMaxPacketSize0        32
  idVendor           0x04e6 SCM Microsystems, Inc.
  idProduct          0x5116 SCR331-LC1 / SCR3310 SmartCard Reader
  bcdDevice            2.04
  iManufacturer           1 SCM Microsystems Inc.
  iProduct                2 SCR3310 v2.0 USB SC Reader
  iSerial                 0
  bNumConfigurations      1
  Configuration Descriptor:
    bLength                 9
    bDescriptorType         2
    wTotalLength           93
    bNumInterfaces          1
    bConfigurationValue     1
    iConfiguration          3 CCID Class
    bmAttributes         0xa0
      (Bus Powered)
      Remote Wakeup
    MaxPower              100mA
    Interface Descriptor:
      bLength                 9
      bDescriptorType         4
      bInterfaceNumber        0
      bAlternateSetting       0
      bNumEndpoints           3
      bInterfaceClass        11 Chip/SmartCard
      bInterfaceSubClass      0
      bInterfaceProtocol      0
      iInterface              4 CCID Interface
      ChipCard Interface Descriptor:
        bLength                54
        bDescriptorType        33
        bcdCCID              1.10  (Warning: Only accurate for version 1.0)
        nMaxSlotIndex           0
        bVoltageSupport         7  5.0V 3.0V 1.8V
        dwProtocols             3  T=0 T=1
        dwDefaultClock       4800
        dwMaxiumumClock      8000
        bNumClockSupported      0
        dwDataRate          12903 bps
        dwMaxDataRate      412903 bps
        bNumDataRatesSupp.      0
        dwMaxIFSD             252
        dwSyncProtocols  00000000
        dwMechanical     00000000
        dwFeatures       000101BA
          Auto configuration based on ATR
          Auto voltage selection
          Auto clock change
          Auto baud rate change
          Auto PPS made by CCID
          CCID can set ICC in clock stop mode
          TPDU level exchange
        dwMaxCCIDMsgLen       271
        bClassGetResponse    echo
        bClassEnvelope       echo
        wlcdLayout           none
        bPINSupport             0
        bMaxCCIDBusySlots       1
      Endpoint Descriptor:
        bLength                 7
        bDescriptorType         5
        bEndpointAddress     0x83  EP 3 IN
        bmAttributes            3
          Transfer Type            Interrupt
          Synch Type               None
          Usage Type               Data
        wMaxPacketSize     0x0008  1x 8 bytes
        bInterval              16
      Endpoint Descriptor:
        bLength                 7
        bDescriptorType         5
        bEndpointAddress     0x84  EP 4 IN
        bmAttributes            2
          Transfer Type            Bulk
          Synch Type               None
          Usage Type               Data
        wMaxPacketSize     0x0040  1x 64 bytes
        bInterval               0
      Endpoint Descriptor:
        bLength                 7
        bDescriptorType         5
        bEndpointAddress     0x05  EP 5 OUT
        bmAttributes            2
          Transfer Type            Bulk
          Synch Type               None
          Usage Type               Data
        wMaxPacketSize     0x0040  1x 64 bytes
        bInterval               0
Device Status:     0x0000
  (Bus Powered)
---------------------------8<--------------------->8---------------------------

That looks promising. BUT:

---------------------------8<--------------------->8---------------------------
# udevadm info -a -n /dev/bus/usb/002/007
[...]
  looking at device '/devices/pci0000:00/0000:00:1d.0/usb2/2-2':
    KERNEL=="2-2"
    SUBSYSTEM=="usb"
    DRIVER=="usb"
    ATTR{configuration}=="CCID Class"
    ATTR{bNumInterfaces}==" 1"
    ATTR{bConfigurationValue}=="1"
    ATTR{bmAttributes}=="a0"
    ATTR{bMaxPower}=="100mA"
    ATTR{urbnum}=="27"
    ATTR{idVendor}=="04e6"
    ATTR{idProduct}=="5116"
    ATTR{bcdDevice}=="0204"
    ATTR{bDeviceClass}=="00"
    ATTR{bDeviceSubClass}=="00"
    ATTR{bDeviceProtocol}=="00"
    ATTR{bNumConfigurations}=="1"
    ATTR{bMaxPacketSize0}=="32"
    ATTR{speed}=="12"
    ATTR{busnum}=="2"
    ATTR{devnum}=="7"
    ATTR{devpath}=="2"
    ATTR{version}==" 2.00"
    ATTR{maxchild}=="0"
    ATTR{quirks}=="0x0"
    ATTR{avoid_reset_quirk}=="0"
    ATTR{authorized}=="1"
    ATTR{manufacturer}=="SCM Microsystems Inc."
    ATTR{product}=="SCR3310 v2.0 USB SC Reader"
[...]
---------------------------8<--------------------->8---------------------------

It seems that the problem is that the device class is defined at the
interface level, which seems to have no corresponding udev property.
There is the ATTR{Configuration}, but is that reliable? I have no idea.

While playing with udevadm control --log-priority=debug, I did notice
that the Debian libccid package has a rules file that also matches on
the device class:

---------------------------8<--------------------->8---------------------------
$ cat /lib/udev/rules.d/92-libccid.rules
# udev rules to set the access rights of CCID smart card readers
# so they can be used by pcscd

# $Id: 92_pcscd_ccid.rules 6275 2012-04-17 13:42:42Z rousseau $

[...]

# If not adding the device, go away
ACTION!="add", GOTO="pcscd_ccid_rules_end"
SUBSYSTEM!="usb", GOTO="pcscd_ccid_rules_end"
ENV{DEVTYPE}!="usb_device", GOTO="pcscd_ccid_rules_end"

[...]

# generic CCID device (bInterfaceClass = 0x0b)
# change group from default "root" to "pcscd"
ENV{ID_USB_INTERFACES}=="*:0b0000:*", GROUP="pcscd"
[...]
---------------------------8<--------------------->8---------------------------

Unfortunately, that match doesn't work on the SCR3310, because I
modified the gnupg rules file as follows, and it didn't do anything:

---------------------------8<--------------------->8---------------------------
SUBSYSTEM!="usb", GOTO="gnupg_rules_end"
ACTION!="add", GOTO="gnupg_rules_end"
ENV{DEVTYPE}!="usb_device", GOTO="gnupg_rules_end"

# generic CCID device (bInterfaceClass = 0x0b)
ENV{ID_USB_INTERFACES}=="*:0b0000:*", ENV{ID_SMARTCARD_READER}="1",
ENV{ID_SMARTCARD_READER_DRIVER}="gnupg"

LABEL="gnupg_rules_end"
---------------------------8<--------------------->8---------------------------

I doubt the ID_USB_INTERFACES match works anyway, seeing how udevadm
info doesn't show it. But that might be a bug in udevadm for all I know.

This is as far as I got on Debian stable.

HTH,

Peter.

-- 
I use the GNU Privacy Guard (GnuPG) in combination with Enigmail.
You can send me encrypted mail if you want some privacy.
My key is available at <http://digitalbrains.com/2012/openpgp-key-peter>


From mailinglisten at hauke-laging.de  Sun Oct 26 12:56:05 2014
From: mailinglisten at hauke-laging.de (Hauke Laging)
Date: Sun, 26 Oct 2014 12:56:05 +0100
Subject: auto refresh for expired certificates
In-Reply-To: <544CA080.5040402@gmail.com>
References: <2877022.PvSyQxtp5e@inno> <544CA080.5040402@gmail.com>
Message-ID: <19669087.AUuB4liyxC@inno>

Am So 26.10.2014, 08:19:28 schrieb NdK:
> Il 25/10/2014 20:09, Hauke Laging ha scritto:
> > I would like to suggest a new option for GnuPG (mainly intended for
> > the config file) which would automatically try to import an update
> > for the certificate if it has expired (both from the standard key
> > server and from the preferred one if set).
> 
> IIRC a tool exists to do that

I do admit that this may be interesting for certain people but I guess 
that this tool does not do "that" but solves a completely different 
problem. 


Hauke
-- 
Crypto f?r alle: http://www.openpgp-schulungen.de/fuer/unterstuetzer/
http://userbase.kde.org/Concepts/OpenPGP_Help_Spread
OpenPGP: 7D82 FB9F D25A 2CE4 5241 6C37 BF4B 8EEF 1A57 1DF5
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From peter at digitalbrains.com  Sun Oct 26 14:14:25 2014
From: peter at digitalbrains.com (Peter Lebbing)
Date: Sun, 26 Oct 2014 14:14:25 +0100
Subject: auto refresh for expired certificates
In-Reply-To: <19669087.AUuB4liyxC@inno>
References: <2877022.PvSyQxtp5e@inno> <544CA080.5040402@gmail.com>
 <19669087.AUuB4liyxC@inno>
Message-ID: <544CF3B1.8080704@digitalbrains.com>

On 26/10/14 12:56, Hauke Laging wrote:
> I do admit that this may be interesting for certain people but I guess that
> this tool does not do "that" but solves a completely different problem.

However, it does broadly correspond to your later comments about periodically
refreshing even before the expiry date.

And more importantly, an implementation of refresh-on-expiry might actually be
done as a new mode of the existing tool parcimonie, leveraging the code that
has already been written. And you get parcimonie's features as a bonus, i.e.,
not exposing too much about when you use keys and what keys you have.

I'm suggesting that automatic runs of parcimonie should schedule a refresh of
a key when a key is close to expiry. It seems to me postponing the refresh to
the first moment you use an already expired key leaks more metadata than
necessary, i.e., that you are about to encrypt to that key.

However, some thought needs to go into when and how often to check keys close
to expiry.

HTH,

Peter.

-- 
I use the GNU Privacy Guard (GnuPG) in combination with Enigmail.
You can send me encrypted mail if you want some privacy.
My key is available at <http://digitalbrains.com/2012/openpgp-key-peter>


From 2014-667rhzu3dc-lists-groups at riseup.net  Sun Oct 26 13:22:24 2014
From: 2014-667rhzu3dc-lists-groups at riseup.net (MFPA)
Date: Sun, 26 Oct 2014 12:22:24 +0000
Subject: auto refresh for expired certificates
In-Reply-To: <544CE01D.4070009@digitalbrains.com>
References: <2877022.PvSyQxtp5e@inno> <544CA080.5040402@gmail.com>
 <361885674.20141026103247@my_localhost> <544CDEB5.1000004@digitalbrains.com>
 <544CE01D.4070009@digitalbrains.com>
Message-ID: <1004631039.20141026122224@my_localhost>

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA512

Hi


On Sunday 26 October 2014 at 11:50:53 AM, in
<mid:544CE01D.4070009 at digitalbrains.com>, Peter Lebbing wrote:




> By the way, my search string was "keyserver lookup
> exposes keyring"

That's brilliant. I tried several options along the lines of: keys
refresh incremental random gnupg.



>> It seems to live at
>> https://github.com/EtiennePerot/parcimonie.sh .

> But this e-mail is to correct this bit: this is
> actually a reimplementation of parcimonie. I hadn't
> looked at it well enough to notice this very obvious
> bit :).

Thanks. That is the one I was thinking of.

Each key is refreshed using a unique Tor circuit rather than a random
keyserver from a list.

The downside that I didn't remember is that it picks a key at random
to refresh each time, so it can't guarantee that every key actually
will get refreshed regularly.


- --
Best regards

MFPA                    mailto:2014-667rhzu3dc-lists-groups at riseup.net

Live your life as though every day it was your last.
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From mailinglisten at hauke-laging.de  Sun Oct 26 15:28:30 2014
From: mailinglisten at hauke-laging.de (Hauke Laging)
Date: Sun, 26 Oct 2014 15:28:30 +0100
Subject: auto refresh for expired certificates
In-Reply-To: <544CF3B1.8080704@digitalbrains.com>
References: <2877022.PvSyQxtp5e@inno> <19669087.AUuB4liyxC@inno>
 <544CF3B1.8080704@digitalbrains.com>
Message-ID: <2464197.tbmXPx5iGk@inno>

Am So 26.10.2014, 14:14:25 schrieb Peter Lebbing:

> that you are about to encrypt to that key.

And who is "you"?  8-)

THEY do know anyway that you (really you in this case) encrypt to a 
certain key as long as SMTP is used (as usual) and the target key ID is 
not hidden (as usual, too).


Hauke
-- 
Crypto f?r alle: http://www.openpgp-schulungen.de/fuer/unterstuetzer/
http://userbase.kde.org/Concepts/OpenPGP_Help_Spread
OpenPGP: 7D82 FB9F D25A 2CE4 5241 6C37 BF4B 8EEF 1A57 1DF5
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From peter at digitalbrains.com  Sun Oct 26 16:12:15 2014
From: peter at digitalbrains.com (Peter Lebbing)
Date: Sun, 26 Oct 2014 16:12:15 +0100
Subject: auto refresh for expired certificates
In-Reply-To: <2464197.tbmXPx5iGk@inno>
References: <2877022.PvSyQxtp5e@inno> <19669087.AUuB4liyxC@inno>
 <544CF3B1.8080704@digitalbrains.com> <2464197.tbmXPx5iGk@inno>
Message-ID: <544D0F4F.7070506@digitalbrains.com>

On 26/10/14 15:28, Hauke Laging wrote:
> THEY do know anyway that you (really you in this case) encrypt to a 
> certain key as long as SMTP is used (as usual) and the target key ID is 
> not hidden (as usual, too).

First of all, the number of parties in the know is enlarged by doing the
keyserver query. Somebody with access to the SMTP session always knows:
the sending and receiving mail providers and anybody who can listen in
on that connection. But you add a keyserver to that.

Secondly, more to the point, after thinking about it, I think it does
make more sense to incorporate this into GnuPG proper (as an optional
feature; --auto-key-locate seems appropriate).

The main motivation is that it sounds like a good option for many casual
users who are not particularly worried about the problem of leaking
social and usage data to keyservers, and those people will not install
parcimonie. And my argument of leveraging code already written equally
applies to GnuPG, that was a bit of a silly argument in retrospect :).

--auto-key-locate automatically retrieves unknown keys. I think it makes
sense to include expired keys, triggering a refresh. Or is there a use
case where this is unwanted?

HTH,

Peter.

PS: I didn't quite understand the different "you"s in your mail; they
all appear to refer to "anyone". But it doesn't seem important.

-- 
I use the GNU Privacy Guard (GnuPG) in combination with Enigmail.
You can send me encrypted mail if you want some privacy.
My key is available at <http://digitalbrains.com/2012/openpgp-key-peter>


From mailinglisten at hauke-laging.de  Sun Oct 26 16:19:03 2014
From: mailinglisten at hauke-laging.de (Hauke Laging)
Date: Sun, 26 Oct 2014 16:19:03 +0100
Subject: auto refresh for expired certificates
In-Reply-To: <544D0F4F.7070506@digitalbrains.com>
References: <2877022.PvSyQxtp5e@inno> <2464197.tbmXPx5iGk@inno>
 <544D0F4F.7070506@digitalbrains.com>
Message-ID: <3307214.SrbsFPW3x1@inno>

Am So 26.10.2014, 16:12:15 schrieb Peter Lebbing:

> PS: I didn't quite understand the different "you"s in your mail; they
> all appear to refer to "anyone". But it doesn't seem important.

Kind of important for your argument.

The statement "that you are about to encrypt to that key" does not make 
much sense if (like in this case) the "you" is a Tor connection.

Unless you meant (what I doubt) that the problem was to know that a 
certain recipient will get an encrypted message (from an unknown 
sender).


Hauke
-- 
Crypto f?r alle: http://www.openpgp-schulungen.de/fuer/unterstuetzer/
http://userbase.kde.org/Concepts/OpenPGP_Help_Spread
OpenPGP: 7D82 FB9F D25A 2CE4 5241 6C37 BF4B 8EEF 1A57 1DF5
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From peter at digitalbrains.com  Sun Oct 26 17:29:52 2014
From: peter at digitalbrains.com (Peter Lebbing)
Date: Sun, 26 Oct 2014 17:29:52 +0100
Subject: auto refresh for expired certificates
In-Reply-To: <3307214.SrbsFPW3x1@inno>
References: <2877022.PvSyQxtp5e@inno> <2464197.tbmXPx5iGk@inno>
 <544D0F4F.7070506@digitalbrains.com> <3307214.SrbsFPW3x1@inno>
Message-ID: <544D2180.5030004@digitalbrains.com>

On 26/10/14 16:19, Hauke Laging wrote:
> The statement "that you are about to encrypt to that key" does not make 
> much sense if (like in this case) the "you" is a Tor connection.

I don't see why this should be so easily dismissed. It's leaked metadata. And
combined with other sources it can provide more information.

And I never assumed parcimonie was used to do the keyserver query when I wrote
that statement, because you suggested including it in GnuPG. Hence my confusion.

Peter.

-- 
I use the GNU Privacy Guard (GnuPG) in combination with Enigmail.
You can send me encrypted mail if you want some privacy.
My key is available at <http://digitalbrains.com/2012/openpgp-key-peter>


From peter at digitalbrains.com  Sun Oct 26 17:36:24 2014
From: peter at digitalbrains.com (Peter Lebbing)
Date: Sun, 26 Oct 2014 17:36:24 +0100
Subject: auto refresh for expired certificates
In-Reply-To: <544D2180.5030004@digitalbrains.com>
References: <2877022.PvSyQxtp5e@inno> <2464197.tbmXPx5iGk@inno>
 <544D0F4F.7070506@digitalbrains.com> <3307214.SrbsFPW3x1@inno>
 <544D2180.5030004@digitalbrains.com>
Message-ID: <544D2308.4070403@digitalbrains.com>

On 26/10/14 17:29, Peter Lebbing wrote:
> I don't see why this should be so easily dismissed. It's leaked metadata. And
> combined with other sources it can provide more information.

Quote failure! I'm sorry about that. I did some stupid things with several
replies open at the same time and then picking the wrong one to use.

Let me redo that:

On 26/10/14 16:19, Hauke Laging wrote:
> Unless you meant (what I doubt) that the problem was to know that a
> certain recipient will get an encrypted message (from an unknown
> sender).

I don't see why this should be so easily dismissed. It's leaked metadata. And
combined with other sources it can provide more information.

And I never assumed parcimonie was used to do the keyserver query when I wrote
that statement, because you suggested including it in GnuPG. Hence my confusion.

Peter.

-- 
I use the GNU Privacy Guard (GnuPG) in combination with Enigmail.
You can send me encrypted mail if you want some privacy.
My key is available at <http://digitalbrains.com/2012/openpgp-key-peter>


From mac3iii at gmail.com  Sun Oct 26 17:55:52 2014
From: mac3iii at gmail.com (Murphy)
Date: Sun, 26 Oct 2014 12:55:52 -0400
Subject: [Announce] The maybe final Beta for GnuPG 2.1
In-Reply-To: <CA+4dSw4oAeCx_0WrM2FKTUdpa=+0SH_xfB3e15dN_36PnfixpA@mail.gmail.com>
References: <CA+4dSw4oAeCx_0WrM2FKTUdpa=+0SH_xfB3e15dN_36PnfixpA@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <544D2798.5030608@gmail.com>

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA1

> On Wed, Oct 15, 2014 at 1:00 PM, Peter Lebbing <peter at
digitalbrains.com> wrote:

> Success! Installing the libldap2-dev package resolves the issue
> and the build process completes with no other errors.

> When I add PLAY/inst/bin/ to my path and PLAY/inst/lib/ to the list
> of shared libraries, everything works as expected.

> Many thanks for your help and patience.

> Cheers! -Pete

Hey Pete I am just at the point of success also using your methods
except I don't know how to put PLAY/inst/lib/ to the list of shared
libraries in my ubuntu 14.04 machine.  Speedo compiles perfectly yet
when I run

gpg2 --version
gpg2: error while loading shared libraries: libcrypt.so.20: cannot
open shared object file: No such file or directory

Can you share for us non-unix guru's how you added the list of shared
libraries?
Thanks for your patience.

- -Murphy
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
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From mac3iii at gmail.com  Sun Oct 26 19:56:01 2014
From: mac3iii at gmail.com (Murphy)
Date: Sun, 26 Oct 2014 14:56:01 -0400
Subject: [Announce] The maybe final Beta for GnuPG 2.1
In-Reply-To: <544D2798.5030608@gmail.com>
References: <544D2798.5030608@gmail.com>
Message-ID: <544D43C1.6010109@gmail.com>

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA1

Problem solved.  The error in finding the shared libraries was
resolved with a single command after the successful speedo install
using the INSTALL_PREFIX=/usr/local option on my ubuntu 14.04 machine:

sudo ldconfig

To summarize the following worked for me on a fresh installation of
ubuntu 14.04

sudo apt-get install libldap2-dev, gtk+-2.0
install pinentry-0.8.4
unpack then cd gnupg-2.1.0-beta864
sudo make -f build-aux/speedo.mk native INSTALL_PREFIX=/usr/local
sudo ldconfig

Now we await the stable version!
Thanks
Murphy
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From pete at heypete.com  Sun Oct 26 22:08:23 2014
From: pete at heypete.com (Pete Stephenson)
Date: Sun, 26 Oct 2014 22:08:23 +0100
Subject: [Announce] The maybe final Beta for GnuPG 2.1
In-Reply-To: <544D43C1.6010109@gmail.com>
References: <544D2798.5030608@gmail.com>
	<544D43C1.6010109@gmail.com>
Message-ID: <CA+4dSw4wEhOid7+Dg_zGEcTLzrsN3Td34BD3JtGYRyJvmVktHw@mail.gmail.com>

On Sun, Oct 26, 2014 at 7:56 PM, Murphy <mac3iii at gmail.com> wrote:
> Problem solved.  The error in finding the shared libraries was
> resolved with a single command after the successful speedo install
> using the INSTALL_PREFIX=/usr/local option on my ubuntu 14.04 machine:
>
> sudo ldconfig

My apologies for not responding earlier.

I used the same method, only I used "sudo ldconfig
/path/to/PLAY/inst/lib/" rather than installing the beta to
/usr/local.

Cheers!
-Pete

-- 
Pete Stephenson


From rjh at sixdemonbag.org  Mon Oct 27 19:20:36 2014
From: rjh at sixdemonbag.org (Robert J. Hansen)
Date: Mon, 27 Oct 2014 14:20:36 -0400
Subject: Update on USG, Software, and the First Amendment
Message-ID: <544E8CF4.7060208@sixdemonbag.org>

Just received word back from a friend of mine who's a law professor
focusing in electronic civil liberties, and is a former Commissioner of
the FCC to boot.  He's skeptical that ITAR/EAR enforcement will affect
U.S. hackers participating in libre software development.  More than
that I can't/shouldn't say, since he was writing off-the-cuff in a
personal email rather than carefully drafting remarks for public
consumption.

He rather likes writing short essays on law.  If there's interest, I'll
try and talk him into writing something layman-friendly about ITAR/EAR,
cryptography, and the First Amendment.


From cderr at simons-rock.edu  Mon Oct 27 19:25:54 2014
From: cderr at simons-rock.edu (charlie derr)
Date: Mon, 27 Oct 2014 14:25:54 -0400
Subject: Update on USG, Software, and the First Amendment
In-Reply-To: <32059_1414434141_544E8D5C_32059_160_1_544E8CF4.7060208@sixdemonbag.org>
References: <32059_1414434141_544E8D5C_32059_160_1_544E8CF4.7060208@sixdemonbag.org>
Message-ID: <544E8E32.4050305@simons-rock.edu>



On 10/27/2014 02:20 PM, Robert J. Hansen wrote:
> If there's interest, I'll
> try and talk him into writing something layman-friendly about ITAR/EAR,
> cryptography, and the First Amendment.


Robert,

Since you seem to be requesting it explicitly, I'll share that I'm interested personally.

     thank you,
         ~c

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From rjh at sixdemonbag.org  Mon Oct 27 20:51:04 2014
From: rjh at sixdemonbag.org (Robert J. Hansen)
Date: Mon, 27 Oct 2014 15:51:04 -0400
Subject: Update on USG, Software, and the First Amendment
In-Reply-To: <544E8E32.4050305@simons-rock.edu>
References: <32059_1414434141_544E8D5C_32059_160_1_544E8CF4.7060208@sixdemonbag.org>
 <544E8E32.4050305@simons-rock.edu>
Message-ID: <544EA228.1010407@sixdemonbag.org>

> Since you seem to be requesting it explicitly, I'll share that I'm
> interested personally.

I just don't want to ask my friend to put together something on the
subject and then discover there's no interest in it -- it seems
disrespectful to Professor Johnson.  :)



From tgmunson at sbcglobal.net  Mon Oct 27 20:03:47 2014
From: tgmunson at sbcglobal.net (Terry Munson)
Date: Mon, 27 Oct 2014 12:03:47 -0700
Subject: Update on USG, Software, and the First Amendment
In-Reply-To: <544E8CF4.7060208@sixdemonbag.org>
References: <544E8CF4.7060208@sixdemonbag.org>
Message-ID: <1414436627.86001.YahooMailNeo@web180901.mail.ne1.yahoo.com>

>He rather likes writing short essays on law.  If there's interest, I'll
>try and talk him into writing something layman-friendly about ITAR/EAR
 
I would be interested.
 
Thanks,
 
Terry

From: Robert J. Hansen <rjh at sixdemonbag.org>
To: "gnupg-users at gnupg.org" <gnupg-users at gnupg.org> 
Sent: Monday, October 27, 2014 11:20 AM
Subject: Update on USG, Software, and the First Amendment


Just received word back from a friend of mine who's a law professor
focusing in electronic civil liberties, and is a former Commissioner of
the FCC to boot.  He's skeptical that ITAR/EAR enforcement will affect
U.S. hackers participating in libre software development.  More than
that I can't/shouldn't say, since he was writing off-the-cuff in a
personal email rather than carefully drafting remarks for public
consumption.

He rather likes writing short essays on law.  If there's interest, I'll
try and talk him into writing something layman-friendly about ITAR/EAR,
cryptography, and the First Amendment.

_______________________________________________
Gnupg-users mailing list
Gnupg-users at gnupg.org
http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users
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From aaron.toponce at gmail.com  Mon Oct 27 21:32:16 2014
From: aaron.toponce at gmail.com (Aaron Toponce)
Date: Mon, 27 Oct 2014 14:32:16 -0600
Subject: Update on USG, Software, and the First Amendment
In-Reply-To: <544EA228.1010407@sixdemonbag.org>
References: <32059_1414434141_544E8D5C_32059_160_1_544E8CF4.7060208@sixdemonbag.org>
 <544E8E32.4050305@simons-rock.edu>
 <544EA228.1010407@sixdemonbag.org>
Message-ID: <20141027203215.GJ3426@irc.ae7.st>

On Mon, Oct 27, 2014 at 03:51:04PM -0400, Robert J. Hansen wrote:
> I just don't want to ask my friend to put together something on the
> subject and then discover there's no interest in it -- it seems
> disrespectful to Professor Johnson.  :)

I think there will be great interest on the list for it. I am also very
interested. Maybe it's time for me to refresh my RSA export-a-crypto-system
sig?

-- 
. o .   o . o   . . o   o . .   . o .
. . o   . o o   o . o   . o o   . . o
o o o   . o .   . o o   o o .   o o o
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From philip.jackson at nordnet.fr  Tue Oct 28 00:20:20 2014
From: philip.jackson at nordnet.fr (Philip Jackson)
Date: Tue, 28 Oct 2014 00:20:20 +0100
Subject: Update on USG, Software, and the First Amendment
In-Reply-To: <544EA228.1010407@sixdemonbag.org>
References: <32059_1414434141_544E8D5C_32059_160_1_544E8CF4.7060208@sixdemonbag.org>
 <544E8E32.4050305@simons-rock.edu> <544EA228.1010407@sixdemonbag.org>
Message-ID: <544ED334.2040106@nordnet.fr>

On 27/10/14 20:51, Robert J. Hansen wrote:
>> Since you seem to be requesting it explicitly, I'll share that I'm
>> interested personally.
> 
> I just don't want to ask my friend to put together something on the
> subject and then discover there's no interest in it -- it seems
> disrespectful to Professor Johnson.  :)

It would be very interesting to read and I add my name to the request.

(I remember well the late 80's when it was a major task getting agreement to
permit the relocation of a micro-VAX from an office in UK to another office,
same company, in France.)

Philip



From holtzm at cox.net  Tue Oct 28 06:59:48 2014
From: holtzm at cox.net (Bob Holtzman)
Date: Mon, 27 Oct 2014 22:59:48 -0700
Subject: Update on USG, Software, and the First Amendment
In-Reply-To: <544E8CF4.7060208@sixdemonbag.org>
References: <544E8CF4.7060208@sixdemonbag.org>
Message-ID: <20141028055948.GA11558@cox.net>

On Mon, Oct 27, 2014 at 02:20:36PM -0400, Robert J. Hansen wrote:
> Just received word back from a friend of mine who's a law professor
> focusing in electronic civil liberties, and is a former Commissioner of
> the FCC to boot.  He's skeptical that ITAR/EAR enforcement will affect
> U.S. hackers participating in libre software development.  More than
> that I can't/shouldn't say, since he was writing off-the-cuff in a
> personal email rather than carefully drafting remarks for public
> consumption.
> 
> He rather likes writing short essays on law.  If there's interest, I'll
> try and talk him into writing something layman-friendly about ITAR/EAR,
> cryptography, and the First Amendment.

Great interest here.

-- 
Bob Holtzman
Giant intergalactic brain-sucking hyperbacteria 
came to Earth to rape our women and create a race 
of mindless zombies.  Look!  It's working!
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From aarcane at aarcane.org  Tue Oct 28 09:20:48 2014
From: aarcane at aarcane.org (Schlacta, Christ)
Date: Tue, 28 Oct 2014 01:20:48 -0700
Subject: Update on USG, Software, and the First Amendment
In-Reply-To: <20141028055948.GA11558@cox.net>
References: <544E8CF4.7060208@sixdemonbag.org> <20141028055948.GA11558@cox.net>
Message-ID: <CACpWn9Sks56=NEL8g5TYSTnG_-QzMpgqX71LrNBWfw96fR7-tA@mail.gmail.com>

I'll add my +1 to the request
On Oct 28, 2014 12:08 AM, "Bob Holtzman" <holtzm at cox.net> wrote:

> On Mon, Oct 27, 2014 at 02:20:36PM -0400, Robert J. Hansen wrote:
> > Just received word back from a friend of mine who's a law professor
> > focusing in electronic civil liberties, and is a former Commissioner of
> > the FCC to boot.  He's skeptical that ITAR/EAR enforcement will affect
> > U.S. hackers participating in libre software development.  More than
> > that I can't/shouldn't say, since he was writing off-the-cuff in a
> > personal email rather than carefully drafting remarks for public
> > consumption.
> >
> > He rather likes writing short essays on law.  If there's interest, I'll
> > try and talk him into writing something layman-friendly about ITAR/EAR,
> > cryptography, and the First Amendment.
>
> Great interest here.
>
> --
> Bob Holtzman
> Giant intergalactic brain-sucking hyperbacteria
> came to Earth to rape our women and create a race
> of mindless zombies.  Look!  It's working!
>
> _______________________________________________
> Gnupg-users mailing list
> Gnupg-users at gnupg.org
> http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users
>
>
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From martin-gnupg-users at dkyb.de  Tue Oct 28 10:54:52 2014
From: martin-gnupg-users at dkyb.de (Martin Behrendt)
Date: Tue, 28 Oct 2014 10:54:52 +0100
Subject: Update on USG, Software, and the First Amendment
In-Reply-To: <544E8CF4.7060208@sixdemonbag.org>
References: <544E8CF4.7060208@sixdemonbag.org>
Message-ID: <544F67EC.2060908@dkyb.de>

Am 27.10.2014 um 19:20 schrieb Robert J. Hansen:
> Just received word back from a friend of mine who's a law professor
> focusing in electronic civil liberties, and is a former Commissioner of
> the FCC to boot.  He's skeptical that ITAR/EAR enforcement will affect
> U.S. hackers participating in libre software development.  More than
> that I can't/shouldn't say, since he was writing off-the-cuff in a
> personal email rather than carefully drafting remarks for public
> consumption.
> 
> He rather likes writing short essays on law.  If there's interest, I'll
> try and talk him into writing something layman-friendly about ITAR/EAR,
> cryptography, and the First Amendment.

I actually would be interested in how he would argue if he was the
government and would want to prosecute hackers for that. Or both. Just
like the old saying: 2 lawyers, 3 opinions.


From ml at sudhirkhanger.com  Tue Oct 28 17:36:36 2014
From: ml at sudhirkhanger.com (Sudhir Khanger)
Date: Tue, 28 Oct 2014 22:06:36 +0530
Subject: Terminal asks for passphrase even when passphrase is cached by
 gpg-agent
Message-ID: <1607424.czcUP34dmR@fedora>

Hello,

I have gpg-agent cache passphrase. When I run gpg -c text.txt it asks for 
passphrase twice like it normally would but Kgpg or KMail don't. What am I 
suppose to do to make both terminal and GUI apps use cached passphrase instead 
of asking for one?

-- 
Regards,
Sudhir Khanger,
sudhirkhanger.com,
github.com/donniezazen,
5577 8CDB A059 085D 1D60  807F 8C00 45D9 F5EF C394.
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From peter at digitalbrains.com  Tue Oct 28 18:53:45 2014
From: peter at digitalbrains.com (Peter Lebbing)
Date: Tue, 28 Oct 2014 18:53:45 +0100
Subject: Terminal asks for passphrase even when passphrase is cached by
 gpg-agent
In-Reply-To: <1607424.czcUP34dmR@fedora>
References: <1607424.czcUP34dmR@fedora>
Message-ID: <544FD829.4080903@digitalbrains.com>

> I have gpg-agent cache passphrase. When I run gpg -c text.txt it asks for 
> passphrase twice like it normally would but Kgpg or KMail don't.

-c is symmetric encryption, encryption with a passphrase. It is
prompting you what the passphrase should be.

If it were to ask you for your passphrase for *decryption*, it would ask
only once (unless you make a typo).

Encryption to a public key would be:

$ gpg -r KEYID -e test.txt

and it will never ask for a passphrase, since you don't need a
passphrase for _encryption_, but rather for _decryption_.

However, also signing the file will need your passphrase, regardless of
the recipient.

By the way, it is possible to specify a "default recipient" in the
configuration file if you do not use a "-r" when encrypting a file with
"-e".

HTH,

Peter.

-- 
I use the GNU Privacy Guard (GnuPG) in combination with Enigmail.
You can send me encrypted mail if you want some privacy.
My key is available at <http://digitalbrains.com/2012/openpgp-key-peter>


From mailinglisten at hauke-laging.de  Tue Oct 28 19:06:08 2014
From: mailinglisten at hauke-laging.de (Hauke Laging)
Date: Tue, 28 Oct 2014 19:06:08 +0100
Subject: Terminal asks for passphrase even when passphrase is cached by
 gpg-agent
In-Reply-To: <1607424.czcUP34dmR@fedora>
References: <1607424.czcUP34dmR@fedora>
Message-ID: <3361822.DP8Is1GNlq@inno>

Am Di 28.10.2014, 22:06:36 schrieb Sudhir Khanger:

> I have gpg-agent cache passphrase. When I run gpg -c text.txt it asks
> for passphrase twice like it normally would but Kgpg or KMail don't.

You probably mean that Kgpg asks just once. KMail isn't capable of 
creating symmetrically encrypted mails thus I don't know what you mean 
there.

I have created a wishlist entry to change that:
https://bugs.kde.org/show_bug.cgi?id=337617


> What am I suppose to do to make both terminal and GUI apps use cached
> passphrase instead of asking for one?

That is not possible AFAIK because a passphrase used in symmetric 
encryption is not a passphrase in the usual gpg-agent sense. gpg-agent 
is used for asking those just because it's already there.

You can call gpg in batch mode (which probably is what Kgpg does):

gpg --batch --passphrase foo --symmetric file.txt

Note that this way everyone on the system can see the passphrase in the 
argument list. You may use something like

echo -n foo | gpg --batch --passphrase-fd 0 --symmetric file.txt

instead (where echo is a shell builtin or something else that does not 
show its arguments in the process list).


Hauke
-- 
Crypto f?r alle: http://www.openpgp-schulungen.de/fuer/unterstuetzer/
http://userbase.kde.org/Concepts/OpenPGP_Help_Spread
OpenPGP: 7D82 FB9F D25A 2CE4 5241 6C37 BF4B 8EEF 1A57 1DF5
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From lechten at wi.uni-muenster.de  Wed Oct 29 09:00:52 2014
From: lechten at wi.uni-muenster.de (Jens Lechtenboerger)
Date: Wed, 29 Oct 2014 09:00:52 +0100
Subject: gpgsm signatures fail starting with 2.1.0-beta864
Message-ID: <87tx2n8fuz.fsf@pcwi7557.uni-muenster.de>

Hi there,

I cannot sign messages with gpgsm any more.  beta834 was (and is)
still working, with beta864 and beta895 invalid signatures are
created:
--8<---------------cut here---------------start------------->8---
echo "Hi" > test.txt
gnupg-2.1.0-beta864/sm/gpgsm -o test.txt.sig --sign test.txt
gpgsm --verify test.txt.sig
--8<---------------cut here---------------end--------------->8---
gpgsm: invalid signature: Falsche Unterschrift

Note that I?ve got multiple keys, the first one is expired, one is
revoked, and one is valid.  Thus, I need to use --local-user to
create signatures (otherwise, the expired key is tried).

Also, I don?t know whether this makes a difference: My current key
is stored on a USB token, while the other ones are not.

Finally, if I sign with the expired key (with --faked-system-time),
then a valid signature is created.

With --debug-level guru, I don?t see noteworthy differences in the
failing and succeeding cases.

Thanks
Jens



From wk at gnupg.org  Wed Oct 29 13:37:50 2014
From: wk at gnupg.org (Werner Koch)
Date: Wed, 29 Oct 2014 13:37:50 +0100
Subject: gpgsm signatures fail starting with 2.1.0-beta864
In-Reply-To: <87tx2n8fuz.fsf@pcwi7557.uni-muenster.de> (Jens Lechtenboerger's
 message of "Wed, 29 Oct 2014 09:00:52 +0100")
References: <87tx2n8fuz.fsf@pcwi7557.uni-muenster.de>
Message-ID: <87sii71275.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>

On Wed, 29 Oct 2014 09:00, lechten at wi.uni-muenster.de said:

> Note that I?ve got multiple keys, the first one is expired, one is
> revoked, and one is valid.  Thus, I need to use --local-user to
> create signatures (otherwise, the expired key is tried).

I can't replicate that while also using --local-user.  The only changes
for gpgsm since beta834 are related to the key storage.  Without any log
output I can't help very much.  Please check that the correct gpg-agent
is used and not some older version - has it been started and is still
running after the test (gpg-connect-agent 'getinfo version' /bye)

> Also, I don?t know whether this makes a difference: My current key
> is stored on a USB token, while the other ones are not.

For verification the card is not used.  Are you sure that the signature
has been created properly?  I heard of problems with pcscd and
policy-kit.  Maybe you missed an error message.


Salam-Shalom,

   Werner

-- 
Die Gedanken sind frei.  Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz.



From rjh at sixdemonbag.org  Wed Oct 29 19:00:39 2014
From: rjh at sixdemonbag.org (Robert J. Hansen)
Date: Wed, 29 Oct 2014 14:00:39 -0400
Subject: key length/size RSA discussion/recommendations in the wiki
In-Reply-To: <201410291657.24769.bernhard@intevation.de>
References: <201410291657.24769.bernhard@intevation.de>
Message-ID: <54512B47.3000407@sixdemonbag.org>

> Because this gets asked quite often, I've started to capture
> some arguments of the debate how long RSAs could/should/can be
> at http://wiki.gnupg.org/LargeKeys

<puts on his FAQ maintainer hat>

I thought we largely addressed this in the FAQ, sections 11.1, 11.2,
11.3, 11.4 and 11.5.

Do we need to address it in more depth?  If so I'm happy to write an
extension to the FAQ.

<takes off his FAQ maintainer hat>

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From peter at digitalbrains.com  Wed Oct 29 19:19:44 2014
From: peter at digitalbrains.com (Peter Lebbing)
Date: Wed, 29 Oct 2014 19:19:44 +0100
Subject: key length/size RSA discussion/recommendations in the wiki
In-Reply-To: <54512B47.3000407@sixdemonbag.org>
References: <201410291657.24769.bernhard@intevation.de>
 <54512B47.3000407@sixdemonbag.org>
Message-ID: <54512FC0.8000102@digitalbrains.com>

Why is brute force even mentioned in something about RSA? You couldn't
brute-force a 128 bit RSA key. I'd say 2048 bit quite covers it 8-)

Peter.

-- 
I use the GNU Privacy Guard (GnuPG) in combination with Enigmail.
You can send me encrypted mail if you want some privacy.
My key is available at <http://digitalbrains.com/2012/openpgp-key-peter>


From rjh at sixdemonbag.org  Wed Oct 29 19:44:59 2014
From: rjh at sixdemonbag.org (Robert J. Hansen)
Date: Wed, 29 Oct 2014 14:44:59 -0400
Subject: key length/size RSA discussion/recommendations in the wiki
In-Reply-To: <54512FC0.8000102@digitalbrains.com>
References: <201410291657.24769.bernhard@intevation.de>
 <54512B47.3000407@sixdemonbag.org> <54512FC0.8000102@digitalbrains.com>
Message-ID: <545135AB.7070504@sixdemonbag.org>

> Why is brute force even mentioned in something about RSA? You 
> couldn't brute-force a 128 bit RSA key. I'd say 2048 bit quite
> covers it 8-)

Sure you can.  To brute-force a 128-bit RSA key would require you to
check every prime number between two and 10**19.  There are in the
neighborhood of ten quadrillion of them.  You could break a 128-bit RSA
key for under $100 of computation on an Amazon cloud instance.



From vedaal at nym.hush.com  Wed Oct 29 21:49:07 2014
From: vedaal at nym.hush.com (vedaal at nym.hush.com)
Date: Wed, 29 Oct 2014 16:49:07 -0400
Subject: key length/size RSA discussion/recommendations in the wiki
In-Reply-To: <545135AB.7070504@sixdemonbag.org>
References: <201410291657.24769.bernhard@intevation.de>
 <54512B47.3000407@sixdemonbag.org> <54512FC0.8000102@digitalbrains.com>
 <545135AB.7070504@sixdemonbag.org> 
Message-ID: <20141029204907.EACE1609B3@smtp.hushmail.com>



On 10/29/2014 at 3:22 PM, "Robert J. Hansen" <rjh at sixdemonbag.org> wrote:
>
>> Why is brute force even mentioned in something about RSA? You 
>> couldn't brute-force a 128 bit RSA key. I'd say 2048 bit quite
>> covers it 8-)

-----

Surely Peter knows this too ;-)

More likely 128 was a typo for the more common older RSA key of 1028 ...


vedaal



From peter at digitalbrains.com  Wed Oct 29 22:18:13 2014
From: peter at digitalbrains.com (Peter Lebbing)
Date: Wed, 29 Oct 2014 22:18:13 +0100
Subject: key length/size RSA discussion/recommendations in the wiki
Message-ID: <4b9eaab17b1dcb012e71a2b714806ea1@butters.digitalbrains.com>

On 2014-10-29 21:49, vedaal at nym.hush.com wrote:
> Surely Peter knows this too ;-)
>
> More likely 128 was a typo for the more common older RSA key of 1028 
> ...

No, I'm using a strict definition of brute force.

For p = 2^63 to 2^64-1
   For q = 2^63 to 2^64-1
     If p * q == n:
       Break
   Next
Next

You're free to adapt the order of tries of p and q, though.

Happy breaking!

I don't feel the method outlined by Rob is still brute force. That 
brute actually is using his brain. Possibly his brain resembles a sieve, 
but still :). Am I too strict?

Peter.

PS: I'm assuming a 128-bit RSA key is made up of two 64-bit primes.

-- 
I use the GNU Privacy Guard (GnuPG) in combination with Enigmail.
You can send me encrypted mail if you want some privacy.
My key is available at 
<http://digitalbrains.com/2012/openpgp-key-peter>


From rjh at sixdemonbag.org  Wed Oct 29 22:23:51 2014
From: rjh at sixdemonbag.org (Robert J. Hansen)
Date: Wed, 29 Oct 2014 17:23:51 -0400
Subject: key length/size RSA discussion/recommendations in the wiki
In-Reply-To: <20141029204907.EACE1609B3@smtp.hushmail.com>
References: <201410291657.24769.bernhard@intevation.de>
 <54512B47.3000407@sixdemonbag.org> <54512FC0.8000102@digitalbrains.com>
 <545135AB.7070504@sixdemonbag.org>
 <20141029204907.EACE1609B3@smtp.hushmail.com>
Message-ID: <54515AE7.3030004@sixdemonbag.org>

> More likely 128 was a typo for the more common older RSA key of 1028 
> ...

Either-or.  RSA-1024's dangerously close to being brute-forceable, too.
We've already brute-forced RSA-768 and we're closing in on RSA-890.  I
haven't looked into how well the general number field sieve
parallelizes, but I wouldn't want to take bets on how long RSA-1024
could stand up to a massive Amazon Cloud instance.



From rjh at sixdemonbag.org  Wed Oct 29 22:30:56 2014
From: rjh at sixdemonbag.org (Robert J. Hansen)
Date: Wed, 29 Oct 2014 17:30:56 -0400
Subject: key length/size RSA discussion/recommendations in the wiki
In-Reply-To: <4b9eaab17b1dcb012e71a2b714806ea1@butters.digitalbrains.com>
References: <4b9eaab17b1dcb012e71a2b714806ea1@butters.digitalbrains.com>
Message-ID: <54515C90.7080409@sixdemonbag.org>

> No, I'm using a strict definition of brute force.

Technically, brute force is testing every *possible* value... not values
that you know aren't going to work.  Why test those?

If you're trying to factorize 2701, for instance, you can feel free to
skip dividing by 2 (doesn't end in an even number), 3 (sum of the digits
isn't divisible modulo three), 4 (already know it's not divisible by 2),
5 (doesn't end in a 5 or a 0), 6 (not divisible by 3 or by 2), etc.

If your brute-forcer is testing values that cannot possibly be correct,
then you're using an inefficient brute-forcer.  Get a better one.  :)

> I don't feel the method outlined by Rob is still brute force. That
> brute actually is using his brain. Possibly his brain resembles a
> sieve, but still :). Am I too strict?

Depends.  I think so.  But if you're taking an exam sometime in the near
future, I think you should answer this however your professor wants.  :)


From peter at digitalbrains.com  Wed Oct 29 22:46:02 2014
From: peter at digitalbrains.com (Peter Lebbing)
Date: Wed, 29 Oct 2014 22:46:02 +0100
Subject: key length/size RSA discussion/recommendations in the wiki
In-Reply-To: <54515C90.7080409@sixdemonbag.org>
References: <4b9eaab17b1dcb012e71a2b714806ea1@butters.digitalbrains.com>
 <54515C90.7080409@sixdemonbag.org>
Message-ID: <c3636db2520bef5f7a2c8c3eae70fe3b@butters.digitalbrains.com>

On 2014-10-29 22:30, Robert J. Hansen wrote:
> Technically, brute force is testing every *possible* value... not 
> values
> that you know aren't going to work.  Why test those?

Well, why not restrict ourselves to primes whose product equal the 
modulus? I could solve any key in constant time that way. The 
distinction obviously(?) is in the cost of computing what makes a 
"possible". But that's the thing about brute force that I thought was 
not included: using computation to speed up your process, and using 
insight into the mathematical properties of an algorithm.

But you are obviously more in touch with the material than me. If you 
refer to just testing primes as brute force, I don't think it should be 
so easily dismissed as I initially did.

Peter.

-- 
I use the GNU Privacy Guard (GnuPG) in combination with Enigmail.
You can send me encrypted mail if you want some privacy.
My key is available at 
<http://digitalbrains.com/2012/openpgp-key-peter>


From florin at andrei.myip.org  Wed Oct 29 22:29:07 2014
From: florin at andrei.myip.org (Florin Andrei)
Date: Wed, 29 Oct 2014 14:29:07 -0700
Subject: changing the user PIN for a smartcard in a script
Message-ID: <54515C23.6080709@andrei.myip.org>

I'm programming the smartcards on a bunch of YubiKey NEO tokens. Before 
I give the token to the user, I would like to allow them to pick a new 
user PIN and set it. I don't need to know their PIN and I actually don't 
*want* to know it.

Ideally, I would run a script, have the user type in the new PIN, and 
the script would run "gpg --change-pin", do another thing with the PIN 
string after that, then discard it.

The problem, of course, is that pinentry is launched. Now the user has 
to type the PIN several times. It's cumbersome and error-prone.

I've learned how to disable the pinentry GUI...

export PINENTRY_USER_DATA="USE_CURSES=1"

...but that's not much better. I tried to write an Expect script with 
autoexpect, but curses makes a mess of the Expect code.

I don't want to send the PIN to the clipboard and retrieve it with 
CTRL-V, as that's not a good place for it to be, even temporarily.

Any ideas?

-- 
Florin Andrei
http://florin.myip.org/


From kloecker at kde.org  Thu Oct 30 00:38:24 2014
From: kloecker at kde.org (Ingo =?ISO-8859-1?Q?Kl=F6cker?=)
Date: Thu, 30 Oct 2014 00:38:24 +0100
Subject: key length/size RSA discussion/recommendations in the wiki
In-Reply-To: <4b9eaab17b1dcb012e71a2b714806ea1@butters.digitalbrains.com>
References: <4b9eaab17b1dcb012e71a2b714806ea1@butters.digitalbrains.com>
Message-ID: <3466270.x3V649KVVI@thufir.ingo-kloecker.de>

On Wednesday 29 October 2014 22:18:13 Peter Lebbing wrote:
> On 2014-10-29 21:49, vedaal at nym.hush.com wrote:
> > Surely Peter knows this too ;-)
> > 
> > More likely 128 was a typo for the more common older RSA key of 1028
> > ...
> 
> No, I'm using a strict definition of brute force.
> 
> For p = 2^63 to 2^64-1
>    For q = 2^63 to 2^64-1
>      If p * q == n:
>        Break
>    Next
> Next

If anything then I'd do

For p = 2^63 to 2^64-1
   If n modulo p == 0:
      Break
Next
q = n / p

which is O(n^(1/2)), but IMO still brute force (even in your strict 
definition), while yours is O((n^(1/2)^2) = O(n). "brute force" doesn't 
mean that you have to use the most na?ve algorithm.


> I don't feel the method outlined by Rob is still brute force. That
> brute actually is using his brain. Possibly his brain resembles a
> sieve, but still :). Am I too strict?

Actually, that brute doesn't seem to be using his brain. If he'd use his 
brain then he'd use he fists to brute force the secret out of you. ;-p


Regards,
Ingo
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From tzornik at gmail.com  Thu Oct 30 23:14:12 2014
From: tzornik at gmail.com (Cpp)
Date: Thu, 30 Oct 2014 23:14:12 +0100
Subject: Is gpg-agent passphrase status query possible?
Message-ID: <CAHeB2A=O1PRPMCQ-N9jGRPCms-Jm9u8gjYuhs_Ey9cB_tvogSQ@mail.gmail.com>

Hey!

I use gpg to store my password-protected private key(s) and some
public keys, but there is also gpg-agent daemon that is used to act as
a backend (key and password manager) to certain applications. I have
configured this agent to remember the secret key passphrase for 15
minutes and then forget it. If the passphrase has been entered
recently, the provided encrypted files will automatically decrypt. If
not then either the command line will prompt me for a passphrase or
the gtk pinentry will pop up. Is there a way to "query" gpg-agent to
see whether a correct passphrase has been recently entered for a
particular secret key, and has not yet been forgotten?

Basically I use Thunderbird with Enigmail to manage encrypted email,
and I find it extremely annoying when each and every time the pinintry
pops up when I accidentally click an encrypted email. Since I use a
long passphrase I find it a nuisance to have to either type it in or
close the pinentry window each time. So was hoping there is a "query"
feature in gpg-agent that an application like enigmail can use to see,
if a particular secret key is unlocked (and it must not trigger any
prompts/popups like gtk-pinentry).

Currently enigmail attempts to automatically decrypt each and every
encrypted email upon opening it regardless of whether a secret key has
been unlocked or not. There's an option to disable this automatic
decryption, but that forces the user to manually decrypt every email,
which is again an annoyance. I was hoping to see a behavior where the
emails are only automatically decrypted, if the correct secret key is
currently unlocked in gpg-agent, else nothing happens (no pinentry
popups!). The user must click the "decrypt" button, enter the key
once, and all emails decrypt so long as the secret key remains
unlocked in gpg-agent.

Thanks


From mailinglisten at hauke-laging.de  Fri Oct 31 00:33:13 2014
From: mailinglisten at hauke-laging.de (Hauke Laging)
Date: Fri, 31 Oct 2014 00:33:13 +0100
Subject: Is gpg-agent passphrase status query possible?
In-Reply-To: <CAHeB2A=O1PRPMCQ-N9jGRPCms-Jm9u8gjYuhs_Ey9cB_tvogSQ@mail.gmail.com>
References: <CAHeB2A=O1PRPMCQ-N9jGRPCms-Jm9u8gjYuhs_Ey9cB_tvogSQ@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <4198882.cFGGfkuuU6@inno>

Am Do 30.10.2014, 23:14:12 schrieb Cpp:

> Is there a way to "query" gpg-agent to
> see whether a correct passphrase has been recently entered for a
> particular secret key, and has not yet been forgotten?

Yes and no.

There is an easy way to find out whether a certain passphrase (make sure 
to distinguish between mainkey and subkeys!) is currently known to gpg-
agent:

: gpg-connect-agent "GET_PASSPHRASE --data --no-ask 
4F7E9F723D197D667842AE115F048E6F0E4B4494 t1 t2 t3" /bye
D fubar
OK

But that doesn't tell you for how long gpg-agent will cache it yet. It 
may be that the passphrase has just been deleted from the cache even if 
you use the key immediately afterwards.


If you know for sure for how long the entries are cached then you may 
write a small "daemon" which checks for the passphrases every few 
seconds. Then it knows with reasonable precision when a passphrase was 
added to the cache and can calculate when it will be dropped.


Hauke
-- 
Crypto f?r alle: http://www.openpgp-schulungen.de/fuer/unterstuetzer/
http://userbase.kde.org/Concepts/OpenPGP_Help_Spread
OpenPGP: 7D82 FB9F D25A 2CE4 5241 6C37 BF4B 8EEF 1A57 1DF5
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From ml at sudhirkhanger.com  Fri Oct 31 06:51:46 2014
From: ml at sudhirkhanger.com (Sudhir Khanger)
Date: Fri, 31 Oct 2014 11:21:46 +0530
Subject: Is gpg-agent passphrase status query possible?
In-Reply-To: <4198882.cFGGfkuuU6@inno>
References: <CAHeB2A=O1PRPMCQ-N9jGRPCms-Jm9u8gjYuhs_Ey9cB_tvogSQ@mail.gmail.com>
 <4198882.cFGGfkuuU6@inno>
Message-ID: <1647525.IfFxH7xqWu@fedora>

On Friday, October 31, 2014 12:33:13 AM Hauke Laging wrote:
> gpg-connect-agent "GET_PASSPHRASE --data --no-ask 
> 4F7E9F723D197D667842AE115F048E6F0E4B4494 t1 t2 t3" /bye
> D fubar
> OK

It prints the GPG passphrase in plain text. Is the password cached in plain 
text?

-- 
Regards,
Sudhir Khanger,
sudhirkhanger.com,
github.com/donniezazen,
5577 8CDB A059 085D 1D60  807F 8C00 45D9 F5EF C394.
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From wk at gnupg.org  Fri Oct 31 08:48:35 2014
From: wk at gnupg.org (Werner Koch)
Date: Fri, 31 Oct 2014 08:48:35 +0100
Subject: Is gpg-agent passphrase status query possible?
In-Reply-To: <1647525.IfFxH7xqWu@fedora> (Sudhir Khanger's message of "Fri, 31
 Oct 2014 11:21:46 +0530")
References: <CAHeB2A=O1PRPMCQ-N9jGRPCms-Jm9u8gjYuhs_Ey9cB_tvogSQ@mail.gmail.com>
 <4198882.cFGGfkuuU6@inno> <1647525.IfFxH7xqWu@fedora>
Message-ID: <8761f0y90s.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>

On Fri, 31 Oct 2014 06:51, ml at sudhirkhanger.com said:

> It prints the GPG passphrase in plain text. Is the password cached in plain 
> text?

Catch-22. How would you protect the key used to decrypt the cache?

Actually the content of the passphrase cache is stored encrypted in RAM
but the key for that is stored in RAM too:

/* The encryption context.  This is the only place where the
   encryption key for all cached entries is available.  It would be nice
   to keep this (or just the key) in some hardware device, for example
   a TPM.  Libgcrypt could be extended to provide such a service.
   With the current scheme it is easy to retrieve the cached entries
   if access to Libgcrypt's memory is available.  The encryption
   merely avoids grepping for clear texts in the memory.  Nevertheless
   the encryption provides the necessary infrastructure to make it
   more secure.  */



Salam-Shalom,

   Werner

-- 
Die Gedanken sind frei.  Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz.



From lechten at wi.uni-muenster.de  Fri Oct 31 12:19:11 2014
From: lechten at wi.uni-muenster.de (Jens Lechtenboerger)
Date: Fri, 31 Oct 2014 12:19:11 +0100
Subject: gpgsm signatures fail starting with 2.1.0-beta864
References: <87tx2n8fuz.fsf@pcwi7557.uni-muenster.de>
 <87sii71275.fsf__37624.1719969132$1414586668$gmane$org@vigenere.g10code.de>
Message-ID: <87fve4pjv4.fsf@pcwi7557.uni-muenster.de>

On 2014-10-29, Werner Koch wrote:

> The only changes for gpgsm since beta834 are related to the key
> storage.  Without any log output I can't help very much.  Please
> check that the correct gpg-agent is used and not some older
> version - has it been started and is still running after the test
> (gpg-connect-agent 'getinfo version' /bye)

Indeed, I?ve got an older gpg-agent running as well.
If I run beta834, it uses the old agent, and verifiable signatures
are created.  Newer betas, however, start their own gpg-agent, and
incorrect signatures are created.  (En- and decryption work,
though.)

For card access I?m using gnupg-pkcs11-scd.

Which logfiles would help?  On list or via personal e-mail?

Thanks
Jens



From pete at heypete.com  Fri Oct 31 14:14:41 2014
From: pete at heypete.com (Pete Stephenson)
Date: Fri, 31 Oct 2014 14:14:41 +0100
Subject: [Announce] The maybe final Beta for GnuPG 2.1
In-Reply-To: <87sij5cjav.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
References: <87sij5cjav.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
Message-ID: <CA+4dSw5uaMjrUybCy8c8Gy0LG7YTpT5nrBOJNzd2YKYF+7HaBw@mail.gmail.com>

On Fri, Oct 3, 2014 at 4:35 PM, Werner Koch <wk at gnupg.org> wrote:
> Hello!
>
> I just released another *beta* version of GnuPG *2.1*.  It has been
> released to give you the opportunity to check out new features and to
> help fixing bugs.

Hi all,

I had a few minor issues/questions with GnuPG 2.1 beta895 that I
thought would be good to report/ask here:

1. Default key prefs[1] don't seem to permit encrypting+signing a
message to a brainpoolP512r1 key. Evidently that curve requires SHA512
only for signatures, and all other algorithms will fail. Since SHA256
and SHA384 are prioritized over SHA512 by default in the key prefs, an
error occurs.

Here's an excerpt of the terminal output, where AF25682B is a primary
test key using brainpoolP512r1 while D74B165F is a test encryption
subkey using the same curve:

=====
pete at kaylee:~/gpg/gnupg-2.1.0-beta895/PLAY/inst/bin$ ./gpg2 --homedir
~/gnupg/ --encrypt --armor --sign -r AF25682B
gpg: NOTE: THIS IS A DEVELOPMENT VERSION!
gpg: It is only intended for test purposes and should NOT be
gpg: used in a production environment or with production keys!
Hello world!
gpg: ECDSA key D74B165F requires a 512 bit or larger hash (hash is SHA256)
gpg: checking created signature failed: General error
gpg: signing failed: General error
-----BEGIN PGP MESSAGE-----
Version: GnuPG v2

hL4DWouX3RbM7L4SBAMEbW91unR/0/0QZ9fxeeIo9StkO2c90E9RQT9Cxy4yM7pI
dz3siYcAgzEtohdCcpy8BWCPRscqyUcD9iX/QDcxpj3CGG3RHJWdq8ezXVg2m460
ONeb1SnkQGxKsU7oDOo5lu6qQ+pAsvEqhKooyBxlIXPu/qqrtkx3DTvmCudld+Aw
od3AWiOPPQOSAzkRDSfk12/FhrWsZUz/q7mq0W/DlYem+B0OvOD+n1dcPDuAJAXR
gpg: [stdin]: sign+encrypt failed: General error
=====

Is it normal/desired for 512-bit curves to only work with SHA512? If
so, shouldn't a newly-minted key have default prefs appropriate for
that key so it will work as expected?

If a 512-bit digest is required for a 512-bit ECC key, shouldn't the
signing system know that and be able to override the key prefs that
might specify a non-512-bit digest?

Similarly, brainpoolP512r1 curves seem unable to make a signature
using digest algorithms other than SHA512. For example, if a
brainpoolP512r1 key is encrypting+signing a message to another key
with the default prefs, it uses SHA512. Is this intended?

Signing/clearsigning a message with a brainpoolP512r1 curve also uses
SHA512, even if one tries to override it. In this example, I try to
override it by using SHA1 instead of SHA512:

pete at kaylee:~/gpg/gnupg-2.1.0-beta895/PLAY/inst/bin$ ./gpg2 --homedir
~/gnupg/ --armor --clearsign -u AF25682B --personal-digest-preferences
SHA1
gpg: NOTE: THIS IS A DEVELOPMENT VERSION!
gpg: It is only intended for test purposes and should NOT be
gpg: used in a production environment or with production keys!
Test.
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA512

Test.
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: GnuPG v2

iJ4EARMKAAYFAlRTekYACgkQRgJQM68laCuoDwH+KNKsSm01h6lJ659FDEGDoorM
/TpWvaVyVbvRa4+8Xya6+c73jt6jSDAeJZMEFBBQYIx3tJy7T6eowYgx3P2eUAIA
gvlSuuFVLqiV2Iujd0oa46PEnZZnxIz8Di6vUWqDq/WhhASDuQiidqc1zQ2VexP8
ET23riihBSBDTdTTR8Dp2Q==
=sUNG
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

2. While Curve25519-based keys can be used for signing using Ed25519,
there doesn't seem to be any way to use Curve25519 for encryption.
While one could use non-Curve25519 subkeys for encryption, that seems
a little sub-optimal. I assume this is known already and will be
resolved prior to the production release.

3. Curve25519 has a security level of 128-bits. In addition to the
Brainpool curves, are there any plans to add other curves with higher
security levels like Curve41417 (>200-bits)? I ask simply because
having various components (e.g. the symmetric, asymmetric, and hash
algorithms) at similar security levels is logical: it wouldn't make
sense to, for example, use 1024-bit RSA with SHA512 due to the wide
difference in security levels, but using a 3072-bit RSA key with
SHA256 would be logical.

4. Are there any plans to add user-specified arbitrary curves in
addition to "baked-in" curves like the NIST, Brainpool, and Curve25519
curves? I realize that using arbitrary curves is something that is not
for the faint of heart, but having options is nice.

5. Why are so many key-generating options hidden behind the
"--full-gen-key" flag? The regular "--gen-key" flag makes a 2048-bit
RSA key, which is fine. I understand hiding the ECC options, as
support is not widespread, but why hide "traditional" algorithms like
DSA/ELG?

Cheers!
-Pete

[1] Cipher: AES256, AES192, AES, 3DES
     Digest: SHA256, SHA384, SHA512, SHA224, SHA1
     Compression: ZLIB, ZIP, Uncompressed
     Features: MDC, Keyserver no-modify

-- 
Pete Stephenson


From wk at gnupg.org  Fri Oct 31 14:34:14 2014
From: wk at gnupg.org (Werner Koch)
Date: Fri, 31 Oct 2014 14:34:14 +0100
Subject: gpgsm signatures fail starting with 2.1.0-beta864
In-Reply-To: <87fve4pjv4.fsf@pcwi7557.uni-muenster.de> (Jens Lechtenboerger's
 message of "Fri, 31 Oct 2014 12:19:11 +0100")
References: <87tx2n8fuz.fsf@pcwi7557.uni-muenster.de>
 <87sii71275.fsf__37624.1719969132$1414586668$gmane$org@vigenere.g10code.de>
 <87fve4pjv4.fsf@pcwi7557.uni-muenster.de>
Message-ID: <87a94cweg9.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>

On Fri, 31 Oct 2014 12:19, lechten at wi.uni-muenster.de said:

> Indeed, I?ve got an older gpg-agent running as well.

Don't do that.

> For card access I?m using gnupg-pkcs11-scd.

Well, scdaemon is part of GnuPG.  If you replace it with something else
it might quite well happen that the systems breaks.


Shalom-Salam,

   Werner

-- 
Die Gedanken sind frei.  Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz.



From bernhard at intevation.de  Fri Oct 31 15:19:22 2014
From: bernhard at intevation.de (Bernhard Reiter)
Date: Fri, 31 Oct 2014 15:19:22 +0100
Subject: key length/size RSA discussion/recommendations in the wiki
In-Reply-To: <54512B47.3000407@sixdemonbag.org>
References: <201410291657.24769.bernhard@intevation.de>
 <54512B47.3000407@sixdemonbag.org>
Message-ID: <201410311519.28469.bernhard@intevation.de>

Robert,

On Wednesday 29 October 2014 at 19:00:39, Robert J. Hansen wrote:
> > Because this gets asked quite often, I've started to capture
> > some arguments of the debate how long RSAs could/should/can be
> > at http://wiki.gnupg.org/LargeKeys

> I thought we largely addressed this in the FAQ, sections 11.1, 11.2,
> 11.3, 11.4 and 11.5.
>
> Do we need to address it in more depth?  

yes, I think that the recurring debate demands that the arguments
are made visible so they can be tested by readers.
You can see in the referred Debian issue tracker, that Werner has to repeat 
his arguments over and over again, there is not good place to refer to the 
chain of arguments.

> If so I'm happy to write an extension to the FAQ.

From my point of view the wiki enables us to catch the debate and more in 
depth. And arguments with its sources. Also it can show the discussion of  
discenting views point. For example the FAQ does not cover the details of the 
support for larger keys like 8 KiB or 16 KiB.

In my view this would be too much for an FAQ, which should be brief and more 
official and thus more stable.

Best Regards,
Bernhard

-- 
www.intevation.de/~bernhard (CEO)    www.fsfe.org (Founding GA Member)
Intevation GmbH, Osnabr?ck, Germany; Amtsgericht Osnabr?ck, HRB 18998
Owned and run by Frank Koormann, Bernhard Reiter, Dr. Jan-Oliver Wagner
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From bernhard at intevation.de  Fri Oct 31 15:23:17 2014
From: bernhard at intevation.de (Bernhard Reiter)
Date: Fri, 31 Oct 2014 15:23:17 +0100
Subject: changing the user PIN for a smartcard in a script
In-Reply-To: <54515C23.6080709@andrei.myip.org>
References: <54515C23.6080709@andrei.myip.org>
Message-ID: <201410311523.19078.bernhard@intevation.de>

On Wednesday 29 October 2014 at 22:29:07, Florin Andrei wrote:
> Ideally, I would run a script, have the user type in the new PIN, and
> the script would run "gpg --change-pin", do another thing with the PIN
> string after that, then discard it.
>
> The problem, of course, is that pinentry is launched. Now the user has
> to type the PIN several times. It's cumbersome and error-prone.

The idea of pinentry is that there is a most direct connection between
the user and the gpg-agent, holding the secret key. It does not want to let 
other software do "another thing" with the PIN string. ;)

And then, of course, if a user is to set a new pin, he or she should be able 
to easily type it in correctly a second time. >:)

You could develop your own pinentry application.

Note that pinentry-0.9 in some variants can do the two entries in one dialog.

Best,
Bernhard

-- 
www.intevation.de/~bernhard (CEO)    www.fsfe.org (Founding GA Member)
Intevation GmbH, Osnabr?ck, Germany; Amtsgericht Osnabr?ck, HRB 18998
Owned and run by Frank Koormann, Bernhard Reiter, Dr. Jan-Oliver Wagner
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From rjh at sixdemonbag.org  Fri Oct 31 18:29:21 2014
From: rjh at sixdemonbag.org (Robert J. Hansen)
Date: Fri, 31 Oct 2014 13:29:21 -0400
Subject: key length/size RSA discussion/recommendations in the wiki
In-Reply-To: <201410311519.28469.bernhard@intevation.de>
References: <201410291657.24769.bernhard@intevation.de>
 <54512B47.3000407@sixdemonbag.org>
 <201410311519.28469.bernhard@intevation.de>
Message-ID: <5453C6F1.8080208@sixdemonbag.org>

> yes, I think that the recurring debate demands that the arguments
> are made visible so they can be tested by readers.

The FAQ is discussed in public and changes are submitted to the
community for comment and review before I make any changes.  So far, no
one on the list has raised a serious objection to the content -- some
have said, "I don't agree but I'm in the minority," but no one has said,
"I don't think the community is behind this."

> You can see in the referred Debian issue tracker, that Werner has to repeat 
> his arguments over and over again, there is not good place to refer to the 
> chain of arguments.

The people who are most up in arms over this aren't going to be
convinced by a chain of arguments.  Holy wars are driven by articles of
faith ("vi is superior to emacs!"), not by reason. [*]

I agree that the FAQ is a bad place to present a chain of arguments and
the wiki is the natural spot for it.  My concern is that the FAQ and the
wiki need to be kept in sync somehow, and I'm not going to be watching
the wiki constantly to make sure we're giving consistent advice.

My other concern is the false air of authority that wikis tend to get.
When anyone can edit, wikis periodically wind up saying ... anything.
If people are looking for a curated line of reasoning from
cryptographers and/or cryptographic engineers, that may not be a good
candidate for a wiki.

All this said, though: how can I help?



[*] emacs is *so* superior to vi, incidentally.  I don't know how any
right-thinking person could think otherwise.  Heathens.  They probably
eat pork, too.

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From ravikumar.SubramaniaRao at netapp.com  Fri Oct 31 18:31:53 2014
From: ravikumar.SubramaniaRao at netapp.com (SubramaniaRao, ravikumar)
Date: Fri, 31 Oct 2014 17:31:53 +0000
Subject: Help needed to setup Passphrase with GNUPG 2.0.26
Message-ID: <91f10d387d4b4d25b8432dfb870e111e@hioexcmbx04-prd.hq.netapp.com>

Hello GNUPG Users,

Help needed to setup Passphrase with GNUPG 2.0.26.

We have installed the following.

(a)     libgpg-error-1.11
(b)     libgcrypt-1.4.0
(c)     libassuan-2.1.2
(d)     libksba-1.3.1
(e)     pth-2.0.7
(f)     GNUPG 2.0.26.

Then (1) % echo $PATH
/u/ravikums/bin/bin.sun4:/u/ravikums/bin:/usr/openwin/bin/xview:/usr/openwin/bin:/usr/dt/bin:/netapp/bin:/netapp/gnu/bin:/usr/software/bin:/usr/software/utils/bin:/usr/software/rats/bin:/usr/software/test/bin:/usr/local:/usr/local/bin:/usr/ucb:/bin:/usr/bin:/usr/etc:/usr/games:/usr/lib/uucp:/etc:/usr/lib:/usr/sccs/bin:/usr/local/X11/sun4/bin:/usr/bin/X11:/r/frame/bin:/usr/sbin:/sbin:/opt/lotus/bin:/u/ravikums/notes:.:/usr/openwin/bin:/usr/openwin/bin/xview
        (2) echo $LD_LIBRARY_PATH
/usr/openwin/lib:/usr/local/X11R5/sun4c/lib:/netapp/gnu/lib:/usr/openwin/lib:/opt/lotus/common/lel/r100/sunspa41:/usr/local/X11R5/sun4c/lib:/usr/local/lib:/usr/lib

After  that we are invoking the Command "gpg2 --gen-key-The Screen Shot is pasted below: The issue is, after entering the Passphrase it stays there forever.



Cheers,
S. Ravi Kumar

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From dkg at fifthhorseman.net  Fri Oct 31 22:04:53 2014
From: dkg at fifthhorseman.net (Daniel Kahn Gillmor)
Date: Fri, 31 Oct 2014 17:04:53 -0400
Subject: Help needed to setup Passphrase with GNUPG 2.0.26
In-Reply-To: <91f10d387d4b4d25b8432dfb870e111e@hioexcmbx04-prd.hq.netapp.com>
References: <91f10d387d4b4d25b8432dfb870e111e@hioexcmbx04-prd.hq.netapp.com>
Message-ID: <5453F975.7040205@fifthhorseman.net>

On 10/31/2014 01:31 PM, SubramaniaRao, ravikumar wrote:
> Hello GNUPG Users,
> 
> Help needed to setup Passphrase with GNUPG 2.0.26.
> 
> We have installed the following.
> 
> (a)     libgpg-error-1.11
> (b)     libgcrypt-1.4.0
> (c)     libassuan-2.1.2
> (d)     libksba-1.3.1
> (e)     pth-2.0.7
> (f)     GNUPG 2.0.26.
> 
> Then (1) % echo $PATH
> /u/ravikums/bin/bin.sun4:/u/ravikums/bin:/usr/openwin/bin/xview:/usr/openwin/bin:/usr/dt/bin:/netapp/bin:/netapp/gnu/bin:/usr/software/bin:/usr/software/utils/bin:/usr/software/rats/bin:/usr/software/test/bin:/usr/local:/usr/local/bin:/usr/ucb:/bin:/usr/bin:/usr/etc:/usr/games:/usr/lib/uucp:/etc:/usr/lib:/usr/sccs/bin:/usr/local/X11/sun4/bin:/usr/bin/X11:/r/frame/bin:/usr/sbin:/sbin:/opt/lotus/bin:/u/ravikums/notes:.:/usr/openwin/bin:/usr/openwin/bin/xview
>         (2) echo $LD_LIBRARY_PATH
> /usr/openwin/lib:/usr/local/X11R5/sun4c/lib:/netapp/gnu/lib:/usr/openwin/lib:/opt/lotus/common/lel/r100/sunspa41:/usr/local/X11R5/sun4c/lib:/usr/local/lib:/usr/lib
> 
> After  that we are invoking the Command "gpg2 --gen-key-The Screen Shot is pasted below: The issue is, after entering the Passphrase it stays there forever.

your screenshot suggests that you're doing all of this on some remote
machine via ssh (it looks like you're using putty on windows).  You
haven't mentioned what operating system you're using, though.

Anyway, gpg might want to use pinentry to gather the passphrase from the
user, and it's not clear that you have the right environment set up for
pinentry.

whatever package manager you have, can you install pinentry-curses and
try again?

	--dkg

PS "Excellence is not an Adjective but a Verb" -- it's actually a noun :)

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From rjh at sixdemonbag.org  Fri Oct 31 22:28:26 2014
From: rjh at sixdemonbag.org (Robert J. Hansen)
Date: Fri, 31 Oct 2014 17:28:26 -0400
Subject: Help needed to setup Passphrase with GNUPG 2.0.26
In-Reply-To: <5453F975.7040205@fifthhorseman.net>
References: <91f10d387d4b4d25b8432dfb870e111e@hioexcmbx04-prd.hq.netapp.com>
 <5453F975.7040205@fifthhorseman.net>
Message-ID: <5453FEFA.1090904@sixdemonbag.org>

> Anyway, gpg might want to use pinentry to gather the passphrase from the
> user, and it's not clear that you have the right environment set up for
> pinentry.

One option would be to install GnuPG 1.4 on the host machine -- headless
servers are some of the few uses I can still see for it.


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From ravikumar.SubramaniaRao at netapp.com  Fri Oct 31 22:35:53 2014
From: ravikumar.SubramaniaRao at netapp.com (SubramaniaRao, ravikumar)
Date: Fri, 31 Oct 2014 21:35:53 +0000
Subject: Help needed to setup Passphrase with GNUPG 2.0.26
In-Reply-To: <5453F975.7040205@fifthhorseman.net>
References: <91f10d387d4b4d25b8432dfb870e111e@hioexcmbx04-prd.hq.netapp.com>
 <5453F975.7040205@fifthhorseman.net>
Message-ID: <0218bea455a342bd8f170a4151718169@hioexcmbx04-prd.hq.netapp.com>

Daniel Kahn Gillmor,

Thank you for your reply. Yes after sending the Mail to you, I installed the Pinentry v0.8.4. But it gives the error " No package 'QtCore' found. We are using Sun Solaris 10.

P.S: The Emphasis is, once you have reached Excellence, do not stop. I was just created the Passphrase with the Famous Phrase ?Excellence is not an Adjective but a Verb?, so that I can remember it..

Cheers,
S. Ravi Kumar

-----Original Message-----
From: Daniel Kahn Gillmor [mailto:dkg at fifthhorseman.net]
Sent: Friday, October 31, 2014 2:05 PM
To: SubramaniaRao, ravikumar; gnupg-users at gnupg.org; Custodio, Gina
Subject: Re: Help needed to setup Passphrase with GNUPG 2.0.26

On 10/31/2014 01:31 PM, SubramaniaRao, ravikumar wrote:
> Hello GNUPG Users,
>
> Help needed to setup Passphrase with GNUPG 2.0.26.
>
> We have installed the following.
>
> (a)     libgpg-error-1.11
> (b)     libgcrypt-1.4.0
> (c)     libassuan-2.1.2
> (d)     libksba-1.3.1
> (e)     pth-2.0.7
> (f)     GNUPG 2.0.26.
>
> Then (1) % echo $PATH
> /u/ravikums/bin/bin.sun4:/u/ravikums/bin:/usr/openwin/bin/xview:/usr/openwin/bin:/usr/dt/bin:/netapp/bin:/netapp/gnu/bin:/usr/software/bin:/usr/software/utils/bin:/usr/software/rats/bin:/usr/software/test/bin:/usr/local:/usr/local/bin:/usr/ucb:/bin:/usr/bin:/usr/etc:/usr/games:/usr/lib/uucp:/etc:/usr/lib:/usr/sccs/bin:/usr/local/X11/sun4/bin:/usr/bin/X11:/r/frame/bin:/usr/sbin:/sbin:/opt/lotus/bin:/u/ravikums/notes:.:/usr/openwin/bin:/usr/openwin/bin/xview
>         (2) echo $LD_LIBRARY_PATH
> /usr/openwin/lib:/usr/local/X11R5/sun4c/lib:/netapp/gnu/lib:/usr/openw
> in/lib:/opt/lotus/common/lel/r100/sunspa41:/usr/local/X11R5/sun4c/lib:
> /usr/local/lib:/usr/lib
>
> After  that we are invoking the Command "gpg2 --gen-key-The Screen Shot is pasted below: The issue is, after entering the Passphrase it stays there forever.

your screenshot suggests that you're doing all of this on some remote machine via ssh (it looks like you're using putty on windows).  You haven't mentioned what operating system you're using, though.

Anyway, gpg might want to use pinentry to gather the passphrase from the user, and it's not clear that you have the right environment set up for pinentry.

whatever package manager you have, can you install pinentry-curses and try again?

        --dkg

PS "Excellence is not an Adjective but a Verb" -- it's actually a noun :)


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From ravikumar.SubramaniaRao at netapp.com  Fri Oct 31 23:10:29 2014
From: ravikumar.SubramaniaRao at netapp.com (SubramaniaRao, ravikumar)
Date: Fri, 31 Oct 2014 22:10:29 +0000
Subject: Help needed to setup Passphrase with GNUPG 2.0.26
References: <91f10d387d4b4d25b8432dfb870e111e@hioexcmbx04-prd.hq.netapp.com>
 <5453F975.7040205@fifthhorseman.net> 
Message-ID: <6088cc41b8114f6284eab1cf50a640e9@hioexcmbx04-prd.hq.netapp.com>

Daniel Kahn Gillmor,

Further I would like to give the output below when I ran ./configure
Perhaps you should add the directory containing `QtCore.pc'
to the PKG_CONFIG_PATH environment variable
No package 'QtCore' found
no
configure: creating ./config.status
config.status: creating assuan/Makefile
config.status: creating secmem/Makefile
config.status: creating pinentry/Makefile
config.status: creating curses/Makefile
config.status: creating tty/Makefile
config.status: creating gtk/Makefile
config.status: creating gtk+-2/Makefile
config.status: creating qt/Makefile
config.status: creating qt4/Makefile
config.status: creating w32/Makefile
config.status: creating doc/Makefile
config.status: creating Makefile
config.status: creating config.h
config.status: executing depfiles commands
configure:

        Pinentry v0.8.4 has been configured as follows:

        Revision:  f610ea6  (62992)
        Platform:  sparc-sun-solaris2.10

        Curses Pinentry ..: yes
        TTY Pinentry .....: maybe
        GTK+ Pinentry ....: yes
        GTK+-2 Pinentry ..: yes
        Qt Pinentry ......: no
        Qt4 Pinentry .....: no
        W32 Pinentry .....: no

        Fallback to Curses: yes

        Default Pinentry .: pinentry-gtk-2
------------------
ngztruapp02-dev# find / -name QtCore.pc -print
find: cycle detected for /apps/dtrusaas/.snapshot/hourly.2014-10-31_0803/home/infauser/informatica9.1/source/ODBC6.1/help/userguide/wwhdata/common/
find: cycle detected for /apps/dtrusaas/.snapshot/hourly.2014-10-31_0803/home/infauser/informatica9.1/source/ODBC6.1/help/userguide/wwhdata/js/search/pairs/
find: cannot read dir /u/custodi: Permission denied

Please help us to resolve the issue.

Cheers,
S. Ravi Kumar

_____________________________________________
From: SubramaniaRao, ravikumar
Sent: Friday, October 31, 2014 2:36 PM
To: 'Daniel Kahn Gillmor'; gnupg-users at gnupg.org; Custodio, Gina
Subject: RE: Help needed to setup Passphrase with GNUPG 2.0.26


Daniel Kahn Gillmor,

Thank you for your reply. Yes after sending the Mail to you, I installed the Pinentry v0.8.4. But it gives the error " No package 'QtCore' found. We are using Sun Solaris 10.

P.S: The Emphasis is, once you have reached Excellence, do not stop. I was just created the Passphrase with the Famous Phrase ?Excellence is not an Adjective but a Verb?, so that I can remember it..

Cheers,
S. Ravi Kumar

-----Original Message-----
From: Daniel Kahn Gillmor [mailto:dkg at fifthhorseman.net]
Sent: Friday, October 31, 2014 2:05 PM
To: SubramaniaRao, ravikumar; gnupg-users at gnupg.org<mailto:gnupg-users at gnupg.org>; Custodio, Gina
Subject: Re: Help needed to setup Passphrase with GNUPG 2.0.26

On 10/31/2014 01:31 PM, SubramaniaRao, ravikumar wrote:
> Hello GNUPG Users,
>
> Help needed to setup Passphrase with GNUPG 2.0.26.
>
> We have installed the following.
>
> (a)     libgpg-error-1.11
> (b)     libgcrypt-1.4.0
> (c)     libassuan-2.1.2
> (d)     libksba-1.3.1
> (e)     pth-2.0.7
> (f)     GNUPG 2.0.26.
>
> Then (1) % echo $PATH
> /u/ravikums/bin/bin.sun4:/u/ravikums/bin:/usr/openwin/bin/xview:/usr/openwin/bin:/usr/dt/bin:/netapp/bin:/netapp/gnu/bin:/usr/software/bin:/usr/software/utils/bin:/usr/software/rats/bin:/usr/software/test/bin:/usr/local:/usr/local/bin:/usr/ucb:/bin:/usr/bin:/usr/etc:/usr/games:/usr/lib/uucp:/etc:/usr/lib:/usr/sccs/bin:/usr/local/X11/sun4/bin:/usr/bin/X11:/r/frame/bin:/usr/sbin:/sbin:/opt/lotus/bin:/u/ravikums/notes:.:/usr/openwin/bin:/usr/openwin/bin/xview
>         (2) echo $LD_LIBRARY_PATH
> /usr/openwin/lib:/usr/local/X11R5/sun4c/lib:/netapp/gnu/lib:/usr/openw
> in/lib:/opt/lotus/common/lel/r100/sunspa41:/usr/local/X11R5/sun4c/lib:
> /usr/local/lib:/usr/lib
>
> After  that we are invoking the Command "gpg2 --gen-key-The Screen Shot is pasted below: The issue is, after entering the Passphrase it stays there forever.

your screenshot suggests that you're doing all of this on some remote machine via ssh (it looks like you're using putty on windows).  You haven't mentioned what operating system you're using, though.

Anyway, gpg might want to use pinentry to gather the passphrase from the user, and it's not clear that you have the right environment set up for pinentry.

whatever package manager you have, can you install pinentry-curses and try again?

        --dkg

PS "Excellence is not an Adjective but a Verb" -- it's actually a noun :)


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