Rebuilding the private key from signatures

[Aaron Toponce]

I generated my key back in 2004, and I've been a very vocal and active
supporter of GnuPG, encrypting communications, and digitally signing
mail. However, I was in a discussion with a friend, and the topic came
up that it is theoretically possible to rebuild your private key if
someone had access to all your signed mail. We debated the size of
signatures and mail that would need to be collected for this to be
probable.

Is it?

What is the likelihood that an attacker could rebuild a private key from
a collections of signed mail, and would it depend on the hash used in
the algorithm?

-- 
. o .   o . o   . . o   o . .   . o .
. . o   . o o   o . o   . o o   . . o
o o o   . o .   . o o   o o .   o o o
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