GPG's vulnerability to quantum cryptography
The Fuzzy Whirlpool Thunderstorm
whirlpool at blinkenshell.org
Mon Jul 7 10:21:41 CEST 2014
On Sun, Jul 06, 2014 at 07:35:05PM +0200, gnupg-users-request at gnupg.org wrote:
> On 06-07-2014 9:36, The Fuzzy Whirlpool Thunderstorm wrote:
>
> > Using GPG encryption is still good, although it's vulnerable to quantum
> > cryptodecryption.
> > It's a good idea to set an expiration for each of your GPG key.
> > So that, when the expiration time comes, you'll be able to generate a
> > new GPG key to address a possibility of your old keys being cracked.
>
> I don't see the relation between these two. You don't know when quantum
> computers who can break > 1024 RSA will be a reality so when should you
> set the expiration date? And you can always revoke a key if something
> like this happens, no need for expiration dates there either.
>
> Since I don't know when I will consider a key compromised or weak, I
> don't work with expiry dates but revoke the key in such a case.
>
This is also a good practice. Revoking a key which is suspected to be
compromised seems a good gpg practice. Because we don't know when
quantum computing will be ready to use. Maybe 50 years later, or maybe
10 years later? Just find out how Intel is shrinking miroprocessor die
size every year.
Quantum computing is still long way to go. For now, as long as we stick
to good gpg practice, no need to worry of compromised keys.
> > GPG is not perfect. It's just pretty good as the name suggest.
> > At least, it'll be able to protect your secured data for the rest of
> > your life or for the time specified at the expiration date.
>
> If a key expires data will not be automatically decrypted. Nor will it
> become unusable.
I know that when the expiration time comes, the data will not be
automatically decrypted.
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