Modified user ids and key servers and a possible security risk?

[Hauke Laging]

Am Donnerstag 26 August 2010 01:45:07 schrieb Chris Knadle:

> There's a problem with this idea, which is that there's no opportunity to
> notify the client that there was a problem if the check is done /later/. 

That's not a problem. You cannot require a server to make this decision 
immediately. The server can tell you that this decision is postponed and for 
how long it well be at most. The client can decide then to make a query at 
that time or later to check if the requested update has been made.

This way the information what kind the error was of is lost, though. But if 
you like to make it more complicated then the keyserver could log failed 
updates and their check result so in case of error (no update visible to the 
client after the given check period) the client would upload the same data 
again and then the server could respond with the error information without 
causing CPU load.


Hauke
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