[PATCH] doc: Note pinentry-mode for passphrase opts

[Ben McGinnes]

On Thu, Jan 11, 2018 at 08:54:14AM -0500, Daniel Kahn Gillmor wrote:
> On Thu 2018-01-11 09:51:02 +1100, Ben McGinnes wrote:
> 
> thanks to Ben and Neal for the feedback, i'm now tracking the
> problem in a local toolchain -- I can confirm that i have at least
> one set of tools that does verify andre's signature correctly.  I
> can follow up on list here if folks are interested once i've got a
> proper diagnosis.

I am a little curious, just in case it's the sort of thing which might
crop up in diagnosing other things.

>> because I haven't signed or trusted Andre's key, but other than that
>> it seemed fine.
> 
> (nitpick: you should never need to "trust" Andre's key to verify
> signatures from it!  i think you just mean that neither you nor
> anyone that you trust has directly certified Andre's key)

Correct.

One of the other problems with living on Tatooine (Australia) is that,
to paraphrase, "if there's a brightest centre of civilisation, I'm on
the continent that's farthest from it."

So there's a (practical) limit to the extent of direct keysigning
which can occur following a face-to-face or other trusted and verified
out of band confirmation of identity and key control.


Regards,
Ben
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