multiple subkeys and key transition

[Ben McGinnes]

On 10/12/10 10:57 AM, Robert J. Hansen wrote:
> On 12/9/2010 6:49 PM, Ben McGinnes wrote:
>> Just to clarify, does this mean that SHA-256 or 512 (or whatever)
>> truncated to 160-bits prevent the potential collision attacks that
>> might be able to be launched against SHA-1?
> 
> Correct.  Truncating a hash does not introduce any flaws in the
> algorithm.  If you truncate a bad hash, you now have a truncated bad
> hash.  Truncate a good hash and you have a truncated good hash.  :)

Excellent.  Thanks.


Regards,
Ben

-------------- next part --------------
A non-text attachment was scrubbed...
Name: signature.asc
Type: application/pgp-signature
Size: 227 bytes
Desc: OpenPGP digital signature
URL: </pipermail/attachments/20101210/be9ec613/attachment.pgp>