From jason.franklin at quoininc.com Wed Nov 20 21:17:11 2019 From: jason.franklin at quoininc.com (Franklin, Jason) Date: Wed, 20 Nov 2019 15:17:11 -0500 Subject: Question about status codes passed to "scd-event" Message-ID: <4d588ed6-6c37-511b-5e30-1ada0adddd2d@quoininc.com> Greetings, I am trying to use the "scd-event" script to lock the user session when a YubiKey is removed. My script seems to work most of the time, but there are some odd edge cases that creep in. For example, if the user removes the key after login but before answering the pinentry prompt, the screen will lock when the pinentry prompt is answered, but not before. I think this may have something to do with only checking for the NOCARD status and not for any particular value of the previous status. Where can I find more information on the status codes that are passed to the "scd-event" script? -- Jason Franklin -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: signature.asc Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 659 bytes Desc: OpenPGP digital signature URL: From jason.franklin at quoininc.com Wed Nov 20 21:19:56 2019 From: jason.franklin at quoininc.com (Franklin, Jason) Date: Wed, 20 Nov 2019 15:19:56 -0500 Subject: Question about avoiding "pinentry" prompt after login Message-ID: <8a8fa79b-df45-ef8e-00ee-94cadd00bdbf@quoininc.com> Greetings, I currently use libpam-poldi to manage authentication on my workstation. My login passphrase is thus the same as my GnuPG key passphrase. After I log in, I'm always prompted with the "pinentry" dialog to re-enter my key passphrase so that my password manager can decrypt my network password. Is there any preferred or accepted way to have the login process pass the key passphrase to gpg-agent so that I don't have to answer the pinentry prompt every time I log in? -- Jason Franklin -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: signature.asc Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 659 bytes Desc: OpenPGP digital signature URL: From wk at gnupg.org Mon Nov 25 22:07:36 2019 From: wk at gnupg.org (Werner Koch) Date: Mon, 25 Nov 2019 22:07:36 +0100 Subject: [Announce] GnuPG 2.2.18 released Message-ID: <87sgmbacmf.fsf@wheatstone.g10code.de> Hello! We are pleased to announce the availability of a new GnuPG release: version 2.2.18. This is maintenance release to fix a couple of minor bugs and provide a few feature updates. This release also retires the use of SHA-1 key signatures created since this year. See below for a list of changes. About GnuPG =========== The GNU Privacy Guard (GnuPG, GPG) is a complete and free implementation of the OpenPGP and S/MIME standards. GnuPG allows to encrypt and sign data and communication, features a versatile key management system as well as access modules for public key directories. GnuPG itself is a command line tool with features for easy integration with other applications. The separate library GPGME provides a uniform API to use the GnuPG engine by software written in common programming languages. A wealth of frontend applications and libraries making use of GnuPG are available. As an universal crypto engine GnuPG provides support for S/MIME and Secure Shell in addition to OpenPGP. GnuPG is Free Software (meaning that it respects your freedom). It can be freely used, modified and distributed under the terms of the GNU General Public License. Noteworthy changes in version 2.2.18 ==================================== * gpg: Changed the way keys are detected on a smartcards; this allows the use of non-OpenPGP cards. In the case of a not very likely regression the new option --use-only-openpgp-card is available. [#4681] * gpg: The commands --full-gen-key and --quick-gen-key now allow direct key generation from supported cards. [#4681] * gpg: Prepare against chosen-prefix SHA-1 collisions in key signatures. This change removes all SHA-1 based key signature newer than 2019-01-19 from the web-of-trust. Note that this includes all key signature created with dsa1024 keys. The new option --allow-weak-key-signatues can be used to override the new and safer behaviour. [#4755,CVE-2019-14855] * gpg: Improve performance for import of large keyblocks. [#4592] * gpg: Implement a keybox compression run. [#4644] * gpg: Show warnings from dirmngr about redirect and certificate problems (details require --verbose as usual). * gpg: Allow to pass the empty string for the passphrase if the '--passphase=' syntax is used. [#4633] * gpg: Fix printing of the KDF object attributes. * gpg: Avoid surprises with --locate-external-key and certain --auto-key-locate settings. [#4662] * gpg: Improve selection of best matching key. [#4713] * gpg: Delete key binding signature when deletring a subkey. [#4665,#4457] * gpg: Fix a potential loss of key sigantures during import with self-sigs-only active. [#4628] * gpg: Silence "marked as ultimately trusted" diagnostics if option --quiet is used. [#4634] * gpg: Silence some diagnostics during in key listsing even with option --verbose. [#4627] * gpg, gpgsm: Change parsing of agent's pkdecrypt results. [#4652] * gpgsm: Support AES-256 keys. * gpgsm: Fix a bug in triggering a keybox compression run if --faked-system-time is used. * dirmngr: System CA certificates are no longer used for the SKS pool if GNUTLS instead of NTBTLS is used as TLS library. [#4594] * dirmngr: On Windows detect usability of IPv4 and IPv6 interfaces to avoid long timeouts. [#4165] * scd: Fix BWI value for APDU level transfers to make Gemalto Ezio Shield and Trustica Cryptoucan work. [#4654,#4566] * wkd: gpg-wks-client --install-key now installs the required policy file. Release-info: https://dev.gnupg.org/T4684 Getting the Software ==================== Please follow the instructions found at or read on: GnuPG 2.2.18 may be downloaded from one of the GnuPG mirror sites or direct from its primary FTP server. The list of mirrors can be found at . Note that GnuPG is not available at ftp.gnu.org. The GnuPG source code compressed using BZIP2 and its OpenPGP signature are available here: https://gnupg.org/ftp/gcrypt/gnupg/gnupg-2.2.18.tar.bz2 (6582k) https://gnupg.org/ftp/gcrypt/gnupg/gnupg-2.2.18.tar.bz2.sig An installer for Windows without any graphical frontend except for a very minimal Pinentry tool is available here: https://gnupg.org/ftp/gcrypt/binary/gnupg-w32-2.2.18_20191125.exe (4139k) https://gnupg.org/ftp/gcrypt/binary/gnupg-w32-2.2.18_20191125.exe.sig The source used to build the Windows installer can be found in the same directory with a ".tar.xz" suffix. A new version of Gpg4win including this version of GnuPG will be released in a few days. Checking the Integrity ====================== In order to check that the version of GnuPG which you are going to install is an original and unmodified one, you can do it in one of the following ways: * If you already have a version of GnuPG installed, you can simply verify the supplied signature. For example to verify the signature of the file gnupg-2.2.18.tar.bz2 you would use this command: gpg --verify gnupg-2.2.18.tar.bz2.sig gnupg-2.2.18.tar.bz2 This checks whether the signature file matches the source file. You should see a message indicating that the signature is good and made by one or more of the release signing keys. Make sure that this is a valid key, either by matching the shown fingerprint against a trustworthy list of valid release signing keys or by checking that the key has been signed by trustworthy other keys. See the end of this mail for information on the signing keys. * If you are not able to use an existing version of GnuPG, you have to verify the SHA-1 checksum. On Unix systems the command to do this is either "sha1sum" or "shasum". Assuming you downloaded the file gnupg-2.2.18.tar.bz2, you run the command like this: sha1sum gnupg-2.2.18.tar.bz2 and check that the output matches the next line: 2f95d6aa409f666c61c1526641fd609f1a50c4c4 gnupg-2.2.18.tar.bz2 e77d823abb64202aa9fe7d651f3ba03d9358669c gnupg-w32-2.2.18_20191125.tar.xz 62c369400da1ee0de7b0275ecd0bcc969805b9da gnupg-w32-2.2.18_20191125.exe Internationalization ==================== This version of GnuPG has support for 26 languages with Chinese (traditional and simplified), Czech, French, German, Japanese, Norwegian, Polish, Russian, and Ukrainian being almost completely translated. Documentation and Support ========================= If you used GnuPG in the past you should read the description of changes and new features at doc/whats-new-in-2.1.txt or online at https://gnupg.org/faq/whats-new-in-2.1.html The file gnupg.info has the complete reference manual of the system. Separate man pages are included as well but they miss some of the details available only in thee manual. The manual is also available online at https://gnupg.org/documentation/manuals/gnupg/ or can be downloaded as PDF at https://gnupg.org/documentation/manuals/gnupg.pdf . You may also want to search the GnuPG mailing list archives or ask on the gnupg-users mailing list for advise on how to solve problems. Most of the new features are around for several years and thus enough public experience is available. https://wiki.gnupg.org has user contributed information around GnuPG and relate software. In case of build problems specific to this release please first check https://dev.gnupg.org/T4684 for updated information. Please consult the archive of the gnupg-users mailing list before reporting a bug: . We suggest to send bug reports for a new release to this list in favor of filing a bug at . If you need commercial support visit or . If you are a developer and you need a certain feature for your project, please do not hesitate to bring it to the gnupg-devel mailing list for discussion. Thanks ====== Maintenance and development of GnuPG is mostly financed by donations. The GnuPG project currently employs two full-time developers and one contractor. They all work exclusively on GnuPG and closely related software like Libgcrypt, GPGME and Gpg4win. We have to thank all the people who helped the GnuPG project, be it testing, coding, translating, suggesting, auditing, administering the servers, spreading the word, and answering questions on the mailing lists. Many thanks to our numerous financial supporters, both corporate and individuals. Without you it would not be possible to keep GnuPG in a good shape and to address all the small and larger requests made by our users. Thanks. Happy hacking, Your GnuPG hackers p.s. This is an announcement only mailing list. Please send replies only to the gnupg-users'at'gnupg.org mailing list. p.p.s List of Release Signing Keys: To guarantee that a downloaded GnuPG version has not been tampered by malicious entities we provide signature files for all tarballs and binary versions. The keys are also signed by the long term keys of their respective owners. Current releases are signed by one or more of these four keys: rsa2048 2011-01-12 [expires: 2019-12-31] Key fingerprint = D869 2123 C406 5DEA 5E0F 3AB5 249B 39D2 4F25 E3B6 Werner Koch (dist sig) rsa2048 2014-10-29 [expires: 2019-12-31] Key fingerprint = 46CC 7308 65BB 5C78 EBAB ADCF 0437 6F3E E085 6959 David Shaw (GnuPG Release Signing Key) rsa2048 2014-10-29 [expires: 2020-10-30] Key fingerprint = 031E C253 6E58 0D8E A286 A9F2 2071 B08A 33BD 3F06 NIIBE Yutaka (GnuPG Release Key) rsa3072 2017-03-17 [expires: 2027-03-15] Key fingerprint = 5B80 C575 4298 F0CB 55D8 ED6A BCEF 7E29 4B09 2E28 Andre Heinecke (Release Signing Key) The keys are available at and in any recently released GnuPG tarball in the file g10/distsigkey.gpg . Note that this mail has been signed by a different key. -- Die Gedanken sind frei. Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz. -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: signature.asc Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 227 bytes Desc: not available URL: -------------- next part -------------- _______________________________________________ Gnupg-announce mailing list Gnupg-announce at gnupg.org http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-announce From ilf at zeromail.org Sat Nov 30 08:00:27 2019 From: ilf at zeromail.org (ilf) Date: Sat, 30 Nov 2019 08:00:27 +0100 Subject: [Announce] GnuPG 2.2.18 released In-Reply-To: <87sgmbacmf.fsf@wheatstone.g10code.de> References: <87sgmbacmf.fsf@wheatstone.g10code.de> Message-ID: <20191130070027.GA3555115@zeromail.org> Thanks for the new release. I run "gpg --check-trustdb --quiet" via cron, but now on every run it outputs: > gpg: Note: third-party key signatures using the SHA1 algorithm > are rejected man gpg(1) sais: > -q, --quiet > Try to be as quiet as possible. IMHO, gpg should not output that line when used with --quiet. Best Werner Koch via Gnupg-devel: > This release also retires the use of SHA-1 key signatures created > since this year. > * gpg: Prepare against chosen-prefix SHA-1 collisions in key > signatures. This change removes all SHA-1 based key signature > newer than 2019-01-19 from the web-of-trust. Note that this > includes all key signature created with dsa1024 keys. The new > option --allow-weak-key-signatues can be used to override the new > and safer behaviour. [#4755,CVE-2019-14855] -- ilf If you upload your address book to "the cloud", I don't want to be in it.