4096 bit keys

[Jerome Baum]

Jonathan Ely <thajsta at gmail.com> writes:

> I really wish 8192 would become available. Not that it would be the end
> all/be all of key security but according to your theory it sounds much
> more difficult to crack.

Take that  a few steps further. Why  not use 99999999999999999999999-bit
keys? Because they are much more difficult to compute. In fact if you go
above a certain key size, since  IIRC the exponent e is standardized and
thus limited, your discrete logarithm  is no longer discrete and so your
key security just vanishes.

In any  case, 4096 bits will  be secure for  some time to come,  and yes
8192 bits would be even more secure.  We can take that as far as we wish
but  there are  limits in  the standard,  in compatibility,  and  in the
current implementation.

-- 
PGP: A0E4 B2D4 94E6 20EE 85BA E45B 63E4 2BD8 C58C 753A
PGP: 2C23 EBFF DF1A 840D 2351 F5F5 F25B A03F 2152 36DA
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