using alternate sources of entropy

[Peter Todd]

On Fri, May 10, 2013 at 09:28:55AM +0200, Werner Koch wrote:
> On Tue,  7 May 2013 21:24, pete at petertodd.org said:
> 
> > If you add the accelerometer data to /dev/random yourself and keep track
> > of how many bits of randomness you've added the hack could be to just
> 
> You are not able to track this because you can't have an estimation on
> many bytes other processes are reading from /dev/{u,}random.

I'm assuming that provided a sufficient number of bits whose values are
unknown to any adversary are added to the pool all subsequent
/dev/urandom output is suitable for use as key material.

-- 
'peter'[:-1]@petertodd.org
000000000000013908ef667dbb075ed27da28870ecb3d6bee5c538ec0ff88e67
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