Adding a nounce before hashing as covert channel (Re: phasing out SHA1 for digest creation)

[Bernhard Reiter]

Am Samstag 07 Dezember 2024 15:35:09 schrieb Andrew Gallagher via Gnupg-devel:
> there are already countless places in the wire format that an adversary
> could use for a covert channel,

It still may not be wise to add another place.
There can be unwanted side effects of adding a nonce
(is what I understand from the example).

> and I’m not aware of any implementation 
> (including gnupg) that attempts to close these channels, perhaps because
> doing so would be a rich source of interop failures. It would be
> counterproductive for an adversary to introduce salted signatures for this
> purpose, as doing so would only draw attention for little further benefit.

Which we only know if we fully understand all side effects.
Not saying that this is done deliberately.

Regards,
Bernhard


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