[Announce] Second release candidate for 1.4.3 available
David Shaw
dshaw at jabberwocky.com
Fri Mar 10 01:36:05 CET 2006
We are pleased to announce the availability of the second release
candidate for the forthcoming 1.4.3 version of GnuPG:
ftp://ftp.gnupg.org/gcrypt/alpha/gnupg/gnupg-1.4.3rc2.tar.bz2 (3.0M)
ftp://ftp.gnupg.org/gcrypt/alpha/gnupg/gnupg-1.4.3rc2.tar.bz2.sig
SHA-1 checksums for the above files are:
eb5b839555ff1957b5956aaf4c96505223a2f9d0 gnupg-1.4.3rc2.tar.bz2
2168b475f49100f5c41fa3830d90eb6d863220e7 gnupg-1.4.3rc2.tar.bz2.sig
Note that this is only a release candidate, and as such is not
intended for use on production systems. If you are inclined to help
test, however, we would appreciate you trying this new version and
reporting any problems.
Note that this release candidate contains fixes for both the "False
positive signature verification in GnuPG" and "GnuPG does not detect
injection of unsigned data" problems reported against 1.4.2.
Noteworthy changes since 1.4.2:
* If available, cURL-based keyserver helpers are built that can
retrieve keys using HKP or any protocol that cURL supports
(HTTP, HTTPS, FTP, FTPS, etc). If cURL is not available, HKP
and HTTP are still supported using a built-in cURL emulator. To
force building the old pre-cURL keyserver helpers, use the
configure option --enable-old-keyserver-helpers. Note that none
of this affects finger or LDAP support, which are unchanged.
Note also that a future version of GnuPG will remove the old
keyserver helpers altogether.
* Implemented Public Key Association (PKA) signature verification.
This uses special DNS records and notation data to associate a
mail address with an OpenPGP key to prove that mail coming from
that address is legitimate without the need for a full trust
path to the signing key.
* When exporting subkeys, those specified with a key ID or
fingerpint and the '!' suffix are now merged into one keyblock.
* Added "gpg-zip", a program to create encrypted archives that can
interoperate with PGP Zip.
* Added support for signing subkey cross-certification "back
signatures". Requiring cross-certification to be present is
currently off by default, but will be changed to on by default
in the future, once more keys use it. A new "cross-certify"
command in the --edit-key menu can be used to update signing
subkeys to have cross-certification.
* The key cleaning options for --import-options and
--export-options have been further polished. "import-clean" and
"export-clean" replace the older
import-clean-sigs/import-clean-uids and
export-clean-sigs/export-clean-uids option pairs.
* New "minimize" command in the --edit-key menu removes everything
that can be removed from a key, rendering it as small as
possible. There are corresponding "export-minimal" and
"import-minimal" commands for --export-options and
--import-options.
* New --fetch-keys command to retrieve keys by specifying a URI.
This allows direct key retrieval from a web page or other
location that can be specified in a URI. Available protocols
are HTTP and finger, plus anything that cURL supplies, if built
with cURL support.
* Files containing several signed messages are not allowed any
longer as there is no clean way to report the status of such
files back to the caller. To partly revert to the old behaviour
the new option --allow-multisig-verification may be used.
* The keyserver helpers can now handle keys in either ASCII armor
or binary format.
* New auto-key-locate option that takes an ordered list of methods
to locate a key if it is not available at encryption time (-r or
--recipient). Possible methods include "cert" (use DNS CERT as
per RFC2538bis, "pka" (use DNS PKA), "ldap" (consult the LDAP
server for the domain in question), "keyserver" (use the
currently defined keyserver), as well as arbitrary keyserver
URIs that will be contacted for the key.
* Able to retrieve keys using DNS CERT records as per RFC-2538bis
(currently in draft): http://www.josefsson.org/rfc2538bis
Happy Hacking,
David, Timo, Werner
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