multiple subkeys and key transition

[Avi]

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I believe our very own Rob discusses that here:
<http://sixdemonbag.org/cryptofaq.xhtml#entropy>

- --Avi
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Comment: Most recent key: Click show in box @ http://is.gd/4xJrs

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User:Avraham

pub 3072D/F80E29F9 1/30/2009 Avi (Wikimedia-related key) <avi.wiki at gmail.com
>
   Primary key fingerprint: 167C 063F 7981 A1F6 71EC  ABAA 0D62 B019 F80E
29F9


From: Faramir <faramir.cl at gmail.com>
> To: "gnupg-users at gnupg.org" <gnupg-users at gnupg.org>
> Date: Thu, 09 Dec 2010 23:21:20 -0300
> Subject: Re: multiple subkeys and key transition
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> El 09-12-2010 16:17, Robert J. Hansen escribió:
> ...
> > It is unlikely it ever will.  3K RSA keys are believed to be equivalent
> > to a 128-bit symmetric key.  If computational power ever develops to
> > that point, the solution is going to involve moving to entirely
> > different algorithms instead of just tacking on another couple of bits.
>
>  I might be wrong, but I remember Bruce Schneier used thermodynamic to
> show it is not feasible to brute-force a 256 bits key, because the
> energy required to do it would be too much (like all the energy
> generated by the sun for several years, or something like that), even
> considering the computer used is fast enough, and doesn't lose energy as
> heat. It was somewhere in "Applied Cryptography, 2nd Ed." (search by
> "Thermodynamic Limitations" title). But of course, a flaw in AES would
> be a very different problem.
>
>
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