keyserver spam

[gnupg at lists.grepular.com]

On 17/12/11 13:40, Jerome Baum wrote:

>> The system can be easily abused, therefore it will be abused. It's just
>> a matter of time. How much time, depends on if/when PGP becomes more
>> popular. It doesn't strike me as unreasonable to want to put defences in
>> place before an attack begins.
> 
> Just like you shouldn't write blatantly inefficient code. But there's
> also a point after which we call this premature optimization. Ditto for
> putting up security measures for a problem that may well never become one.

So you agree that there is a point where putting security measures in
place is a good idea. Where you disagree with me, is you think it is
unlikely that the keyservers will be abused in this manner in the near
future.

I guess neither of us can see into the future, but the prevalence of
this sort of abuse on the Internet, always places me on the side of caution.

> I would be very happy to see this become a problem in fact. It would
> imply that OpenPGP is popular enough to attract script kiddies & co.

It would only take one troll.

-- 
Mike Cardwell https://grepular.com/  https://twitter.com/mickeyc
Professional  http://cardwellit.com/ http://linkedin.com/in/mikecardwell
PGP.mit.edu   0018461F/35BC AF1D 3AA2 1F84 3DC3 B0CF 70A5 F512 0018 461F

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